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The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 

shall  contain  the  symbol  — ^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  in  eaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

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Les  images  suivantes  ort  ixi  reproduites  avec  le 
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do  la  nettet*  de  I'exemplaire  film*,  et  en 
conformity  avec  lea  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 

Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimAa  sont  film^s  en  commenpant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
derniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  salon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  filmis  en  commenqant  par  la 
premiere  pege  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  derniire  page  qui  comports  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
derniAre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbole  — ^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE '.  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  peuvent  etre 
film^s  A  des  taux  de  reduction  diff^rents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  etre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichi,  il  est  film*  i  partir 
do  Tangle  sup^rieur  gauche,  de  gauche  ^  droite. 
•t  do  haut  en  bas.  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  n^cessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
iltustrent  la  methods. 


1 


1 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


THK  MACMII.I  \\  COMTANY 

NEW  VOIIK  •  BOSTON  •  CHICAtiO 
ATLANTA  ■   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONPON  •  BOMBAY  ■  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Lm 

TOKOMTU 


1 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS 
A  W  OULD  I'OWER 


ARCHIBALD  CAKY  COOLIDGE 

nABVARD  UNIVERSITY 


THE  MAUMILLAN  COMPANY 
1908 


All  rights  rettrttd 


PliEFACE 


No  one  c.in  hv  mnri'  conscious  tl  u  the  author  of  this 
volume  how  far  it  is  from  carrying  out  the  too  ambi- 
tious promise  of  its  title.  Its  subject  —  the  United  States 
as  a  World  Power  —  could  well  be  treated  in  many 
different  ways.  One  writor  mif^ht  rpcnunt  the  growth  of 
the  fouiitry  from  its  earliest  infancy  to  its  pn'scnt  stature; 
to  another  its  ccononiic  position  in  the  worM  to-day  nii^ht 

of  surpassing  interest  ;  a  third  might,  care  only  for  the 
spiritual  influence  of  tlio  United  Stales,  the  spread  of 
American  ideals  of  liberty,  government  and  civilization, 
and  the  changes  those  same  ideals  are  now  undergoing. 
The  scope  of  the  present  work  is  more  modest.  It  is  a 
study  of  the  part  which  the  United  States  plays  in  the 
great  drama  of  world  politics  —  a  part  w' '  h  cannot 
help  being  injportant  and  which,  although  inij  )ssiKh^  to 
pn  ihesy  about  in  detail,  yet  is  afTe(  d  })y  «  nrns  lops 
of  geography  and  of  national  i  hara  ^er,  of  i  istoi;  d  oi 
tradition,  of  economic  and  of  social  conditions  sus« .  ptible 
of  investigation. 

This  book  was  originally  prepared  in  the  forni 
tures  which  were  delivered  at  the  Sorbonne  in  t!i< 
of  l!tOt!-OT  as  the  Harvard  lectures  on  the  llydi    t.  ,i- 
tion.    Since  then  it  has  been  entirely  recast,  ))ut  it  t- 
less  still  retains  traces  of  having  been  first  addressed  i 
foreign  audience,  the  irore  so  as  1  have  striven  to  presei 
a  neutral  rather  then  a  specifically  American  attitude, 
have  not  felt  called  upon  to  offer  a  solution  to  all  tb* 


vi 


PRKFACK 


pDbloms  to  wliii'li  I  n^f«'rn'«l  or  to  volunteer  my 

ii|)iiii(Hi  cvt'iT  ilispiiti'd  ( pii'st ioii.  For  my  l.isi  i  ii;i|itt'r 
I  wish  lo  iiiiiki-  s|>i'i  ial  jifkiinu  li'il;;iiiciit,  lu  m\'  frirriil 
liiiiiis  AuIm'iI  oI"  l*;iris,  wIidsc  iiitrrt'stiii^  n  lit  \v(»rk, 
AviSricainn  et  JajionalH,  I  hiivo  found  most  luilpl'iil,  bcs'uUui 
being  roiuin<U'!<l  by  it  of  many  ploasunt  diHcuRMions  wo 
have  had  together. 

A  volume  covering  so  bronil  a  fn'M  and  one  so  <"iiI1  of 
controversial  matter  as  the  I'liittvl  States  as  jr  WoiM 
I'oNvtT,  is  expos,  il  ,it  f\cr\  point  to  ch.iri^rs  of  siipcrficiai- 
il y  ami  partisanship.  No  \h»>\\  of  liir  kind  could  satisfy 
every  one  or  [>erhaps  aiiv  one  in  all  its  details.  1  ( iin  o'd* 
ask  that  mine  may  l)e  judged  as  a  whole  rather  than 
praised  or  blamed  on  the  strength  of  detached  passages. 
As  most  of  the  facts  cited  are  well  known  or  easy 
to  look  up,  copious  reference  to  authorities  has  seemed 
needless. 

A.  C.  C. 

IlAKVMtn  Univkksity, 
May,  1908. 


CON'I'KNTS 


Imtrodcctton  ...... 

CBAPTB* 

I.  Formation  anq  Grow>' 

II.  NATiONALITT  AMD  >  ,  lOM  . 

III.  Race  Qorbtiohs  .... 

IV.  Idralh  Ano  Shibbolbtiim 

V.  Thr  Monpor  DocrRtKB 
VI.  The  Spanish  War 

VII.  The  AcqcMiTioN  op  Colonies  . 

VIII.  The  Philippine  Qcbstion  143 

IX.  Economic  Considerations  . 

X.  The  Unitrd  Statrs  and  France 

XI.  Th'  Umitrd  States  and  Germany  . 

XII.  Ti     Jnitkd  States  and  Russia 

XI  Tl.  Thi.  iJxitrd  States  and  England  . 

X7V.  The  United  States  and  Canada  . 

X  Thk  Isthmian  'janal  .      .      .      .  , 

XVI.  TiiK  Unitkd  States  and  Latin  Amsrica 

XVII.  'I'jiK  United  States  in  the  Pacific  . 

XVIII.  TiiK  United  States  and  China  . 

XIX.  The  United  States  and  Japan 

Index   


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOELD  POWEE 


INTRODUCTION 

TWENTY  years  ago  the  expression  "world  power"  was 
unknown  in  most  languages;  to-day  it  is  a  political 
commonplace,  bandied  about  in  wide  discussion.  But  the 
term  is  lacking  in  exactness.  Men  differ  as  to  its  meaning,  as 
to  the  countries  to  which  it  can  properly  be  applied,  and  as 
to  the  moment  when  it  first  becomes  applicable  to  them. 
Sometimes  it  seems  to  be  appropriately  used  of  a  country 
in  one  connection,  but  not  in  another;  and  in  a  certain 
sense  it  may  be  applied  to  nearly  all  independent  states, 
for  all  may  be  called  upon  to  maintain  their  particular  rights 
and  interests  in  any  quarter  of  the  globe,  and  all  may  take 
part  in  framing  regulations  for  the  general  welfare  of  man- 
kind. And  yet,  uncertain  as  the  limits  of  the  phrase  may 
be,  it  conveys  a  pretty  definite  conception,  —  a  conception 
that  is  of  recent  origin,  although  there  is  nothing  new  in  the 
political  sentiments  to  which  it  owes  its  birth. 

The  idea  that  one  people  should  control  the  known  world 
is  ancient  enough,  its  most  salient  expression  being  found 
in  imperial  Rome  and  '  qually  imperial  Cliina;  and  it  is  not 
extinct  even  now.  We  may  to-day  condenm  all  more  lust 
of  domination,  and  hope  that,  as  civilization  progresses,  tlie 
stronger  peoples  will  more  and  more  regard  the  weaker  ones 
as  having  rights  as  sacred  as  their  own;  but  complete 
equality  has  never  existed,  and  can  never  exist,  between 
B  1 


2 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Btatcs  of  greutly  unequal  strength.  In  pnictice  the  larger 
must  tend  to  arrange  many  matters  without  consulting 
every  wish  of  their  numerous  smaller  brethren.  The  com- 
munity of  nations  cannot  content  itself  with  anarchy  like 
that  of  the  Polish  republic,  and  submit  to  the  liberum  veto 
of  its  most  insignificant  member.  As  there  have  been  in 
th<  past,  so  there  will  always  be,  certain  leading  states 
which,  when  they  are  agreed,  will  find  some  w  ..y  of  impos- 
ing their  decisions  upon  the  rest,  and  by  their  mutual 
jealousies  will  tend  to  establish  a  balance  of  power  among 
themselves. 

Without  stopping  to  trace  the  working  of  these  principles 
in  f^arlier  days,  we  note  that,  by  the  close  of  the  fifteenth 
century,  certain  states  had  assumed  a  position  which  en- 
titles them  to  the  modern  designation  of  "great  European 
powers."  The  Holy  Roman  Empire,  still  first  in  dignity; 
France,  after  she  had  recovered  fr  a  the  Hundred  Years' 
War  and  had  broken  the  might  of  her  great  feudal  nobles; 
England,  in  the  firm  hand  of  Henry  VII ;  the  newly  formed 
kingdom  of  Spain,  which  had  finally,  ended  Moorish  rule  in 
the  peninsula,  —  all  these  held  a  position  unlike  that  of 
their  neighbors.  The  difference  between  them  and  such 
powers  as  Denmark,  the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  Venice 
was  one  of  rank  as  well  as  of  strength.  Politically  they 
were  on  another  plane :  they  were  not  merely  the  leaders, 
they  were  the  spokesmen,  the  directors,  of  the  whole 
community. 

As  time  went  on,  changes  took  place  in  their  membership. 
In  the  course  of  the  sixteenth  C(M:tury,  when  the  Empire 
became  so  dislocated  that  it  was  hardly  a  power  at  all,  its 
place  was  taken  by  Austria,  a  strangely  conglomerate  for- 
mation, which  protected  the  eastern  frontier  of  Christendom 
against  the  Turks.  Spain  was  for  a  while  a  real  world 
power,  overshadowing  all  the  others,  dominant  in  Europe, 
supreme  in  America,  and  dreaded  even  in  remote  Japan. 


INTRODUCTION 


3 


The  seventeenth  century  witnessed  the  decline  of  Spain, 
the  primacy  of  France,  and  the  temporary  rise  of  Sweden 
and  the  Netherlands ;  but  the  greatness  of  these  last  rested 
on  too  small  a  material  foundation  to  support  it  after  the 
countries  themselves  had  outlived  their  heroic  period.  The 
eifjhtoenth  century  saw  them  subside  into  relative  insig- 
nificance, and  in  their  stead  two  newcomers  step  to  the 
forefront  of  European  affairs.  The  huge  somi-Asiatic  em- 
pire of  Russia  was  now,  by  the  genius  of  Peter  the  Great, 
transformed  into  the  outward  semblance  of  a  European 
state;  and  the  little  military  kingdom  of  Prussia,  the 
representative  of  Northern  Germany,  won  for  itself  a  posi- 
tion which  its  resources  hardly  warranted,  but  which, 
thanks  to  the  extraordinary  ability  of  its  rulers  and  the 
sense  of  discipline  of  its  people,  it  succeeded  in  maintaining. 

After  the  violent  episode  of  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  Napoleonic  wars,  the  European  continent  settled  down 
to  what  seemed  to  be  a  stable  orj^anization  with  five  great 
powers,  —  Russia,  England,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  France, 
for  the  skill  of  Talleyrand  at  Vienna  prevented  France  from 
being  even  temporarily  excluded  after  her  disasters.  The 
Ottoman  Empire  was  still,  in  spite  of  Metternich,  held  to 
be  not  quite  European ;  and  the  weaker  countries  were  con- 
sulted but  little  on  general  questions.  It  was  not  the  formal 
meetings  of  all  the  representatives  of  the  nations  assembhxl 
that  decided  the  affairs  of  Europe  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
in  1811:  it  was  a  small  committee  of  the  leading  states. 
^^  hat  they,  after  much  wrangling,  agreed  upon  among  *hem- 
solves,  the  others  had  to  accept. 

This  arrangement  lasted  for  two  generations,  although 
the  relative  positions  of  the  several  states  changed  not  a 
little.  In  the  seventies,  the  German  Empire,  with  a  mighty 
Hovpinpmcnt,  inherited  the  international  place  formerly 
held  by  the  Prussian  kingdom,  and  a  new  member  was 
added  to  the  oligarchy  by  the  formation  of  United  Italy. 


4 


THE  XJNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Since  then  there  have  been  six  great  European  powers  in- 
stead of  five.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  are  equal  in 
size  and  strength:  there  is,  for  instance,  less  difference 
between  Italy,  which  is  recognized  as  a  great  power,  and 
Spain  or  the  Ottoman  Empire,  whicli  technically  is  not, 
than  between  Italy  and  Germany  or  Russia;  but  the  hne, 
however  artificial,  has  been  clearly  drawn  by  political  usage. 

In  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  new  situa- 
tion, with  a  far  widei  horizon,  gradually  attracted  the  atten- 
tion of  writers  and  statesmen.  Great  Britain,  France,  Spain, 
Portugal,  and  Holland  had  long  owned  extensive  territories 
in  many  climes;  but  the  last  three  countries  had  ceased  to 
be  of  the  first  rank.    Although  their  distant  holdings  un- 
doubtedly added  to  their  importance  in  the  world,  they  could 
not  make  up  for  their  weakness  at  home.   As  for  France, 
she  had  formerly  had  the  beginnings  of  a  magnificent  em- 
pire; but  she  had  sacrificed  it  in  the  pursuit  of  purely 
European  aims,  now  recognized  as  of  less  consequence  than 
what  she  gave  up  for  them.    Even  England,  who  during 
the  eighteenth  century  so  successfully  subordinated  her  con- 
tinental interests  to  her  colonial  ones,  had  a  moment  of 
uncertainty  after  the  loss  of  most  of  her  American  pos- 
sessions, and  for  a  time  the  theory  prevailed  in  the  mother 
country  that  her  colonies  must  eventually  fall  away  from 
her  as  ripe  fruit  falls  from  a  tree  (this  was  the  simile  usually 
employed).    Nevertheless,  the  gigantic  British  Empire  con- 
tinued to  grow  steadily,  but  as  a  result  of  natural  causes 
rather  than  of  fixed  purpose. 

Suddenly,  almost  without  warning,  tlie  nations  entered 
upon  a  wild  scramble  fr,r  land  wherever  it  was  not  strongly 
held  or  protected  by  competing  interests.  The  conquests 
of  Alexander  the  Great  or  of  the  caliphs  did  not  equal  in 
territorial  magnitude  the  changes  which  the  last  twenty 
years  have  witnessed.  The  circumstances,  the  pretexts, 
the  excuses,  have  differed  in  the  case  of  each  state  whi-.h 


INTRODUCTION 


has  taken  part  in  the  movement  of  expansion;  but  the 

fundamental  reasons  have  been  the  same.  Each  country 
has  honestly  felt  a  certain  reluctance,  and  has  been  (  mvinced 
with  truth  that  its  hand  has  been  forced  by  others;  but 
oach  li;is  also  realized  that,  unless  it  were  content  to  let 
itself  be  forestalled  by  its  rivals,  there  was  need  of  haste. 
Hence  the  frantic  hurry  with  which  many  of  the  annexations 
have  been  made.  IT"nce,  too,  the  indiscriminate  seizvc 
of  r(  gions  which  we  j  of  no  immediate  value,  but  which 
might  be  of  profit  some  day,  —  a  pracice  that  Lord 
Rosebery  has  apt Called  "pegging  out  claims  for  the 
future." 

In  England,  the  imperial  idea  of  Greater  Britain,  of 
which  Beaconsfield  was  one  of  tlie  first  practi'.'al  exponents, 
displaced  tlie  la  'sscz-faire  theories  of  the  school  of  Cobden, 
and  the  empire  was  extended  almost  from  year  to  year. 
France,  who  had  with  timid  steps  begun  agair  in  Algeria 
and  Cochin  China  the  building  up  of  a  new  colonial  domin- 
ion, now,  in  spite  v.f  popular  indifference,  not  to  say 
opposition,  rapidiy  added  to  her  store  in  Indo-China  and 
in  various  parts  of  Africa  until,  thanks  to  the  energy  of 
Julef,  Ferry  and  a  few  others,  her  colonies  surpassed  in  ex- 
tent those  which  she  had  lost  in  earlier  days.  Germany, 
becoming  aware  that,  despite  her  military  power  and  her 
inil  istrial  development,  she  held  but  a  small  spot  on  the 
surface  of  the  globe,  eagerly  began  to  clutch  at  new  lands 
wherever  there  seemed  ^  be  a  chance  of  seizing  them, 
although  Bismarck,  repre  ang  thf  ideas  of  an  older  gen- 
eration, was  never  more  than  luke  warm  in  the  cause.  Italy 
decided  that  she  also  had  need  of  colonies,  and  made  a 
beginning  on  the  African  coast.  The  King  of  the  Belgians 
acquired  for  his  subjects  a  lien  on  the  Congo  Free  State. 
Portugal,  baulked  in  part  by  the  rival  an^bitio;:  of  England, 
tried,  too  late,  to  turn  many  vague  claims  into  roal 
possessions. 


6 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Though  this  fever  of  rapid  expansion  affected  nearly  all 
the  states  of  Western  Europe,  it  was  not  confined  to  them. 
During  the  greater  p  t  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Russia 
had  been  pusliin^^  southward  into  the  regions  of  the  Caucasus 
and  Central  Asia ;  now,  wliile  preparing  for  further  progress 
in  the  same  directions,  she  turned  her  chief  attention  to  the 
extreme  east.  Long  before,  she  had  reached  the  Pacific, 
and  had  even  crossed  it  far  to  the  north ;  but  she  had  never 
had  more  than  a  sliglit  hold  on  these  distant  and  desolate 
shores.  After  the  iiiiddle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  how- 
ever, although  she  disposed  of  her  American  possessions, 
she  so  added  to  her  domain  in  eastern  Asia  as  to  establish 
her  power  there  ok  a  new  foundation;  and  a  generation 
later,  by  the  buildirg  up  of  her  fleet,  the  gradual  increase 
of  immigration  to  Siberia,  and  the  construction  of  the 
Trans-Siberian  railway,  she  had  revolutionized  her  position 
in  the  Far  East.  She  who,  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War, 
could  muster  but  a  few  hundred  soldiers  in  this  whole  part 
of  the  world,  now  became  a  r^enacing  power  in  the  Pacific, 
one  that  was  for  a  while  feared  more  than  any  other. 

At  the  same  time,  to  the  astonishment  of  all,  including 
herself,  America  suddenly  accepted  the  role  of  a  power 
holding  distant  colonies.  Already  her  extraordinary  eco- 
nomic progress  was  bringing  her  more  and  more  to  the  front ; 
but,  though  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  could  be  foreseen, 
no  one  was  prepared  for  that  of  Porto  Rico  and  the 
PhiUppines,  or  for  the  real,  if  unexpressed,  protectorate 
over  Cuba  and  Panama.  Still  greater  surprise  was  excited 
by  Japan,  who  in  her  war  with  China  in  1894  first  gave 
evidence  of  her  new  ambitions,  as  weil  as  of  her  ability  to 
realize  them,  and  in  her  conflict  with  Russia  ten  years  later 
furnished  even  inor;»  deciaiv(>  proof  of  their  remark.ahle  in- 
crease. What  will  be  their  limits  is  indeed  one  of  the 
most  important  questions  of  international  politics  at  the 
present  day. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

It  was  in  course  of  the  discusBions  provoked  by  this  suc- 
coBsion  of  startling  events  that  political  writers,  in  formulat- 
ing the  principles  of  the  new  state  of  affairs,  began  to  employ 
an  expression  which  has  now  passed  into  common  use,  — 
"world  powers";  that  is  to  say,  powers  which  are  directly 
interested  in  all  parts  of  the  world  and  whose  voices  must 
be  lioteued  to  everywhere.    The  term  is,  as  we  have  said, 
not  scientifically  exact;   for  each  of  the  so-called  world 
powers  has  spheres  in  which  its  interests  are  vitally  im- 
portant, rnd  others  in  which  they  are  comparatively  srxiall, 
if  not  inferior  to  those  of  less  powerful  states.   Thus  Russia 
can  h  irdly  claim  to  be  consult  d  much  about  South  American 
questions ;  and  the  Uniteu  States  takes  no  part  as  yet  in  a 
matter  so  strictly  European  as  the  settlenien:  of  the  affairs 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.    Nevertheless,  both  Jiu  jsia  and 
the  United  States  are  certainly  world  powers  in  the  ordinary 
acceptance  of  the  term.   China,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not, 
although  she  is  third  in  size  among  the  states  of  the  world, 
ana  has  perhaps  the  largest,  as  well  as  the  hardest-working, 
population.    However  great  her  potentialities  may  be,  her 
actual  military  strength  and  political  influence  are'  not 
yet  such  as  to  entitle  her  to  a  place  a  nong  the  arbiters 
of  mankind.    This  is  truer  still  of  Brazil  and  of  the  Argentine 
Kepublic,  which,  though  they  seem  assured  of  more  con- 
sideration son^e  day,  at  present  count  for  little  in  inter- 
national affairs.    Even  Austria  and  Italy  do  not  come  under 
the  new  category:  they  are  both  great  European  powers  in 
every  sense  of  the  term,  and  as  such  hold  a  proud  position; 
but  in  spite  of  their  armies  and  their  navies,  their  glories 
and  their  high  civilization,  they  have  little  political  in- 
fluence outside  of  their  o'vn  continent.    In  th(  ease  of 
Japan,  the  question  may  seem  more  doubtful :  and  if  we 
should  give  a  negative  answer  to-day,  we  might  have  to 
revise  t  to-morrow.    Her  prestige  is  very  great.   She  has 
just  emerged  triumphant  from  a  contest  with  an  aiversaiy 


8 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  inuiHMisc  streniJfth,  during  which  slie  hiVH  astoiiishfd  tho 
world  by  luT  I'xtruordinury  pro-^rcss  and  Iut  wimderful 
(li8i)l:iy  of  national  efficiency;  she  has  allied  herself  with 
the  British  Empire  under  conditions  which  make  it  seem 
as  if  her  aid  had  been  sought  for  the  protection  of  England's 
Indian  frontier;  and  she  is  re^'ardcd  l)y  many  as  tlireatening 
not  only  the  colonial  possessions  of  the  Tnitcd  States  in  the 
J'acific,  but  even  the  whole  western  shores  of  the  American 
continents.  Be  this  as  it  may,  since  Japan  takes  no  part 
in  t\w  affairs  of  Europe,  western  Asia,  Africa,  or  most  of 
America,  she  can  hardly  be  called  a  world  power,  thou^'h 
she  is  without  question  one  of  the  eight  great  powers  of 
the  world. 

Turning'  now  to  those  states  whose  claim  to  the  title  is 
beyond  question,  we  find  that  they  are  five  in  number,  and 
all  ruled  by  peoples  of  European  blood,  but  in  two  of 
them  the  dominant  whites  at  home  are  outnumbered  by  the 
colored  inhabitants  of  the  colonics.  Of  the  five,  Russia  is 
the  only  one  which  had  already  attained  to  something  like 
its  present  dimensions  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century. 

In  order  to  show  how  these  states  compare  with  one 
another  in  certain  fundamental  respects,  such  as  area  and 
population,  it  may  be  well  to  give  here  a  few  round  nundjers, 
and,  without  going  into  an  analysis  of  these  figures  or  a 
study  of  their  values,  to  distmguish  between  the  white 
population  and  the  colored.  Unscientific  and  misleading  as 
this  process  may  be,  it  is  in  many  ways  indispensable  for  our 
purpose;  for  without  venturing  into  the  vexed  questions  of 
the  relative  superiority  or  inferiority  of  different  races  and 
tlieir  capabilities  of  development,  we  must  recognize  that  at 
the  present  day,  at  least,  all  races  are  not  of  equal  political 
value.  A  single  Annamite  or  Sudanese  may  be  worth  more 
to  France  in  every  respect  than  a  particular  Parisian  or 
Marseillais;  but  ten  million  Frenchmen  in  France  mean 


INTRODUCTION 


9 


something  very  different  from  ten  million  French  subjects 
iu  Asia  or  Africa.    Again,  we  should  also  bear  in  mind  the 

(liircivncc  botwcon  tropical  and  non-tropical  territoric.-,. 
'I'hc  white  races  have  not  succeeih'd  in  getting  acclinuitized 
ill  the  tropics,  and,  excejjt  in  a  few  favored  spots.  th(>re  is 
no  immediate  j)i(.spect  of  their  doing  so.   Thuugli  wliite  men 
in  the  prime  of  life  can  dwell  almost  anywhere  as  officials, 
sohliors,  merchants,  or  employers  of  labor,  white  colo- 
nization on  a  large  scale  is,  in  general,  possible  in  the 
temperate  zone  only.    Innally,  Ave  must  not  forget  that  all 
the  great  empires  of  to-day  ci)ntain  large  tracts  oi  bad 
land,  either  wilderness  or  desert.    Northern  Canada  and 
noi-thern  Siberia,  central  Australia  and  central  Asia,  the 
arid  W  est  in  the  United  States  and  southwest  Africa,  are 
not  without  value, —  they  liave  their  comparatively  fertile 
districts,  and  are  in  places  rich  in  minerals,  -  but  "all  con- 
tain vast  stretches  which  add  little,  except  on  the  maf), 
to  the  importance  of  their  owners.    With  these  cousidera- 
ticnis  in  view,  let  us  look  at  the  statistics. 

Of  the  five  world  ])owers,  the  British  Empire  stands  easily 
first  in  area,  and  still  more  so  in  population,  for  in  numbers 
it  exceeds  any  two  of  its  rivals.  It  extends  over  nearly 
eleven  and  a  half  milUon  square  miles,  situated  in  every 
part  of  tlie  globe,  and  has  some  four  hundred  milUon 
inhabitants.'  Of  these,  however,  less  than  sixty  million 
are  wiiites,  of  whom  some  forty-three  and  a  half  million 
live  in  the  home  country,  most  of  the  rest  in  Canada, 
Australia,  and  South  Africa.  The  ruling  white  rar-e  is  thus 
to  the  subject  colored  race  in  the  dangerous  ratio  of  hardly 
more  than  one  to  six ;  but  the  whites  are  in  the  main 
homogeneous,  although  the  Irish,  the  French  in  Canada, 
and  the  Dutch  in  South  Africa  form  somewhat  discordant 

'  N'ot  including  Egypt  imd  the  AngU)-Egyptian  Sudan,  together  about 
l^icvpii  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  square  miles,  with  twelve  miUion 
inhabitants. 


10 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


elements.   The  colored  population,  on  the  other  hand,  is 

made  up  of  an  oihiIcss  variety  <>f  races  and  nationalities,— 
black,  yellow,  and  ail  shades  o'"  brown,  —  far  apart  from 
one  another  in  almost  every  cspect.  The  pjreat  major- 
ity of  them  live  in  the  +  'opic-.  As  the  niotlier  country 
is  by  no  means  self-supportint?  in  the  matter  of  food,  it  is 
easy  to  understand  why  Englishmen  feel  that,  although 
they  do  not  need  a  large  army,  the  possession  of  the  most 
powerful  navy  in  the  world,  one  that  will  assure  the  safety 
of  their  communications,  is  for  them  a  matter  of  life  and 
death. 

Russia  comes  next  in  size,  with  a  territory'  of  a  little  less 
than  eight  and  a  half  million  square  miles.*  In  contrast 
to  the  widely  scattered  British  empire,  the  Russian  is 
absolutely  compact,  with  no  outlying  possessions,  almost 
no  islands  of  importance,  and  nmch  general  sameness  in 
climate  and  conditions.  Of  its  one  hundred  and  fifty 
million  inhabitants,  about  one  hund.^d  and  twenty-five 
million  are  of  Aryan  or  Semitic  stock,  —  a  larger  white 
poi)ulation  than  that  of  any  other  country;  but  although 
the  whites  are  five  times  as  numerous  as  the  Asiatics,  one 
race  here  melts  into  the  other  to  an  extent  unknown  else- 
where. The  European  element,  besides  being  backward 
as  a  whole,  contains  several  discontented  nationalities, 
which,  resisting  al)sorption  into  the  general  mass,  are  in  many 
ways  a  source  of  weakness  ratlier  than  of  strength.  Even 
the  purely  Russian  element  is  divided  into  three  distinct 
branches.  Russia's  natural  increase  by  the  surplus  of 
births  over  deaths  is  more  than  two  miUion  a  year.  Her 
undeveloped  resources  at  home  are  indeed  immense;  but 
slie  is  still  poor,  and  liy  recent  events  she  lias  lost  tempo- 
rarily in  political  influence.  She  has  no  territory  in  the 
tropics. 

Third  among  world  powers  comes  Greater  France,  with 
*  lacludirig  Khiva  and  Bokhara,  but  not  northern  Manchuria. 


INTRODUCTION  H 

an  area  of  perhaps  four  and  u  half  million  squar..  miles 
and  some  ninety-five  million  inhabitants.  Ihr  tirritory' 
hko  that  of  fir.  at  Britain,  is  dispersed  over  the  world  •  but 

nion.  than  half  of  it  is  i„  a  solid,  if  irr^KuIarly  shaped,  block 
i»  n...1lu.rn  Africa,  and  h.-r  .har,.  of.  the  Sahara  alone  ac- 
counts for  about  two  million  s.iuare  miles.    The  white 
population  of  France  is  not  quite  forty  nullion,  of  which 
three-ciuarters  of  a  million  are  in  North  Africa;  the  rest 
are  in  Lurope,  and  barely  increasing  in  numbers.  The 
colored  element,  whieh  is  to  the  white  as  almost  six  to  four 
comprises  over  twenty  million  each  of  hhieks  and  Mongolians' 
hvingm  the  tropics;  tlie  rest  are  Berbers,  Arabs,  Mala^-isv' 
Hmdus,  South  Sea  Islanders,  etc.    Most  of  the  colonial 
possessions  of  France  are  recent  acquisitions,  as  yet  little 
d<  velopcd.  but  offering  a  wide  field  to  the  capital  and 
enterprise  oi  th.'  mother  country.    Of  tliem  all,  only  North 
Africa  and  New  Caledonia  are  suited  to  Furop.ean  settle- 
ment.   The  population  of  France  herself,  however  varied  in 
other  ways,  is  more  nationally  homogeneous  than  that  of 
any  of  her  world  rivals. 

The  United  States  '  is  slightly  below  France  in  territory 
and  population,  with  an  area  of   three  million,  seven 
hundred  thousand  square  miles,  and  ninety-three  million 
mhabitants.    On  the  other  hand,  it  has  a  considerabb 
larger  white  element  than  France,  -  about  seventy-five 
million.    1  he  birthrate  is  not,  as  a  rule,  very  high ;  but  the 
annual  immigration  has  now  risen  to  over  a  million  and  a 
'^^^'^  '^"'"''^'^  population,  of  some  eighteen  and  a 
»uilf  million,  IS  made  up  of  ten  million  negroes  and  mulat- 
toes,  nearly  eight  million  Filipinos,  and  the  rest  Indians, 
Japanese,  Chinese,  Hawauans,  etc.    Like  Russia,  the  United 
Mates  forms  a  compact  mass:  but  it  now  has  outlying 
dependencies,  -  Alaska  far  to  the  north,  and  n  nnmhon  .  f 
tropical  islands,    liow  much  niost  of  these  possessions  add 
'  Not  including  Cuba  and  Panama. 


12 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


to  the  real  strength  of  the  country  is,  however,  a  question 
about  which  there  h*i8  Ix-cn  iiuicli  dispute. 

^in  atcr  (Icrmaiiy,  with  only  ;i  little  over  :i  tnillion  jind  fi 
{juartcr  s(|u;in'  miles  (seureely  more  than  a  tenth  of  tlu? 
miiiiber  in  the  British  ICnipire),  stands  fur  Ih'Iow  her  rivals 
in  area;  but  her  white  population  of  more  than  sixty 
millions,  out  of  a  total  of  seventy-five,  is  superior  to  that 
of  (Ireat  Hritaiti  or  France.  These  sixty  million,  which 
include  several  nnwillinj^  elements,  are  concentrated  on  a 
small  tract  of  no'  very  fertile  territory;  for  the  Cicrnian 
cohjnial  possessions,  nearly  five  times  the  size  of  the 
home  country,  are  for  the  most  part  situated  in  the 
tropica,  and  hence,  with  the  doubtful  exception  of  South- 
west Africa,  can  never  sui)port  a  larjz;e  number  of  white 
settlers.  In  (lermany  the  annual  surplus  of  births  over 
deaths  is  n'or<  than  ei^^ht  hundred  thousand;  and  the 
emigration,  which  was  large  a  few  years  ago,  is  now,  with 
the  increasing  industrial  prosperity,  under  fifty  thousand. 
It  is  not,  then,  to  be  wondered  at,  if  the  Germans  are  not 
satisfied  with  their  present  limits.' 

Figures  like  the  above  are,  of  course,  nothinj^  l)ut  a 
slight  frainew(,'k  for  any  serious  comparison.  In  order  to 
get  a  more  precise  idea  of  the  relative  resources  of  the  five 
world  powers,  we  should  have  to  examine  many  other  facts 
about  each.  such  as  the  extent  of  soil  capable  of  culti- 
vation and  its  fc'.ility,  the  wealth  in  forest  and  minerals, 
the  climate,  the  wat<M-  power,  the  means  of  communication, 
the  acquired  wealth,  the  industrial  development,  and  many 
similar  things.    Noi  would  this  be  all ;  for  we  cannot  leave 

'  For  purposes  of  cenipuri.son.  we  may  note  that  the  present  Japanese 
Empire,  tuit  incliuliiig  soiitln'rn  Maiuliuhii,  cxtctKis  over  two  hurulre<i 
and  fifty  tliousund  scjuunj  miles  (of  which  only  a  few  thousand  are  situated 
in  the  tropics),  with  sixty-three  million  inhabitants.   Of  these,  forty- 

Liaotung  district,  and  ten  to  twelve  niilliou  aru  discontcuted  dependeata 
in  Korea. 


INTRODUCTION  13 

out  of  acc(mnt  the  moral  side,  —  the  degree  of  civilization 

of  til.'  |M-(.i.I<.  of  (lifr,.iciit  nations,  their  industry,  their 

hal.ifs  ..I  thrift,  thrir  skill,  iiitclli^rcnce,  etc.  Any  iittompt 
at  sucii  ji  coiiipaiisoii  vvoiiid  lead  us  u  lori^'  way,  and  it 
is  not  necessjiry  lor  ji  study  of  Anifrican  intormitlonal 
relations.  On  the  other  ha  d,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  note 
in  passing  the  obvious  truth  that,  although  in  the  modern 
world  r.  itain  ^;rcat  states  trnd  more  and  more  to  have  a 
dominant  position  as  comjjarcd  with  that  of  their  smaller 
brethren,  tliey  are  not  necessarily  su[)erior  to  th<-ni  in 
civilization  or  more  admirable  in  any  way.  J'roni  an 
ethical  as  well  as  from  an  {esthetic  point  '  "i(!w,  there  is 
still  much  to  ])(•  said  in  favor  of  small  co'-  ..ities. 

One  etTect   of  the  present  interna        ..  evolution  has 
l>een  to  modify  certain  lon^,'-acceptett      rinulas.    An  onj? 
these  is  the  idea  of  a  continent  as  a  group  of  states" 
each  of  which  has,  besides  historical  traditions  of  its 
own,  particular  ties  and  interests  common  to  them  all, 
but  not  shared  by  the  rest  of  numkind.    This  has  in  the 
past  heeii  more  or  less  tru(>  of  Europe,  and  as  a  sentimental 
bond  it  deserves  respect.    In  actual  politics,  however,  it  is 
becom'ng  a  mere  figure  of  speech.    Are  wc  to  regard  Im- 
perial B    ain  as  a  European  power,  when  the  greater  part 
of  her  external  interests  and  difficulties  are  connected  with 
her  situation  on  other  cor.tinents?    Are  not  the  vast  major- 
ity of  Englishmen  more  in  touch  in  every  way  with  Aus- 
tralians, Canadians,  Americans,  than  they  are  .vith  Portu- 
guese, Italians,  or  Austrians  of  one  s   t  or  another?  What 
strictly  European  interests  does  England  represent,  she 
who  is  now  joined  in  close  alliance  with  the  Asiatic  empire 
of  Japan?    Oris  Russia   European?    Although  the  ma- 
jority of  her  inhabitants  live  on  Ih-  .v,=;t-rn  side  of  the 
open  range  of  hills  we  call  the  I  ral .  nr    .    he  larger 
i-'=.  tion  of  her  territory  is  on  the  oth   ,  ai.d  m  i'^vji-pe  itself 
she  has  many  Asiatic  elements.    Ic   }      .to,  ^lui  popula- 


14         THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


tion,  there  is  indeed  hardly  more  real  separation  between 
European  Kussiu  and  Siberia  tlian  there  is  between  the 
eastern  and  western  parts  of  the  United  States.  Of  late 
Russia's  foreign  pohcy  has  been  chiefly  concerned  with 
Asiatic  questions,  and  it  is  likely  so  to  continue.  As  for 
France,  although  her  national  life  is,  and  will  remain,  centred 
in  the  European  continent,  her  man}'  colonies  are  scattered 
over  the  }j;l()be.  Ah-eady  some  of  them  are  represented  in 
her  chambers,  and  as  time  goes  on  they  will  become,  more 
and  more,  parts  of  one  organic  dominion.  A  Frenchman 
bom  in  Algeria  regards  himself  as  a  European,  and  with 
good  right ;  but  he  is  no  more  so  than  is  the  white  Australian 
or  the  Canadian,  or,  except  in  the  matter  of  allegiance,  than 
the  American.  Under  these  circumstances,  \:hcn  people 
abroad  talk  about  a  union  of  the  European  po^vers  against 
"the  Asiatic  peril"  or  "the  American  commercialinvasion," 
they  are  appealing  to  a  community  of  interests  which  does 
not  exist. 

Between  states  of  small  territory  and  limited  horizon 
a  union  especially  for  commercial  purposes  may  be  natural. 
It  is  quite  conceivable,  too,  that  one  of  the  world  powers 
may,  from  political  as  well  as  from  economic  motives, 
strive  to  group  about  itself  a  number  of  satellites,  after  the 
famous  historical  example  of  Prussia  in  the  ZoUverein. 
Many  people  in  Germany  would  be  glad  to  bring  about  a 
league  of  this  sort,  in  Central  Europe,  and  the  United  States 
is  accused  of  a  corresponding  design  in  its  pohcy  of  Pan- 
Americanism.  Such  combinations  are  fair  enough,  and 
may  be  profitable  to  all  concerned  in  them,  but  they  are  not 
hkely  to  include  more  than  one  power  of  the  first  rank ;  for 
the  great  ])()wers,  with  their  enormous  fields  for  independent 
developnu'ut,  are  in  a  position  to  work  out  their  own  des- 
tinies, and  to  take  care  of  themselves  without  fettering  their 
liberty  of  action. 

A  recent  writer  has  declared  that,  whereas  the  nineteenth 


INTRODUCTION 


15 


I 


century  has  l)eon  the  ago  of  nationalism,  the  twentieth 
will  be  tliat  of  national  imperialism.'  Though  this  rather 
sweeping  prophecy  takes  too  little  account  of  the  tendencies 
in  another  direction,  especially  those  of  a  socialistic  nature, 
and  thougii  it  looks  too  far  ahead,  it  is  near  the  truth  when 
applied  to  the  international  p<.litios  of  the  present,  which 
have  not  been  seriously  aff(H't(>d  l)y  the  progress  of  modern 
ultra-democracy.  Indeed,  in  certain  questions,  —  as,  for  in- 
stance, in  the  dispute  over  the  admission  of  Asiatics  into  the 
United  States,  —  the  feeling  of  the  laboring  classes,  so  far 
from  being  the  influence^  in  favor  of  peace  which  it  is  often 
declared  to  be.  is  one  of  the  chief  difficulties  in  the  situation. 

If,  then,  the  politird  destinies  of  the  glojjo  are  to  be 
determined  more  and  more  by  a  few  great  nations,  it  is 
desirable  that  we  should  know  as  much  as  possible  about 
them,  and  should  try  to  understand  the  circumstances  which 
determine  their  relations  with  one  another.  The  United 
States  may  be  a  world  in  itself,  but  it  is  also  a  part  of  a 
larger  world.  There  is  no  doubt  that  its  power  for  good 
and  for  evil  is  very  great.  How  that  power  is  to  be  used 
is  of  consequence  to  all  humanity. 

'  Reinsch,  World  Politics. 


n 


CHAPTER  I 


FORMATION  AND  GROWTH 

AS  tho  world  is  constitutod  at  the  present  day,  no 
state  that  lacks  a  broad  territorial  foundation  can 
hope  to  enjoy  permanently  a  )  osition  of  the  first  rank. 
In  the  past  this  has  not  been  true  to  the  same  degree : 
Athens  in  antiquity,  Venice  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
Dutch  Republic  in  the  sevontoonth  century,  not  only 
made  theniselvos  immortal  '  v  their  contributions  to  civil- 
ization, but  were  also  able  to  cope  with  gigantic  adver- 
saries, —  Persia,  the  Ottoman  Empire,  Spain.  In  modern 
times,  however,  when  the  latest  improvements  of  mechani- 
cal industry  and  military  science  may  be  equally  the  prop- 
erty of  all  who  can  pay  for  them,  and  when  railways  and 
telegraphs  enable  even  the  most  unwieldy  organizations 
to  l)ring  their  full  strength  to  bear,  mere  mass  counts  in 
a  way  it  never  did  before.  The  size  of  Russia  foilci 
Napoleon  as  it  had  foiled  Charles  XII,  and  it  deprived  the 
recent  Japanese  victories  of  much  of  the  effect  wliich  they 
would  otherwise  have  had.  The  Japanese,  indeed,  like 
the  (Ie,-mans,  realize  keenly  the  disadvantage  of  dwell- 
ing in  a  territory  too  limited  in  extent  to  offer  a  suffi- 
cient outlet  to  their  surplur^  population  or  to  admit  of 
the  full  development  of  their  economic  energies.  Fear- 
ing, therefore,  that  they  may  be  unable  to  maintain  their 
present  rank  among  nntinns,  they  have,  to  tln^  dis(]uiet  of 
their  neighbors,  been  stimulated  to  a  policy  of  active  ex- 

16 


FORMATION  AND  GROWTH 


17 


pansion.  Because  of  their  size,  certain  states  now  sec- 
ondary may  look  forward  with  ronfidenco  to  a  more 
exalted  position  in  the  future.  Thus,  it  is  safe  to  predict 
that,  within  a  few  generations,  Brazil  and  Argentina  will, 
unless  they  break  up  in  the  meantime,  be  of  more  conse- 
quence in  international  politics  than  Italy.  Furthermore, 
though  all  civilized  countries,  in  these  days  of  keen  in- 
dustrial competition  and  high  protective  tariffs,  aim  to  be 
as  nearly  self-supporting  as  may  be,  especially  in  the  great 
necessary  staples,  such  independence  is  possible  only  to 
the  owners  of  broad  lands  with  much  variety  of  climate 
and  productions.  The  peoples  with  fewer  resources  at 
tlieir  command  may,  to  be  sure,  do  something  to  Gounter- 
balance  their  disadvantages  by  a  higher  display  of  energy 
and  intelligence  ;  but  society  is  tending  toward  a  general 
level  of  enlightenment  in  which  there  can  be  no  monopoly 
of  id  eas  or  of  methods.  More  than  ever  before,  political 
preeminence  among  nations  now  rests  on  quantity  as  well 
as  on  qualit\'. 

Among  the  world  powers,  the  United  States  is  fourth  in 
size  as  well  as  in  population.  If  we  compare  it  with  the 
one  next  above  it,  Greater  France,  we  note  that,  although 
no  one  section  is  the  equal  of  France  proper,  the  terri- 
tory as  a  whole  is  of  higher  value  ;  for  about  half  of  the 
French  colonial  possessions  are  in  the  Sahara,  and  most 
of  the  rest  are  in  the  tropics  and  therefore  unfitted  to 
support  a  considerable  white  population.  The  United 
States  has,  to  be  sure,  its  share  of  bad  lands  in  Alaska 
and  the  arid  West,  and  it  has,  too,  its  tropical  holdings ; 
but  it  possesses  in  the  temperate  zone  several  times  as 
much  land  as  France.  It  is  inferior  in  this  respect  to 
Russia;  but  it  has  a  greater  variety  of  climate  and  a 
larger  extent  of  really  good  soil.  Moreover,  it  is,  from 
its  situation,  practically  invulnerable;  though,  unlike 
Hussia,  it  has  important  dependencies  of  which  it  might 


i  18        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

bo  deprived  by  un  adversary  that  controlled  the  sea. 
I  Still,  these  are  insignificant  enough  as  compared  with 

I  the  mass  of  the  home  country,  whose  very  size  makes 

I  it  secure  against  invasion.    The  United  States  could 

not  be  brought  to  its  knees  by  one  fierce  blow  at  the 
heart,  as  England  might  conceivably  be;  and  it  is  alno 
:  less  exposed  to  attack  than  is  either  France  or  Ger- 

j  many.    Economically,  too,  it  is  the  most  self-supporting 

^  of  all  modern  powers.    Even  if  it  can  furnish  itself  with 

but  a  small  part  of  the  tropical  produce  which  it  needs, 
it  is  not  dependent  on  any  one  of  its  chief  rivals,  who  at 
present  all  pay  it  an  irksome  tribute  for  their  supply  of 
cotton,  one  of  the  most  necessary  staples  for  modern 
manufacture. 

i  Though  to  a  worli  power  a  diversity  of  climates  and 

conditions  is  a  source  of  strength,  a  state  that  is  to  hold 
together  must  have  unity  of  somv  kind  in  its  essential  parts, 
whether  of  race,  of  sentiment,  or  of  interests;  and  the 
,  inore  it  has,  the  better.    Here  the  influences  of  geography 

f  are  to  be  reckoned  with,  though  they  are  not  infrequently 

overborne  by  what  seems  like  mere  historical  accident. 

i'  The  strongest  frontiers   are  not  impassable.  Nations 

in  their  wanderings  stray  beyond  their  :^atural  bounda- 
ries, and  unfriendly  peoples  have  been  brought  into  lasting 
-  union  by  some  chance  royal  marriage.  Well-protected, 

t  sharply  defined  peninsulas  like  Italy  and  India  have  been 

the  scene  of  repeated  invasion.    They  have  been  divided 
j  lietween  liostile  states,  and  ruled  by  distant  foreigners; 

I  while  Austria-Hungary,  a  mere  heterogeneous  creation,  has 

[  been  a  great  power  for  nearly  four  hundred  years.    If  we 

f  want  typical  instances  of  the  working  and  of  the  failure  of 

geographical  influences,  we  find  them  in  the  history  of  the 
I  Spanish  peninsula:  the  separation  of  Spain  from  France 

j  appears  natural  and  inevitable;  the  growth  of  Spain  and 

f  Portugal  into  two  states  inhabited  by  diff-^rent  nationalities 


i 


FORMATION  AND  GROWTH 


19 


is  nothing  but  n  freak  of  fortune.  Since  mankind  may 
thus  develop  in  opjiosition  to  mere  geographical  influences, 
it  is  dangerous  to  lay  much  weight  on  them ;  yet,  though 
they  may  be  neutralized,  if  not  altogether  overcome,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  they  are  forces  of  great  magnitude. 
Soil,  climate,  and  situation  hf  vc  always  affected  national 
character.  (Jood  natural  frontiers  njraiust  the  outer  world 
and  easy  means  of  communication  within  are  aids  in  build- 
ing up  the  unity  of  a  nation,  and  go  far  to  insure  the  main- 
tenance of  this  unity  when  once  achieved. 

The  physical  geography  of  North  America  has  been 
descril)ed  as  "large,  simple,  and  easily  comprehensible.'" 
There  is  no  such  variety  and  confusion  as  in  the  configura- 
tion of  Europe,  with  its  extraordinarily  fantastic  outHnes, 
its  scattered  ranges  of  mountains,  its  many  divergent 
river  valleys,  and  its  obviously  separate  regions,  like  Scan- 
dinavia, Spain,  Italy,  and  the  Balkan  Peninsula;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  America  has  proportionately  much  less 
available  coast-line.  The  interior,  though  not  free  from 
obstacles  which  in  earlier  times  interfered  with  the  ease 
of  communication,  contains  no  such  formidable  barriers 
as  the  Andes  in  South  America,  the  Himalayas  and  the 
Thien  Shan  in  Asia,  and  the  Sahara  in  Africa.  Like 
eastern  F:urupe  anrl  northern  Asia,  North  America  appears 
as  the  setting  for  a  few  large  states  rather  than  for  a 
mosaic  of  small  ones. 

The  United  States  (omitting  its  dependencies)  occupies 
the  middle  of  the  continent,  and  like  Europe,  it  is  situated 
wholly  in  the  temperate  zone.  No  part  is  too  cold  f.  r  the 
raising  of  grain,  —  to  find  the  American  cqTiivalent  of 
northern  Scandinavia  or  northern  Russia,  one  nuist  turn 
to  Alaska  and  Canada,  —  and  no  part,  except  certain  dis- 
tricts m  low-lying  sections  of  the  South  or  in  the  deserts 
of  the  Southwest,  is  too  hot  for  the  white  man,  even  when 

•  Shaler. 


20        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  North-Europcuii  drscont,  to  work  in  the  fields;  nor  is 
any  too  rold  for  the  black,  tlioiigh  the  latter  takes  naturally 
to  out-door  labor  in  the  warmer  regions  only.  The  climate, 
as  compared  with  that  of  Europe,  is  more  continental, 
with  f^re.'itor  extremes  of  heat  and  cold.  The  isothermal 
lines  ari'  nearer  to^'ether,  hence  we  find  difTerent  zones 
of  cultivation  closer  to  one  another.  Almost  all  the 
products  of  the  Old  World  have  flourished  in  the  New; 
and  many  of  the  chief  staples  of  American  cultivation 
to-day,  like  most  of  the  animals,  are  of  foreign  origin,  un- 
known at  the  coming'  of  white  men.  The  most  notable 
exception  to  tills  rule  is  Indian  corn,  or  maize. 

Turning  to  the  configuration  of  the  country,  we  mark 
its  simple  compact  mass,  —  even  more  simple  and  compact 
than  that  of  the  Russian  Empire,  which  can  better  be  com- 
pared with  the  United  States  and  Canada  together  than 
witii  the  United  States  alone.  On  the  east  and  the  west 
the  United  States  has  the  best  of  all  natural  boundaries,  the 
ocean,  —  or,  rather,  it  had,  for  since  the  republic  has  ac- 
quired outlying  possessions,  the  Pacific  coast  no  longer  con- 
stitutes a  fir.st  line  of  defence.  Still,  these  new  possessions 
seem  so  much  like  f)utposts  which  could  be  sacrificed  without 
S(>rious  loss  that  Ainerican.s  have  liardly  yet  come  to  think  of 
them  as  imperilling  the  excellence  of  their  frontiers.  The 
southern  boundary  of  the  country,  determined  in  the  main 
by  the  Rio  Grande  anH  the  Gila  depression,  is  not  unsatis- 
factory as  such  lines  •  :  for  it  consists  of  clearly  marked 
natural  forn^  is  i:  -gion  for  the  most  part  thinly 
iiihabited.  It  is  not  al,  iiowever,  and  even  to-day  has 
along  nmch  of  its  length  a  mixed  population  on  both  sides. 
The  northern  frontier  is  the  result  of  historical  accident, 
of  succession  of  compromises  attained  only  after  many 
protracted  disputes.  Throiigh  thf  eastern  wilderrzess  and 
along  the  Great  Lakes  the  division  is  still  tolerable,  although 
the  harbors  of  New  England  are,  at  least  in  winter,  the 


FORMivTIO.N  AM  J  UliOWTM 


21 


obvious  ports  for  most  of  Eastern  Canada ;  but  farther  west 

the  boundary  is  one  of  the  most  unnatural  in  the  whole 
world.  For  tliousancls  of  miles  it  clings  to  geographical 
parallels,  heedless  of  the  contour  of  the  ground.  The  coun- 
try on  both  sides  of  it  is  the  same ;  the  rivers  and  mountains 
run  north  and  south ;  and  the  inhabitants  are  one  people, 
not  only  in  language  ancl  character,  but  in  vital  interests. 
In  spite  of  every  artificial  diversion  of  their  trade  and  of 
their  ))olitical  symijathies,  they  are  steadily  drawn  together 
by  permanent  forces,  which  will  grow  in  strength  as  the 
region  on  both  sides  becomes  more  thickly  settled. 

Within  the  United  States  itself,  the  great  physical  lines 
of  division  are  few  and  simj)le.  They  run  north  and 
south,  cutting  the  parallels  of  latitude  and  the  zones  of 
climate  at  right  angles  instead  of  coinciiling  with  them. 
This  fact  has  been  of  far-reaching  political  importance; 
for  it  has  worked  against  sectionalism,  and  has  produced 
cross  currents  of  interests.  Had  the  chain  of  the  Alleghanies 
intervened  between  the  free  states  and  :he  slave  states,  we 
may  doubt  whether  the  Union  would  have  been  preserved, 
or  even  have  been  formed. 

Twice  in  the  last  two  hundred  years,  but  in  opposite 
ways  in  the  two  epochs,  it  has  seemed  likely  that  the  terri- 
tory w  hich  now  constitutes  the  American  republic  would 
be  divided  among  several  owners.  During  much  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  it  was  fair  to  suppose  that  the  North 
America  of  the  future  would  remain  in  the  hands  of  three 
nationalities,  each  of  them  holding  an  immense  section,  — 
the  English  having  the  smallest  part,  the  Atlantic  coast; 
the  French,  the  interior  plains,  with  the  Mississipi)i,  and  in 
the  north  the  valley  of  the  St.  Lawrence;  the  Spanish,  the 
extreme  south  and  the  southwest.  The  lines  separa- 
tion bet\.een  the  three  would  in  the  main  have  run  from 
north  to  south,  corresponding  with  physical  barriers. 
Fate  decided  otherwise,  and  gave  nine-tenths  of  the  whole 


22 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


continent  to  the  English-speaking  peoples,  between  whom 
th»>  chief  lines  of  deniurcution  have  run  from  east  to  west, 
leaping,'  over  natural  obstacles.  But  no  sooner  was  the 
Union  assured  of  its  extension  from  ocean  to  ocean,  across 
mountains  and  rivers  and  deserts,  than  it  was  threatened 
with  a  division  ii-.o  a  northern  and  a  southern  half,  separated 
from  one  another  by  the  arbitrary  Mason  and  Dixon's  line. 
The  long-standiii-i;  political  divergences  between  these  two 
sections  culminated  in  a  violent  attempt  at  secession,  Since 
that  failed,  the  unity  of  the  republic  has  been  secure. 

The  physical  geography  of  the  North  American  continent 
explains  why  the  much  more  numerous  English  colonists 
penetrated  into  the  interior  so  slowly  as  compared  with 
the  French  settlers  farther  north.  After  the  short  episode 
of  Dutch  rule  in  New  York,  the  English  i)ossessed  the 
whole  Appalachian  coast  from  New  Brunswick  to  the 
Spanish  colony  of  Florida.  At  the  time  of  their  arrival, 
this  strip  was  covered  with  thiek  woods,  trackless  to  the 
wliite  man.  Numerous  rivers,  it  is  true,  gave  access  to  the 
interior,  but  none  except  t'  udson  were  navigable  to  any 
great  distance  for  ships  of  iderable  size.  In  the  north 
the  mountains  approached  nearer  the  coast ;  farther  south 
they  receded,  leaving  a  coastal  plain  of  much  wealth  and 
fertility.  To-day,  penetrated  in  every  dinn'tion  by  rail- 
ways, and  inhabited  by  a  dense  mining  population,  the 
Alleghanies  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  barrier;  two  centuries 
ago  they  were  formidable  one,  more  formidable  in  reality, 
though  less  obvious  on  the  map,  than  the  Urals,  the  sup- 
posed dividing  line  between  \sia  and  Europe.  The  colo- 
nists did  not  succeetl  in  crossing  thfui  for  several  gen- 
erations. On  the  other  hand,  the  Frenchmen,  pushing  up 
the  St.  Lawrence,  whose  tide-water  extends  to  Montreal, 
had  only  to  continue  along  the  river  to  reach  the  Great 
T.akes,  whence  they  soon  found  themselves  in  the  valley  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  after  that,  naturally  floated  down- 


FORMATION  AND  GHOWTH 


23 


stroiuii  and  explored  the  whole  length  of  the  "Father  of 

Wat. To."  If  tlic  population  of  the  French  colonies  had 
Ihcm  huyv,  —  France  hers.^lf  had  at  that  time  tnany  more 
inlialiitants  thuu  England,  -  a  <rn.at  Fr.'nch  dominion 
might  well  have  been  built  uj)  which  would  have  confined 
the  Anglo-Saxon  race  permanently  to  the  eastern  coast. 

Th(  Faglish  were  slow  in  establishing  themselves  in  the 
western  heiuispluMV.    A  century  after  the  discoveries  of 
Cohunlms  and  the  Iniilding  up  of  an  immense  Spanish 
colonial  empire,  they  had  nut  yet  gained  anv  permanent 
foothold.    When  they  did  come,  it  was  in  u  hajduizard 
fashion.    The  Pilgrim  Fathers,  aiming  for  New  Jersey, 
landed  farther  north,  missing  the  mouth  of  the  Hud- 
■■"i:,  the  hest  situation  on  the  coast,  which  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Dutch.     Fortunately  for  the  English,  the 
line  of  whose  settlement  was  thus  cut  in  two  at  Uie  luost 
important  point,  the  Dutch  never  obtained  a  really  strong 
1>"M  on  the  territory.    When  it  was  conquered  by  the  Duke 
«<f  \ovk  two  generations  later,  some  half  of  the  ])upulation 
were  already  English;    and  the  gradual  Anglicization  of 
the  rest  was  a  matter  of  no  great  difhcultv. 

One  after  another,  the  British  colonies  in  the  New  World 
were  j)lanted,  and  grew  up  in  an  independent  irregular 
tashiou.    Circumstances  favon-d  them,  for  the  spirit  of 
<'nterpns..  that  characterized  th<.  Elizabethan  age,  combined 
with  the  desire  to  plunder  the  Spaniards,  had  drawn  atten- 
tion m  this  direction.    The  economic  chang(>s  in  England 
iiad  made  life  so  difficult  there  that  the  hope  of  better  for- 
tune prompted  adventurous  spirits  to  cross  the  ocean.  An- 
oth.  r  stimulus  to  emigration  was  furnished  by  the  religious 
disputes  and  intolerance  of  the  time.    While  France,  with 
the  greater  logic  and  the  lesser  politic.-il  wisdom  cliarnff.-- 
istic  of  her  people,  jealously  preserved  her  colonies  from 
tlie  contamination  of  heresy,  Englartd  regarded  with  com- 
parative mdiff-rence  the  theological  vagaries  of  her  stray 


24        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WUllLU  PUWEK 

children  in  distant  lands.  Dissenters,  Separatists,  Cut  holies, 
Quakers,  could  here  enj.^v  h  liberty  tlmt  uuh  refused  at 
home;  aiul  in:uiy  profited  l>y  the  oi)i)ortuiiity. 

With  the  foumi.itio'.i  of  (u-or^'ui  in  the  cightienth  century, 
tlic  list  of  the  thirteen  orij^inul  colonies  was  complete. 
They  iuul,  for  tUc  most  part,  thrown  up  independently  of  one 
another,  and,  varying  much  in  size  and  strength  and  torn 
by  mutual  jealousies  which  were  often  exasperat.d  by 
hopelessly  condictin^,'  boundary  claims,  they  could  imt,  f(.r 
several  ^'enerations,  be  broii^dit  to  feel  ii  common  inter»>st 
„r  to  take  united  action.  They  were  spread  over  the  three 
tlivisions  of  the  Appalachian  coast  country  which  now 
call  New  England,  the  Middle  States,  and  the  Old  South. 

New  England,  the  smallest  and  poorest  of  the  thr(>e  in 
ni.hiral  resources,  had  by  accident  received  the  greatest 
iinmigratiun.    At  the  time  of  the  Kevolution,  Boston  was 
larger  than  New  York.    The  preponderance  of  this  section 
in  which  the  population  was  homogeneous  and  of  n  strong 
Anglo-Saxon  type  has  indeed  had  a  profound  intluei-  e 
on  the  destiny  of  th'  country  ;  for  the  New  En-land  ehMuent 
has,  on  the  whole,  l)een  the  dominant  one  in  the  formation^ 
,)f  th(>  American  character.    However  relatively  insignifi- 
cant this  small  section  may  be  in  the  future,  in  the  past  it 
has  played  a  role  which  can  hardly  be  ov(  restimated,  — 
one  which  might  almost  be  compared  with  that  of  Greece 
in  European  history. 

The  Middle  colo:  es  were  then,  as  now,  more  cosmopolitan 
than  those  to  the  north  or  to  the  south  of  them ;  but,  though 
the  earlier  foreign  elements,  the  Dutch  and  the  Swedes,  were 
reinforced  in  the  eighteenth  century  by  the  coming  of  many 
Germans,  it  was  the  En^dish  type  which  predominated,  and 
J,,.,.,,  iw.f;,r->  tlw.  {{..volution  the  future  importance  of  New 
York,  with  its  iinecpialled  situation,  could  be  foretold. 

The  Southern  colonies  were  the  largest  in  area,  but,  mth 
the  exception  of  Virginia,  the  smallest  in  population. 


FORMATION  AND  CiliOW  i  ll 


25 


Alrrudy  tlic  cxi.stoncc  of  slavery  on  un  extensive  Hcal'  had 
(tcveloncd  .social  an<l  econoniie  ecjiiditions  (»f  a  special  nat!:-e, 
I'or  some  tinu-,  as  we  may  see  hy  the  debates  of  the  Con- 
stitutioiml  Convention,  it  was  generally  believed  that  the 
southern  half  of  the  country  would,  on  account  of  its  size, 
its  Kii|)posedly  better  clitiiate,  und  its  Rrcuter  resources, 
develop  faster  than  the  northern,  -  a  belief  whieh,  on  the 
invention  of  the  eotton-j^'in  in  17<»;{,  was  held  more  con- 
fidently than  ever.  The  non-fulfilment  of  these  hopeB, 
which  was  attributed  by  Southerners  to  unfair  tariff  legisla- 
tion, was  indeed  one  of  the  causes  that  ultimately  led  to 
the  attempt  at  secession.  In  none  of  the  colonies  were 
what  we  should  now  call  democratic  ideas  really  prevalent. 
In  the  North  the  political  power  was  in  the  hands  of  an  intel- 
li^'ent  middle  class,  who  made  up  most  of  the  population; 
in  the  South  the  whole  economic  situation  tended  to  produce 
a  planters'  aristocracy,  the  so-called  "slave  barons"  of  a 
later  lay. 

In  jirocess  of  time,  us  was  inevitable,  the  attempt  on 
tile  j)art  of  the  English  colonists  to  push  beyond  the  moun- 
tains came  in  conflict  with  the  e  jrts  of  the  French  to 
establish  an  unbroken  line  of  posts  between  their  Canadian 
and  their  Mississippi  possessions;  and  the  result  was  a 
fierce  struggle  between  the  two  peoples  for  supremacy  on 
the  continent.  There  had  already  bi-en  more  than  one 
contest  between  them,  in  the  course  of  which  France  had 
lost  what  are  to-day  the  Canadian  maritime  provinces, 
^^he  still  held,  however,  a  much  larger  territory  than  her 
rival,  and  one  with  greater  possibilities  of  future  develop- 
!!'.eiit;  but  owing  to  the  small  immber  of  h(>r  settlers,  iier 
iK'ld  on  it  was  far  weaker.  When,  therefore,  the  English 
folonists  began  to  spread  to  the  westward,  they  found 
nothing  to  oppose  them  but  a  thin  chain  of  French  military 
posts  without  adequate  support.  It  has  been  said  that 
h  rauce  lost  her  Indian  and  American  empires  on  the  battle- 


20         THE  UMTKU  .STATt-S  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

fields  of  Germany;  and  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that,  in 
defence  of  continental  ir.tetvsts,  rral  or  fancied,  she  wasted 
in  EnroiH'  ciuM^ncs  wl.icli  wouUl  have  been  better  employed 
in  dcfctuhn-  h.'r  Ameruau  possessions.     It  was  also  her 
irreparal>lc  misfortune  that,  at  this  critical  moment,  when 
the  fate  of  empires  hunj?  in  the  balance,  she  was  ruled  by 
the  indolent  and  worthless  Louis  XV,  wliereas  th.-  rn.>r^ne8 
of  Britain  were  stimulated  ]>y  the  liery  spirit  ot  the  elder 
I'itt.    Voltaire's  f:iiiious  description  of  Canada  as  "a  few 
■o  res  of  snow"  shows  that  what  we  might  call  the  anti- 
imperiaUst  section  of  French  pubUc  opinion  was  incapable 
of  appreciating  the  gravity  of  the  issues  involved. 

On  the  .lisput.d  soil  itself,  th(>  stru^rKlc  was  from  the 
outset  hopelessly  ...H-side.l      In  sp.te  of  the  greater  unity 
of  desi^rn  and  aetion  on  the  part  of  the  French  authorities 
in  Cjinada,  and  oi  the  more  military  character  of  the  popu- 
lation under  their  control,  in  spite  too  of  the  superior 
skill  of  most  of  their  ofncers,  tlie  English  and  their  American 
colonists  won,  as  they  could  not  fail  t(.  do  in  the  end;  for 
not  only  were  their  availal)le  resources  far  greater,  owing 
to  lia- "  eaormour.   numeric:)'   sup.'riority  of  the  English 
population  in  the  New  World,  but,  in  consequence  ot 
England  s  command  of  the  sea,  they  could  obtain  rcnnforce- 
ments  in  -.vavs  imi)ossible  to  tiieir  ndversiiries.    In  this  war, 
which  decided  th^-  fate  of  the  Xoith  American  continent, 
the  Ki-ench  -ained  most  of  the  glory,  but  the  English  got 
all  the  i)!()fits. 

Twenty  years  later  France  obtained  her  reve!i,re,  though 
an  incomplete  one,  in  the  war  of  the  AnuMican  Revolution, 
which  deprived  K.i-laiul  of  lu>r  most  valued  possessions 
and  gave  birth  to  tlu-  United  States.  To  the  young  nation 
w  hich  thus  canu>  into  the  world,  the  question  of  the  extent 
of  its  territories  was  second  in  importance  only  to  inde- 
pendence itself-  Had  the  new  republic  remained  con- 
fined to  the  Umits  of  the  thirteen  colonies,  it  would 


FORMATION  AM)  tiUOWTH 


27 


liryoiul  (louht  have  had  a  very  (lifTcrciit  history.     Not  im- 
Idoli.ibly,  if  (!r(>at   Hiitaiii  IiikI  insisted  at   \'cisaiil(S  on 
n  tuinin^'  the  Uliiu  Valley,  the  Aiiieriean  commissioiicis  and 
p»vernment,  unsupported  by  France,  would  Imve  been 
obliged  to  yield  on  thig  point,  and  the  westward  movement 
of  the  American  people,  which  has  carried  them  to  the 
sliorvs  of  the  racific,  iiii;,'ht  have  been  checked  at  the  out- 
set.   Hut  Kngland.  anxious  for  jx'aic,  was  not  disposed 
to  haggle  over  terms  witli  her  disobedient  childreii.  While 
refusing,  naturally  enough,  the  demand  of  the  Americana 
that  Canada  should  be  handed  over  to  them,  she  yielded 
uiTh  surprising  facility  on  the  question  of  the  Ohio  Valley, 
tiinst  of  which  was  indeed  no  longer  actually  in  her  hands. 
The  contjue.st  of  this  regi(jn   by  (leorge  Rogers  Clark  is 
rightly  deemed  one  of  the  decisive  events  in  American 
history,  but  it  is  no  less  true  that  the  definite  acquisition 
of  it  in  1783  was  a  stroke  of  extraordinary  good  fortune. 
\et  even  this  good  foituni'  cantu)t  prevent  Americana 
from   regretting  that   tliey   did   not  at   the  same  time 
ol)tain  Canad.'i,  as  they  conceivably  might   have  done; 
for  in  that  case  they  would  have  avoided  many  of  the 
difSculties  which  have  arisen  between  the  United  States 
and  (Ireat  Britain  since  that  day,  as  well  as  certain  grave 
pos8i])ilities  in  regard  to  the  future.    If  the  success  of 
Clark's  enterprise  is  one  of  the  events  for  which  Americans 
have  every  reason  to  be  grateful,  the  failure  of  the  expe- 
dition of  Arnold  and  Montgomery  against  Quebec  is  one 
of  the  disasters  which  they  have  most  cause  to  regret. 

The  years  inmiediately  following  the  achievement  of 
in(l(.])eiidence  are  generally  regarded  as  the  most  inglo- 
rious in  American  history.  The  form  of  confederation 
adopted  by  the  new  states  soon  proved  itself  quite  insuf- 
ficient for  the  purposes  of  government ;  but  not  till  after 
many  bitter  experiences  of  its  evils,  would  the  states  con- 
sent to  sacrifice  their  more  short-sighted  views  and  selfish 


! 

i  ■ 

n 


28        THE  UNITED  STATF-J  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 

interests  to  the  public  welfare.    Nevertheless,  tliis  inglo- 
rious period  witiiessod  the  promul^'aiioii  of  oiu>  of  llu>  most 
important  lo^islulive  acts  in  the  wlu.le  liistory  of  tlie  coun- 
try, -  the  Nortliwcst  Onlinanre  of  17S7,  which  not  only 
at  that  tinir  proilainied  tlie  principles  by  which  Anu  n<;:!n 
expansion  was  to  be  regulated  as  long  as  it  wa^  .(.nfined 
to  the  continent,  but  wliich  oven  to-day,  when  t  i  c  nmd 
States  has  strct.-hcd  beyond  tho  sc...,  is  still  vcv^^.  .'  mI^ 
determining'  its  ix.licv,  iUoukIi  it  may  not  always  be  im- 
mediately ai.plieal.le.    By  the  Northwest  Ordinance  the 
V  •  le  vacant  territory  west  of  the  mountains  was  declared 
a  national  domain,  a  reserve  tract  out  of  which,  as  tli(> 
population  increased,  new  stat(>s  should        created  with 
rights  in  every  way  equal  to  tliose  of  tlie  ..id  ones.  Even 
lu'fore  such  states  sliould  come  uWo  existence,  the  settlers 
in  this  region  were  to  be  granted  the  right  of  possession  of 
property,  of  habeas  corpus,  of  trial  by  jury,  and  the  other 
essentials  of  Anglo-Saxon  liberty. 

The  principle  of  the  Northwest  Ordinance  was  a  new 
one  in  the  history  of  democratic  national  expansion.  Up 
to  this  time,  eolonies -  unless,  like  the  Oreek  ones,  they 
separated  themselves  at  the  start  — had  been  regarded 
as  mere  appendages  or  outposts  of  the  mother  country. 
They  might  have  privileges  and  liberties  of  their  own,  but 
these  privik'ges  were  i-ersonal:  tlie  territory  did  not  form 
an  equal  ))art  of  the  paivnt   state,  except  in  countries 
with  an  auiocr;iiic  form  of  government,  where  all  lanes 
were  at  tiie  disposal  of  the  sovereign.    Thus,  though  the 
emigrant  to  Eastern  Siberia  might  feel  that  his  position 
was  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  his  brother  in  Moscow, 
since  both  were  subjects  of  a  d(>spotic  ruler,  tlie  English- 
man in  the  colonies  was  not  the  equal  of  the  one  at  home, 
f.,r  he  could  vote  for  no  nicuuber  of  Parliament.    No  one 
of  the  English  settlements  had  enjoyed  complete  self- 
government  from  the  beginning;  and  the  American  colo- 


FORMATION  AiND  GROWTH 


29 


■a 


nios  had  not  contested  the  right  of  the  mother  country  to 

legislate  fcr  them.  They  liud  merely  resisted,  as  a  viola- 
fi'.n  of  their  inalienal.le  rights  as  Englishmen,  her  attempt 
to  impose  taxes  upon  them  without  their  consent;  and 
this  resistance  had  led  to  the  war  for  independence.  Now 
that  they  had  triumphed  and  had  possessions  of  their  own 
about  which  they  must  legishite,  they  wisely  determined 
to  treat  the  now  sections  as  the  equals  of  the  old,  and 
to  inipos(>  upon  them  only  such  temporary  restrictions 
as  were  necessary  during  the  i)erio.!  of  first  development, 
when  they  were  too  weak  to  walk  without  guidance.  Not 
only  is  the  Northwest  Ordinance  thus  of  fundamental  im- 
ix.rtance  hi  tlie  history  of  the  United  States,  but  it  is  a 
landmark  in  the  story  oi'  government. 

At  the  census  taken  in  1  71H),  the  population  of  the  m'wly 
constituted  federal  republic  numbered  a  little  less  than 
four  million  inhabitants,   unevenly  distributed  over  an 
area  of  about  nine  hundred  thousand  square  miles.  Of 
these  the  greater  number  still  lived  close  to  the  coast,  much 
of  the   interior  being  uninhabited  save  by  Indians  and 
traders.    The  western  movement   had,   however,  begun. 
Kentucky,  Vermont,  and  Tennessee  were  all  admitted  as 
states  before  the  end  of  the  century,  and  Ohio  at  the  begiii- 
ning  of  the  new  one.    And  the  growth  of  the  country  con- 
tmued  in  two  ways:  not  only  was  its  area  extended  from 
time  to  tii..o  by  the  aihlition  of  broad  tracts  of  land,  until 
U  was  several  times  as  large  as  the  thirteen  original  colo- 
nies, but  while  these  new  lands  were  being  oj)en(>d  up  and 
developed  with  astonishing  rapidity,  the  population  of  the 
older  st.ii.  s  was  increasing  by  the  surplus  of  births  over 
•  leaths  and  by  foreign  immiL^ration.    Thus  the  great  sur- 
face (•.\])ansion  ,,f  the  country  did  not  lead,  as  some  feared 
that  it  might,  to  a  dispersal  of  the  resources  and  .•!  fe.-.r.;.,] 
weakening  of  the  fabric.    On  the  contrary,  at  the  oi)ening 
of  the  twentieth  century  every  state  in  the  Union,  even 


II' 


'J  T 


1k\ 


30         THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  i^OWER 

mutilated  Virginia,  had  more  than  doubled  the  population 
that  it  had  at  the  be^'inning  of  the  ni.iot    nth,  and  New 
York  alone  contained  a  larger  number  of  inhabitants  than 
the  whole  repubUe  did  one  hundred  years  before.  Up 
to  the  time  of  the  \  -ir  with  Spain,  the  lands  acquired  by 
the  United  States  had  been  almost  unoccupied  one  ;  but, 
with  the  exception  of  Alaska,  they  were  so  well  fitted  for 
white  colonization  that  settlers  soon  began  to  pour  mto 
them  in  numbers  sufficient  to  submerge  the  earlier  ele- 
ments.   There  was  consequently  little  difficulty  in  apply- 
ing to  them  the  principles  of  the  Northwest  Ordinance,  and, 
as  time  went  on,  in  erecting  new  states  on  the  same  basis 
as  the  old.    In  Alaska  this  policy  has  not  yet  proved  prac- 
ticable, and  may  never  do  so ;  but  this  huge  desolate  waste 
offers  no  new  probUnn  of  government,  for  its  sparse  Indian 
tribes  mav  be  treated  as  other  Indians  have  been.  Not 
indeed  till  the  annexations  beginning  in  1898,  which  have 
brought  under  the  wing  of  the  United  States  regions 
alreadv  inhabited  by  very  considerable  alien  populations, 
did  the  republic  have  to  face  the  question  whether  Amcncan 
ideals  and  institutions  were  suitable  to  territories  of  this 

kin*b  .      ^,       TT    -x  J 

According  to  the  census  of  1800,  there  were  m  the  United 
States  5,308,483  persons,  of  whom  about  a  miUion  were 
blacks.   The  gain  made  in  the  preceding  ten  years  had 
been  extraordinarv,  especially  as  there  had  been  no  new 
accession  f)f  territory.    Three  years  later,  the  area  of  the 
republic  was  doubled  by  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  one 
of  the  most  astonishing  strokes  of  good  fortune  —  for  it 
was  not  the  result  of  any  special  foresight  —  that  ever 
befell  a  nation.    Although  the  American  government  real- 
ized how  serious  in  its  consequences  would  be  the  cession 
_r  I'..-..  .^;-p;.t  (>vpansc  on  its  western  frontier  to  a  strong 
power  like  France,  it  had  not  instructed  its  commissioners 
to  try  to  purchase  more  than  the  island  of  New  Orleans 


FORMATION  AND  GROWTH 


31 


with  an  insignificant  bit  of  land  about  it.  Tho  proposition 
for  the  svlIq  of  the  whole  cani<>  from  Napoleon  I.ini.seif. 
His  decision  was  startlingly  sudden,  was  opposed  by  many 
of  his  counsellors,  and  was  a  complete  surprise  to  the 
I'nited  States.  The  commissioners  who  signed  the  terms 
of  the  purchase  acted  without  instructions;  and  President 
Jefferson,  who  ratified  it,  belic^ved  that  he  was  committing 
an  unconstitutional  act,  which  was  justified  only  by  its 
immense  advantage  to  the  country.  Many  Frenchmen, 
naturally  enough,  have  ever  since  deplored  the  surrender 
of  the  last  chance  of  luiildiiig  up  a  gr(>at  French-speaking 
commuiiity  in  the  western  world.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  France  could  have  kept  tliis  distant  def(>nceless 
region  against  the  inevitable  attack  of  the  English;  she 
certainly  could  not  have  done  so  if  the  Americans  had  felt 
driven  to  ally  themselves  with  Great  Britain.  France 
ma(l(>  l!(>r  fatal  mistake,  not  in  l^iVA,  but  forty  years 
earlier,  when  si  <-  ceded  Louisiana  to  Spain.  Had  she  kept 
it  tli(>n  and  tri'  d  to  fill  it  with  settlers,  she  might,  by  the 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  have  had  French 
colonists  enough  to  maintain  permanently  the  national 
character  of  the  region;  but  even  this  is  liy  no  means 
certain.  As  it  was,  the  fifty  thousand  inhabitant.?,  French, 
Spanish,  and  lilack,  who  did  not  represent  one  per  cent  of 
the  population  of  the  country  into  which  they  were  now 
absorbed,  could  not  possibly  retain  their  identity  in  the 
long  run. 

^^!H't]ler  the  action  of  France  was  wise  or  not,  the  gain 
to  the  I'nited  States  was  incalculable.  At  one  stroke  its 
territory  was  increased  twofold  by  the  addition  of  a  region 
which  was  a  hundred  years  later  to  be  the  home  of  more 
than  sixteen  million  inhabitants ;  and  r.t  the  same  time  the 
way  was  opened  for  further  expansion  westward  toward 
iiie  Pacific.  W  ithout  I^ouisiana,  the  Americans  could  not 
have  reached  Oregon,  which  must  before  long  have  fallen 


32         THE  UMTHD  HTXTEH  AS  A  WORLD  POWlill 


into  British  hands;  and  yet,  as  has  oftrn  Iutii  pointed  out, 
this  first  expansion  in  their  history,  which  ^mvc  tliciii  the 
control  of  the  Mississii^pi  Valley  witli  its  untold  possibili- 
ties, met  with  the  same  bitter  ojjposition  that  we  find  in 
all  the  later  and  sometimes  less  justifiable  instances. 

The  purchase  of  Florida  from  Spain  in  the  year  1819  was 
the  natural  termination  of  a  lon^  scries  of  disputes  about 
boundaries  and  other  matters  lu'tween  the  viporous  grasp- 
ing younj,'  republic  and  a  (l(-cre])it  neighbor.    On  account 
of  the  situation  of  Florida,  the  American  people  coveted 
it  from  the  first,  and  their  desire  was  greatly  stimulated 
by  their  purchase  of  Louisiana;  for  after  that  event  the 
peninsula  was  in  their  eyes  a  dangerous  foreign  excrescence 
which  broke  the  co  -inuity  of  their  coast  and  also  threat- 
ened one  of  their  most  im]K»rtant  lines  of  communication. 
The  weakness  of  Spain's  hold,  and  the  fact  that  Florida 
served  as  a  refuge  for  runaway  slaves,  hostile  Indians,  and 
adventurers  of  all  kinds,  continually  invited  American 
interference,  which  more  than  once  took  i^lace.  Finally, 
therefore,  in  ISIO,  when  the  greater  part  of  the  Spanish 
colonies  were  already  engaged  in  a  successful  revolt  which 
might  easily  extend  to  Florida,  the  government  at  Madrid 
decided  that  the  time  had  come  to  put  an  end  to  a  continual 
source  of  dispute  between  the  two  countries,  and  to  get 
something  for  the  colony  before  it  was  too  late.    From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Aniericans,  tlie  purchase  was  in  every 
way  advantageous;  for  the  seventy  thousand  square  miles 
thus  acquired,  which  to-day  have  a  population  of  more 
than  half  a  million,  were  of  value  in  themselves,  and  from 
their  position  were  almost  a  necessity  to  the  United  States. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  liard  for  any  inuiartial  \vrit(>r  to 
maintain  tliat  the  treatment  of  Spain  by  the  United  States 
for  maiiv  years  before  the  sale  can  be  justified  either  by 
international  law  or  by  morality. 
The  census  of  1820  showed  that,  if  the  area  of  the  Union 


FORMATION  AND  GROWTH 


33 


was  inoro  than  twice  what  it  had  been  when  the  century 
(•i'tiHMl,  the  ixipulatioii,  which  now  mimhered  <),C)3S,4r)3, 
had  increased  at  a  nearly  equal  rate.  Durin}^  the  next 
generation  the  American  republic  added  to  its  domin- 
ions on  four  separate  occasions,  and  dreamed  of  other 
v(>ntures.  Tliis  movement  of  expansion,  which  was  popu- 
lar with  anient  spirits  in  all  sectiors,  was  twofold,  one 
side  of  it  being  imncipally  for  the  l)en(>fit  of  the  Northern 
States,  the  other  for  that  of  the  Southern,  and  it '  ,s  stimu- 
lated by  their  rivalry.  In  both  spheres  it  was  successful, 
but  not  to  tl:  same  extent;  for  it  was  pressed  with  unequal 
zeal,  and  it  was  opposed  by  adversaries  of  very  different 
force. 

The  Northern  States,  in  their  disptite  about  the  Oregon 
frontier,  had  less  at  stake  than  had  the  South  in  the  atfairs 
of  Mexico,  and  had  to  deal  with  a  f^reat  power,  England. 
rnd(>r  these  circumstances  the  joint  occupation  of  the 
territory  from  ISIS  to  1S4r,  ended,  after  much  bickering 
coupled  with  threats  of  war,  in  a  compromise.  This  settle- 
ment was  roundly  condemned  in  the  United  States  n. 
weak-kneed  surrender  not  only  of  American  possessions  but 
^ven  of  the  sacred  Monroe  Doctrine  itself.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  lieen  regarded  by  Canadians  as  one  more 
instance  in  which  (;reat  Britain  sacrificed  her  colony  in 
the  interest  of  peace  with  the  United  States.  When 
we  remember  that  the  complete  claims  of  neither  party 
rested  on  a  very  sound  foundation,  and  that  the  line  of 
compromise  actually  agreed  on  was  the  obvious  one,  — 
namely,  the  continuation  of  that  which  already  existed 
for  a  long  distance,  —  we  may  feel  satisfied  that  the  settle- 
ment was  just  and  honorabh;  to  both  |)a.rties.  It  gave  the 
United  States  a  tract  of  about  two  hundred  and  ninety 
thousand  square  miles,  which  in  1900  was  inhabited  by 
a])out  a  million  two  hundred  thousand  persons. 

In  the  South  the  situation  was  very  different.  The 


34         THE  UMTEU  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

slave  states  felt  that  the  acquisition  of  now  territory,  by 
the  aid  of  which  thoy  could  koop  pace  with  the  growing 
North,  was  for  ihein  a  nuitter  of  poUtical  life  and  death. 
Realizing  that  by  tiie  Missouri  Compromise  they  were  shut 
off  from  all  hope  of  penetrating  above  Mason  and  Dixon's 
line,  thev  saw  that  they  could  add  to  their  domain  only 
at  the  expense  of  Spain  and  Mexico.    However  little  we 
may  defend  the  morality  of  the  conduct  of  the  Americans 
toward  the  Mexican  republic  at  this  period,  we  can  per- 
fectly understand  the  tremendous  temptation  which  a 
huge,  valuable,  and   almost  unoccupied   region  offered 
to  a  vigorous  neighbor  afflicted  with  land-hunger.  His- 
torv  ;md  human  nature  show  us  that  sm'h  conditions 
Irad  to  but  one  residt,  — the  spoliation  of  the  weaker  by 
the  stronger.    We  have  to  comfort  ourselves  as  best  we 
nuxy  by  the  reflection  that,  in  the  hands  of  its  new  posses- 
sors, this  region  has  been  so  developed  as  to  become  of 
much  mon-  value  to  mankind  than  it  would  have  been  had 
it  remained  the  property  of  its  former,  legitimate  owners.^ 
The  insurn-ction  of  Texas  in  183G  was  a  rising  of  Ameri- 
can colonists,  aided  by  volunteers  from  across  thj  border, 
against  a  distant  alien  government  weakened  by  continual 
revolutions.    One  main  object  of  the  revolt  was  the  estab- 
lishment of  slav.  ry,  which  was  instituted  as  soon  as  the 
movement  succ(>eded.    When  we  consider  all  the  circum- 
stances, and  remember  the  dominant  influence  of  the  South 
at  this  period,  we  are  rather  surprised  that  Texas  was  not 
taken  into  the  Union  at  once.    This  step  was,  however, 
prevented  for  a  time  by  Northern  opposition,  the  treaty 
of  annexation  failing  in  the  Senat(>  in  1844,  and  the  measure 
being  carried  through  in  the  following  year  only  by  a  joint 
resolution  of  the  two  houses.    From  the  point  of  view  of 
the  struggle  against  slavery,  it  is  fortunate  that  the  new 
state  was  not,  as  had  been  planned,  divided  into  four  states 
with  eight  senators,  —  an  arrangement  which  might  be 


FORMATION  AND  OIIOWTII 


35 


(losirablc  to-day  if  it  \v(to  not  too  lato.  The  territory 
thus  acquired,  about  three  hundred  and  ninety  thousand 
sf[uaro  miles  with  one  lumdred  and  fifty  thousand  inhabit- 
ants, had  in  1900  a  population  of  some  three  millions. 

Mexico,  as  was  natural,  bitterly  resented  the  loss  of  one 
of  her  most  valuable  provinces,  and  the  strained  relations 
between  the  two  republirs  were  made  worse  by  boundary 
disputes  and  by  th"  unconcealed  d(>sire  of  the  Americans 
for  California.    Their  hif^h-handed  action  on  the  Texas 
frontier  led  to  a  war  which  was  one-sided  from  the  begin- 
ning.   Although  the  hostilities  were  on  a  small  scale,  the 
story  of  the  military  operations  was  almost  a,s  creditable 
1  to  the  American  name  as  that  of  the  pn'vions  di])l()matic 
dealinps  had  been  discreditable.    By  the  tr(>aty  of  (Juada- 
lupe  Hidalgo  in  1848,  the  United  States,  in  return  for  a 
payment  of  fifteen  million  dollars  as  a  sort  of  conscience 
money,  acquired  a  tract  of  about  five  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  square  miles ;  and  five  years  later,  by  the  Gadsden 
1^  Purchase,  the  boundary  was  again  changed  for  the  biMiefit 
^  of  the  stronger  power.    The  treaty  of  peace  was  almost 
'  immediately  followed  by  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California, 
I  and  by  the  rush  of  immigrants  to  that  region,  which  in 
.  consequence  made  rapid  progress;   whereas  New  Mexico 
and  Arizona  hav(>  gone  ahead  so  slowly  since  the  cession 
tli.'it  tliey  \::'vo  not  yet  been  admittcnl  as  states.    In  the 
^  territory  thus  taken  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  from  the  Latin- 
■  .American  republic,  there  are  to-day  some  two  million 
;  inhabitants,  of  whom,  except  in  certain  thinly  settled  dis- 
g  tricts,  only  a  small  percentage  are  Mexicans. 

Ill  the  half  century  b(>ginning  with  the  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase and  ending  with  the  Gadsden  Purchase,  the  United 
States  tripled  its  size,  and  more  than  quadrupled  its  popula- 
tion, which  in  1850  exceeded  twenty-three  million  whites, 
of  whom  some  ten  per  cent  were  of  foreign  birth,  chiefly 
Irish,  British,  and  German. 


i 


36         THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WUKLl)  I'UWEIl 


Such  a  rate  of  progress  cannot,  of  coursp,  continue 

ind«'fiiiitcl,\-.  tliouj^h  the  most  iioticciihlc  cIkui^'c  thus  far 
has  l)r<Mi  in  tlic  (Hiality  ratlior  than  in  tho  fiuantity  ot'  the 
(Icvchtpiiu-nt.  Since  i;  ')()  the  nutnlier  of  inlialiitants  has 
quadniph'il  ai;ain  ;  Imt  over  ei^'ht  niilli')n  of  them  (more 
than  the  total  i)()i)ulation  a  hundred  years  ago)  are  the 
black,  brown,  and  yellow  brothers  brought  into  the  fold 
by  the  Spanish  War;  and  twice  as  many  are  iinniip;rants 
who  hav(>  coinc  from  dilTerciit  parts  of  iMiroj  i\  I'ven  so 
the  ^ross  increase  in  millions  has  l)een  less  than  that  of  tlie 
Hussian  Einpire  by  the  surplus  of  births  over  deaths 
during  the  same  period.  The  territorial  expansion  of  the 
United  States  in  tliis  time  h;is  Iteeii  fxns'iter  than  that  of 
Russia,  but  less  than  that  of  lOn^Mand,  I'Vance,  or  (Jermany. 
It  has  coven>d  an  area  lar^'er  than  tliat  of  thi'  thirtcM-n 
original  colonies,  but  it  has  not  included  one  square  mile 
to  which  the  American  people  have  as  yet  felt  justified 
in  granting  the  full  self-government  which  the  older  regions 
enjoy. 

The  annexations  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury meant  the  taking:;  over .  of  land  capable  of  being 
converted  into  new  states  of  the  same  kind  as  the  old, 
a  process  that  will  soon  be  completed.  Contrary  to  expec- 
tation, the  addition  of  fresh  members  to  thi  '"nion  has 
not  weakened  the  ties  that  bind  it  to<xeth(>r.  Many 
patriots  of  a!i  (>arlier  generation  ])ro]>hesi(Hl  that,  if  the 
country  extended  its  boundarit>s,  it  nuist  soon  break  up 
into  several  independent  communities,  and,  in  particular, 
that  the  original  states  and  their  younger  sisters  would  not 
remai  i  long  together.  Such  fears  now  only  provoke  a 
smile  Modern  means  of  commnnicat  ion  have  revolu- 
tionized our  conc<>)itions  of  time  and  space.  As  the  vacant 
l;;;^!:-  !i;;ve  filleil  ;ip  with  settlerH,  and  :vr  railways  and  tele- 
graphs have  multiplied,  the  different  sections,  instead  of 
drawing  farther  apart,  have  come  into  an  ever  closer  com- 


FOUMATIU.N  AND  (JHUWTII 


37 


nuinity  of  interests,  as  well  as  of  ideas  and  traditions. 

Ill  the  case  of  California,  it  is  true,  there  was  for  a  while 
a  {vvVuxis.  that  the  new  re^rion  dilTered  niaterialiy  from  the 
rest  of  the  country,  and  hence  might  wish  to  ohtain  its 
autonomy;  but  all  danger  of  a  separation  of  this  kind  van- 
islied  after  the  completion  of  the  Union  Pacific  railway. 
-\i  w  York  and  San  Francisco  are  practically  nearer  to 
each  other  than  Boston  and  I'iiiladelphia  were  at  the  time 
of  the  Kevolution,  and  the  distance  between  them  is  short 
as  compared  with  that  between  Ht.  Petersburg  and  Vladi- 
vostok. 

The  local  antagonism  which  existed  from  the  early  days 

of  the  republic  and  ^nvw  steadily  stronger  until  it  led  to 
civil  war,  was  not  between  the  .lew  states  and  the  olil,  or 
the  seacoast  and  the  interior,  but  between  the  North  and 
the  South.  At  the  root  of  the  trouble  was  the  institution 
of  slavery  in  the  South,  where,  favored  by  peculiar  natural 
conditions,  it  led  to  a  peculiar  economic  and  social  develop- 
ment, which  so'i<.'ht  its  protection  in  the  creed  of  states' 
rights.  Tlie  war  put  an  end  to  slavery  forever.  Though 
the  scars  of  the  conflict  are  not  entirely  forgotten,  there 
is  no  danger  of  its  recurrence;  for  the  primal  cause  has 
b(  (  n  removed,  and  the  constitutional  question  in  dispute 
has  been  settled  by  force  of  arms.  When  the  generation 
with  personal  memories  of  the  struggle  has  passed  away, 
even  Southerners  will  m.  re  and  more  look  upon  it  ns  an 
historical  event  of  which  they  are  proud  on  account  of  the 
heroism  they  displayed,  but  which  has  no  bearing  on  their 
future  interests. 

In  the  years  immediately  following  the  war,  p\d)lic  o])in- 
ion  occupied  itself  but  little  with  foreign  affairs;  for  the 
nation  was  engaged  in  recovering  from  the  effects  of  the 
struggle.  At  such  a  moment,  territorial  expansion  did  not 
;ipi)eal  either  to  statesmen  or  to  the  people,  the  general 
feeling  on  the  subject  being  very  different  from  what  it 


TlIK  UMTLD  .SlATEri  AS  A  WORLD  PUWEK 


had  been  just  before  1800.  Still,  Bcarct'ly  was  the  war 
over  whon  America  acquired  by  purchase  half  a  million 
more  sciuarc  miles,  —  a  step  that  tiiet  with  some  criti- 
cism, but  produced  little  real  uppDsitiuii.  Sol  that  the 
vast  expanse  of  Hussian  America,  which  was  offered  f~r 
sale  at  an  insignificant  price,  was  regarded  as  having  much 
value  in  itself.  Kussia  was  glad  to  get  rid  of  it  because  it 
was  luiprofitalile  from  a  pecuniary  point  of  view,  and  could 
not  be  defended  in  th-  event  of  a  war  with  Enj^lund,  an 
emergency  which  at  that  time  sei'nied  quite  probable; 
and  the  Americans  bought  it  partly  in  accordance  with  a 
general  principle  of  freeing  the  continent  of  European 
dominion,  and  partly  in  order  to  i)revcnt  Great  Britain 
from  acquiring  the  re^cion  either  liy  force  or  l)y  purchase; 
for  if  Uussia  were  anxious  to  sell,  she  would  luiturally  turn 
to  England  next.  Some  believed,  too,  that  the  value  of 
the  fisheries  and  mines  was  sufficient  to  justify  the  expen- 
ditnre  of  the  very  moderate  sum  of  sevi  n  million,  two  hun- 
dred thousand  dollai'S.  This  last  calculation  has  been  more 
than  confirmed  by  I'vents;  for,  apart  from  its  political 
ailvantages,  the  Alaska  Purchase  has  turned  out  a  very 
good  bargain  in  itself,  the  annual  value  of  its  products 
being  greater  to-day  than  the  whole  sum  paid  for  the  terri- 
tory. In  making  an  acquisition  which  it  could  not  reach 
and  defend  by  land,  the  United  States  seemed,  to  bo  sure, 
to  be  entering  upon  a  new^  jiolicy ;  but  it  was  argued  that 
the  new  territory  was  on  the  same  contineat,  and  that  by 
the  annexation  of  Canada,  which  most  Americans  believed 
would  take  place  sooner  or  later  and  many  expected  within 
a  short  time,  Alaska  would  be  united  to  the  rest  of  the 
republic. 

In  spite  of  the  ease  with  which  this  matter  went  through, 
the  feeling  in  America  for  over  a  generation  remained 
hostile  to  further  expansion.  The  treaties  for  the  pur- 
chase of  the  Danish  West  Indies  and  the  acquisition  of 


FOUMATIOX  AND  GROWTH  39 

San  Domingo  failed  in  the  Senate,  and  that  for  the  aiuu  .vi- 
ti.'ti  of  Il.nvuii  in  ,x-'3  was  withdrawn  from  consiidemtion 
hy  r.cHi(i..(.t  Clcvchmd  as  Bc.ii  MH  ho  came  into  office 
I'or  thirty  yurs  th.T.-  wun  littl."  sv^n  th:it  tlie  Uuitrd  States 
would  mmn  go  l.cyuud  its  houiulH.     It  is  true  that  the 
l.opuKation  increased  to  some  Keventy-liv..  milliouH,  nnd 
that  there  was  a  great  industrial  develoi)inent ;  and  it  is 
also  true  that,  although  there  were  still  many  vacant  places 
HI  the  e(,untry,  there  was  no  lon-er  an  internal  "frontier" 
<.t  eolonization  beyond  which  broad  .ands  lav  waiting  for 
the  settler.    These  facts  made  i'or  a  new  ent  of  expan- 
sion, but  at  the  time  few  persons  reahzed  the  drift  of  the 
(urrcnt.    There  was  indeed  a  general  belief  that  tlie 
I  nited  States  was  destined  to  dominate  the  western  world 
and  to  annex  Canada,  if  not  Mexico.    No  one,  however, 
dreamed  of  aggressive  action.    To  use  a  recent  term  we 
may  say  that  public  opinion  was  anti-imperialistic 

Suddenly,  and  without  warning,  the  whole  situation 
(hanged,  and  the  country  found  itself  engaged  in  a 
foreign  war,  and  presently,  without  preparation  or  de- 
sign, launched  on  a  can.,-r  of  conquest  and  expansion, 
iiut  before  inquiring  into  the  causes  and  effects  of  this 
starthng  departure,  let  us  look  at  the  composition  of  the 
American  people  itself,  and  the  nature  of  the  political  ideas 
which  have  guided  it  up  to  the  present  time. 


CHAPTER  II 


NATIONALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION 

THE  Amoricjin  Constitution  bepfins  with  tho  words, 
"We,  tho  People  of  the  United  States  " ;  and  "We,  tlio 
People"  have,  in  practice  ;is  well  as  in  theory,  been  the 
SDVereif^n  Jiower  in  the  eoiintrv  tn  an  extent  i:ii'ely  e<|U;iileil 
in  the  histiiiy  of  theuoiUl.  Al  times  tht'  "  \\  e  '  ' ,:ive  l.een 
negligent  or  deceived,  and  thi-ir  liesiri-s  have  often  been 
thwarted  ;  but  in  the  end,  if  once  they  have  definitely  nuide 
up  their  minds,  their  will  has  always  overriild-  n  evny  ob- 
struction and  become  tlie  supreme  law  of  tiie  land  '1  he 
sovereign  Atnri  ican  people  are  the  master  wliose  w  i-^lies  aic 
to  be  earned  out  by  the  servants  whom  he  has  ai)pi)inted. 
To  jud>:;e  of  the  conduct  of  the  servants  in  foreign  as  well 
as  in  domestic  affairs,  we  have  to  begin  by  knowing  some- 
t'.iii^'  about  the  master. 

Tht  :v  is  another  r(\'is()n  why  the  student  of  pfilitical 
affairs  slioiild  devote  attention  to  th<'  character  and  com- 
position of  tiie  people  of  the  United  States:  1  le  nation  is 
still  "in  the  making."  The  character  of  the  America?is  — 
"  Yankees,"  as  they  are  called  abroad  rather  than  at  home  — 
is,  indeed,  well  known,  and  is  ^  definite  as  that  of  English- 
men or  Spaniards;  but,  though  they  are  stampinir  this 
character  on  newcomers  to  tlie  country  with  extraordinary 
success,  they  are  in  danger,  according  to  some  persons,  of 
being  submerged  by  the  ever  increasing  floods  of  these 
strangers.    When,  therefore,  we  look  closely  at  the  term 

40 


.\ATlu\ALITV  A.\U  IMMIUItATIOX  41 

•  tho  People  of  the  United  States,"  we  find  that  it  is  not 

always  an  .'xact  expression.  I,.  17,s7.  for  instance,  it  could 
hardly  havr  I..,,,  sai,!  to  in.lu.l..  the  [.lacks:  tlir  nr.-n, 
Slavs. ,|-  ihr  South  .lid  not  ••ordain  and  cstaMish  tl,i^  ( '.m- 
st.tuti(»n  ...  in  Order  to  form  a  more  l\  yU  vi  Tniun  " 
"i  t'  •  .se.-u;.  the  blessings  of  Liberty"  to  them.-ilv,' s 
i  tcritv.    True,  much  has  happened  since  then; 

^     ii.      hrsitate  to  t.-rin  tl...  mass  of  the  nej?ro  popula- 
p.'irt  ol  !he  sov.M,  ,^.„  ,„,,,,!,.  at  thr  pre.sent  ni..„HM,t 
uidthissoverei^m  [n'opl,-  itself,  —  is  il  uhat  it  used  In  I.e" 
What  are  the  prospecta  that  it  will  maintai.i  its  ess,.utial 
r  -      tlie  future?    With  the  ever  growin^Hnflu.x  of  new 
<  I'  ■-.-nts  .nd  the  derliniuK'  lurthrnte  of  the  native  popula- 
"•  n.  IS  H.ere  no  danp.r  that  the  Anie.ieans  may  .some  day 
I-  .  ^Toup  ni  sepa  ate  nati.u.alit  ies  instead  of  one  nation"' 
^pit<-  uf  tin  eosmopolitan  tendencies  of  modern  soci  d- 
lerecan  he  no  doubt  that  the  simit  of  nationality  in  one 
h'l  M  or  anoiher  is  still  a  tremendous  political  force  The 
i..>t   Imndred  ye.rs  ,.re  full  of  examples  of  its  action  in 
i'mldiUK  up  atid  ,n  .h.stn.yin-     By  Aveldiu^r  to^'ether  into 
iKitional  communities  states  long  separated,  and  by  throw- 
ing; off  foreign  dominion,  it  has  forged  modern  ciermany 
italy.  lJ,.umama,  Greece,  Servia,  and  Bulgaria.    It  h-ig 
-).Tyed  the  n  sistanee  .^f  I'ol.  s,  Finns,  .\rmenians,  and  others 
a^'.'unst    the   atten.j.ts  of  alien   p.-oples   to  absorb  them. 
I  ndvr  Its  mthunwi^,  Norway  has  separated  herself  from 
Sweden,  Austria  is  in  peril  ..f  going  to  pieces,  and  ey,  ,  ( ;n>at 
lintam  is  weakened  by  Irish  disaffection.    But  tiie  same 
-i'lrit  of  nationality  that  awakens  the  longing  for  inde- 
I"  n.h  nce  also  leads  to  the  persecution  of  recalcitrant  minori- 
ties    Kae,'  eonnicts  to-day  are  as  intense  in  their  fierceness 
as  the  rehgious  ones  of  earlier  times,  and  are  eveti  harder 
t')  adjust  by  fair  compromise.    When  favored  l)y  fort  ir.. 
the  oppressed  easily  become  the  oppressors.  Governments 
and  nations  fear,  anu  not  without  reason,  that  what  is  at 


42        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


first  harmless  pride  in  race  and  language  on  the  part  of  some 
minority  may  easily  take  the  form  of  political  sedition 
dangerous  to  the  existence  of  the  state.  If  the  American 
republic  is  ever  threatened  with  the  formation  of  distinct 
national  communities  within  its  borders,  its  unity  for  the 
future  will  cease  to  be  secure. 

One  difficulty  in  dealing  with  all  such  topics  as  this  is 
the  looseness  in  meaning  of  the  terms  we  have  to  use. 
When  we  speak  of  a  nation,  we  usually  have  in  mind  an 
independent  people  with  a  common  language;  but  the 
Swiss,  the  Belgians,  the  Austrians,  are  nations,  and  each 
composed  of  several  nationalities  with  equally  acknowl- 
edged rights.  Nor  need  a  nation  be  all  of  tlie  same  race,  — 
according  to  the  Fifteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution, 
the  people  of  the  United  States  are  not.  Nor  is  it  always 
politically  independent :  the  Poles  are  a  nation,  though  they 
are  under  several  governments ;  and  the  term  is  sometimes 
applied  to  the  Jews,  who  have  neither  a  common  speech 
nor  a  common  dwelling-place.  Nevertheless,  as  the  history 
of  the  last  century  has  shown,  the  tendency  nowadays  is 
for  nations  and  nationalities  to  correspond  as  nearly  as  may 
be,  and  for  the  idea  of  nationality  to  be  based  on  language 
alone,  regardless  of  descent  or  of  the  preferences  of  those 
concerned,  —  a  tendency  v.hich  the  French  have  experienced 
to  their  cost  in  the  case  of  Alsace,  which  was  taken  away 
from  them  on  the  ground  that  its  inhabitants  were  Germans, 
v/hether  they  wanted  to  be  or  not,  and  hence  properly 
belonged  to  Germany.  The  movement  known  as  Pan- 
Germanism  is  a  logical  outcome  of  the  same  theory.  The 
earlier  nationalistic  movements  proclaimed  the  right  of 
peoples  to  determine  their  own  destinies ;  the  later  exten- 
sions have  tended  to  look  on  nationality  as  a  sort  of  higher 
law  which  is  as  much  justified  in  overriding  the  opposition 
of  minorities  as  were  the  Nurthrri;  St;iti  s  of  tlie  UriiwU  in 
putting  down  the  rebellion  of  the  Houthern.    Such  a  doc- 


NATIONALTTY  AND  IMMIGRATION  43 

trine  may  easily  be  pushed  to  great  lengths:  sweet  reason- 
ahlonr.s,  not  to  say  common  fairness,  is  seldom  a  char- 
ac  eristic  of  ardent  champions  of  nationality,  who,  as  a 
H'le,  oa huly  overlook  the  most  obvious  inconsistencies, 
and  while  warmly  advocating  a  policy  for  the  assimilation 
of  all  alien  elements  at  home,  cry  out  oppression  if  the  same 
treatment  is  given  to  those  of  their  ilk  in  foreign  laiuls. 
Ihe  .erman  who  favors  severe  measures  in  order  to  dena- 
tionalize the  Poles  in  Posen  is  sure  to  be  full  of  indignation 
at  the  way  in  which  the  German  language  is  discrimi- 
nated against  in  Hungary  and  in  the  Baltic  provinces;  and 
many  an  Amencan  who  has  condemned  the  iniquity  of 
trymg  to  Russianize  the  Finns  or  the  Armenians  beUeves 
as  a  matter  of  course  that  the  EngUsh  language  should 
H>  imposed  as  soon  as  possible  on  the  inhabitants  of  Porto 
Kico. 

In  spite  of  the  very  hberal  policy  followed  until  recently 
by  the  United  States  toward  those  who  sought  its  shores 
as  a  refuge  and  a  home,  there  has  always  been  a  certain 
amount  of  opposition  among  native  Americans  to  the  free 
adnussion  of  too  many  newcomers.  Two  generations  ago, 
V  J^'     Z  ^  u'^'  Nothing  party,  this  opposition 

was  ^imulated  by  religious  motives,  by  the  dislike  of  Ameri- 
can Protestants  for  Irish  Roman  Catholics;  in  the  days 
when  German  immigration  was  at  its  height,  there  were 
t<'ars  that  some  whole  section  of  the  couniiy  might  become 
permanently  German  in  character;  and  to-day' when  el 

ZlUr  '"'"''^  "'^'^  ^^'■"I^^  predominant 

among  the  new  arrivals,  many  persons  dread  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  old  American  type  in  a  flood  of  aliens  belongin-^ 
to  what  most  so-called  Anglo-Saxons  regard  as  less  highl^ 

of  al  1-'  i  f  ''''''  questions 

all  kinds  are  full  of  pitf.n.  f.r  the  unwary;  and  when 

come  to  such  a  subject  as  th,>  influence  on  national 
character  of  an  infusion  of  foreign  blood,  we  are  in  a  domain 


44 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


in  which  there  is  a  minimum  amount  of  ascertained  fact 
and  the  fullest  play  for  fancy.  In  such  a  case,  prophecy  is 
nothing  but  guesswork.  It  does  seem  clear,  however,  that 
if  the  Americans  are  to  impregnate  all  their  citizens  with 
their  ideals  and  traditions,  and  thus  to  maintain  the  unity 
of  the  nation,  it  is  of  vital  importance  that  newcomers 
should  sooner  or  later  adopt  the  national  tongue  instead  of 
maintaining  a  speech  of  their  own.  Otherwise,  how  can 
they  ever  be  completely  absorbed  into  the  general  mass? 
That  any  language  besides  English  has  a  chance  of  estab- 
lishing itself  permanently  in  the  country,  few  Americans 
believe.  Some  foreigners  have  been  inclined  to  regard  the 
question  as  an  open  one. 

If  we  turn  to  the  tables  of  population  as  given  by  the 
census  of  1900,  there  seems  at  first  sight  to  be  cause  for 
alarm.  Of  the  seventy-six  milUon  inhabitants  of  the  United 
States  proper,  we  find  that  at  that  date  (leaving  out  of  ac- 
count for  the  moment  the  colored  races,  which  must  be 
taken  up  separately)  forty-one  million  were  of  native  parent- 
age, ten  milUon  of  foreign  l)irth,  and  more  than  fifteen  million 
of  foreign  parentage,  —  a  total  of  more  than  twenty-five 
milUon  aliens  as  compared  with  only  forty-one  million 
whites  of  native  birth.  When  we  remember,  too,  that  the 
annual  immigration  has  of  late  been  over  a  milUon,  and 
that  the  birthrate  among  the  foreign  population  is  higher 
than  among  the  native,  is  there  not  some  reason  for 
anxiety  ?  Will  not  the  United  States  of  the  future  be  like 
Austria  or  Russia  to-day,  a  country  inhabited  by  many 
different  and  often  discordant  nationalities? 

Natural  as  such  fears  are,  a  little  study  will  convhice  us 
that  thus  far  there  is  no  cause  for  apprehension  of  tiiis  kind  ; 
we  may  rest  assured  that  the  American  of  the  future  wiU 
speak  English  as  his  native  tongue,  except,  perhaps,  when 
he  is  born  in  Porto  Rico  or  some  other  outlying  possession. 
When  the  situation  in  the  United  States  is  compared  in 


NATIONALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION  45 

detail  with  that  in  Russia  or  Austria,  the  difference  is 

evident.    In  the  two  empires,  although  there  is  much 
mingling  of  population,  each  nationality  has,  as  a  rule, 
its  particular  aistrict  in  which  it  outnumbers  all  others' 
-  its  own  home,  consecrated  by  history  and  traditions.' 
\\  ithin  the  American  Union,  on  the  contrary,  although  the 
inhabitants  of  foreign  origin  outnumber  the  older  natives 
in  several  states,  in  no  single  --tate  does  one  foreign  element 
predominate  to  such  an  extent  that  it  threatens  to  become 
supreme,  and  in  no  part  of  the  country  are  f.  .-igners  of  one 
language  and  nationality  massed  in  such  groups  as  to  be 
formidable  to  the  national  unity  of  the  whole.    The  Germans 
m  New  York  and  in  tlie  Middle  West,  the  Scandinavians  in 
tJie  ^orth-Central  States,  the  French  Canadians  in  northern 
rsew  England,  are  each  so  counterbalanced  by  other  ele- 
ments that  they  are  incapable  of  denationalizing  the  people 
about  them.    The  different  foreign  contingents  do  not  even 
seek  to  coalesce  against  the  older  sort  of  Americans ;  it  is  be- 
tween themselves  rather  than  between  the  eariier  and  the 
later  comers  that  national  jealousies  are  usually  found. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  language,  too,  the  significance  of 
the  census  figures  is  greatly  diminished  by  the  fact  that  the 
English,  the  Scotch,  the  Irish,  and  the  English  Canadians, 
who  together  form  more  than  one-third  of  the  foreign-bom, 
speak  English  as  their  native  tongue,  and  hence  are  an  in- 
Jluence  in  favor  of  unity  rather  than  of  diversity.  Moreover, 
if  we  examine  in  detail  the  composition  of  the  fifteen  million 
Americans  of  foreign  parentage,  we  discover  that  one-third 
of  them  were  only  of  half-foreign  parentage,  one  parent  being 
a  native.    They  may  thus  safely  be  counted  as  Americans  in 
evciy  sense  of  the  word,  and  so  may  most  of  the  other  two- 
thuds.    Up  to  the  present  time,  the  United  States  has,  in- 
deed, shown  remarkable  power  of  assimilation.    Even  when 
tlie  foreign  immigrant  has  come  to  the  country  too  old  to 
learn  English  himself,  his  child  is  almost  certain  to  do  so. 


46 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


According  to  the  census  of  1900,  among  the  children  of 
foreign  ])a rentage  who  were  over  ten  years  of  age,  the  pro- 
portion oi  those  ignorant  of  Enghsh  was  in  only  three  states 
or  territories  more  than  eighteen  per  cent  of  the  wholcj  — 
a  striking  testimony  to  the  enonnous  influence  of  the  Ameri- 
can public  school  in  preserving  the  national  unity.  Mill- 
ions of  children  of  Poles,  Bohemians,  Italians,  Russian  Jews, 
and  of  other  ahens  of  many  sorts  come  together  in  this 
common  meeting-phice,  and  in  acquiring  first  and  foremost 
a  knowledge  of  the  language  of  the  country  in  which  they  are 
to  live,  get  to  feel  that  they  are  all  equally  Americans.  The 
patriotism  that  is  thus  taught  them  may  sometimes  be  of 
a  crude,  chauvinistic  type,  hnt  it  is  of  incalculable  service 
in  fusing  tliem  into  one  homogcuieous  mass  of  future 
American  citizens. 

Another  influence  which  until  now  has  helped  to  draw 
the  immigrant  into  the  common  interests  of  American 
life  has  been  the  keenness  of  political  strife.  The  local 
politician  never  loses  a  chance  to  get  votes.  If  he  knows 
that  in  his  district  there  is  a  colony  of  Italians  or  of  Russian 
Jews  who  care  nothing  about  American  questions,  but  whose 
votes  he  may  be  able  to  obtain  for  his  purposes,  he  is  not 
likely  to  leave  them  long  to  themselves ;  he  may  be  trusted 
to  hunt  them  out,  and  i  persuade  them  to  be  naturalized 
and  join  the  local  party  organization.  Ilis  object  in 
such  cases  is,  of  course,  purely  selfish,  and  the  means 
of  persuasion  he  employs  are  often  far  from  admirable; 
but  in  the  long  run  it  is  certainly  better  for  a  democratic 
community  that  every  element  of  the  population  should  be 
interested  in  its  government  than  that  any  should  feel  that 
they  are  foreigners  witho  it  voice  in  the  general  welfare. 

The  three  parts  of  the  Union  in  which,  in  1900,  more  than 
eighteen  per  cent  of  the  children  of  foreign  parentage  had 
no  knowledge  of  English  were  Texas,  Arizona,  and  New 
Mexico.    It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  as  this  region  repre- 


NATIONALITY  ANP  IMMIGRATION  47 

sents  a  conquest  at  tl.e  expense  of  another  civilized  state, 
Its  bpanish-speaking  population  is  of  older  date  than  its 
English.    Without  attributing  too  much  importance  to 
the  resistance  of  the  earlier  language  in  this  particular  case, 
^ve  may  note  the  circumstance;  for  it  helps  to  emphasize 
the  immense  advantage  which  the  United  States  has  en- 
joyed m  other  sections  from  the  fact  that  the  foreign 
element  among  its  citizens  is  due  not,  as  in  Kussia,  to  con- 
quest, or  even  to  peaceful  union,  but  to  voluntary  immigra- 
non.    i  he  Hussian  goes  as  an  alien  to  the  other  peoples  in 
the  empire,  and  endeavors  to  impose  upon  them  his  lan- 
guage and  his  way  of  thought ;  hut,  however  justified  Ins 
efforts  may  be  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  general  good  of 
the  state,  to  the  subject  peoples  his  attempt  to  Kussianize 
t  lu  ni,  to  deprive  them  of  the  nationality  which  they  held  for 
generations  before  he  appeared  in  their  land,  is  an  act  of 
oppression,  which  they  fiercely  resent.    In  the  United  States, 
It  IS  the  foreigner  who  comes  of  his  own  free  will  to  live 
among  strangers  and  to  profit  by  the  advantages  which  such 
n  .<l(.nce  offers;  he  has  not,  therefore,  the  same  right  to 
<'"nii,lain  if  they  insist  upon  a  certain  conformity  to  their 
own  tyi)e.    The  Pole,  the  Finn,  the  Armenian,  feels  very 
differently  about  having  to  learn  Russian  in  his  schools  at 
home  and  about  attending  English  schools  in  America  In 
the  first  mstance,  useful  as  the  language  may  be  in  itself 
he  regards  the  requirement  to  learn  it  as  an  unjustifiable 
imposition  if  it  i.  designed  to  supplant  his  own;  in  the 
second  he  looks  on  the  obligation  as  a  privilege  by  which 
he  is  glad  to  profit. 

The  mental  attitude  of  the  immigrant  toward  the  people 
-this  new  country  is  of  vital  consequence  in  determining 
whether  he  is  going  to  identify  himself  with  them.  If  he 
:-r-l3  that  he  belongs  to  a  sup.  'lor  race,  that  he  represents 
u  higher  level  of  civilization  than  they,  he  is  not  likely  to 
strive  to  become  one  of  them  any  more  than  is  necessary  for 


48         THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


his  mattriui  profit;  he  will  keep  his  home  life  and  all  his 

more  uU  '  listic  iiitorcHts  as  unchanged  as  possible.  On  tln' 
otlier  hiiii  1  ;  (  lias  coiiu'  as  a  watulcrcr  to  a  promised 
land,  to  one  wli'-rc  he  will  not  oidy  have  greater  oppitr- 
tunitios  than  he  has  enjoyed  at  home,  but  where  he  can 
learn  from  those  about  him  much  that  will  better  his  con- 
dition, the  chances  are  that  he  will  not  live  apart  or  cling 
too  jealously  to  his  former  inheritance. 

The  United  States,  beiiiji;  a  prosperous,  progressive  com- 
munity, has  had  tlu"  good  fortune  t(j  find  in  most  of  those; 
who  seek  its  shores  p(>o[)le  eager  to  learn  its  lessons  and 
to  share  in  its  life.  The  immigrant  may  cherish  his  pride 
of  nationality  and  love  of  his  former  country ;  but  usually 
he  has  no  feeling  of  superiority  to  make  him  disinelined  to 
become  one  of  the  nation  abuut  him.  On  the  contrary, 
he  arrives  full  of  enthusiasms  and  dreams,  some  of  which,  it 
is  tnie,  are  sadly  dissipated  later,  but  most  of  which  are 
realized.  Being  an  American  means  for  him  a  rise  in  the 
social  scale,  as  well  as  an  increase  in  the  comforts  of  life ; 
and  he  is  not  ungratefid. 

For  a  striking  instance  of  the  power  of  influence  of  this 
kind,  we  have  but  to  turn  to  the  history  of  tiie  (Jerman 
settlements  on  the  Volga.  More  than  a  century  and  a 
quarter  ago  several  thousand  German  colonists  were  planted 
by  the  En\press  Catherine  II  in  this  region,  where  they  were 
providtnl  with  a  liberal  allowance  of  land  and  various  privi- 
leges. It  was  thought  not  only  that  they  would  prosper 
themselves,  but  that,  by  the  example  of  their  higher  civiliza- 
tion and  superior  thrift,  they  might  affe.^t  for  the  better  the 
Russian  peasantry  about  them.  The  experiment  has,  how- 
ever, been  a  partial  failure;  for  altliough,  thanks  to  their 
privileges  and  to  their  sterluig  qualities,  the  colonists  have 
prospered,  tliey  have  remained  ii  chisa  iipart,  kccpiug  tiicir 
own  language  and  customs,  and  neither  influencing  their 
neighbors  nor  being  influenced  by  them.   Though  perfectly 


NATIONALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION 


49 


loyal  sul.jects,  tlioy  have  never  regarded  themselves  as 
Russians ;  and  they  have  resisted  tr  the  best  of  their  ability 
the  measures  of  the  government  to  teach  them  the  language 
of  the  empire.    In  recent  years,  as  their  special  privileges 

have  been  curtailed,  a  number  of  them  have  emif^rated  to 
the  United  States,  where  a  curious  charij^e  is  taking;  pbice  ; 
for  these  same  German  colonists  who  have  withstood  for  so 
long  the  influences  of  their  Russian  environment  are  yield- 
ing rapidly  to  their  American  one.  They  are  beginning  to 
iicquire  Etij^lisii,  and  in  a  g-'neration  or  two  will  undoul)tedly 
disappear  in  the  mass  of  American  citizens,  a  result  due  not 
so  much  to  better  conditions  of  life  than  those  which  they 
enjoyed  in  Russia  as  to  their  different  attitude  toward  the 
p( ople  about  them.  We  may  note,  too,  that  the  German 
inunigrants  in  southern  Brazil  have  kept  their  mother  tongue 
and  their  individuality  to  a  greater  extent  than  have  their 
fellow-countrymen  in  the  United  States,  a  circinnf-f -  : .  o 
which  may  in  this  case  be  attributed,  at  least  in  part,  to 
their  feeling  of  superiority  to  their  neighbors.  Whether 
such  superiority  is  real  or  fancied  matters  little;  the  es- 
sential thing  is  not  the  grade  of  civilization,  but  the  senti- 
ment of  aloofness. 

In  pure  theory,  the  conceptions  of  religion  and  those  of 
nationality  have  nothing  to  do  with  each  other;  but  in 
practice,  as  all  history  shows,  they  are  very  often  con- 
fused, and  the  idea  of  "our  God "  and  a  "chosen  people" 
nppeals  strongly  to  the  human  mind.    Doubtless  there  have 
been  nuiny  violent  race  conflict  ,  in  which  the  rival  elements 
have  been  of  the  same  creed  —  as  to-day  in  Austria-Hun- 
gary; but  the  worst  are  those  in  which  each  nationality 
IS  the  champion  of  a  particular  church,  and  hence  feels 
that  it  is  fighting  for  its  faith  as  well  as  for  its  individu- 
;iiiiy.    In  such  cases  tiic  clergy,  instead  of  being  apostles 
of  peace,  whose  mission  is  to  allay  passions,  are  promoters 
of  discord.    Differences  in  religious  belief  also  prevent 


50 


THE  UNITED  I3TATE8  AS  A  WUIILU  I\)\VEU 


mixed  marriages,  the  most  effectunl  means  of  fusing  two 

p(  pics  into  nii(>.  Tile  fact  that  the  lines  of  rleavage  have 
not  coiiu  idcil  has  clone  ijioro  than  anythinj^  else  to  prcsprvo 
the  pcaot'  between  the  nationalities  and  hct\v-(M'n  the  faiths 
in  Switzerland.  Among  both  the  (u nnan  and  the  IVench 
Sw^iss,  Catholics  and  Protestants  are  so  evenly  divided  that 
religious  and  national  questions,  instead  of  inflaming  each 
other,  act  as  imitual  restraints;  l)Ut  in  western  Russia,  where 
reli^'ion  and  nationality  are  nearly  inseparable,  —  Pole  and 
Catholic,  (Jerinan  and  Protestant,  Kussian  and  Orthodox, 
meaning  one  and  the  same  thing,  —  the  task  of  combinuig 
these  elements  into  one  nation,  or  even  of  maintaining  the 
peace  between  them  is,  indeed,  formidable. 

Here,  afjain,  the  Unitcnl  States  has  been  singularly  fortu- 
nate. Although  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  cent\iry 
the  Catholics  formed  but  a  small  minority  of  the  population, 
which  was  looked  on  somewhat  askance  by  the  rest,  they 
had  full  religious  liberty.  The  first  Catholic  imr-agrants  to 
come  in  considerable  numbers  were  the  Irish,  who,  though 
they  bore  no  love  to  England,  spoke  the  English  language, 
and  thus  never  felt  themselves  to  be  foreigners  in  their  new 
home.  In  spite  of  some  natural  friction  with  the  American 
Protestant  element,  they  soon  became  an  integral  part  of 
the  community.  When  later  Catholics  of  foreign  speech 
—  Italians,  Poles,  Bohemians,  French  Canadians  —  began 
to  arrive  in  force,  they  found  to  welcome  them  a  Catholic 
churcli,  large,  flourishing,  and  so  thoroughly  patriotic  in  its 
feeling  that,  far  from  helping  the  newcomers  to  safeguard 
their  own  nationalities,  it  has  served  to  Americanize  them 
in  language  as  well  as  in  ideas.  Another  most  fortunate 
circumstance  is  that  the  Catholic  church  in  the  United 
States  is  not  sectional.  Its  adherents  are  scattered  over 
the  country,  varying  in  strvngth  in  the  different  parta,'  but 

'  Massachusetts,  the  liomo  of  the  Puritan,  is  now  a  Roman  Catholic 
state. 


NATIONALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION  51 

80  thoroughly  mixed  up  with  others  that  they  nowhere  form 
a  cornpac  block,  as  they  do  in  French  Canada  and  in  many 
parts  of  Europe.  There  seems  to  be  Httle  chance  anywhZ 
of  sueh  elear-cm  divisions  into  CathoHc  and  Protestant  di^ 
tnets  as  we  hnd  in  ( Jer.nany  and  Switzorlund 

Owing  to  various  causes,  some  of  which  are  oasv  others 
very  hard,  to  determine,  the  divers  nationaluuvs '  anu.  " 
tlH>  imnuKrants  to  America  are  not  assimilated  witli  equ'd 
-I-I.ty.  Son.e  of  them  -  the  Scotch,  the  Irish,  the  EngSsh 
and  even  more  the  En.Hsh  Canadians  -  are,  for  pract  ca 
purposes,  assHudated  from  the  beginning;  'for,  Sthough 
there  is  a  certam  clannishness  among  thc^ni   it  does  not 
seriousb^  affect  their  value  as  citizens.    The  Iriih  differ  moJe 
rom  the  earlier  American  type  than  do  the  English;  but 
they  are  more  desirous  of  becoming  citizens  at  once!  and  they 

tL""  TTTu  ^'"'-'^  have  been 

much  affected  by  their  activity.  Whatever  may  be  the 
psychological  influence  of  these  elements  in  the  make-up  of 
he  future  Anicrican  character,  they  constitute,  from  the 
ponu  o  view  of  lang^iage,  a  reinforcement  to  the  earlier  n^ 
habitants  and  a  powerful  aid  in  the  maintenance  of  national 

In  the  last  twenty  years,  Jewish  emigrants  from  Russia 
have  been  coming  into  the  United  States  in  overwhelming 
numbers     Although  they  have  spread  over  the  countr^ 

InZTt     T^T'^"  -       g^-t  cities,  and  particularly 

m  and  abou  Aew  York,  where  there  are  now  some  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  of  them.  Verv  few.  on  the'r  " 
arnval  know  any  English ;  and  they  differ  ^nuch  in  men- 
:.l.t  rom  the  average  American  citizen.  On  the  other 
'■•tnd  .h.v  have  no  national  idiom,  but  only  a  jargon  to 
.huh  they  are  seldom  attached,  and  no  people  are  1^^ 

Xt  ^^'^     ^^'t  '^'^'^^^ 
huf  L  V    l"'"  '^''^''''^      expression  not  only  in  public 
but  in  their  homes,  -  a  circumstance  nhicli  often  leads  to 


52 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WUllLU  I'UVVEIl 


a  rciilly  tru^'ic  dilTcrcnce  between  parents  and  children,  for, 
with  the  sDcfch,  the  latter  arc  apt  to  the  habits, 

tho  o})ini()iiH,  utui  cvfii  the  fuith  of  their  futliens. 

Ill  Hpite  of  this  ready  aiiaptabihty  on  the  part  of  the  Jew, 
there  is  in  the  United  States  an  anti-Semitic  feeUug,  new 
in  its  present  intensity,  and,  as  in  France,  quite  at  variance 
with  the  traditions  of  two  generations  ago.  It  is  stroiig- 
est  anioiin;  tlie  upper  el;iisHe,s.  In  most  Americiin  eities 
few  or  no  outspoivcn  Jews  will  !)e  found  in  fashionable 
society ;  and  even  in  the  universities  in  which  they  are  at 
all  numerous,  they  are  left  much  to  themselves  by  the 
other  students.  The  subject  is  rather  carefully  avoided 
by  the  newspapers;  for  the  A  aerican  Jews  are  already 
a  power  to  he  feared,  and  (piick  to  take  ofTenee. 

In  the  United  States,  as  elsewhere,  tlu-  French  are  noted 
for  their  tenacity  in  maintaining'  their  national  iutlividuality. 
If  they  had  been  more  numerous  at  the  time  of  the  Louisiana 
Purchase,  it  is  quite  possible  that  a  considerable  section  of 
the  S')uth  niiglit  long  hav(>  retained  a  French  character.  As 
it  was,  they  were  so(^'.  i  atnuml)ere(l  l)y  the  American  set- 
tlers; and  as  time  lias  gone  on,  their  significance  has 
dwindled  more  and  more,  French  society  held  its  own  in 
New  Orleans  till  the  days  of  the  Civil  War,  but  in  the  ruin 
of  the  planters  which  accompanied  the  conflict  it  r(>ceived 
a  blow  from  which  it  never  recovered,  and  though  French 
memories  in  Louisiana  to-day  are  interesting  and  pictur- 
esque, they  are  not  politically  important.  France  herself 
has  contributed  few  immigrants  to  the  American  j)opulation 
during  the  nineteenth  century;  and  those  she  has  •  have 
not  been  agriculturalists,  but  have  followed  certain  special 
occupations,  and  thus  have  scattered  all  over  the  country 
instead  of  concentrating  in  any  one  region. 

The  quota  of  French  Canadians  has  been  (if  much  more 
importance.  AttracteJ  by  the  high  wages  of  the  New 
England  mills,  the  "habitants"  have  come  down  from 


I 


AATIOAALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION  53 

Canada  in  very  considerable  numbers,  until,  according  to 

(he  cMiHtis  of  1!H)(),  there  were  three  hundrnl   ad  ninety-five 
thouHjuul  of  th.  in  ill  the  ooiintry  iuul  f(,ur  hundrc.l  and 
thirty-six  thousand  children  born  in  the  Vnhvil  States  of 
whom  the  great  majority  aro  to  be  found  in  the  nortii. m 
New  England  States,  and  chiefly  in  a  few  manufueturing 
towns.    As  ih(-y  keep  inuih  to  themselves,  they  form  an 
•'I'Muent  wiu.  h  is  but  slowly  affected  by  its  surroundings. 
A  few  writers,  who  hav(>  not  sufficient  I  v  investigated  the 
(juestion,  have  talked  of  the  probability  of  their  I<V(>nchify- 
ing  northern  New  England.   There  is  no  reason  to  expect 
anything  of  this  kind,  for,  although  the  process  of  assimi- 
lation is  more  gradual  in  their  case  than  in  that  of  most 
(.thers,  it  is  just  as  surely  at  work.    After  they  have  settled 
m  the  United  States,  they  are,  for  instance,   less  under 
the  influence  of  tiie  church,  which  has  been  <,ne  of  the 
strongest  forces  in  preserving  their  nationality  in  Canada; 
and  they  show  this  independence  even  when  they  have 
their  own  priests,  and  not,  as  sometimes  happens,  Irish  ones, 
'ihey  are  also  beginning  to  learn  English,  and  to  take  an 
interest  in  politics.    Although  in  certain  important  centres 
they  form  a  large  proi)ortion  of  the  population,  and  have 
occupied  some  abandoned  farms,  they  have  not  yet  spread 
over  the  country  districts;  and  in  Boston,  the  chief  city 
of  New  England,  th.-ir  numl)er  is  insignificant.     Of  late 
y  ars  the  immigration  (if  the  French  Canadians  has  de- 
clined, and  it  does  not  seem  likely  to  begin  again  on  the  old 
scale.    Their  places  in  the  mills  are  being  taken  to  a  certain 
extent  by  Portuguese,  Armenians,  and  others. 

Tlie  Scandinavini.o,  in  «pite  of  the  fact  that  they  cling 
to  their  own  language  with  teiiacitv  and  often  live  rather 
secluded  hvcs,  are  viewed  with  general  favor;  for  they  have 
the  reputation  of  being  steady  and  iiuiusirious,  and,  unlike 
most  of  the  other  immigrants  to-day,  they  go  chiefly  to  the 
country  rather  than  to  the  towns.    In  the  northern  parts 


If  4 


i 


THE  L'MTEU  aTATti  .\-  A  VM  ULD  PoWLi. 


of  the  land,  they  onconnter  conditionn  of  clirante  and  life 

rcscmhliiu^  those  to  '  liicli  thry  \\,  locust.  cd  i  le; 
niid  in  tfic  ririi  soil  v\Mii  us  ai;  ui'  rio-.^  tlic  tir.d 
opportunities  to  pn^sprr  siu  ii  ;i8  th  m  vor  l-  :i<'\v  I  ''fn-e. 
They  constitut*'  a  vi  . y  iinporcmt  '  !<'ment.  '  it  '  unr 
large  enough  to  threaten  seriously  tho  KM.  iisl,  ^  ang 
character  of  if  reL'ioii.  They  are  rnoBi  uiu  i.  r-)UH  in 
Minnesot;.  wh.  (i?  •  I'ldinj,'  their  e'  idrc  Ix-ni  ■ 
L'nited  Suites)  tii<  u  iIht  ^  '  ,!t'  -i  n.  iimi,  •■ 
than  a  third  of  tlie  ii-  .J  populai  n  of 
the  two  '  ndred  and  thirrv-six  fi 
Sc;indin;i\  iis  in  Minnesot;  were  ■ 
rho\i.s;ind  June  o  hundr.  •!  ;u 
u<  -';ins,  iid  "uc  hundred  an  lilrec, 
hut  ilie  th.  •(•  rutiunalities,  in  sj  'e  i 
do  not  ;d\\  tys  live  on  cordial  ter  )s 

T!  Italians,  Poles,  Bohemi;  81 
et(     wh  .  in  recent  .\ears  1  ivo  !ih 

lly  S( 

■ . !  i  n ' ' 


Ht 

nd 

'•d   ii  I 

thoU; 

11  tnd 
<ar 
ani 

r 


I 


81 


in  '-Vi  r  iiicr  i.sin'.-  -w;in  u 
(ir       the  n  anul.i.-tiuhi)^  an^ 
tn' -ute  iittle  to  th^-  at;ricuiti 
elements  are  to-day  ^  .  re 
ali-n  to  the  nativ--  A  rterira 
hal)its  of  life    li:ji  w  }. 
JU",  a  fact         '     t  n 
number.  ,  li 
forget  that  the  i| 

*  onvey  a  perf 

•  ecount  of  an  i 
aan-'  'hey  In 
lefce  ,  but 
-[j''ciaiiy  conm 

are  to  get  nt  the 


in.,  a  J, 
States 

'    -l-  .c  cities 

'li>n-i'       and  con- 
iai.  1  of  tiM'se 

^  niure 
at    iid  in 
nty  years 
ir  largo 
\\c  must  not 
rati v)n  do  not 
besides  taking  no 
lis  1    vinsi  .)Ut  the  Cana- 
i  in  Americr! 
f<  e.  a  i)racticf 

;  nong  iie  i  dians.  ihen,  too,  if  we 
ue  ant:  ;al  addition  in  the  foreign-bom 


a>  -cwa  at^d 
ii  ways  o 
•  pr>  deresso 

■  ■on' 

'8  Ulli 


..le  imi 
retu ! ! 


op-:,  ion,  —  n  addition  greater  in  itself  than  ever  before, 
ut  iot  a  mof}  ]  rger  per   ntage  of  the  whole  than  it  was 


NA'IION'AUTV  AM)  IMMiUlUTlON 


'  vo  pot 
lor  otii 

tl'is,  of  course,  serves  only  io  attmiiar. 


fact  ih  t  a  veritable  flood  cf  ali..nrar  .v.'.s  'ln'  , 
^<  itlu.  ,  and  eastern  Europe.    Their  pre^seIM  <■ 


at   ns  l,:vck,— we  must  subtract  all  those  who 

Hwseor    .other,  return  t(.      ir  own  r,  .,ntry.  All 

fnuu 

,       1  '  -•   ••  i"vn,-„,  lu-wever, 

iHMi^.h     ,  .uy  aggravate  certain  social  dangers,  cannot  vet 

unonfu  P^"^'  --^^-^^y 

Hmongthrmean  hope  to  acquire  a  pennauent  loothuM  " 

such  nor  ,   8  any  shown  denin  to  du  so.    Mor.  over,  th.  uct 

that  the  newcomers  flock  to  the  cities  rath.r  than  to  the 

country  ,f  perhaps  economics; i.  unfortunate,  tends,  never- 

H  I<  ss,  to  l„       them  tnore  quickly  under  the  influence  of 

ti'.'ir  .urroui,       s,  and,  throu.^h  th<  powerful  influence  of 

children.    In  some  of  tue  cungc-ied  uanuig  and  niar.u- 
unng  districts  the  proee.«  of  cor.  verting  them  into  m- 
tehigent  Av.   ncixii  citizens  is  much  slower. 

he  Germ.  ,s  forrn  the  largest  and  th.  most  important 
^■l-nent  l,on.    he  European    .  ntin.nt.    In  1900  they  in- 
l  foreign-huni.    .nd  r,,155,2S;i   children  of 
-'e,  though  of  tliis  nund)er  1,5S0,S74  had 
arent.   Can  we  marvel  that  patriotic 
loss  of  this  enormous  number  of  fellow- 
A, , '  ■       ^'      ^"  Australia,  or  Brazil,  or 
;^\rgumne,  nug,..  aave  Uiilt  up  a  future  great  Cennan  stato'> 
Most  German  writers  have  had  to  console  themsehvs  with 
H.  unsubstantial  satisfaction  of  pointing  out  how  beneficial 
hese  lost  sheep  have  been  to  the  New  Worid,  and  with 

".  Tn  ^  affections  as 

as  possible;    .at    .^n-  and  there  a  n>ore  imaginative 
spmt,  excited  perhap-  by  the  brilliant  dreams  of 
U^rmamsm,  has  managed  to  hdieve  that  they  may  • 
their  national  individuality  and  add  to  thp 
(.ermnii-spoaking  peoples  in  the  worid.    A  first 
the  figures  may,  indeed,  seem  to  justify  confident 


eluded  2,<i  'i 
(J«'rman  p. 

hut  one  Ci 
(Icrinnns  Ian 
fount rvmen  ., 


it 


56        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


kind;  but  a  closer  cxaniiniition  leads  all  whose  judgment 
has  not  been  warped  by  their  patriotism  tc  admit  that  such 
a  prospect  is  hopeless  of  realization. 

Curiously  enough,  if  there  was  ever  a  danger  that  a  portion 
of  America  would  become  permanently  German,  the  i)cril 
existed  in  the  earlier,  rather  than  in  the  later,  period  of  the 
national  history.  Durinjj;  the  sevcntomth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  there  was  a  large  German  immigration  into 
Pennsylvania:  it  has  been  estimated  that  at  the  time 
of  the  Revolution  the  so-called  Pennsylvania  Dutch  formed 
one-half  the  population  of  the  colony.  These  people 
led  a  life  much  to  themselves,  and,  if  they  had  received 
reinforcements  at  a  later  date,  might  perhaps  have 
become  the  nucleus  of  a  considerable  German  community. 
Such,  however,  was  not  the  case.  In  the  course  of  three- 
quarters  of  a  century  after  the  war  for  American  independ- 
ence, the  Pennsylvania  Dutch,  thou<zli  still  u  '  aining  many  of 
their  older  characteristics,  had  become  in  the  main  ^  'igli- 
cized;  and  when  the  new  current  of  German  immigra- 
tion set  in  with  force,  it  did  not  turn  to  this  particular 
region,  nor  did  it,  indeed,  concentrate  itself  in  any  one 
territory. 

The  result  of  this  dispersion  is  that,  numerous  as  are  the 
Americans  of  German  origin,  they  are  nowhere  prepon- 
derant, the  highest  proportion  in  any  single  state  —  710,000 
in  Wisconsin,  out  of  a  total  population  of  2,069,000  — 
being  little  more  than  one-third  of  the  whole  population. 
The  greatest  number  of  Germans  to  be  found  in  any  state 
is  1,'217,0(K)  in  New  York;  but  even  here  they  formed,  m 
1900,  barely  more  than  one-sixth  of  the  total  population  of 
7,208,894.  Moreover,  immigration  from  Germany  has  fal'en 
off  enormously  in  the  last  few  years.  Between  1880  and 
1890  it  numbered  nearly  one  million  and  a  half  (J  452,970) ; 
fidiii  1S90  to  1900  it  was  ik^I  iii  u-li  more  than  one-third  as 
large  (543,922) ;  for  the  year  190ti  it  was  about  thirty-seven 


NATIONALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION  57 

thousand  or  loss  than  the  total  number  of  Germans  from 
Austna,  Russia,  etc.  Such  small  accessions  as  tlie  Gernian- 
Amencans  at  present  receive  are  not  enougli  to  make  up  ff,r 
the  contmual  loss  which  they  suffer  by  death  and  by  absorp- 
tion iMirthermore,  even  if  economic  causes  in  Germany 
should  produce  a  fresh  immigration  on  the  old  scale  (which 
IS  hardly  likely),  the  time  is  past  when  it  could  make  a 
serious  impression. 

One  reason  for  this  is  the  well-known  truth,  admitted 
by  German  writers  themselves,  that  no  elements  of  the 
foreign  population,  except  the  Russian  Jews,  are  more 
eager  than  the  Germans  to  learn  the  English  language  or 
readier  to  denationalize  themselves  and  become  patrioti.- 
Amencans.    This  has  long  been  the  case ;   and  .oupled 
with  the  sterling  character  of  most  of  the  German  im- 
migrants. It  explains  why  they  have  been  regarded  with 
l.articular  favor.    No  mistake  could  be  greater  than  to  think 
of  most  of  the  children  of  German  parents  in  the  United 
btates  as  foreigners.    Not  only  do  the  great  majoritv  of 
them  speak  English  rather  than  German  by  preference  but 
many  avoid  the  language  of  their  fathers,  and  some'  are 
ovon  ashamed  of  it.    Certainly  they  all  deem  themselves 
thoroughly  American.    For  that  matter,  so  do  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  German-Americans  born  in  ( ;,>rmany  Those 
who  have  come  to  their  new  home  at  an  advanced  ag(^  cling 
to  their  native  customs  and  language,  keep  up  their  societies 
cherish  old  memories,  and  always  feel  a  little  strange  in  thei^ 
m-w  environment ;  but  the  young  folks  are  little  affected 
by  such  sentiments.   So  strong,  indeed,  is  the  loyalty  of  the 
German-Americans  that,  according  to  the  opinion  of  com- 
petent observers,  although  they  would  regard  a  war  between 
th.'.r  adopted  country  and  the  Fatherland  as  a  terrible 
calamity,  they  would  nevertheless,  in  such  an  event,  be  true 
to  the  former.    Another  evide„ee  of  their  denationalization 
IS  seen  in  the  fact  that  in  the  United  States  to-day  German 


if 


58        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


schools  and  newspapers  are  declining  in  numbers,  and 
German-American  literature  has  taken  no  deep  root.  The 
situation  may,  indeed,  best  be  summed  up  in  tlie  words  of 
a  recent  Gorman  writer,  "Das  Deutsch-Amerikanerthum 
hat  nur  eine  Cegenwart  aber  koine  Zukunft,"  —  German- 
Americanism  has  only  a  present,  but  no  future/ 

Until  recently  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Americans  has 
been  to  welcome  newcomers  to  their  shores.  They  have 
proclaimed  the  right  of  expatriation  as  part  of  the  inalien- 
able privilege  of  the  freeman ;  and  with  happy  confidence 
in  themselves,  their  land,  and  their  institutions,  they  have 
felt  sure  that  the  foreigner  would  be  only  too  glad  to 
identify  himself  with  them  as  soon  as  possible.  Experience 
has  shown  that  on  the  whole  they  have  been  right.  For  gen- 
orations  the  United  States  has  been  able  to  remain  the  land 
of  Uberty,  with  Avifle-opon  doors  for  the  poor  and  the  op- 
pressed, who  have  been  taken  freely  into  the  family,  and  in 
return  have  not  been  wanting  in  gratitude,  but  have  made 
good  use  of  the  hospitality  accorded  to  them. 

Of  late  years  a  certain  reaction  has  set  in.  Alarm.ed  at 
the  coming  of  so  many  aliens,  of  whom  a  smaller  and 
smaller  proportion  belong  to  the  English-speaking  ])ooi)les, 
the  Americans  are  becoming  imbued  witli  that  advanced 
form  of  nationalism  characteristic  of  the  present  day, 
which  demands  uniformity  of  language  on  the  part  of  all 
the  inhabitants  of  the  state.  Although  they  have  not,  like 
the  Germans  and  the  Russians,  applied  severe  pressure  to 
the  national  minorities,  there  has  boon  a  growing  tendency 
to  teach  "patriotism,"  —  for  instance,  in  the  cult  of  the 
flag,  —  and  to  insist  on  a  prompt  knowledge  of  EngUsh. 
People  feel  less  safe  than  they  did  a  generation  ago  in 
leaving  matters  to  the  quiet  wo:l.'  ,  of  time.  In  certain 
western  states  wh{>re  German  w;  ormerly  the  medium 
of  inotruction  in  sunu:  of  t'no  ].ut)iio  sciiuols,  it  has  been 

» Polenz,  Das  Land  dcr  Zukunft,  p.  381. 


NATIONALITY  AND  IMMIGRATION 


59 


displaced  by  Englisli.  In  other  states  a  knowledge  of 
English  is  requisite  for  the  suffrage;  and  by  the  federal 
law  of  1906  the  ability  to  speak  English  is  henceforth 
necessary  for  naturalization.  This  last  step  is  an  important 
departure  from  the  earlier  policy  of  the  republic ;  for  it 
means  that  a  larger  contingent  of  immigrants  will  keep 
their  foreign  allegiance,  a  circumstance  not  only  undesirable 
in  Hself,  but  likely  to  complicate  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  other  governments.  Although  there  is  much 
to  be  said  in  favor  of  the  new  provision,  it  cannot  be  denied 
tliat,  whetlier  wise  or  not,  it  In  longs  to  the  class  of  nation- 
alistic legislation  whicli  Americans  are  prone  to  condemn 
in  other  countries.' 

Not  merely  in  regard  to  the  foreigners  actually  settled 
m  the  United  States  have  precautions  been  taken,  but 
immigration  itself  has  recently  been  made  more  difficult 
than  it  used  to  be.  Mormons,  contract  laborers,  paupers, 
anarchists,  diseased  persons,  are  excluded  with  increasing 
rigor;  and  in  view  of  the  ever  greater  tide  of  arrivals  from 
southern  and  eastern  Europe,  the  demand  grows  louder  that 
some  sort  of  barrier  be  erected  to  check  this  invasion. 
There  is  much  division  of  opinion  on  the  subject.  The 
capitalists,  wishing,  as  employers  of  labor,  to  obtain  it  on  as 
eheap  terms  as  possible,  are  entirely  opposed  to  restrictions; 
and  they  are  supported  by  the  older  ideaUst  sentiment  that 
the  land  of  liberty  should  be,  as  it  has  been,  free  to  all,  a  ref- 
uge for  the  oppressed  and  the  unfortunate.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  labor-unions,  in  spite  of  the  sympathy  of  the  for- 
eigners among  them  for  their  fellow-countrymen,  dread  the 
competition  to  which  unlimited  immigration  exposes  them. 
Their  fears  are  shared  by  disinterested  thinkers  who,  anxious 

•  The  same  statute  curtails  an  old  but  growing  evil,  the  practice  by 
Which  foreignors  have  obtained  American  ctlizenship  for  n--.  .-•■the'- purpose 
than  that  they  might  enjoy  its  profcti,,,,  in  tlicir  own  lan,l,-an  abuse 
Which  has  made  many  troubles  for  Americ  an  diplomats  in  the  past. 


GO 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


only  for  the  welfare  of  the  country  as  a  whole,  are  seriously 

alarmed  at  the  enormous  quantity  of  new  clcnu'nts  which 
American  society  is  required  to  di^'est,  and  believe  that 
it  is  time  to  call  a  halt.  Several  measures  looking'  in  this 
direction  have  been  voted  in  the  last  few  years,  but  the  law 
of  1907  did  not  mark  any  great  progress,  for  the  provisions 
requiring  an  eilucational  test  of  the  immigrant  and  a  higher 
proj)erty  qualifi(  ation  were  struck  out  of  the  bill.  Still, 
fresh  k't^islatiou  on  the  subject  is  nor  inqirobable,  especially 
if  there  is  to  be  a  period  of  financial  depression,  with  a  glut 
in  the  labor  market. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  American  people  of  the  future  will 
have  more  variety  in  their  ancestry  than  theirfathershad,  and 
this  variety  may,  and  [)rol);ibly  will,  produce  serious  changes 
in  the  national  characteristics;  but  what  these  changes 
will  be,  no  man  can  predict.  There  will  be  local  differences, 
too,  in  spite  of  the  increasing  ease  of  communication  due  to 
modern  invention;  and  such  local  variations  may  be  ac- 
centuated by  a  preponderance  of  one  or  another  national 
strain  in  the  blood.  They  will  hardly  be  greater,  however, 
than  those  of  the  Prussian  and  the  Bavarian,  of  the  Norman 
and  the  Provencal,  of  the  Piedmontese  and  the  Neapolitan 
to-day,  with  their  long  ages  of  local  life  and  separate  de- 
velopment behind  them,  and  yet  none  of  these  differences 
seriou.sly  threatens  the  unity  of  Germany,  France,  or  Italy. 
In  the  same  way,  the  United  States  of  the  future  bids  fair 
to  be  an  English-speaking  community,  of  mixed  origin, 
but  fused  by  common  traditions,  interests,  aspirations, 
and  language  into  one  essentially  homogeneous  people. 
Unfortiuuitely  this  assurance  leaves  out  of  account  a  ques- 
tion of  great  magnitude.  In  till  our  considerations  thus 
far  we  have  been  thinking  only  of  the  white  race,  and  the 
conclusions  reached  apply  to  it  alone.  The  probl  em  ()f  the 
colored  races  on  the  American  continent  is  quite  another 
matter. 


I 


I 


CHAPTER  III 

RACE  QUESTIONS 

A  LI>  the  world  powers  own  land  which  they  have  won 
^-1.  by  the  sword,  and  which  they  hold  in  subjection  by 
sheer  force.    They  all  have  to  pay  the  penalty  in  one  form 
or  another.^  In  a  few  fortunate  instances  -  as  in  that  of 
the  terntones  which  the  Americans  took  from  Mexico  — 
the  lands  acquired  have  been  practically  vacant ;  the  earlier 
population  has  been  so  scant  that  it  has  soon  given  way  to 
the  later  comers.    Ordinarily,  however,  instead  of  disappear- 
ing, It  has  mcreased  in  numbers;  and,  thanks  often  to 
the  regeneration  which  better  government  has  produced 
It  18  now  becoming  insistent  on  what  it  believes  to  be  its 
iiK'lits.    Under  a  despotism,  when  all  subjects  are  so  far 
iH-low  the  ruler  that  a  little  more  or  less  is  not  of  much 
importance,  conquerors  and  conquered  mav  be  on  about 
the  same  level,  -  their  monarch  is  equally  lord  of  them  all  • 
but  m  these  days  of  sovereign  peoples,  the  subject  ones  arc' 
foehng  more  sharply  the  humiliation  of  their  position, 
llioy,  too,  have  had  an  awakening,  and  are  beginning  to 
clamor  for  liberty  and  .^quality.    With  such  pretensions,  a 
king  by  divine  rvM  need  have  no  sympnthv  ;  hut  a  govern-  > 
ment  based  on  democratic  principles  and  the  rights  of  man 
cannot  logically  reject  them,  except  on  the  ground  that  the 
(  la.mants  are  unworthy,  -  that  is  to  say,  that  they  belong 
to  inferior,  or  at  least  backward,  races. 
The  treatment  of  aUen  races  gives  rise  to  complex 

61 


62 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


questions,  sonio  of  them  of  infinite  difFuMilty.  Tlie  simplest 
ones  relate  to  the  peoples  lowest  in  the  social  scale.  It  is 
comparatively  easy  to  rule  over  mere  savages,  especially 
if  they  are,  like  the  natives  of  tropical  Africa,  far  enough 
away;  for  in  such  cases  firmness,  honesty,  patience,  and 
roMi'  M  sense,  qualities  in  which  the  English  as  colonial 
;  ,.!nini>trators  have  been  preeminent,  are  the  chief  roqui- 
-ijt'^s.  U  is  another  matter  to  handle  people  with  a 
iugiier  grade  of  intelligence  and  with  a  history  and  civiliza- 
tion of  their  own,  such  as  the  Hindus,  the  Eg>-ptians,  or  the 
Arabs  of  Algeria  and  Tunis;  for  the  more  that  is  done  to 
educate  tlieni  and  to  improve  their  condition,  the  more 
impatient  they  becom*'  at  being  kept  in  a  state  of  politi- 
cal inferiority. 

Every  nation  holding  colonies  will  have  to  face  such 
problems  sooner  or  later.  In  this  respect  the  Germans  have 
least  to  trouble  thcni ;  for  their  outlying  possessions  are  not 
nimierous,  and  the  few  thoy  have  are  inh  abited  by  peoples 
who  are  in  such  a  low  state  of  civilization  that  it  will  be  long 
before  they  can  claim  self-government  of  any  kind.  Many 
Germans,  to  be  sure,  think  of  the  Poles  within  their  own 
boundaries  as  an  inferior  breed ;  but  this  inferiority  would 
vanish  at  once  if  only  the  Poles  would  consent  to  be  Ger- 
manized. Greater  France  contains  more  subjects  than  citi- 
zens, and  the  British  Empire  has  some  six  inhabitants  of 
the  subject  races  to  one  of  the  ruling  people.  Both  em- 
pires include —  one  in  north,  the  other  in  south,  Africa  — 
possessions  of  the  kind  most  difficult  to  manage;  namely, 
those  where  the  native  population  is  increasini:  rapidly, 
but  where  there  are  also  not  merely  a  few  officials  and 
merchants,  but  a  large  body  of  immigrant  colonists.  The 
same  thing  is  true  of  Japan  in  Korea.  It  is  in  such  cases, 
when  conquerors  and  conquered  meet  in  every  walk  of 
life,  that  it  is  hardest  to  establish  good  reflations  between 
them.    The  arrogance  of  the  privileged  poor  white  or  the 


i;  a(je  Q(  lotions  63 

coolie  is  more  galling  th d  the  dc.iiination  of  the  official ;  and 
the  task  of  the  home  governrn^nt  in  reconciling  the  support 
v/hich  it  is  obliged  to  give  its  ( olonists  with  its  duty  toward 
the  natives  under  its  rule  is  arduous  in  the  extreme.  France 
and  Great  Britain,  however,  enjoy,  like  Cermany,  the  im- 
mense h\r  of  having  no  race  questions  in  their  home 
countries,  )opulations  of  different  color:  whatever  may 
happen  at  a  distance,  house  and  home  at  least  are  secure 
from  the  horrors  of  rare  war.  In  this  respect  Russia  is  less 
favorably  situated,  for  h(>r  various  peoples  all  live  in  one 
unbroken  block  of  territory,  though  most  of  them  are 
within  fairly  definite  separate  areas.  But  they  shade  into 
one  another  to  such  an  extent  that  it  would  be  hard  to  say 
just  where  the  inferior  peoples  begin.  From  top  to  bottom 
there  is  no  such  gap  as  there  is  between  the  American  and 
the  negro. 

Of  all  countries,  the  United  States  is  afflicted  with  the 
most  complicated  race  problems.  The  Filipinos  and  the 
Hawaiians  are  indeed  far  way,  and  America  could  get 
along  pretty  well  without  them ;  but  inside  her  own  borders 
are  populations  wliose  presence  .rings  with  it  difficulties 
that  tax  all  the  wisdom  of  her  statesmen  and  make  every 
demand  on  the  self-control,  not  to  say  the  generosity,  of 
her  citizens.  Of  these  populations,  only  an  insignificant 
fraction  represents  the  original  dispossessed  inhabitants: 
the  var;t  majority  have  inherited  an  even  worse  grievance, 
for  they  are  the  descendants  of  impori.-i  slaves.  The 
proper  treatment  of  these  people  is  a  matter  f  f  momentous 
importance  for  the  future  of  the  republic.  All  we  have  time 
for  here  is  to  note  a  few  facts  essential  to  an  understanding 
of  the  present  situation. 

Taken  together,  the  \  .inoiis  nfin-Furonp.'in  elements  in 
the  dominions  of  the  United  States  number  al.out  eighteen 
mUlion  persons,  belonging  to  five  separate  branches  of  the 
human  family,  usually  known  as  the  Indian,  the  Negro,  the 


THE  UNITED  S'l  ATllS  .VS  A  WORLD  I'OWEll 


Moiiixoli.m,  the  Polynesian,  and  the  Malay.   These  five  races 

(litTff  from  (uic  another  profoundly,  in  sonic  cases  perhaps 
more  profoundly  than  they  do  from  the  whitf  man  ;  and  the 
questions  which  arise  in  dealing  with  tiieni  are  not  at  all 
the  same.  Nevertheless,  there  are  certain  characteristics, 
not  so  much  of  the  races  themselves  as  of  their  relations 
with  the  whites,  which  are  common  to  them  all. 

To  \H-<;:m  with,  we  have  to  reckon  with  the  infjraincd 
belief  of  the  white  man  in  his  own  superiorilv.  This  senti- 
ment is  proliahly  stronger  among  people  of  north-European, 
than  among  those  of  south-European,  blood;  and  it  is 
supposed,  rightly  or  wrongly,  to  be  especially  developed 
among  the  English  speaking  peoples.  It  is  something  that 
goes  deeper  than  ordinary  national  pride;  it  seems,  indeed, 
a  matter  of  physical  instinct  almost  as  much  as  of  reason. 
The  successes  of  Japan  may  have  given  a  rude  blow  to  the 
complacent  assumption  of  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  America 
that  they  were  cal  d  ui)on  to  rule  the  world;  but  this  has 
not  altered  a  wliit  ihe  determination  of  the  Californian  or 
the  Australian  to  keep  his  land,  at  any  cost,  "a  white  man's 
country."'  The  man  of  European  blood  will  gladly  have 
servants  of  any  sort ;  he  will  welcome  the  Asiatic  (though 
seldom  the  African)  as  an  honored  guest  in  his  tmiversity, 
and  even  in  his  home;  he  will  like  him  and  admire  liim; 
but  he  r(\sents  Ins  coinii:g  into  competition  with  liim  on 
even  terms,  and  he  would  reject  with  indignation  the  sug- 
gestion that  a  man  of  another  race  might  marry  a  member 
of  his  family.  How  many  of  the  cmmtless  Englishmen  and 
Americans  who  sympathized  enthusiastically  with  the 
Japanese  in  :'ie  late  war  wo\ild  prefer  Japanese  to  [\us- 
sians  as  hiisl';'iuls  for  their  daughters  or  sisters?  And 
yet  the  Jajjaiiese  have  entered  so  whole-heartedly  int(> 
European  civilization,  and  have  proved  themselves  such 
adepts  at  it,  that  we  can  imagine  their  being  regarded  as 
virtually  one  of  the  white  peoples. 


RACE  QUESTIONS 


65 


In  the  matter  of  interbreeding  between  the  whito  and  the 
inlond  racrs  wp  find  curious  inconsistencies.    The  white 

iii;il(>  lias  seldom  shown  much  aversion  to  coiisorlin,!.'  with 
u(»iiieii  of  :iny  color,  iuid  to  having'  children  hy  them.  In 
India,  in  Japan,  la  the  i'hilippiiies,  -  everywhere  it  has 
been  the  same  story;  and,  when  we  refiect  on  tlie  orijjin 
of  the  millions  of  mulattoes  in  the  South,  there  is  somethiuK 
almost  comical  in  the  heat  of  the  feeling  of  Southerners 
alxnit  the  daii^'er  of  " misce^'enation."  Th.-re  have,  also, 
lieen  le^al  unions  with  Asiatic  and  even  with  African  women, 
liut  they  have  been  rare;  and  the  white  has  aliVays  recoiled 
with  horror  from  the  idea  of  his  womenkind  having  sexual 
intercourse  with  men  of  another  color.  In  the  eyes  of  the 
i:n};lish  colony  in  Inrlia,  of  the  French  in  Indo-China,  of 
the  American  in  the  Philippines,  a  fellow-countryman  who 
weds  a  native  woman,  even  one  of  exalted  rank,  loses  caste, 
but  a  white  woman  who  marries  a  native  man  is  at  once  be- 
yond the  pale.  Such  sentiments  are,  of  course,  not  equally 
extrem(>  in  n-gard  to  all  races;  but  the  instinctive  aver- 
sion is  always  ther(>. 

I<]ven  if  we  were  to  admit  that  all  such  antipathies  are 
based  on  prejudice  and  should  vanish  with  increasing 
enlightenment  and  human  brotherhood,  tlure  is  still  a 
reason  why  we  should  hesitate  before  approving  of  mixed 
n.arriages:  it  is  by  no  means  sure  that  the  offspring  of 
parents  racially  far  apart  are  likely  to  be  satisfactory. 
Among  English-sjieaking  peoples  especially  there  is  a  strong 
conviction  to  the  contrary;  and  this  conviction  cannot  be 
dismissed  contemptuously  as  mere  i^rejudico,  for  there  is 
sound  evidence  in  support  of  i  At  all  events,  the  popu- 
lar saying  that  children  of  mixed  blood  have  the  vices  of 
both  si(Ies  ixivX  the  virtues  of  rn-if  her  j'orr<:^'2VH>p-''s  w'^h  a  vide- 
spread  belief.  Granting  that  many  an  individual  mulatto  or 
Eurasian  may  be  in  every  respect  of  a  fine  type  of  humanity 
does  it  necessarily  follow  that  a  large  population  of  this 


66        THE  UNITED  STATliS  AS  A  WOULD  1H>\V 


sort  would  bp  a,  ^onil  addition  to  mankind?  Or,  even  if  we 
think  that  the  muhitto  is  suitcrior  to  the  unadultoratrd 
nof^ro,  (h)  we  want  th(>  white  ';iee  to  hi'  thrown  into  the 
melting-pot  in  order  to  produce  this  blend?  But  we 
need  not  take  up  the  question  of  superiority  at  all:  mere 
differences  may  be  sufficient,  as  in  the  case  of  certain  ani- 
mals. Dogs,  for  instance,  can  often  bo  profitably  crossed  if 
they  beloMu;  to  speeies  not  too  far  apart;  btit  if  kinds  that 
are  too  alien  to  one  another  are  bred  togeth'T,  the  produrt 
is  a  worthless  mongrel.  May  not  something'  of  the  same 
sort  hold  true  of  human  beings  ?  The  fact  that  the  chief 
European  nations  of  tiie  present  day  have  been  formed 
by  the  rninj-'linp;  of  several  elements  not  greatly  dissimilar 
does  not  prov(>  it  to  be  desirable  that  th.<>  American  people 
of  the  future  should  be  a  compound  of  whit-^s,  negroes,  and 
Chinese. 

The  inhabitants  of  southern  Europe  seem  to  mix,  not 
only  more  freely  but  perhaps  with  better  result,  with  some 
of  tlie  darker  races  than  do  people  f;i  hci  north.  For  this 
there  may  be  })hysiologiraI  reasons.  But  in  all  surii  ques- 
tions we  are  on  very  debatable  ground,  and  our  tiieories 
and  beliefs  cannot  yet  claim  acceptance  as  ascertained 
scientific  truth.  One  thing,  however,  is  certain,  —  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States  is  overwhelmingly  opposed  to 
iintermarri.ni^e  with  either  Asiatics  or  Africans.  This  iversion, 
which  goes  so  far  as  to  produce  strict  prohibitory  !■  ^islation 
in  some  states,  is  a  fact  of  the  utmost  magnitude;  for  as 
long  as  it  exists  there  can  never  be  amalgamation  on  a  large 
scale  between  the  different  races  in  the  country.  We  should 
entertain  no  illusions  on  this  point.  The  colored  elements 
may  live  in  perfect  agreement  with  the  whites;  they  may  be 
thoroughly  patriotic  in  sentiment,  and  may  feel  that  they 
are  as  American  as  anybody;  but  they  will  still  remain 
something  different,  with  traditions  and  mentality  not  quite 
the  same,  —  something  insoluble  in  the  body  politic.  Com- 


RACE  QUEbTiONS 


67 


plete  fusion  is  not  even  an  ideal  to  be  aimed  at :  all  that  we 
can  hope  to  obt: 'n  is  harmony  and  a  community  of  ideals. 

In  ooiihidcrin^  the  position  of  the  difforont  non-European 
pveoplos  ill  the  torritorics  of  tho  United  StiitoH,  wo  may  bojrin 
by  disassociating  thoso  in  tl.c  insidar  jjOHsessions  from  those 
on  the  fontinont.  The  problems  connected  with  the  former 
are  in  many  respects  the  same  as  those  which  have  to  be 
dealt  with  by  other  powers  owning  dependencies,  and  may 
best  be  taken  up  in  coiinection  with  the  colonial  policy  of 
the  country.  Jiut  the  latter  class,  the  representatives  of 
the  colored  races  in  the  Union  itself,  by  their  presence  im- 
pose on  the  Americans  difficulties  peculiarly  their  own. 

At  the  present  day,  the  question  of  the  American  Indians 
is  chiefly  a  sentimental  one,  and  no  longer  of  serious  political 
importance.  In  1905  there  were  284,079  of  them  on  reser- 
vatintis  apgregating  about  ninety  thousand  square  miles; 
a  few  thousand  more  are  dispersed  throughout  the  coun- 
try. Although  no  one  will  pretend  that  the  history  of 
the  treatment  they  have  received  has  been  creditable  to  the 
Americans  either  in  colonial  times  or  since,  there  has  un- 
doubtedly been  a  great  deal  of  exaggeration  on  the  subject. 
TiiO  idea  that  a  dense  native  popidation  has  been  swej)t 
away  by  the  sword  and  the  fire-water  of  the  white  man  is 
not  historically  correct.  When  the  New  World  was  dis- 
covered, various  peoples,  scattered  about  in  unequal 
numbers  over  vast  regions,  were  in  possession  of  the  two 
American  continents.  Those  occupying  the  territory  of 
what  is  now  the  United  States  w(>re  for  the  most  part 
warlike  .seminomadic  tribes,  who  supported  themselves  by 
hunting,  or  by  a  little  rough  cultivation  of  the  soil,  carried 
on  by  the  women.  Although  we  cannot  estimate  accurately 
uliai  iiir  (oi;ii  Imiian  pojAihiiion  was  when  the  whites  first 
arrived,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  much 
greater  than  it  is  now.  The  tribes  were  numerous  l)Ut 
small.    Even  the  powerful  confederation  of  the  Iroquois, 


68        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  l-OWEIl 


who  terrorized  a  tract  of  the  size  of  France,  was  nevt  r  able 
to  l)rinn  ten  thtnis.iiul  wiirrions  into  the  field. 
As  in  Sil.cri.i  atid  in  AnHtniliu,  the  native  population  was 

dnoint'd  from  tlic  first  ;  fur,  Iiowcvct  picf urcNqnc  and  attrac- 
tive the  iH.Mc  savage  may  he,  he  is  a  savage,  ulium  it  takes 
lonR  generations  to  convert  from  his  m.madie  habits  to  the 
humdrum  work  of  civilized  life.  A  race  of  hizy  warriors 
caririot  he  transformed  in  u  day  into  industrio  • .  farmers. 
Such  a.  Iiange  riiiglit,  iiidee(!,  have  taken  place  in  course  of 
time,  in  it  has  in  Mexico,  if  white  immigraiit>  liad  tii  ' 
come  in  sueh  nuiid)ens  as  to  ups.  t  everything.  The  coh)nisi 
can  never  be  made  to  see  the  justice  of  having  gnat 
stretches  of  good  land  lying  i.llc  in  the  hands  of  an  in- 
dolent red  man  ulien  he  him.self  prepared  to  (h'veh)p 
them.  for  his  own  henefit,  to  1  .  Hire,  hut  also  for  that  of 
society.  Viuivv  siieh  circumst,  aces  he  easily  gets  to  feel 
that  "the  only  good  Indian  is  a  dead  Indian." 

The  government  at  Washington  has,  in  the  main,  tried 
to  do  its  best  for  the  wards  of    he  nation;  but  the  v\:< 
orous  (h  inands  <  ■         frontiersn    n,  the  pressing  claims 
greedy  white  adventurers  wMh  political  influence,  the  ,  ' 
ficulty  of  preserving  order  ;.  id,  still  more,  of  preventi: 
the  illicit  sale  of  liquor  in  thinly  settled  districts,  and 
finally,  owing  to  a  deficient  civil  service,  the  appointment 
of  unworthy  local  agents,  —  all  these  things  have  proved 
too  mtich  for  the  American  people  and  tiieir  represe';tatives, 
m  spite  of  honest  intentions.    The  tale  (-f  the  rele.uuiis  be- 
tween the  white  nian  and  the  red  in  America  forms  one  of 
the  many  unsatisfactory  chapters  in  the  history  of  dealings 
het\  ,>en  the  stronger  and  the  weaker  races  of  the  world; 
Init  this  chapter  is  neither  so  disgraceful  nor  so  important 
us  has  been  T'l^idr  out. 

To-day  the  red  men  form  less  than  a  half  of  one  per  cent 
of  the  population  of  the  Union;  and,  though  the  birth- 
rate among  them  is  about  equal  to  the  deathrate,  thpy  are 


HACK  gUEailOXS 


09 


apparently  doomed  to  extinction.    Already  many  so-called 

IiidiiiiiH  I  vc  cithrr  white  or  hluck  hl.x.a  in  tli.  ir  veins, 
iind  H..uii(  or  l;i»cr  tli.-y  will  ;ill  doubt  less  Ix.  .-ihsorhcd  by 
the  surroii  diiiK  population,  wiucli  they  iirc  iK.t  iiuiiktoii.s 
enough  t(  affect  niaterially.  The  virtues  of  the  ludiun 
have  been  auch  as  to  appeal  to  the  imagination,  und  ro- 
mantic fiction  has  helped  to  make  him  popular.  Any 
one  who  lia.s  seen  an  afliictic  team  from  one  of  the  In- 
dian school.s  in  the  United  StatcH  inlaying  a^'aiiist  white 
students  of  a  university  will  hear  witness  to  the  fact  that 
the  red  men  have  the  sympathy  -f  the  crowd.  Tlu  v  are 
also  assured  of  the  friendly  feelings  of  their  white  antago- 
nists, antagonists  who  would  never  consent  to  play  against 
a  team  comiioscd  of  Itlacks. 

The  foreign  relations  of  the  Tnitcd  States  have  hccii  little 
affected  by  the  presence  of  the  Indian.  The  employment  of 
savages  by  the  mother  country  in  the  war  against  her  colo- 
nists roused  hitter  feeling,  and  was  one  of  the  grievances 
set  forth  in  flic  Declaration  of  Independence;  yet  it  may  he 
doubted  whetlu'r  the  patriots  would  have  hail  any  scruples 
themselves  if  they  had  been  rb.'e  to  find  valuable  native 
allies.  Again,  some  years  later,  the  fact  that  the  Spaniards 
were  unable  to  control  the  Indians  in  Florida  served  as 
both  rej»F  n  ar  d  pretext  for  American  interference. 

P'ui  ■  e  I.iicult  than  the  Imlian  question  is  the  negro 
question  m  America.  It  i>resents  one  of  tli(>  niost  sericuis 
problems  which  any  nation  in  the  world  is  called  upon  to 
sol-.  ,  but  it  is  useless  to  try  to  shirk  it.  The  facts  must  be 
faced  as  tiity  are,  whether  pleasant  or  not. 

To  bej^in  with,  the  negro  question  is  not  going  to  solve 
itself.  In  the  United  States  to-day  are  about  nine  million 
colored  people,  either  blacks  or  mulattoes.  The-e  may  be 
separated  by  fierce  jealousies,  and  one  may  look  <jown  on  the 
■  tlur;  but  in  the  eyes  of  the  whites  both  are  negroes. 
Moreover,  far  from  being  ready  to  disappear,  they  are 


70       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


stciidily  iiicrcusing  in  niiml)ers;  and  there  seems  to  be  no 
reason  why  tliis  im-rease  should  not  continue,  ut  least  for 
some  time.  In  fact,  census  figures  show  that  in  the  so- 
called  "black  belt"  the  disproportion  be  ween  the  two 
races  is  becoming  constantly  greater ;  tlie  jiresenre  of  so 
many  negroes  militates  against  white  immigration,  and 
where  the  blacks  have  a  considerable  preponderance  of 
numbers  the  whites  tend  to  move  away,  and  more  blacks 
come  in. 

Owing  to  the  social  system  produced  by  slavery,  the 

colored  population  before  the  war  was  continually  receiving 
fresh  infusions  of  white  blooil ;  but  this  is  no  longf^r  true, 
except  in  Vfry  slight  incasun-.  Marriage  between  the 
two  races  is  sternly  forbidden  by  the  laws  of  nuuiy  states, 
and  even  illegitimate  connections  are  now  frowned  upon  by 
public  opinion  in  the  South  in  a  way  unknown  in  old  days ; 
hence  the  negro  bids  fair  to. revert  in  time  to  a  more  purely 
black  type  than  lhat  now  prevailing.  Amalgamation  is 
quite  out  of  the  question. 

In  the  second  place  certain  political  truths  must  be 
recognized.  Experience  since  the  Civil  War  has  proved 
that  the  Southern  whites  will  go  to  almost  any  lengths 
r;.ther  than  submit  to  "black  duMiination.''  That  the 
Smith,  with  its  inherited  slave-holding  traditions,  is  an  ab- 
solute unit  on  this  point  may  not  be  surj)rising.  What  is 
surprising  is  that,  within  the  lifetime  of  thousands  of  men 
who  fought  for  the  freedom  of  the  slaves,  the  victorious 
North  has  accepted  the  Souiaern  view  to  such  a  degree  that 
the  dominant  Kcpublican  party  has  submitted,  with  very 
little  nuirnmring,  to  a  series  of  laws  on  tiic  part  of  the 
Southern  States  designed  to  evade,  if  they  do  not  actually 
violate,  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution  guaranteeing 
equality  to  the  negro.  This  extraordinary  change  of  atti- 
tude is  due  in  part  to  the  abuses  committed  in  the  period 
of  uegro  domination,  of  the  so-called  "carpet-bag  rule"; 


.  ■  c 


RACE  QUESTIONS  71 

i 

but  the  real  causes  lie  deeper.   The  substitution  in  the 
North,  during  the  last  twenty  years,  of  whites  for  blacks  >  ; 

in  suoh  occupations  as  those  of  waiters  and  barbers  neenis 
to  point  to  an  increased,  rather  than  a  diminished,  natural 
aversion.  Now  that  the  negro  can  no  longer  provoke  the 
sympathy  which  he  excited  in  the  days  of  Uncle  Tom's 
Cabin,  he  finds  fewer  champions.  Moreover,  the  political 
philosophy  of  the  day,  with  its  theories  of  race  inferiority, 
does  not  make  for  equal  treatment.  Only  b>  forcf  'jf  arms 
can  the  South  be  obliged  to  grant  him  the  promised  rights ; 
and  there  is  no  disposition  in  the  North  to  resort  to  any 
such  pressure.  On  the  contrary,  many  people  in  that 
section  sympathize  with  the  attitude  of  the  Southerners, 
aii'I  pity  them  for  having  such  a  terrible  burden  on  their 
hands. 

In  the  Suuth,  at  the  j^n'sent  time,  tlic  relations  between 
the  two  races  are,  to  say  the  least,  very  unsatisfactory, — 
worse,  perhaps,  than  they  were  twenty  years  ago.  Among 
the  negroes,  tb^re  exists  a  sullen  resentment  at  the  loss  of 
their  political  rights,  as  well  as  at  the  increasing  tendency  to 
segregate  them  in  the  public  conveyances  and,  in  general,  to 
impress  upon  them  unmistakably  that  they  belong  to  a  lower 
order  of  mankind.  Among  the  whites,  the  fear  of  negro 
rule  has  grown  into  a  perfect  frenzy  of  wrath  against  what- 
ever appears  like  an  assertion  on  the  part  of  the  colored 
l^opidation  of  political  or  of  social  equality.  Even  their 
education  is  regarded  with  a  suspicion  that  reminds  one 
of  the  days  of  slavery;  and  the  situation  with  regard  to 
lynching  is  terrible.  When  the  whites  in  country  districts 
get  to  feel  that  their  women,  unless  accompanied,  are  not 
s;if"  against  assault  a  few  hunilred  yariLs  from  their  own 
homes,  their  exasperatioti  makes  them  capable  of  any  act 
of  savagery.  An  epidemic  of  social  crime  on  the  one  hand 
has  engendered  an  epidemic  of  wild  lawless  punishment  on 
the  other,  leaving  both  sides  more  embittered  than  ever. 


72        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


To  add  to  the  difficiiltirs,  tho  two  compete  with  each  other 
in  daily  life  to  an  extent  unknown  before. 

Under  tho  system  of  slavery  t'lere  was  no  actual  rivalry 
l)etween  the  black  man  and  the  white:  each  had  his  own 
sphere  of  action,  somewhat  as  the  different  classes  of  society  in 
luedi.Tval  Europe  had  theirs.  But  the  feelinjis  of  an  ancient 
aristocracy  forced  to  luect  a  newly  crMancipatcd  lower  class 
on  even  terms  are  mild  compared  with  those  of  white  work- 
men at  the  prospect  that  their  standard  of  wages  may  be 
kept  down  to  the  lowest  point  by  the  competition  of  a  former 
servile  poj)ulation  of  another  color.  It  is  small  wonder 
that  the  labor-unions  do  not  admit  negroes  to  their  ranks, 
but  look  on  thi'in  as  the  igiKjiaiit  tool  of  the  capitalis* 
and  a  j^eril  to  the  white  workingman.  It  is  to  be  feared 
that  the  recent  industrial  development  of  the  South  may 
embitter,  rather  than  allay,  the  existing  hostility. 

In  regard  to  the  progress  made  by  the  negroes  since  they 
have  had  tlie  gift  of  freedom,  there  have  been  hot  disijutes. 
Such  statistics  ag  we  have  are,  on  the  whole,  encouraging, 
whereas  the  violent  criticisms  that  we  hear  rest  on  alle- 
gations not  always  easy  to  prove.  These  questions  need 
not  be  discussed  ;  but  it  is  worth  remarking  that  the  negro, 
unlike  the  Kussian  peasant,  was  not  provided  with  land 
on  which  to  sujjport  himself  in  his  new  liberty.  True,  the 
nmjik  with  his  land  has  not  |)rospered  in  a  way  to  give 
cause  for  envy;  but  he  has  had  disadvantages  of  his  own  to 
contend  with. 

The  probable  result  of  the  present  tendencies  in  the  South 

will  be  an  increasing  segregation  of  the  two  races.  Except 
ill  the  cities,  they  may  come  to  inhaliit  almost  separate  ter- 
ritories, an  outcome  which  might  easily  prove  disastrous 
from  an  economic  point  of  view.  Some  persons  fear,  too, 
that  the  negroes  of  the  black  belt,  if  left  to  themselves, 
may  relapse  into  siuuetiiing  very  like  barbarism. 
The  negro  question  has  more  than  once  affected  the  for- 


RACE  QUESTIONS 


73 


eign  policy  of  the  United  States:  the  desire  to  get  new 
lands  for  slavery  was  the  main  reason  for  the  annexation 
of  Texas,  for  the  Mexican  War,  and  for  the  attempts  to 
acquire  Cuba  a  few  years  later ;  and  the  hatred  of  the  South 
for  the  einancipatt  (I  slav('  prevented  the  recognition  of  Haiti 
up  to  the  time  ut  the  Civil  War.  At  the  j)resent  day,  the 
relations  of  the  republic  to  the  West  India  Ishxnds,  and  in 
a  lesser  degree  to  Latin  America  and  even  to  the  Philippines, 
are  complicatt  il  by  the  race  problem  at  home. 

Abounding  in  troubles  as  the  whole  situation  is,  it  has  at 
least  one  good  feat\ire,  it  is  free  from  condict  of  rclij-'ions 
or  of  civilizations.  The  blacks  and  the  whites  in  the  L'nited 
States  do  not  represent  two  different  types  of  culture.  The 
negro,  though  an  alien  element,  possesses  no  civilization  of  his 
own  :  such  as  he  has,  he  has  !j:ot  from  the  white  man.  The 
blacks  brought  irito  the  colonies  for  generations  came  from 
ditl'erent  tribes,  sp(>aking  iiuh^priident  languages;  and  in 
no  case  were  enough  of  them  imported  from  any  given 
region  at  one  time  for  them  to  maintain  their  native  tongue 
in  their  new  home.  The  Anierican  negroes  speak  English, 
and  nothing  but  English.  They  have  been  influenced  by  no 
fortMgn  culture  (^xcept  that  of  their  former  jnasters.  nor  have 
they  shown  tht  inselves  cai)able  of  origiiuiting  one  of  their 
own.  Their  standards  may  be  lower  than  those  of  their 
white  neighbors;  but  they  differ  in  degree,  not  in  kind. 
Their  intellectual  influence  is  a  passive  one ;  and,  as  yet, 
they  present  a  social  problem,  not  a  political  d.uiger. 

Colored  soldiers  have  been  used  with  good  results,  against 
the  Indians  and  in  Cul)a.  In  the  Philippines  they  did  not 
prove  so  satisfactory ;  for,  although  they  fought  well 
enough,  it  was  difficult  to  keep  them  in  proper  discipline 
in  out-of-the-way  iM)sts,  and  their  pursuit  of  the  native 
women  provoked  much  anger  among  the  men,  giving  rise 
to  fresh  iiisu!  rcction  in  districts  which  had  been  paci- 
fied.   Their  employment  at  all  v.as  lulterly  resented  by 


74 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  Filii)iuos,  who  regard  themselves  as  belonging  to  a  race 
superior  to  the  African.'  Nevertheless,  the  latter  un- 
doubtedly constitute  an  important  milit;iry  rosourco,  ami 
us  an  (M'onoiiiic  one  they  seem  to  Ix'  ludisix'iisahlc  to  the 
8t)Utheru  Stiilcs;  for  it  is  thoir  hihor  which  produces  ahnost 
the  whole  of  the  inuueuoo  cotton  croj).  Whatever,  there- 
fore, may  be  thought  about  internal  perils,  the  presence  of 
the  black  man  in  the  territory  of  the  republic  cannot  be 
said  to  diminish  its  external  power. 

Compared  with  nini^  million  ncfxrocs,  the  couple  of  hun- 
dred thousand  Japanese,  Ciiiuese,  Kon-ans,  and  Hindus 
in  the  United  States  api)ear  insignificant  enough;  indeed, 
their  numbers  do  not  together  equal  even  that  of  the  North 
American  Indians.  Unlike  the  Indians,  however,  they  are 
not  the  r(>innants  of  p(H)i)les  that  are  disappearing.  On  the 
contrary,  tli(>y  form  tiie  vanguard  of  an  arm}-  of  hundreds 
of  niiliious,  who,  far  from  retreading  before  the  white  man, 
thrive  and  multiply  in  competition  with  him.  It  is  not 
they,  but  he,  who  retires  from  the  field. 

We  can  easily  understand  why,  in  these  davs  of  easy 
communication,  Chinese  and  Japanese  should  flock  into  a 
thinly  populated  land  where  the  climate  is  perfectly  suited 
to  them,  where  there  are  vast  resources  not  yet  develo[>ed, 
and  where  wages  are  so  high  that,  living  as  they  do,  they 
can  hope  to  save  in  a  few  years  a  sum  of  money  that  will  be 
a  fortune  at  home.  In  the  long  discussion  over  their  admit- 
tance, the  two  peoples  have  been  the  object  of  nmch  unfair 
criticism.  They  have  been  inconsistently  charged  with 
taking  money  out  of  the  country  by  the  very  people  who 
make  the  loudest  objections  when  they  propose  to  stay 
permanently;  they  have  been  attacked  on  the  ground  of 
immoraUty,  —  a  subject  on  which  a  good  deal  might  be 

'  The  Filipinos  were  infuriated  at  tln'  siurK''stio!i,  inaili'  in  tlic  T'liited 
States,  that  tlieir  islands  should  be  colouizod  by  the  surplus  of  the  .\meri- 
can  colored  population. 


RACE  QUESTIONS 


75 


said  with  little  result ;  and  divers  other  complaints  have 
been  brought  against  theni.  Leavmg  all  such  accusations 
out  of  account,  however,  and  condemning  no  one,  we  still 
have  to  admit  the  existence  of  certain  social  facts  which 
American  statesmen,  however  free  from  anti-foreign  preju- 
dice, must  take  into  consideration. 

In  the  first  place  if,  as  is  generally  thought,  a  racial  inter- 
mixture of  the  newcomers  with  the  white  po])ulation  is 
undesirable,  it  follows  that  they  can  never  be  entirely 
assimilated.  Now  the  whole  American  theory  of  welcom- 
ing settlers  from  foreign  lands  has  rested  on  the  confident 
belief,  which  has  thus  far  been  justified  by  events,  that 
sooner  or  later  tin  y  will  become  Americans  in  every  respect 
and  be  merged  with  the  rest.  When  this  is  imi)ossible, 
should  immigrants,  no  matter  what  may  be  their  virtues, 
be  allowed  to  establish  themselves  in  large  numbers 
in  the  country  ?  In  view  of  the  terrible  difficulties  presented 
by  the  negro  problem,  is  the  United  States  going  to  saddle 
itself  light-heartedly  with  the  possibility  of  a  Mongolian  or 
a  Hindu  one  ?  This  does  not  mean  that  we  liken  Orientals 
to  negroos,  or  that  the  complications  which  their  presence 
might  give  rise  to  would  be  the  same  in  all  respects.  None 
the  less,  if  the  coming  of  Asiatics  bids  fair  to  burden  the 
United  States  with  another  insoluble  race  question,  is  it  not 
better  to  nip  the  danger  in  the  bud  by  limiting  admission 
from  the  start? 

This  dan^.  r  has  still  another  aspect.  All  the  evidence  we 
have  on  the  subject  goes  to  prove  that  white  men,  as  a 
working  class,  cannot  maintain  themselves  in  the  long  run 
against  the  competition  of  Chinese,  Japanese,  Hindus,  and 
perhaps  others.  The  reasons  are  not  far  to  seek.  It  is  not 
that  Asiatics  will  content  themselves  with  any  lower  wages 
than  they  can  get,  for  experience  has  shown  they  are  prompt 
enough  to  obtain  whatever  they  can ;  Imt  as  they  are  willing 
to  work  for  longer  hours,  and  have  a  lower  standard  of 


76       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


requisite  comfort  and  a  higher  standard  of  sobriety  than 
white  men,  they  can  afford  to  underbid  them.  We  may 
grant  that  in  time  their  conditions  tend  to  approximate 

tlioso  of  tht'ir  noit^hbors,  and  that,  if  there  were  but  a  hand- 
ful of  them,  the  solution  might  well  be  left  to  time;  but  the 
few  thousand  Asiatics  on  the  American  continent  have 
behind  them  the  countless  millions  of  their  teeming  native 
lands.  If  they  come  in  any  considerable  numbers,  the 
white  capitalist,  the  white  shopkeeper  on  a  large  scale,  and 
certain  kinds  of  white  skilled  la])orers  may  be  able  to  main- 
tain themselves  in  the  midst  of  an  Asiatic  population, 
though  even  this  would  be  doubtful  in  the  long  run ;  but 
the  white  workman  cannot.  He  must  go  to  the  wall,  or  he 
must  leave. 

The  question,  then,  may  present  itself  in  this  way :  Is  the 
future  population  of  the  Pacific  coast  to  be  white  or  is  it 
to  be  Oriental?  If  the  Americans  are  constrained  to  face 
matters  in  this  direct  form,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
they  will  take  measures  to  prevent  what  may  come  to  be 
regarded  as  a  deadly  peril.  Such  measures  might,  of  course, 
be  tributes  to  the  virtues,  rather  than  to  the  vices,  of  the 
Asiatic,  —  the  desire  to  exclude  him  mi<j,ht,  like  the  determi- 
nation of  the  negroes  to  keep  white  men  out  of  Haiti,  be 
construed  as  an  admission  of  his  superiority.  Be  it  so.  A 
protective  tariff  may  be  called  a  confession  of  weakness,  but 
that  does  not  prevent  nations  from  adopting  it.  No  mert< 
taunts  will  keep  the  American  people  from  taking  whatever 
steps  tliey  believe  to  ])v  necessary  to  protect  the  'tandard 
of  living  of  their  workingmen,  of  which  they  are  not  a  little 
proud ;  and  they  will  go  to  any  extreme  before  they  will 
allow  their  Pacific  coast  to  become  the  domain  of  the  yellow 
race  or  of  any  but  the  white.  Such  action  need  not  be  a 
reflection  upon  the  Chinese  and  the  Japanese.  It  simply 
tneans  that,  if  white  men  and  Mongolians  caiiuot  live  side 
by  side  in  the  same  land,  the  Americans,  being  white  them- 


RACE  QUESTIONS 


77 


selves,  will  reserve  their  territory  for  the  people  of  their 
own  blood. 

In  like  manner,  the  Russians,  who  are  traditionally  sup- 
posed to  be  tolerant  in  their  dealings  witii  Asiatics,  have 
V)oen  alarmed  of  late,  and  witli  ^ood  reason,  by  the  prospect 
that  their  East  Siberian  possessions  may  be  overrun  by 
Chinese,  a  catastrophe  which  they  will  certainly  do  their 
utmost  to  prevent.  We  may,  indeed,  assert  with  confi- 
dence that  there  is  not  a  state  in  Europe  in  which  the 
annual  arrival  of,  let  us  say,  fifty  thotisand  Chinese  would 
not  provoke  such  active  opposition  that  means  would  soon 
be  found  to  check  the  movement. 

As  might  be  expected,  there  is  much  division  of  opinion 
in  America  in  regard  to  Chinese  and  Japanese  immigration. 
The  western  coast  is  particularly  exposed  to  it,  and  is  cor- 
respondiuf^ly  hostile,  and  determined  to  repress  it  at  any 
cost.    Th(>  East,  bein^  less  ex|)ose(l  than  Uie  West,  is  not 
so  much  in  favor  of  restriction;  and  even  the  South,  in 
spite  of  its  intense  feeling  on  race  topics,  which  makes  it 
sympathize  with  CaUfornia,  sometimes  thinks  lon^'ingly  of 
what  its  fields  mi^ht  be  made  to  produce  l>y  the  importa- 
tion of  yellow  laborers,  so  superior  in  steadiness  to  the 
black.    Capitalists,  too,  desiring  to  get  their  workmen  in 
large  numbers  and  at  as  cheap  rates  as  possible,  would 
be  glad  to  tap  the  inexhaustible  supply  in  Asia.  And 
the   old-fashioned  school  of  uncomproniisintr  liberalism 
still  believes  that  the  land  of  lil  t^rty  should  be  op(>n  to 
all,  and  that   such  intelli^jfMit   peopl(>s  as  the  Orientals 
could  be  brought  before  long  to  the  level  of  ihe  whites 
in  every  respect.    On  the  other  hand,  the  labor-unions 
are  unanimous  in  their  opposition ;  and  they  are  supported 
by  a  general  feeling  that  the  United  States  must  remain 
"a  white  man's  country." 

Unlike  tlie  problems  in  regard  to  the  Indian  and  the 
negro,  which  are  internal  matters  and  not  the  concern  of 


78        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  TOWER 


any  foreign  nation,  the  question  of  the  Asiatic  is  one  which 
the  United  States  is  not  at  liberty  to  settle  off-hand  ac- 
cording to  its  own  impulses.  In  the  case  of  the  Hindus, 
Cireat  Britain  may  be  unable  to  rcnionstrato,  for  while  she 
allows  her  own  colonics  to  shut  out  hor  Asiatic  subjects, 
she  cannot  complain  if  other  states  oxcludo  tiioin;  but 
behind  the  Chinese  and  the  Japanese  stand  two  great 
empires,  neither  of  which  is  indifferent  to  the  treatment 
meted  out  to  its  citizens,  anrl  both  of  which  have  more 
than  one  way  of  retaliating  if  they  conceive  themselves  to 
be  injured. 


CIIAl^'ER  IV 


IDEALS  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 

ON  Murcli  A,  1S<)7,  .Mr.  William  McKiiiI(\v  was  inaupju- 
ratcd  Prcsiilctit  of  tlio  United  States.  Thi.s  date, 
hardly  more  than  ten  years  iiy^o,  now  seems  strangely 
distant  to  Americans  in  view  of  the  changes  which  they 
have  witnessed  since  that  time.  Then  they  were  quite 
unconscious  that  great  events  were  inij.e;  dir.  Though 
every  one  kwx  that  the  country  was  gain'r'u  :i  strength 
year  by  year,  even  the  few  who  believed  thai  it  might  soon 
be  called  upon  to  make  use  of  this  strength  had  little  con- 
ception of  what  the  broader  results  of  such  action  might 
be.  Foreign  relations  appeared  to  be  following  tli(>  normal 
course  which  they  had  taken  for  a  generaticjn.  The  United 
States  was  at  peace  with  the  world,  and  s(>emed  likely  to 
remain  so.  True,  the  continuance  of  the  Cuban  revolt 
was  attracting  more  and  more  attention  and  sympathy, 
which  might  easily  crystallize  into  a  resolve  to  interfere; 
but  thus  far  the  interest  of  the  public  in  the  matter  was  not 
equal  to  that  of  th(>  newspapers. 

The  .\merican  people  as  a  whole  were  wr;ii>ped  up  in 
their  home  afTairs,  and  in  particular  in  the  discuSvSion  uf 
the  proper  remedies  for  the  "hard  times"  through  which 
the  coimtry  had  just  been  passing.  The  presidential  elec- 
tion had  turned  on  internal  questions,  the  naiionai  (•latfcrmg 
of  both  parties  containing  mere  perfunct  d-  larafinns 
on  the  subject  of  foreign  policy.     The  new  rjesK'':n!.  who 

70 


80 


THE  UiNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


li  t|  fir^'  Ix'comc  ^'rucriilly  known  ;is  tlic  father  of  ji  hi^'li- 
tantl  was  |»riniarily  iiiUTcstod  in  llic  lU'Vclopnu-nt  of 
Aniorican  imlustrips;  ho  had  just  been  nominated  and 
elected  as  tlu-  cli  nnpion  of  a  sound  currency  and  of  busi- 
ness intcnsts,  his  upponent  representinf?  the  spirit  of 
tlissatisfactioii  with  c  !-,tin;^  (•conninic  conditions.  Mr. 
.Mi  K'iiih-y  Was  an  honest,  cdnscirnti  nis  statesman,  of  ear- 
nest purj)oac  and  h'mh  seiiHe  of  d\ity,  a  w  If-inade  man,  in 
Muiny  ways  a  typical  American  of  the  time.  He  had  never 
ikin  a  jiromiuent  part  in  foreij^n  questions;  indeed, 
like  most  of  iiis  felh)w-coiiiit rymen.  he  knew  and  cared 
httle  alxHit  tliein.  It  is  sai'i  that  when  on  the  day  of  his 
inauguration  lie  was  told  hy  a  retired  general  that  the  most 
important  event  in  his  presidency  would  be  a  war  with 
Spain,  he  was  a8toninhed  at  the  prediction. 

Tlie  \'en(  /uela  flurry  was  liy  this  time  h;ip|)ily  over,  and 
to  the  satisf.irtioii  'he  .America?)  people,  whc  were  ple.'ised 
with  the  staiul  wiiich  they  had  taken  in  the  affair;  for  their 
action,  if  somewhat  emphatic,  had  been  in  their  oijinion 
conservative,  as  they  had  only  reasserted  and  maintained  a 
principle  of  self-defence  which  had  long  been  dear  to  them. 
They  were  the  more  ph  ased  at  haviiu'  got  the  best  of  the 
di^|)ute  for  the  reason  that  they  liad  run  very  serious  risks, 
more  serious,  in  tnith,  than  they  had  realized  at  the 
moment.  But  for  this  episode,  the  Democratic  administra- 
tion of  President  Cleveland  had  been  enunently  peaceful. 
Whatever  stray  writers  might  predict  about  the  future 
expansion  f)f  the  eountrv,  there  seetned  no  valid  reason 
to  expect  any  suddi'u  change  in  its  progranuue  of  tran- 
quil activity. 

In  the  one  hundred  and  twenty  years  of  their  independent 
existence  the  American  people  had  had  time  for  a  full 
development  of  their  national  itiili\ i<lu,ility.  W'l  Ic  sh.ar- 
ing  in  ;  ,v  of  the  virtues  and  faults.  i(h\'ils  and  illiisioiis  of 
others,  they  posse.s.st-d  characterioti*  s  of  their  own  which 


IDEALS  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 


81 


were  HiifTK'M'ntlv  mnrkcd.  Tlu  y  had  their  own  position  in 
tho  worhl,  Ihnr  iicctpti'd  viewB  of  thfinwlvcH  and  of  others, 
and  fspecially  their  cherished  traditions,  which  Uflually 
guided  and  always  influenced  them  in  their  management 
of  their  home  afTairs  as  well  as  in  their  dealiii^'H  with  foreifin 
nations.  In  order  to  appreciate  tiie  elianp  s  r)f  tin  hist 
few  years,  we  neini  to  keep  well  in  mind  the  heritage  of 
temperament  and  of  doctrines  with  which  the  people  of 
the  United  States  faced  the  new  problems  so  soon  to  be 
presentycd  to  them. 

From  the  iM  '^'inninu  of  time,  all  nations  have  shown  a 
tendenry  to  divi'le  mankind  into  two  catepories,  (ireeks 
and  Barhariaiis,  that  is,  ourselves  and  everybody  else; 
and  the  idea  that  We"  are  the  chosen  people  is  still  far 
from  being  extinct.  The  Americans,  like  others,  have  cher- 
ished this  pleasing  belief,  and  they  hav(>  also  entertained 
to  the  full  tlie  ordinary  national  illusions,  —  for  instance, 
that  they  liave  grown  jrreat  by  tlnir  virtues  uid  l)y  tho 
disposition  of  a  kindly  Trovidence,  whereas  the  progress 
of  other  nations  has  been  marked  by  unscrupulous  ra- 
pacity; that  their  support  gives  an  extraordinary  moral 
weight  to  any  cause  tliey  espouse,  and  that  no  fair-minded 
person  can  doubt  th(>  honesty  of  their  intentions,  but  that 
ihcy  must  keep  a  sharj)  watch  on  the  nefarious  ilesis'us  of 
their  neighlM)rs;  that  in  their  simplicity  they  are  in  con- 
stant danger  of  being  overreached  by  wily  adversaries; 
that  their  chief  faults,  as  they  mutlestly  admit,  are  self- 
depreciation,  admiration  of  foreign  things,  and  too  much 
good  n;itur(>,  — in  short,  that  their  hearts  are  better  than 
their  lieads. 

In  accordance  with  this  common  theory,  the  people  of 
the  United  States  were  sure  of  their  own  good  inten- 
tions. Their  attitude  toward  the  rest  of  h\imanity  was 
friendly,  for  they  wore  pretty  well  satisfied  with  the  world 
in  general  and  with  themselves  in  particular,  a  content- 


82        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


ment  not  to  be  wondered  at,  and  to  be  ascribed  chiefly  to 
the  same  cause  that  has  helped  to  make  optimism  one 
of  the  saUent  traits  in  the  national  character,  —  the 
consciousness  of  success.  In  1 897  they  had  already  long 
been  imbued  with  the  feeling,  not  since  diminished,  that 
the  history  of  their  country  had  been  one  of  tremendous 
achievement.  In  a  little  over  a  century  it  had  grown  to  be, 
without  question,  one  of  the  greatest — in  theii-  opinion  the 
greatest  —  in  the  world.  In  spite  of  the  reccii,  pinch  of 
hard  times,  it  was  rich  and  prosperous ;  and  its  progress 
from  year  to  year  was  eminently  gratifying.  The  Americans 
were  convinced  that  this  progress  was  not  all  due  to  the 
favors  which  nature  had  lavished  upon  them,  but  that  to 
an  equal  exent  it  was  the  resu  t  of  their  own  endeavors. 
They  were  proud  not  only  of  the  size  of  their  population 
and  of  the  wealth  of  their  resources,  but  even  more  of  their 
own  enei^  and  activity,  of  their  achievements  in  industry 
and  invention.  They  were  proud  of  the  freedom  which 
had  made  th(>ir  land  a  haven  of  refuge  for  oppressed  mill- 
ions from  the  Old  World;  proud  of  their  popular  govern- 
ment, which  had  stood  the  test  of  time  and  the  strain  of 
a  tremendous  civil  war;  proud  of  the  courage,  endurance, 
and  self-sacrifice  shown  by  both  j  arties  during  that  war; 
and,  finally,  proud  of  the  way  in  which  the  wounds  of  the 
war  had  been  healed,  leaving  the  nation  stronger  and  more 
united  than  ever.  They  ])elieved  their  country  to  be  the 
best,  the  freest,  the  richest,  the  happiest,  in  the  world, 
and  they  gave  due  recognition  to  their  own  merits  which 
had  made  it  so. 

With  the  assurance  of  vigorous  youth,  they  were  dis- 
posed to  attach  little  weight  to  the  experience  of  others. 
The  fact  that  others  had  done  things  in  a  particular  way 
was  no  reason,  in  their  eyes,  why  they  should  do  them 
in  the  same  way;  and  the  failure  of  a  European  nation 
in  a  given  task  was  no  proof  that  Americans  might  not 


IDEALS  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 


83 


be  more  successful.  With  this  self-confidence  we  find  an 
idealism  which  sometimes  surprises  foreign  observers.  Ac- 
cording to  a  common  impression  abroad,  the  people  of 
the  United  States  are  a  race  of  prosaic  money-makers,  who 
care  for  nothing  but  getting  rich,  unless  it  be  for  marry- 
ing their  daughters  to  foreigners  with  titles.  In  reality, 
though  European  critics  seldom  perceive  it,  the  Americans 
are  not  lacking  in  generous  imagination,  even  if  it  does 
not  crop  out  much  in  everyday  life.  Tlieir  ideals,  as  com- 
pared with  European  ones,  may  sometimes  appear  mate- 
rial rather  than  aesthetic,  but  they  are  none  the  less  noble, 
and  they  are  very  real. 

The  general  feeling  of  self-satisfaction  prevailing  in  the 
country  at  this  period  did  not,  of  course,  prevent  clear- 
sighted men  from  recognizing  that  there  were  many  shadows 
in  the  picture:  the  negro  problem  was  becoming  ever 
more  difficult;  the  increasing  antagonism  between  labor 
and  capital,  coupled  with  the  growth  of  huge  unions  and 
trusts  and  with  corruption  in  local  politics,  alarmed  hon- 
est and  patriotic  citizens  ;  the  recent  financial  depression 
had  made  bad  feeling  between  different  classes,  and  even 
between  different  sections,  of  the  Union;  the  lamentable 
decay  of  the  merchant  marine,  once  the  just  pride  of  the 
nation,  proved  that  Americans  were  not  equally  successful 
in  all  kinds  of  economic  enterprise;  and  finally  in  the 
higher  domains  of  literature,  art,  and  i)ure  science,  the 
United  States  was  not  contributing  a  very  notable  quota 
to  the  wealth  of  the  worid.  All  this  the  broad-minded 
patriot  had  to  admit  and  deplore ;  but  for  the  average  man 
American  optimism  came  to  the  rescue.  With  a  fine  self-con- 
fidence, public  opinion,  when  forced  to  admit  the  charges 
brought  against  anything  American,  consoled  itself  with 
the  belief  that  things  would  soon  be  better.  There  was  a 
comfortable  conviction  that,  if  the  Americans  had  failed 
in  any  respect,  it  was  only  because  they  had  been  too  busy 


84         THE  UNITED  iSTATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


elsewhere  to  turn  their  attention  in  that  particular  direc- 
tion ;  that,  when  once  they  had  established  their  material 
eonditions  on  a  th<)-oun;hly  firm  foundation,  they  could 
attend  t  >  su-h  matters  as  tinkering;  the  weak  places  in 
the  machine  of  government,  or  developing  the  aesthetic 
capabilities  of  the  race.  The  saying  ran:  "When  Chicago 
gets  liold  of  culture,  culture  will  have  to  hum."  Many  a 
traveller  has  been  struck  by  the  fact  that  in  a  new  Ameri- 
can town  the  patriotic  citizen  will  oftener  talk  al)oi:c  the 
future  than  about  the  present;  that,  however  boastful  he 
may  be  of  what  his  own  place  has  already  achieved,  he  will 
declare  that  it  is  nothing  to  what  it  is  going  to  be  some 
day.  Every  inland  mart  p  .  ans  to  be  a  new  Chicago ;  every 
port  hopes  to  surpass  New  York. 

Crude  as  the  expression  of  such  sentiments  may  be,  the 
frame  of  mind  which  they  represent  not  only  helps  to  make 
life  pleasanter,  but  also  constitutes  an  element  of  very  real 
national  strength.  A  robust  faith  of  this  sort  enables  a 
nation,  as  well  as  a  man,  to  bear  misfortune  serenely,  and 
to  persist  in  tlie  face  of  apparently  overwhelming  difficulties 
until  success  is  wrung  from  an  unwilling  fate.  A  decadent 
philosophy  may  be  more  picturesque  in  itself;  but  when 
decadent  individuals  or  peoples  come  into  collision  with 
self-reliant  ones,  they  are  at  a  disadvantage  from  the  start. 
The  pcTil  of  the  American  lies  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Like  the  Russian,  he  is  too  prone  to  think  that,  whatever 
his  previous  negligence  may  have  been,  in  the  last  resort 
he  will  manage  to  "pull  through  somehow";  and  conse- 
quently he  has  the  same  impatience  of  careful  precautions, 
—  impatience  that  may  cost  dear. 

The  quality  of  boastfulness  which  eo  many  foreigners 
have  noticed  as  characteristic  of  the  free  citizens  of  the 
United  States  had  declined  since  the  Civil  War.  This  self- 
assertion,  besides  being  a  sign  of  the  exuberance  of  green 
youth,  and  betraying  in  its  very  extravagance  an  uncom- 


IDEALS  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 


85 


fortable  doubt  that  it  might  not  bring  conviction  to  the 
listener,  had  also  been  a  reply  to  the  condescension,  kindly 
or  unkindly,  which  the  American  met  with  in  European 
society.  With  the  growth  of  the  country,  there  had  come 
from  outside  a  more  general  acknowledgment  of  its  posi- 
tion, especially  since  the  great  events  of  the  war,  and  the 
boastfulncss  of  its  citizens  had  tlimiiiisliod  correspondingly. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  millions  of  people  of  European 
birth  lived  in  the  New  World  and  that  increasing  numbers 
of  American  tourists  visited  the  old  one  every  year,  in  spite, 
also,  of  the  presence  of  students  who  had  attended  German 
universities,  of  painters  who  had  lived  in  France,  of  educated 
men  and  women  who  delighted  in  European  literature  and 
art,  the  attitude  of  the  immense  majority  of  people  in  the 
United  States  toward  things  European  was  at  this  time  one 
of  good-natured  indifference,  not  to  say  superiority.  Edu- 
cated Americans,  it  is  true,  knew,  know,  -  nd  ought  to  know 
more  about  Europe  than  Europeans  about  America;  but 
the  general  public  took  little  interest  in  the  affairs  of  Euro- 
pean countries,  and  not  much  more  in  the  external  rela- 
tions of  their  own.    A  proof  of  this  indifference  may  be 
found  in  the  little  care  with  which  the  American  diplo- 
matic representatives  abroad  were  selected.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  all-important  office  of  minister  to  England,  ^n 
which  it  was  so  evidently  desirable  to  have  a  distinguished 
man  that  surh  a  one  was  usually  appointed,  the  American 
diplomatic  posts  were  too  often  filled  with  more  attention 
to  political  influence  than  to  the  suitability  of  the  candi- 
dates.   As  for  the  consular  service,  it  is  strange  that  a 
nation  of  business  men  should  have  been  conttiit  to  recruit 
it  in  the  sam<>  hajihazard  fashion.    It  was  not  until  1906, 
after  many  scandals  in  the  history  of  American  consulates, 
that  the  system  at  last  began  to  be  put  on  a  sound  basis. 
News  and  comment  from  across  the  ocean  usually  came 
through  English  channels,  and  Americans  knew  little  and 


86        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


cured  less  al)out  the  opinions  which  foreigners  might  en- 
tertain i)i  tliom. 

One  unpleasant  result  of  this  indifference  was  the  reck- 
lessness which  prevailed  not  only  in  the  American  pai)ers, 
but  in  the  utterances  of  public  men,  in  regard  to  foreign 
nations.  If  a  Congressman  believed  that  his  remarks 
would  please  his  constituents,  it  niattei  d  little  to  him 
that  they  might  make  bad  blood  in  Austria  or  Russia, 
and  thus  complicate  the  work  of  the  state  department. 
Even  American  diplomacy  did  not  enjoy  abroad  a  reputa- 
tion for  good  manners.  At  the  same  time,  though  it  cannot 
hv  denied  thai  American  methods  /f  treating  international 
politics  were,  often,  largely  for  "lionie  consumption,"  it 
is  possible  to  push  this  theory  too  far.  Foreigners,  Eng- 
lishmen in  particular,  have  now  and  then  made  the  mistake 
of  thinking  that  the  declarations  of  American  statesmen 
were  not  meant  seriously,  wheu,  as  events  showed,  they 
were  made  in  all  earnestness. 

Another  trait  in  the  national  character  which  more  than 
once  made  difficulties  for  those  in  charge  of  the  destiny 
of  the  republic,  was  an  impatience  of  the  bonds  imposed 
by  written  agreements  that  were  no  longer  deemed  in 
keeping  with  existing  conditions.  When  a  compact  ceased 
to  be  advantageous,  there  was  a  tendency  to  regard  it  as 
a  dead  letter;  and  irresponsible  membe.j  of  Congress  could 
always  be  found  to  give  expression  to  this  sentiment.  In 
the  notable  instance  of  the  Clajrton-Bulwe-  treaty,  the 
United  States  chafed  so  violently  that  England  was  in  the 
end  virtually  forced  to  consent  to  its  abrogation  ;  and,  again, 
the  conduct  of  the  uov(>rnnient  at  Washington  in  dealing 
with  the  subject  of  Cliinese  inunigration  was  hardly  in 
accordance  with  its  pledged  treaty  word.  It  is  true  that 
an  impatience  of  mere  paper  bonds,  of  "musty  parch- 
ments," is  a  general  characteristic  of  modern  democracy,  — 
witness,  for  example,  the  recent  repudiation  of  the  con- 


IDEALS  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 


87 


cordat  with  the  papacy  by  the  French  republic,  —  but  it 
must  be  admitted  that  there  is  a  strain  of  hiwlessness  in 
the  American,  a  result  of  individualism  and  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  his  development.    Although  he  recognizes  the 

necessity  of  law,  ho  docs  not  look  upon  it  as  sacred,  or 
even  as  indispensable  on  all  occasions.  His  practical  bent 
and  his  luck  of  understanding  of  the  full  value  of  social 
solidarity  incline  him  to  pay  more  attention  to  the  neces- 
sities of  the  moment  than  to  abstract  general  principles. 
At  the  sam(>  time,  the  American  people  have  shown  as 
high  a  sense  of  honor  as  any  other,  and  they  usually  take 
their  moral  obli^Mtions  with  all  seriousness;  indeed,  no 
modern  people  has  shown  itself  more  willing  to  make 
painful  sacrifices  in  order  to  carry  out  its  principles. 

Nations,  like  individuals,  are  often  inconsistent,  thereby 
laying  themselves  open  to  thr-  charge  of  dishonesty  on  the 
part  of  uncharitable  neighbors.  This  is  particulariy  true 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  whose  minds  are  not  so  uncom- 
promisingly logical  as  those  of  the  French  or  the  Russians; 
it  explains,  for  instance,  why  the  English  have  so  often 
been  accused  of  hypocrisy.  When  the  Englishman  or  the 
American  finds  that  his  premises  lead  him  to  conclusions 
that  he  dislikes,  he  is  pretty  sure  to  kick  over  the  traces 
and,  regardless  of  the  premises,  to  accept  other  conclusions 
that  suit  him  better.  He  never  allows  previous  logical 
subtleties  to  tempt  him  into  a  position  which  his  common 
sense  condemns ;  but  guided  by  a  sound  instinct,  he  acts 
as  he  thinks  best  in  each  instance,  careless  of  the  fact  that, 
by  any  course  of  general  reasoning,  he  will  appear  incon- 
sistent. For  a  striking  example  of  the  difference  between 
Latin  and  Anglo-Saxon  political  conceptions,  we  have 
but  to  compare  two  well-known  sayings,  —  the  "P^ris- 
sent  les  colonies  plutot  qu'un  prineipe"  of  the  French 
lievolution,  and  Clevt  laud's  famous  renuirk,  "'  It  is  a  con- 
dition which  confronts  us,  not  a  theory."    It  is  highly  char- 


88        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


actoristic  that  even  Joffersoi,  perhaps  the  most  theuretioal 
of  all  American  statesmen,  accepted  without  hesitation  the 
resj-onsibility  of  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  although  he 
believed  that  he  had  no  constitutional  right  to  take  such 

action. 

This  iin[):iti('iK'e  of  pn  ccdciit  has  in  no  wise  prevented  tlie 
Ameiicans  from  having  traditions  of  their  own,  to  which  they 
have  believed  themselves  to  be  strongly  attached.    In  the 
main  their  foreign  policy,  up  to  the  time  '    the  Spanish 
War,  had  not  been  haphazard,  whatever  y         was  at  the 
hehn.  The  international  relations  of  the  co    uryhad,  Mideed, 
seldom  been  eoin])licated ;  for  it  had  kept  out  of  general 
European  affairs,  and  most  of  Europe  had  had  no  part  in 
those  of  the  United  States.    For  these  reasons,  the  Ameri- 
cans had  not  often  been  obliged  to  take  into  considerati 
more  than  one  foreign  power  at  a  time  in  any  question 
in  which  they  were   involved;   and  since  they  achieved 
their  independence  they  had  had  but  one  European  war,  — 
that  with  Great  Britain  in  1812.   They  had  not,  of  course, 
been  exempt  from  their  share  of  miscellaneous  disputes; 
but  most  of  their  quarrels,  being  on  such  tangible  matters 
as  discussions  of  boundary,  had  not  called  for  far-seeing 
statecraft,  and  none  of  them,  except  that  with  Mexico,  had 
ended  in  actual  hostilities.    With  time,  the  boast  "We  are 
a  peaceful  people"  had  become  a  fixed  article  of  the  national 
creed.    The  truth  of  this  statement  was,  however,  open  to 
some  doubt.     If  it  meant  that  the  Union  had  had  few 
wars  in  the  past  and  had  made  little  preparation  for  any 
in  the  future,  it  was  beyond  dispute;  but  if  it  signified 
that  the  Americans,  individually  or  collectively,  were  of  a 
peaceful  temperament,  it  was  far  from  being  exact,  for  no 
people  were  quicker  to  resent  a  provocation  or  more  de- 
termined to  return  blow  for  blow.    Their  comparative  im- 
munity from  the  necessity  of  taking  up  arms  had  been  due 
to  their  situation  rather  than  to  any  innate  gentleness  of 


IDEALS  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 


disposition;  iiiul  yet,  with  n  rocoi  l  of  furty-scvcri  disputes 
referred  to  uil)itriititiii,  —  more  than  half  of  all  the  cases 
thus  submitted, — the  United  St  ites  could  well  claim  that 
it  had  shown  a  real  desire  for  peace  and  justice. 

In  proof  of  their  peaceful  disposition,  Americans  pointed 
to  the  sinalliiess  of  their  niilitarv  forces;  but  it  would, 
])erhaps,  have  l)een  more  correct  to  ascribe  this  to  their 
inherited  Enj^lish  dislike  of  a  standing  army  us  a  "foe  to 
liberty,"  and,  still  more,  to  the  careless  confidence  which 
trusted  that,  when  necessity  should  arise,  the  means  would 
be  found  to  meet  it.  We  need  not  wonder  that  their 
regular  army  had  dwindled  since  the  Civil  War  till  it  num- 
bered less  than  thirty  tlioiisand  enlisted  men,  with  no  re- 
serve but  a  very  imperfect  militia  organization :  a  country 
which  has  no  fear  of  being  invaded  is  apt  to  'eel  that  it 
will  always  have  time  enough  to  find  soldiers.  What  is 
more  sur})rising  is  that  the  wealthy  coast  cities  should  have 
been  left  for  so  long  without  any  modern  system  of  defence, 
and  that  the  navy,  of  whose  past  achievements  all  Ameri- 
cans were  justly  proud,  should  have  been  permitted  to 
decl3r..-»  until,  about  1885,  it  was  hardly  worthy  of  a  third- 
ra'  Certainly  no  fair-minded  observer  could  at 

tlu  .  nave  accused  the  United  States  of  "meditating 

ag^'!-es-siou  "  against  any  one. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  a  gross  mistake  to  think,  as 
did  many  people  in  Europe,  that  the  American  republic 
would  be  kept  from  any  course  of  action  by  fear  of  the 
greater  military  preparedness  of  rival  powers.  The  people 
who,  with  thousands  of  miles  of  umlefended  coast-line  and  a 
still  infant  navy,  were  ready  to  risk  a  war  with  the  British 
Empire  on  a  question  of  principle  about  a  matter  of  such 
slight  intrinsic  value  as  the  exact  location  of  a  corner  of 
the  boundary  of  Venezuela,  were  not  likely  to  shrink  from 
any  conflict,  if  their  passions  were  aroused.  The  danger 
was  just  the  opposite:  it  lay  rather  in  the  confidence  of 


90        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  Aiueriotm  pooplo  that  thoy  roulil lick  creation," — a 
hchcf  which  tcndcci  to  •  ikc  pubHc  opinion  recklessly  irre- 
sponsible. Moreover,  the  hirger  purt  of  the  country  oould 
hardly,  under  any  circumstances,  be  exposed  to  foreign  at- 
tack. New  York  and  San  Francisco  might  be  at  the  mercy 
of  a  hostile  fleet ;  but  the  citizen  of  Kansas  City  or  Denver 
knew  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear,  and  hence  was  under 
small  temptation  to  nuike  concessions  to  tin  overweening  foe. 
lie  might,  to  be  sure,  sutTer  economic  loss  sometime  in  the 
future,  but  he  could  easily  overlook  such  a  possibility  in  the 
excitement  of  the  moment ;  und  at  any  rate,  he  need  never 
see  an  enemy  unless  he  went  out  of  his  way  to  find  him. 

A  lather  curit)us  contention,  savoring  of  earlier  years, 
was  frequently  expressed  in  the  phrase  "  We  are  a  plain 
people,"  —  a  notion  based  on  the  fact  that  in  the  United 
States  there  was  no  king  or  court  or  titled  aristocracy,  and 
not  at  all  on  any  greater  simplicity  of  living  prevailing 
among  Americans.  True,  the  mass  of  the  population  lived 
jjlainly  enough, — they  do  everywhere,  —  but  the  leisure 
class  was  already  characterized  by  just  as  much  luxury 
as  in  any  country  in  the  world ;  and  persons  of  moderate 
means  enjoyed  perhaps  greater  comfort  than  anywhere 
else.  Life  was  as  complicated,  pleasure  as  riotous,  display 
as  profuse,  as  in  other  lands ;  and  yet  the  American  people 
not  only  expected  a  rej)ublican  simplicity  in  the  demeanor 
of  their  ofl&cials,  but,  by  the  same  token,  generally  under- 
paid them,  with  the  undemocratic  result  that  some  of 
the  posts,  especially  in  the  diplomatic  service,  could  with 
difficulty  be  accepted  by  any  but  men  of  independent 
wealth,  rhere  was,  too,  a  strange  dislike  to  certain  titles, 
as,  for  instance,  to  anything  above  lieutenant-general  in 
the  army,  even  more  to  the  title  of  admiral  in  the  navy, 
and  most  of  all  to  that  of  ambassador.  While  repelling 
with  scorn  the  suggestion  that  the  United  States  should 
not  be  treated  as  the  equal  of  any  othc   great  nation,  many 


IDEALS  AND  SHlBBuLETilS 


91 


Americans  rrj^urdod  it  as  deiiux mtic  that  their  representa- 
tive abroiid  sliould  1)0  an  oflitial  of  imW  the  second  rccofi- 
nized  grudu;  but  few  of  those  who  thought  that  the  term 
"ambassador"  sounded  aristocratic  realized  that  the  full 
appellation  which  they  preferred  was  "envoy  extraordinary 
and  minister  plenipotentiary,"  a  title  hardly  suggestive  of 
simplicity.  When  the  ofhce  of  ambassudor  was  at  last  in- 
stituted in  18<j:i,  tlie  provision  that  created  it  was  smupgled 
through  Congress  as  quietly  as  possible  for  fear  of  a  public 
outcry. 

In  most  essentials,  American  political  ideals  had  not  at 

this  tinF'  undertcone  any  revolutionary  chanp:es  since  the 
early  days  of  t  e  republic.  The  teachings  of  the  fathers 
had  not  lost  their  force.  The  Declxratit-n  of  Independence 
had  proclaimed  that  "all  men  are  created  equal  "  and 
have  "  unalienable  rights  "  to  "life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit 
of  happiness";  and  even  if  the  Declaration  had  been  de- 
s(Ti])ed  as  a  tissue  of  glittering  generalities,  Americans  still 
believed  in  lil)erty  and  equality.  But  these  two  terms  can 
doubtless  be  understood  in  several  ways.  In  the  days 
before  the  Civil  War,  the  South  managed  to  reconcile 
them  with  the  possession  of  negro  slaves,  just  as  the 
governing  aristocracy  in  Poland,  when  the  mass  of  the 
population  was  in  hopeless  serfdom,  had  believed  that  theirs 
was  the  only  free  country  in  Europe.  Recently  the  South- 
ern States  had  by  one  means  or  another  well-nigh  disfran- 
chised the  blacks  in  spite  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  North 
had  not  interfered. 

However  we  may  feel  about  the  consistency  of  all  this, 
it  would  be  unjust  to  accuse  the  people  of  the  United  States 
of  hypocrisy.  They  had  sympatiiized  enthusiastically  with 
the  revolutions  in  France,  in  Italy,  in  Greece,  in  Hungary, 
in  South  America ;  and  they  had  given  Kossuth  such  tre- 
mendous ovations  when  he  visited  them  that  he  had  been 
misled  into  expecting  armed  intervention  in  behalf  of  his 


92        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WUULU  FUWEK 


cause.  They  had  never  let  themselves  be  restrained  by 
caution,  or  by  politeness,  frcjin  expressing  their  generous 
sentiments,  or  fn.iii  ])n>cl;iini".iiK  the  superiniity  of  their 
form  of  goverimiciit.  Tlu  y  luui  ^'ivcii  asylum  to  countless 
political  fugitives.  They  had  favored  broad  laws  of  neu- 
trality, freedom  of  navigation  in  rivers  and  straits,  an  open 
door  in  the  Far  East,  and  modern  and  enlightened  i)rin(  i- 
ples  in  international  dealings  in  general.  True,  they  had 
once  hud  the  blot  of  slavery  on  their  scutcheon,  but  they 
had  washcil  it  out  with  blood;  and  now  the  i)hrase  "the 
land  of  liberty"  was  no  mere  flourish  of  patriotic  rhetoric, 
but  the  expression  of  a  truth  that  could  not  be  gainsaiil. 

Liberty,  however,  is  a  thing  that  men  get  used  to.  If 
they  have  always  enjoyed  it,  it  becomes,  like  health  or 
fresh  air,  something  taken  for  granted,  —  a  priceless  gift, 
but  too  much  a  part  of  everyday  Ufe  to  awaken  ready 
enthusiasm.  The  Americans  had  learned  by  experience, 
too,  that  liberty  was  not  a  panacea  for  political  ills.  In 
addition,  they  were  not  so  sure  as  they  had  once  been  that 
every  people  was  capable  of  self-government,  and  that 
their  own  successful  institutions  were  equally  suited  to 
others.  They  had  applauded  the  independence  of  Latin 
America,  but  they  had  not  been  edified  by  the  history 
of  most  of  her  republics ;  for  they  were  too  orderiy  them- 
selves to  approve  of  an  uninterrupted  series  of  revolutions, 
even  if  the  iprisings  took  ph.ce  in  the  name  of  liberty, 
fetill  they  believed,  as  a  general  truth,  that  government 
(except  for  the  Southern  negroes)  should  be  by  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed ;  and  they  were  proud  of  not  owning 
foreign  colonics  that  would  have  to  be  held  down  by  brute 
force.  Th.'y  felt  that  they  could  moraUze  with  comfortable 
superiority  over  the  greed  of  the  various  European  powers 
as  siiown  in  recent  years  in  the  furious  scramble  for  lands 
in  Asia  and  Africa. 

In  their  foreign  policy,  they  had  followed  the  same 


ir'='AL8  AND  SHIBBOLETHS 


93 


gpneral  principles  as  other  modern  nations.  In  tlie  ii  aiiv 
treaties  they  had  concluded,  thry  h  i  aimed  not  only  ti 
cultivate  inutuuUy  beneficial  relations  with  otiier  peoples, 
but  to  promote  their  own  trade  and  to  protect  their 
citizens  in  every  part  of  the  world.  Their  efforts  had 
been  crowned  with  gratifying  success,  and  they  could  pride 
themp'^lv(>s  on  the  result.  In  all  this  th(>re  was  nothing 
peculiar  to  them.  What  was  pecu  lar  was  tlieir  follow- 
ing of  certain  fecepts  that  have  had  a  decisive  influ- 
ence on  the  whole  course  of  their  foreign  relations.  The 
first  of  these  was  to  avoid  "entangling  alliances." 

Washington,  in  his  fa'nwell  address,  —  a  doninipnt  which 
in  the  American  mind  :anks  second  onlv  to  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  —  solemnly  warned  his  fellow-countrymen 
against  foreign  alliances.  He  himself  had  had  experience 
with  such  things.  The  treaty  with  France,  concluded  in 
1778,  had  been  of  this  nature;  but,  though  it  had  led  to 
the  independence  of  the  colonies  and  the  humiliation  of 
England,  it  had  not  proved  entirely  satisfactory  to  either 
of  the  contracting  parties.  At  the  conclusion  of  peace  in 
1783,  their  interests  had  been  divergent,  and  thr  had  been 
some  slight  friction  between  them.  Later  a  ich  more 
serious  difficulty  had  arisen  in  the  quej^iif  w  whether  the 
United  States  was  bound  to  ass;st  Frap.  e  when,  after  the 
fall  of  her  monarchy,  she  fouu  '  rerself  i  ^  m  at  war  w.  i 
England.  On  the  face  of  the  text  it  certainly  seemed  so; 
but  the  government  of  President  Washington  decided  that 
circumstances  were  so  entirely  different  from  what  they  had 
been  at  the  time  the  treaty  was  concluded  that  its  provisions 
were  no  longer  apjilicable  to  the  existing  situation.  This 
decision  was  doubtless  politically  wise,  and  the  judgment  of 
Washington  has  been  ratified  by  the  unanimous  approval 
of  American  historians  ever  since.  On  the  other  hand, 
members  of  his  own  cabinet  to  whom  the  question  was  sub- 
mitted, including  Jefferson,  the  secretary  of  state,  had  given 


94        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


it  as  their  opinion  that  the  United  States  was  bound  by 
treaty  to  aid  France ;  and  a  man  as  high-minded  as  Wash- 
ington could  hardly  have  helped  feeling  that  the  repudiation 
of  a  formal  obligation  of  this  kind,  however  justified,  cast 
a  shadow  of  suspicion  on  the  honor  of  his  country.  The 
United  States  Rot  out  of  its  difficulties,  but  in  a  way  that 
left  an  uncomfortable  imprussion ;  and  the  lesson  of  the 
incident  was  reflected  in  the  President's  farewell  address. 

The  advice  given  in  this  famous  document  has  been  con- 
sistently followed  by  American  statesmen  ever  since,  and 
with  satisfactory  results.  Again  and  again  the  United  States 
has  refused  to  become  a  party  to  agreements  with  European 
powers,  basing  its  decisions  on  this  very  ground  of  avoiding 
entangling  alliances.  Except  in  the  Far  East,  where  joint 
action  of  the  Christian  powers  has  sometimes  been  neces- 
sary, it  has  preferred  to  follow  out  its  own  interests  sepa- 
rately, even  when  they  have  coincided  with  those  of  other, 
and  friendly,  nations. 

This  policy  has,  to  be  sure,  caused  occasional  irritation 
abroad,  where  the  Americans  have  been  accused  of  selfish 
unwiUingness  to  take  part  in  work  for  the  common  good ; 
but  from  the  American  point  of  view  it  has  so  far  been 
wise.  Whether  it  can  be  maintained  in  our  new  period 
of  world  questions  is  open  to  doubt. 

Another  pecuUar  principle  of  American  foreign  policy 
has,  however,  by  its  originality  and  its  importance,  attracted 
far  more  attention  abroad,  and  is  more  vital  to-day.  When 
any  foreigner  begins  to  talk  of  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  toward  the  rest  of  the  world,  one  of  the  first  things 
he  will  be  sure  to  mention  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

THE  late  Mr.  John  Hay,  for  nearly  seven  years  secretary 
of  state,  and  one  of  the  best  that  his  country  ever  had, 
once  said  of  his  policy  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 
Golden  Rule  were  a  sufficient  basis  of  action.  "The  prin- 
ciples which  have  guided  us,"  he  added,  "have  been  of 
limpid  simplicity."  To  his  mind,  at  least,  there  was  no 
contradiction  between  his  two  principles,  no  matter  what 
may  be  the  difference  between  them.  The  Golden  Rule  is, 
let  us  say,  a  precept  as  commonly,  or  as  uncommonly, 
observed  by  one  people  as  by  another ;  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  something  specifically  American,  and  cannot  claim  respect 
on  quite  the  same  grounds.  Its  origin,  its  meaning,  and  its 
justification  have  been  the  subjects  of  long  controversy 
both  at  home  and  abroad.  Here  we  need  repeat  only  so 
much  of  the  well-known  story  as  serves  to  bring  the  essential 
features  clearly  before  us. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  promulgated  on  December  2, 
1823.  It  was  based  on  the  idea,  then  common  in  the 
United  States,  that  there  was  a  natural  separation  between 
the  Old  World  and  the  New.  As  ex-President  Jefferson 
put  it,  "Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be  never 
to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe;  our  second, 
nevor  to  suffer  Europe  to  meddle  with  cisatlantic  affairs." 

The  immediate  cause  of  the  famous  declaration  was  two- 
fold, —  a  dispute  with  Russia  over  the  limits  of  her  posses- 

95 


96        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


sions  in  the  northwest,  and  Jilarin  .it  French  intervention  in 
Spain.  This  last  step  awakened  a  fear  that  the  powers  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  might  attempt  to  aid  the  Spo.nish  King 
to  regain  control  of  his  revolted  American  colonies,  and 
thus  porhiqis  uequiro  territory  for  themselves  in  the;  Ne^v 
World.  When  the  British  Prime  Minister,  George  Canning, 
suggested  a  joint  declaration  on  the  part  of  England  and  the 
United  States  that  they  would  oppose  any  such  attempt,  his 
plan  was  at  first  received  with  favor  in  Washington;  but 
r.nally,  und'-r  the  influence  of  the  secretary  of  state,  Jclm 
Quincy  Adams,  President  Monroe  decided  on  an  independent 
expression  of  policy. 

The  two  questions  at  issue  were  taken  up  in  the  uame 
message,  but  they  were  not  connected  in  such  a  way  as 
to  call  for  a  declaration  of  general  principles  which  should 
apply  to  both  ;  they  were,  in  fact,  separated  from  each  other 
by  a  considerable  quantity  of  intervening  matter.  The  de- 
cisive passages  run  as  follows :  — 

(1)  "  The  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  indepen- 
dent condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are 
henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  any  European  powers;"  and  (2)  "In  the 
wars  of  the  European  powers  in  matters  relating  to  them- 
selves we  have  never  taken  any  j^art,  nor  does  it  comport 
with  our  policy  so  to  do.  .  .  .  The  political  system  of  the 
aUied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  respect  from  that 
of  Ainerica.  This  dilTerencc  proceeds  from  that  which 
exists  in  their  respective  governments;  and  to  th(>  defence 
of  our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much 
blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom  of  their 
most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which  we  have  enjoye  d 
unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation  is  devoted.  We 
owe  IT,  Tni  iOiore,  Xu  caiuior  ;uui  lO  uie  riinuaiiU'  rri.iiiOiUi 
existing  between  the  United  States  and  those  powers  to 
declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


97 


to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.    With  the  existing 

colonics  or  dependencies  of  any  European  power  we  have 
not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  govern- 
ments who  have  declared  their  independence  and  maintained 
it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration 
and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any 
interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  con- 
trolling in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  Euro- 
pean power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States." 
The  principle  thus  enunciated  may  be  briefly  summed 
up  as  one  of  "Hands  off,"  or  of  "America  for  the  Ameri- 
cans." 

From  the  date  of  its  appearance  down  to  the  present  day, 

this   doctrine  has  met  with  almost  universal  approval 

at  home.    For  many  reasons  it  appealed  immediately  to 

popular  imagination  and  at  the  same  time  commended 

itself  to  the  judgment  of  statesmen.    In  the  eyes  of  the 

Americans,  it  was  a  proclamation  of  their  cherished  ideals, 

of  their  belief  in  the  ri<j;ht  of  free  peoples  to  dotermine  their 

own  destinies.    By  it  the  United  States  declared  that,  while 

respecting  existing  institutions  of  which  it  did  not  approve, 

it  would  never  consent  to  let  similar  ones  be  imposed  by 

force  on  any  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  New  World  who  had 

alroadv  freed  themselves  from  such  trammels.    In  other 

words,  it  announced  that  it  was  not  only  a  land  of  liberty, 

but  likewise  the  protector  of  liberty.    Surely  here  was 

just  cause  for  national  pride.    In  the  President's  message 

there  was,  furthermore,  an  expression'  of  the  feeling  that 

the  New  World,  as  something  essentially  different  from  the 

Old,  should  have  its  independent  development.  Already 

nrdent  patriots  were  dreaming  of  a  future  (  [xxh  in  wliicu 

the  glories  of  the  western  hemisphere  should  outshine  those 

of  the  earlier  homes  of  civilization ;  they  believed  that  the 
m 


98        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


whole  of  both  American  continents  should  be  included  in 
the  Promised  Land. 

While  sentimental  considerations  of  this  sort  roused 
honest  enthusiasm,  the  practical  merits  of  the  new  policy 
were  also  such  as  to  assure  it  of  favor.  Nations  havo 
always  found  it  convenient  that  their  nearest  neighbors 
should  be  inferior  to  themselves  in  strength,  and  have  been 
prone  to  resent  the  approach  of  their  equals  as  a  menace. 
This  idea  has  been  a  fundamental  principle  of  British  policy 
in  regard  to  India.  Similarly,  the  Americans  dreaded  the 
thought  that  dangerous  enemies  might  hold  military  po- 
sitions close  to  their  borders.  They  also  realized  that,  for 
commercial  as  well  as  for  political  reasons,  it  was  to  their 
advantage  to  keep  all  of  the  western  hemisphere  that  they 
could  in  what  would  to-day  be  termed  their  "sphere  of 
influence."  In  supporting  the  stand  taken  by  President 
Monroe,  they  at  the  same  time  extended  a  protecting  hand 
over  their  weaker  brethren  and  followed  the  behests  of 
enlightened  self-interest. 

The  last  feature  of  the  doctrine  that  went  to  make  it 
popular  was  its  appearance  of  unusual  daring.  The  young 
Amerit  an  republic,  with  its  scant  ten  million  inhabitants, 
and  almost  without  an  army,  appeared  to  be  throwing  down 
the  glove  to  the  great  military  monarchies  of  Europe.  This 
was  enough  to  stir  the  blood  of  patriots.  In  actual  fact,  the 
peril  was  not  serious ;  for  as  long  as  England  was  on  the  side 
of  the  United  States,  the  Americans,  being  at  a  safe  dis- 
tance, had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  continental  powers. 
And  the  views  of  the  British  government  on  the  South 
American  question  were  well  known.  Though  the  news 
had  not  reached  Washington,  Canning  had  already  told 
Prince  Polignac,  tho  French  ambassador,  that  Great 
Britain  would  not  tolerate  any  European  interference  in 
Spanish-American  matters,  and  Polignac  had  replied  that 
France  had  no  thought  of  interfering  in  then  .  Neverthe- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


09 


less,  the  apparent  triumph  of  the  new  doctrine  was  com- 
plete. All  talk  of  intervention  soon  died  out,  a  result 
which  the  Americans  of  course  assumed  to  be  entirely  due 

to  their  attitude.  Even  Canning  gave  countenance  to 
this  belief  by  declaring  proudly,  if  inaccurately,  "I  called 
the  New  World  into  existence  to  redress  the  bal  nee  of  the 
Old." 

We  may  note  here  a  curious  similarity  between  the  pol- 
icy pursued  by  England  in  1823  and  that  followed  in  1902. 

On  both  occasions,  finding  herself  isolated  and  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  chief  military  states  of  continental  Europe, 
she  sought  her  ally  at  a  distance,  legardless  of  any  senti- 
mental twaddle  about  the  community  of  European  nations. 
Sl.e  acted,  in  short,  like  a  true  world  power,  unfettered  by 
local  prejudice.  If  the  United  States  had  accepted  Can- 
ning's overtures  and  joined  with  Great  Britf'in,  as  might 
quite  conceivably  have  happened,  the  parallel  would  have 
been  more  exact ;  or  we  may  imagine  that  Japan,  if  she  had 
felt  strong  enough,  might  have  preferred  to  proclaim  on  her 
own  responsibility  the  doctrine  of  "Asia  for  the  Asiatics." 
Russia,  however,  was  a  very  different  menace  to  Japan  in 
1902  from  what  she  was  to  the  United  States  in  1823.' 

When  we  compare  the  two  passag*  in  which  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  proclaimed  we  see  that,  althoi-^'h  disconnected 
and  dealing  with  different  matters,  r.ey  are,  after  all,  ex- 
pressions of  the  same  idea  of  hostility  to  European  inter- 
vention in  American  affairs.  Of  the  two,  the  second  passage 
has  enjoyed  the  greater  celebrity,  partly  because  it  is  a 
careful  argument  not,  like  the  first,  a  mere  pronouncement, 
but  chiefly  because  of  its  reputed  brilliant  eiiccess  in 
blocking  the  proposed  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
in  the  troubles  of  the  New  World.    It  also  emerged  tri- 

'  And  yet  Secretary  Adams  had  said  to  the  British  minister,  October, 
1820,  "I  find  proof  enni;  'i  to  put  down  the  Russian  ai^^eat;  but  how 
shall  I  answer  the  Russian  cannon " 


100 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


iiniphant  when  its  principle  was  violated  by  Napoleon  III 
in  his  attempt  to  create,  with  the  aid  of  French  troops,  a 
Mexican  empire  for  Archduke  Maximilian  of  Austria.*  No 
one  can  well  call  it  obsolete  to-day ;  for  it  frequently  appears 
in  discussion,  and  it  would  he  maintained  with  vigor  if  a 
case  that  came  under  its  provision  should  arise.  None 
the  less,  we  may  question  whether  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
its  present  form  does  not  rest  satisfactorily  on  the  President's 
simple  statement  about  European  colonization. 

In  the  longer  declaration  there  is  much  that  is  now  some- 
what antiquated.  Wedded  as  the  Americans  are  to  a  re- 
publican form  of  government,  they  have  to  admit  that  a 
monarchy  is  not  necessarily  a  despotism ;  that  in  most  of 
the  countries  of  Europe  the  people  are  the  real  sovereigns ; 
and  on  the  other  hand,  they  have  seen  examples  of  a  very 
queer  sort  of  liberty  in  some  of  the  republics  of  Latin  Amer- 
ica. Although,  in  the  Venezuelan  dispute  of  1895-1896, 
the  old  cry  about  the  protection  of  republican  institutions 
in  the  New  World  was  raised,  it  was  difficult  for  any  intel- 
ligent American  to  believe  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
disputed  territory  would  be  worse  off  or  less  secure  of  the 
"unalienable  rights  of  life,  libcity,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness" under  the  rule  of  Queen  Victoria  than  under  the  sway 
of  a  Venezuelan  dictator.  The  American  objection  to  Euro- 
pean interference  in  the  western  hemisphere  is  in  reality 
no  longer  bascnl  on  any  "hereditary  differences  of  political 
systems."  The  United  States  would  oppose  just  as  reso- 
hitely  an  attempt  of  th(>  French  republic  to  acquire  new 
lands  in  South  America  as  it  would  similar  action  on  the 
part  of  the  Russian  Empire.  Even  if  the  arguments  used 
in  the  two  cases  might  not  be  the  same,  the  reasons  would 
at  bottom  be  identical. 

*  Curiously  enough,  Mr.  Seward,  in  his  long  discussions  with  the  French 
government,  never  once  referred  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  the  batiis  of  his 
arguments. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


101 


The  announcement  that  the  "American  continents  are 
henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  coloni- 
zation by  any  European  powers"  contains  the  kernel  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  But  the  meaning  of  the  word  "coloniza- 
tion" hus  been  expanded  until  it  covers  not  only  all  ac- 
quisition of  territory,  hut  also,  and  to  an  increasing  degree, 
forcible  intervention  for  nearly  any  purpose.  It  is  true 
that  the  contingency  which  called  forth  this  clause  soon 
passed  away  ;  for  by  the  treaty  of  1824  the  southern 
boundary  of  Russian  America  was  agreed  upon  to  the  satis- 
faction of  l)oth  parties.  President  Monroe's  message  prob- 
ably had  no  influence  on  the  settlement  of  the  dispute; 
indeed,  he  said  nothing  on  the  subject  that  had  not  been 
already  said  to  Russia  with  more  emphasis  by  his  secretary 
of  state.  And  the  only  foreign  country  that  paid  any  par- 
ticular attention  to  the  President's  dictum  about  colonization 
was  England.  Canning  did  not  relish  the  thought  that  he 
had  "called  the  New  World  into  existence"  to  prevent 
Great  Britain  from  acquiring  more  territor;'  in  it ;  nor  could 
he  "acknowledge  the  right  of  any  power  to  proclaim  such 
a  principle,  much  less  to  bind  other  countries  to  the  observ- 
ance of  it."  He  termed  the  declaration  "very  extraor- 
dinary," and  one  which  His  Majesty's  government  was 
"prepared  to  combat  in  the  most  unequivocal  manner." 

In  spite  of  these  brave  words,  the  "very  extraordirary" 
declaration  has  continued  to  guide  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  ever  since,  and  has  come  out  victorious  from  many 
encounters.  Not  that  the  Americans  have  always  had 
things  their  own  way;  for  in  their  disputes  with  Great 
Britain  they  have  had  to  make  concessions  which  have 
been  attacked  as  surrenders  of  principle.  Nor  can  it  be 
denied  that  the  English  possessions  in  the  western  hemi- 
sphere are  larger  to-day  than  they  were  in  1823;  what  was 
then  a  shadowy  protectorate  in  B(>lize  ha  grown  into 
actual  ownership  of  the  colony  of  British  Honduras;  and 


102       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


by  the  Oregon  boundary  treaty  of  1840  lands  which  the 
Americans  had  claimed  as  theirs  were  awarded  to  Great 
Britain.  Still,  the  fact  that  the  United  States  has  been 
obliged  to  compromise  with  a  nation  of  equal  strength 
lines  not  signify  any  al)andoiiinent  of  principle  on  its  part. 
It  has  even  gone  to  the  length  of  inviting  a  European 
sovereign  to  decide  as  to  the  justice  of  a  contention;  for 
instance,  in  1871  it  made  the  Emperor  of  Germany  arbi- 
trator in  the  San  Juan  da  Fuca  controversy.  If  his  de- 
cision had  been  in  favor  of  Great  Britain,  we  may  suspect 
that  the  Americans  might  have  dedarinl  that  he  ought 
never  to  have  been  called  in  at  all ;  but  as  it  was,  they  had 
no  cause  to  complain  of  his  participation,  for  the  islands 
in  dispute  were  allotted  to  them. 

Although  the  message  of  President  Monroe  attracted  some 
attention  abroad  at  the  moment,  it  w'as  soon  forgotten  by 
all  but  a  few ;  only  within  very  recent  years,  indeed,  has  the 
European  public  recognized  its  importance,  or  even  realized 
that  it  existed.  Meanwhile,  in  the  country  of  its  origin  it 
had  become  a  part  of  the  national  creed.  The  maxims 
set  forth  in  it  were  accepted  as  beyond  dispute,  and  the 
government,  no  nuitter  what  party  was  in  power,  was  ready 
to  act  in  accordance  with  them.  TIumc  were,  to  be  sure, 
some  Ia})ses  from  consistency,  the  most  noticeable  being  the 
signing  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with  England,  a  step 
that  was  soon  repented  of ;  but  an  occasional  slip  of  this 
kind  was  not  enough  to  weaken  the  general  principle.  As 
new  cases  for  its  application  have  arisen,  new  conclusions 
have  been  drawn  from  it,'  until  it  has  been  amplified  in  a 
way  not  foreseen  by  its  first  expounders. 

'  T!i','  <'.0','!;ir:itioii  of  President  Po!k  in.  1,S45  tb.at  tb.e  United  States  fould 
not  permit  any  European  interventiun  on  the  North  American  continent, 
on  the  one  hand,  pushed  the  theory  farther  than  it  has  been  carried  out  in 
practice,  and.  on  the  '-thor,  it  restricted  the  original  idea  by  failing  to 
include  tlie  southern  continent. 


THE  MOiNROE  DOCTRINE 


103 


In  the  discussions  about  Cuba  and  about  the  Isthmian  Canal, 
we  find  it  quoted  again  and  again;  but  the  world  did 

not  wako  up  to  its  full  si<xnificance  till  the  year  1S95,  when, 
to  the  astonisluncut  of  all  beholders,  the  Americans  sud- 
denly showed  themselves  ready  to  ^'o  to  war  with  England 
over  a  question  which  few  persons  had  heard  about,  and 
which  affected  the  direct  interests  of  the  United  States  in 
hardly  the  slightest  degree,  —  the  settlement  of  the  bound- 
ary l)etween  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana. 

S'  -retary  Olney,  in  his  despatch  of  July  20,  1895,  not  only 
urged  the  claims  of  Venezuela  and  demanded  arbitration, 
but  also  proceeded  to  restate  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  to 
explain  its  history  and  application  in  full.  Some  of  his 
remarks  were  sufficiently  startling.  After  speaking  of  the 
differences  between  the  two  Iiemispheres,  he  declared, 
''That  distance  and  thret?  thousand  miles  of  intervening 
ocean  make  any  permanent  political  union  between  an 
European  and  an  American  state  unnatural  and  inexpedient, 
will  hardly  be  denied";  and,  he  added,  "The  states  of 
America,  South  as  well  as  North,  by  geographical  proximity, 
by  natural  sympathy,  by  similarity  of  Governmental  Con- 
stitutions, are  friends  and  allies,  commercially  and  politi- 
cally, of  the  United  States."  Nor  was  this  all.  "To-day," 
he  continued,  "the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign 
on  this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to 
which  it  confines  its  interposition.  .  .  .  There  is,  then, 
a  doctrine  of  American  public  law,  well  founded  in  principle 
and  abundantly  sanctioned  by  precedent,  which  entitles  and 
requires  the  United  States  to  treat  as  an  injury  to  itself 
the  forcible  assumption  by  an  European  power  of  political 
control  over  an  American  state." 

Lord  Salisbury,  in  reply,  flatly  denied  Secretary  Olney's 
contentions,  asserting  that  the  Monroe  Doctrino  was  neither 
international  law  nor  applicable  to  this  particular  contro- 
versy.  Thereupon  President  Cleveland  laid  the  whole  corre- 


!04        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


sp.Mulciitf  In  fore  Congress.  He  proposed  thut  the  United 
Stiitea  should  appoint  a  conuaiBmon  to  investigate  and  de- 
cide upon  the  merits  of  the  Ix.iuiaary  ([ucstion,  and  should 
then  enforce  the  decision.  "In  niakin",'  these  recomiueiida- 
tioris,"  he  added,  "I  am  fully  alive  to  the  full  ivspousihil- 
ity  iucunvil,  and  keenly  reaUzo  all  the  couse(iuences  that 
nuiy  follow." 

The  effect  of  this  message  was  instantaneous.  Heretofore 
Mr.  Cleveland  had  shown  himself  so  peac(>ful  and  con- 
servative IX  statesman  that  no  one  luul  foreseen  violent 
action  on  his  i)art.  Now,  all  at  once,  a  wave  of  passion 
swept  through  the  country.  The  newspapers,  with  few 
exceptions,  were  loud  in  their  denunciation  of  Great  Britain ; 
and  both  political  parties  rallied  to  the  support  of  the 
President.  When  the  more  conservative  elements  had 
a  chance  to  express  themselves,  when  stocks  and  bonds 
came  tumbling  down,  and  when  the  nation  began  to  realize 
the  undefended  condition  of  ivs  coasts,  a  reaction  did  in- 
deed take  place;  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the 
majority  of  the  American  people  were  fully  determined  to 
fight  rather  than  to  yield  in  the  question  at  issue. 

In  England  the  first  feeling  was  one  of  utter  bewilder- 
ment ;  for,  if  the  American  public  nad  known  little  about 
the  Venezuelan  dispute,  the  English  knew  even  less,  and 
they  had  never  dreamed  of  it  as  a  matter  of  serious  con- 
sequence.   The  storm  of  violent  abuse  in  the  .Vmerican 
press  ,  rovoked  sharp  replies ;  but  the  government  remained 
cool.    As  it  had  no  thought  of  going  to  war  over  an  insig- 
nificant matter  of  tl?is  sort  unless  absolutely  forced  to  do 
so,  it  proceeded  to  extricate  itself  from  the  situation  with 
as' little  loss  of  dignity  as  possible.    To  this  end,  it  nego- 
tiated with  Venezuela  for  a  treaty  of  arbitration,  and  thus 
settled  the  affair  without  awaiting  a  report  from  the  Ameri- 
can commission.    The  English  people  felt  some  soreness 
over  the  incident ;  but  they  soon  found  an  outlet  for  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTIIIXE 


105 


pent-up  iviiKor  which  hud  not  been  discharged  against  the 

Aincric.'Uis  by  vciititi^^  it  u-'  the  (lerniun  emperor  when  he 
iH'iit  his  fuinoiiH  t»'h'}jriiin  to  IVesich-nt  Krviger  at  the  time 
of  tlie  Jameson  raid.  It  is  fortunate  that  the  raid  did 
n  t  occur  before  President  Cleveland's  message ;  for  it  was 
owing  to  the  |j;ood  temper  shown  by  the  British  people,  as 
well  as  by  the  governiiuMit  of  Lord  Salisbury,  that  the 
VenezTielaii  war  eh)ud  vanished  so  (juickly. 

Althou^^h  the  (h'cision  of  the  arbitrators  awarded  tlie 
larger  part  of  the  disputed  territory  to  (ireat  Britain, 
the  outcome  of  the  dispute  was  a  notable  triumph  for  the 
United  States.  Even  if  many  Americans  would  still  hesi- 
tate to  indorse  all  the  views  of  Secretary  Olney,  most 
of  th(Mu  may  be  said  to  accept  his  exposition  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  official  statement  of  a  policy 
now  more  popular  than  ever.  Since  1896  they  have  seldom 
let  slip  a  chance  to  reiterate  their  belief  in  it.  At  the  close 
of  the  first  pt  .ce  congress  at  The  Hague,  the  American 
delegates  .signed  the  resolutions  agreed  upon,  but  with  the 
reservation  that  "nothing  contained  in  this  Convention 
shall  be  so  construed  as  to  require  the  United  States  of 
America  to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of  not  entering 
upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political 
questions  of  international  administration  of  ony  foreign 
state,  nor  shall  anything  contained  in  tlie  said  Convention 
be  so  construed  as  to  require  the  relinquishment,  by  the 
United  States  of  America,  of  its  traditional  attitude  toward 
purely  American  questions."  The  Republican  platform 
of  lUOO  proclaimed,  "We  nvissert  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
its  full  extent;"  and  the  Democratic,  not  to  be  outdone, 
anno\inc(Hl,  "The  Monroe  Doctriiie  as  originally  declared 
and  interpreted  l)y  succeeding  Presidents,  is  a  permanent 
part  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  and 
must  at  all  times  be  maintained."  Finally,  President 
Roosevelt  has  again  and  again,  in  speeches  and  messages, 


106 


THE  UNITF.D  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWtU 


referred  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  expounded  its  prin- 

ciplcH.* 

Another  rostilt  of  the  Vctu-zuclun  controvorsy  of 
was  that  it  l)rou^^ht  the  .\h»iir()('  Doctrine  much  tiutrc  promi- 
nently to  the  noti(<;  of  iiw.  outsitli'  world.  The  European 
powers  have  at  last  realized  that,  whether  they  like  the 
idea  or  not,  they  must  recognize  that  this  ()rinciple  is  v. 
corner-stone  of  American  foreign  policy,  ami  that  no  f)ne 
can  venture  to  disro^ard  it  except  at  tlie  })eril  of  imme- 
diate trouble  with  the  United  States,  —  a  truth  further 
emphasized  by  the  angry  tiuspicion  with  which  American 
public  opinion  viewed  the  sending  of  British  and  German 
warships  to  Venezuela  in  1902.  Under  these  circumstances, 
European  nations  have  shown  a  certain  readiness  to  ac- 
quiesce in  the  doctrine,  not  indeed  witii  enthusiasm,  but  as 
a  thing  which  exists  and  must  be  reckoned  with,  and  which, 
in  view  of  the  strength  of  the  United  States,  might  as  well 
be  accepted  with  good  grace.  Most  of  them  have  made 
no  definite  declaration  on  the  suliject ;  but  England,  the 
power  whi  h  in  the  past  has  mcjst  freqaiutl}'  como  into 
collision  with  American  political  aims,  now  iaeems  to  have 
mad(  '  ■  her  mind  to  make  the  best  of  them.  In  1903  the 
Duke  Devonshire  declared,  "Great  Britain  accepts  the 
Monroe  Joctrine  unreservedly,"  a  pronoui  ement  which 
may  bo  regarded  as  an  official  statement  of  the  attitude  of 
the  British  government  to-day.  Whether  other  states  fol- 
low thia  example  or  not  is  a  matter  of  no  great  conse- 
quence.'   What  is  of  consequence  to  them,  as  well  ae 

'  Perhaps  the  best  recent  exposition  of  the  doctrine  is  to  be  found  in 
Captain  Mahan's  article  in  the  National  Review  of  February,  1903. 

-  The  tlccliiratioii  of  <I<Tniaii\  c-i  DoceiulKM'  11,  1901,  that  in  her  pro- 
posed measures  against  \  eiu  zuda  she  had  "  no  purpose  or  intention  to 
make  even  the  smallest  acquisition  of  le.iitory  on  the  South  American 
continent  or  the  islarids  adjacent,"  has  lieen  regarded  as  an  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  principle,  but  it  was  nothing  hut  a  statement  of  intentions  on 
a  particular  occasion  and  in  no  way  binding  for  the  future. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


107 


to  the  United  States,  is  the  question  of  the  exact  nature 
and  scope  of  the  doctrine  at  the  present  time. 

Before  attempting  to  examine  thie  subject  from  the  posi- 
tive side,  h't  us  hcKi"  by  eUmrinR  out  of  the  way  certair 

mistaken  i(h-as.  lu  tl>e  first  place,  the  Monroe  Dortrin. 
is  not  an  international  '•  iru|).Ttin.>nce,"  as  Bismarck  is  s;,i( 
to  have  called  it,  and  us  some  forci^^n  writers  arc  still 
prone  to  regard  it.  Such  an  epithet  cannot  be  seriously 
applied  to  the  well-considered  policy  of  one  of  the  first 
nations  in  the  world,— a  policy  successfully  upheld  for 
K'cnerations,  and  one  which  the  country  will  support  at 
any  cost. 

Secondly,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ia  not  a  part  of  inter- 
national law,  although  many  Americans  have  said  that  it 
was,  and  although  President  Roosevelt  has  expressed  the 
hopo  that  it  may  be  some  day.    Even  if  it  were  to  be  ac- 
cepted by  all  nations,  it  wou.d  remain  simply  an  expression 
of  individual  policy,  respected  on  account  of  the  might 
of  the  nation  that  asserted  it.    Though  based  on  sound 
considerations,  it  is  not  in  itself  a  general  principle,  but 
belongs  to  the  same  class  of  dogmas  as,  let  us  say,  tlie  French 
objection  to  the  seating  of  a  German  prince  on  th  .hrone 
of  Spain,  or  as  the  British  i)r<)tectorate  of  the  Pi-rsian  Culf 
and  the  maintenance  of  buffer  states  on  the  Indian  frontier. 
Legitimate  as  these  tenets  may  be,  no  one  would  caU  them 
part  of  international  law. 

Thirdly,  it  is  not  a  doctrine  of  expansion,  but  only  of 
self-defence.  Although  the  ultimate  result  of  measures 
of  self-defence  may  conceivably  be  aggrandizement,  tlie 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  itself  does  not  warrant  anything  of  the 
tsort.  Since  it  presupposes  the  right  of  people  to  govern 
themselves,  the  Latin-AmPricar  states  Ixavc  nothing  to  fear 
from  it,  —  a  point  which  has  been  emphasized  by  Secre- 
tary Root  in  his  recent  South  American  journey.  Like 
other  growing  countries,  the  United  States  has,  in  the  course 


108       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  its  history,  sometimos  been  guilty  of  r.ggression,  of  add- 
ing to  its  territories  by  force,  and  it  may  be  destined  to 
expand  still  more  in  the  future ;  but,  whether  we  approve 
of  aggrandizement  or  not,  we  have  no  right  to  accuse  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which,  like  anything  else,  may  be  made 
to  serve  unfair  purposes.'  Even  the  Golden  Rule  may  be 
distorted  into  a  pretext  for  rapacity. 

Fourthly,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  no  longer  the  literal 
teaching  of  President  Monroe.  Although  first  expressed  in 
his  famous  message,  it  has  in  course  of  time  been  developed 
to  meet  new  conditions,  a  fact  overlooked  by  Lord  Salisbury 
when  he  said  that  it  was  inai)pli('able  to  "the  state  of 
things  in  which  >v'e  live  at  the  present  day."  "  The  question 
whether  its  application  to  any  particular  set  of  circum- 
stances would  have  met  with  the  approval  of  Monroe  and 
his  advisers,  is  one  which  belongs  to  the  history  of  politi- 
cal theories,  but  has  no  bearing  on  actual  i)olitics. 

While  some  of  the  ideas  set  forth  by  the  fathers  of  the 
doctrine  have  grown,  others,  as  we  have  seen,  are  no  longer 
an  essential  part  of  it,  even  if  the  public  has  not  always 
recognized  the  fact.  For  instance,  educated  Americans 
know  not  only  that  the  United  States  is  nearer  in  almost 
every  way  to  Europe  than  to  South  America,  but  that 
the  average  American  has  more  in  common,  not  with  the 
Englishman  alone,  but  with  the  German,  the  Frenchman,  or 
the  Russian  ihan  with  the  Mexican,  the  Peruvian,  or  the 
Brazilian.  This  has,  indeed,  always  been  true ;  but  it  was 
less  reali'^ed  at  a  time  when  it  seemed  possible  to  divide 
civilized  peoiiles  into  two  categories,  —  those  who  were 
ruled  l)y  irresfwusible  authority  and  those  who  enjoyed 
self-government.  Such  a  division  is  now  out  of  date,  and 
race  feeling,  on  the  contrary,  is  more  active  than  ever. 
When  we  remember  how  small  and  mixjd  is  the  white 

'  As  for  instance  by  President  Polk  when  he  widied  to  seiae  Yucatan. 
'  Venezuelan  Correspontlcnce. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRLNE 


109 


element  in  some  of  the  Latin-American  countries,  and  how 
strong  the  prejudice  against  colored  blood  in  the  United 
Stutcs,  wo  can  appreciate  some  of  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  union  of  soul  with  tl.  •  sister  republics. 

After  all,  we  ask,  would  not  a  close  bond  between  the 
United  States  and  Greater  Britain,  and  one  between  Spain 
and  her  former  revolted  colonies,  be  more  in  keeping  with 
the  tendencies  of  the  day?  Anglo-American  friendship  and 
Pan-Aniericanisni  can,  of  course,  exist  side  by  side;  but 
they  might  easily  conflict,  and  the  question  might  arise  as 
to  which  had  the  more  natural  foundation.  In  this  age  of 
world  powers,  geographical  divisions  are  disappearing  even 
faster  than  differences  of  government.  If  "Europe"  is 
antiquated  as  a  political  conception,  why  is  not  "America" 
equall:  so?  If  it  is,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  appear  to 
rest  upon  a  fiction. 

But  this  is  going  too  far  The  geographical  situation  of 
the  United  States,  and  its  "paramount  interest"  in  the 
affairs  of  the  western  hemisphere,  impose  upon  it  certain 
rules  of  policy  toward  its  immediate  nci^'hl)ors,  whether 
there  be  an  inborn  comnuuiion  of  sentiment  between  them 
or  not.  Furthermore,  it  is  wise  to  cultivate  good  and 
profitable  relations  of  every  kind  with  all  countries.  The 
reasons  for  cordiality  will  vary  according  to  circumstances. 
For  instance,  the  grounds  for  friendship  between  France 
and  Spain  are  quite  dissimihir  to  tliose  existing  between 
France  and  Russia.  A  certain  conununity  of  institutions, 
interests,  and  ideals  does  exist  between  the  republics  of  the 
western  hemisphere,  though  it  would  be  hard  to  say  just 
how  far  it  extends.  Nothing,  therefore,  could  be  more  legit- 
imate than  the  attempt  to  strengthen  and  multiply  these 
ties.  To  make  them  more  real,  it  is  wise  to  dwell  fre- 
(juently  upon  them. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  persons,  even  in  the 
United  States,  who  think  it  would  be  better  if  certain  parts 


110        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  Latin  America  were  under  the  control  of  some  European 
power,  instead  of  being  left  to  the  guidance  of  their  own 
unrestrained  wills.  If  we  accept  this  view,  we  cannot  defend 
the  United  States  for  protecting  their  independence  ex- 
cept on  the  ground  that  such  protection  is  necessary  for 
the  furtherance  of  legitimate,  if  selfish,  American  interests. 
In  that  case,  the  question  as  to  what  would  be  best  for 
the  world  and  for  civilization  might  be  rather  delicate. 
However,  it  is  unfair  to  say  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
an  entirely  selfish  policy.  It  may  not  be  so  full  of  altru- 
'sm  as  Americans  are  inclined  to  think;  but  it  has  at 
least  been  unselfishly  applied  so  far  as  the  states  of  Latin 
America  are  concerned.  No  one  who  has  studied  the  ex- 
pansion of  Europe  in  the  last  part  of  the  nineteenth 
century  can  escajie  the  conclusion  that  the  partition  cf 
lands  in  Asia  and  the  scramble  for  Africa  might,  but  for 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  have  been  accompanied,  or  followed, 
by  a  movement  of  the  same  sort  in  Latin  America.  The 
conditions  in  many  of  her  states  have  been  such  as  to 
give  plenty  of  pretext  lor  foreign  interference;  and  here, 
as  well  as  elsewhere,  the  rivalry  of  the  great  powers  would 
only  have  hastened  the  seizure  of  lands  weakly  held.  There 
may  never  have  been  r^ny  deep  designs  of  this  kind,  but 
expansion  as  often  been  haphazard.  The  danger  was  none 
the  less  there. 

In  return  for  the  immense  se  rvice  it  has  thus  rendered, 
the  United  States  has  as  yet  demanded  absolutely  nothing. 
Of  course  in  its  attempts  to  promote  fiier.dly  relations  be- 
tween Anglo-Saxon  and  Latin  America,  it  has  not  forgotten 
material  advantages,  and  it  has  made  llie  most  of  friendly 
entinients  in  order  to  heli)  Aniericaii  ijoiimeree  to  th(>  ad- 
vantage of  all  parties.  Motives  of  this  sort  are  fair  enough 
in  themselves,  and  arc  usual  under  like  circumstances  in 
private,  as  well  as  in  public,  life.  The  Latin  Americans  are 
not  forced  to  buy  goods  from  the  United  States  if  they  can 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


111 


get  them  elsewhere  with  more  profit.  So  far,  then,  they 
have  good  cause  to  be  grateful  for  the  existence  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  for  the  way  in  which  it  has  been 

applied  up  to  the  present  day. 

As  has  l)ecn  well  said  by  Captain  Mahan,  "The  prerise 
value  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  understood  very  loosely  by 
most  Americans,  but  the  effect  of  the  familiar  phrase  has 
been  to  develop  a  national  sensitiveness  which  is  a  more 
frequent  cause  of  war  than  material  interests."    The  appli- 
cation of  the  theory  may  well  vary  according  o  the  temper 
of  the  time  (^r  the  views  of  the  administration;  but  it  has 
stea(My  tended  to  become  broader.    Thus  the  Venezuelan 
controversy  of  1895-1896  may  be  regarded  as  having  settled 
the  point  that,  in  a  boundary  dispute  between  a  European 
power  and  an  American  one,  the  former  must  be  willing  to 
siibmit  to  arbitration  ;  but  so  far  the  United  States  has  not 
demanded  that  the  arbitrator  should  be  an  American: 
indeed,  at  the  very  tin^e  when  the  Venezuelan  discussion 
had  reached  its  most  critical  phase,  a  long-standing  differ- 
ence as  to  the  frontier  of  French  Guiana  and  Brazil  was 
referred  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia  for  decision  without 
raising  a  protest  from  Wasliii, -ton.* 

Nevertheless,  American  pubi  c  opinion  is  increasingly 
opposed  to  European  intervention  of  any  kind  in  trans- 
atlantic affairs,  and  may  be  expected  to  forbid  in  the 
future  Unw^s  which  it  has  tolerated  in  the  past,  — a  change 
which  may  be  ascribed  to  a  consciousness  of  greater 
strength,  as  well  as  to  the  keen  chauviiiism  of  the  national 
sentiment  to-day.  Altliough  admitting  in  theory  the  right 
of  European  nations  to  obtain  reuress  from  delinquent 
/imerican  ones,  even  by  force,  the  United  States  has  in 

-  In  spite  of  the  dt-i  iaiiiiujii  of  Mr.  Freiinghuysen  (January  4,  1883), 
that  "The  Department  of  State  will  not  sanction  an  arbitration  by 
European  states  in  South  AmericMi  difficulties  even  with  the  consent  of 
the  parties." 


112        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

practice  beconip  very  suspicious  of  such  action,  and  is  hostile 
♦o  any  landing'  of  European  troops  on  American  soil.  The 
experience  of  Egypt,  for  example,  shows  how  easily  a  tem- 
porarj'  occupation  may  become  a  permanent  one,  even  when 
a  promise  to  evacuate  has  been  made  in  perfect  i^ood  faith. 

While  the  United  States  was  occupied  with  the  Civil  War, 
the  Spaniards,  he(^dless  of  its  protests,  reestabli  .lied  their 
former  sovereignty  at  San  Domingo.  They  did  so  with  the 
consent  of  the  Dominicans,  though  they  were  soon  driven 
out  again.  With  this  case  in  mind.  President  Grant  de- 
clared in  1870  that  "No  European  power  can  acquire  by  any 
means, —  war,  colonization,  or  annexation,  —  even  when 
the  annexed  people  demands  it,  any  portion  of  American 
territory." 

A  still  further  extension  of  the  principle  is  the  idea,  now 
generally  accepted,  that  no  transfer  of  American  territory 
from  one  European  power  to  another  can  henceforth  1)0 
allowed,  —  a  proposition  that  was  set  fortli  in  the  particular 
case  of  Cuba  as  early  as  1808.    The  United  States  permits 
the  existence  of  foreign  colonies  in  its  neighborhood,  but 
will  resist  any  changes  in  their  alien  ownership;  for  svuh 
changes  would  be  in  the  nature  of  the  colonization  which  it 
forbids    We  may  fed  sure  that  it  would  risk  all  the  hazards 
of  war   ather  tlum  acquiesce  in  the  sale  of  St.  Thomas  to 
Germany.    This  might  seem  to  be  pushing  the  doctrine 
pretty  iar ;  for  it  would  limit  the  right  of  free  transaction 
between  two  independent  nations,  one  of  them  a  world 
power.    Nevertheless,  it  would  not  be  unprecedented,  and 
might  be  justified  by  the  importance  of  the  interests  in- 
volved.   The  establishment  of  such  a  fortified  coahng  sta- 
tion within  a  short  distance  of  the  American  coast  would 
be  something  which  the  United  States  would  no  more  toler- 
ate, so  long  as  it  was  capable  of  effectual  resistance,  than 
England  and  France  would  a^^re-  to  the  transfer  from 
Spain  to  Germany  of  the  African  fortress  of  Ceuta. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


113 


Other  complications  in  the  West  Indies  are  also  conceiv- 
able. It  has  been  asserted '  that,  if  Holland  were  to 
become  part  of  the  Germanic  Confederation,  the  United 
States  could  not  consent  to  the  inclusion  of  the  Dutch 

colonies  of  the  western  hemisphere.  This  view,  we  may 
surmise,  Avould  almost  certainly  be  taken  by  the  Ameri- 
can government  and  people  if  a  union  between  Holland  and 
Germany  were  brought  about  by  some  sudden  act.  In 
case,  however,  of  the  gradual  absorption  of  Holland  into 
the  German  Empire  by  some  slow  process  of  ever  closer 
alliance,  it  mij^'ht  bo  hard  to  say  when  or  how  the  Americans 
could  interfere,  although  they  would  doubtless  wish  to  do 
so.  They  would  also,  in  all  probability,  object  to  the  cession 
of  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  as  an  indemnity,  if  France 
were  defeated  in  a  war  with  Germany  or  Great  Britain. 
If  this  supposition  is  correct,  they  thus  practically  guar- 
antee to  Franco  her  possessions  in  the  Caiibbean  Sea. 

It  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  since  the  declaration  of 
President  Grant  there  has  been  a  transfer  of  American  terri- 
tory from  one  European  power  to  another,  and  that  it  met 
with  no  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  When, 
in  1S7S,  Sweden  ceded  to  France  the  little  island  of  St. 
Barthelemi,  the  Americans  took  no  notice  of  the  proceed- 
ing, an  indifference  which  may  be  explained  partly  by  their 
lack  of  interest  in  foreign  affairs  so  soon  after  the  Civil  War, 
and  partly  by  the  insignificance  of  the  island  ceded,  which 
did  not  materially  add  to  the  strength  of  the  French  in  West 
Indian  waters.  It  is  nevertheless  strange  that  no  atten- 
tion whatever  was  paid  to  the  transaction,  and  that,  though 
it  seems  to  present  a  certain  analogy  to  a  sale  of  St. 
Thomas  to  Germany,  it  seems  to  have  escaped  the  notice  of 
writers  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  well  as  of  American 
historians  generally. 

The  ex*reme  interpretation  of  the  Monrop  Dortrine  may 
'  By  Crptain  Mahan,  in  the  National  Review,  February,  1903. 


114        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


1)0  found  in  the  assertion,  first  made  officiiilly  by  President 
Grant,  that  "The  time  is  not  so  far  distant  when,  in  the 
natural  course  of  events,  the  iCuropean  political  connection 
with  this  continent  will  cease ;"  and  the  same  idea  has  often 
been  renoated  since,  notably  by  Secretary  Ohiey,  witli  his 
usual  emphasis,  in  1895.  No  wonder  that  European  nations 
holding  territory  in  America  have  been  disquieted  by  it, 
even  though  there  is  as  yet  no  serious  foundation  for  such 
a  fear.  Monroe  himself  said  explicitly,  "With  the  existing 
colonies  or  d(>j)end(MU'ios  of  any  European  power  we  have 
not  interfered,  and  shall  not  interfere,"  —  a  declaration  of 
policy  which  has  ever  since  been  scrupulously  observed  by 
i-iie  United  States,  except  in  the  case  of  Cuba,  where  circum- 
stances were  of  a  peculiar  nature.  The  Americans  may  be 
counted  upon  to  sympathize  with  any  people  in  the  western 
hemisphere  who  are  struggling;  to  emancipate  themselv(>s 
from  the  rule  of  a  European  mother  country ;  but  no  Euro- 
pean nation  need  apprehend  aggressive  action  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  so  long  as  its  colonies  are  contented 
with  their  lot. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  considering  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
from  its  positive  side,  —  that  of  its  advantages  to  America. 
Let  us  now  look  at  the  negative,  —  at  the  obligations  which 
it  entails.  We  may,  of  course,  say  that  it  does  not  entail 
any,  if  we  believe  that  it  is  a  matter  of  selfish  policy,  upheld 
by  physical  force  only.  Tliat  it  doe:;  depend  chiefly  on  force 
is  obvious, — it  would  never  have  been  accepted  by  oti 
nations  on  account  of  its  inherent  virtue;  and  yet  in  up- 
holding it,  the  Americans  justify  their  action  by  moral 
considerations,  and  admit  the  existence  of  duties  on  their 
part.    What  are,  then,  some  of  th?se  duties? 

The  first  question  that  arises  is,  Are  the  .Anierirans  bound 
to  carry  out  the  doctrine  they  have  proclaimed,  even  when 
it  is  contrary  to  their  interests  to  do  so?  Such  a  limitation 
would  be  out  of  keeping  with  the  practical  nature  of  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


115 


Anglo-Saxon,  which  makes  him  dislike  being  subject  to  mere 
theories.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  spite  of  the  applause 

whicli  greeted  Monroe's  words,  American  public  opinion 
showed  itself  lukewarm  about  the  Congress  of  Panama, 
a  meeting  called  shortly  afterwards  with  the  avowed  inten- 
tion of  furthering  the  new  creed.    The  country  preferred  to 
reserve  its  own  liberty  of  action  without  hampering  itself  by 
outside  agreements.    In  the  course  of  debate  on  the  subject, 
Henry  Clay  (h dared  that  the  President's  message  was  meant 
to  enlighten  opinion  at  home  and  not  to  be  construed  as  a 
promise  to  any  foreign  nation.    When,  on  various  occasions 
since  that  time,  the  United  States  has  refused  to  listen  to 
appeals  for  assistance  from  one  or  another  of  the  Latin- 
American  states,  it  has,  of  course,  always  been  charged  with 
treason  to  its  principles ;  but  it  has  felt  free  to  act  according 
to  its  own  judgment.    In  the  case  of  the  f>ench  interven- 
tion in  Mexico,  for  instance,  the  government  at  Washington 
did  not  adopt  an  attitude  of  resolute  opposition  until  the 
Civil  War  at  home  was  nearly  over.    On  the  other  hand,  in 
1S0.5  Secretary  Olney,  supported  by  President  Cleveland, 
took  the  ground  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  "entitles  and 
requires"  the  United  States  to  intervene  in  behalf  of  Vene- 
zuela.   If  we  accept  this  view,  we  admit  the  existence  of  a 
serious  obligation;  but  a  country  whose  "fiat  is  law"  is 
likely  to  decide  for  itself  whether  the  situation  "requires" 
action  on  its  part  or  not.    Americans  are  far  too  realistic  to 
sacrifice  themselves  on  the  altar  of  their  own  shibboleths. 
When  they  find  these  becoming  antiquated,  they  will  never 
hesitate  to  adapt  them  to  circumstances  or,  if  need  be,  to 
abandon  them  altogether. 

One  ol)ligation  imposed  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
recently  been  coming  into  unpleasant  prominence.  If  a 
Latin-American  state  is  guilty  of  an  injury  to  a  European 
power  for  which  redress  can  be  fairly  exacted,  and  if  there 
is  no  effective  way  in  which  punishment  can  be  applied 


116        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


except  by  occupation  of  American  soil,  what  will  happen? 
Although  the  government  at  Washington  has  repeatedly 
declared  that  it  will  not  protect  any  state  in  wrong-doin^', 
and  has  not  prevented  punishment  in  the  past,  puMic 
opinion  is  b(>c<)niin^^  more  and  more  unwilliiij^  to  permit  a 
European  occupation  of  American  territory  for  any  reason 
whatsoever.  This  means  that  the  United  States  must 
accept  the  responsibility  of  satisfying  the  injured  party, 
a  thin^'  wliich  it  can  very  likely  do  only  by  taking  action 
against  the  wrong-doer.  But  the  role  of  "international 
policeman "  in  American  affairs  is  one  which  the  country 
has  no  desire  to  assume ;  for  it  would  very  soon  lead  to 
conflict  with  some  of  the  other  republics,  who,  while  they 
welcome  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  protection  against 
Europe,  dread  nothing  so  much  as  interference  on  the  part 
of  Tiieir  powerful  sister  at  the  north.  Moreover,  besides  act- 
ing as  guardian  of  the  peace,  the  United  States  would  have 
to  play  the  arbiter  as  to  the  right  and  the  wrong  of  any 
question  under  dispute;  in  fact,  there  is  no  end  to  the 
difficulties  in  which  it  might  become  involved. 

These  difficulties  are  now  well  recognized.  President 
Roost>V(>lt  deserves  credit  for  having  been  one  of  the  first 
to  perceive  and  to  face  them.  Unluckily,  even  facing  a 
difficulty  does  not  remove  it.  The  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment at  the  present  time  seems  to  be  to  make  tlu^  best  of 
each  case  as  it  comes  along,  to  try  to  persuade  all  parties 
to  be  reasonable,  to  warn  the  Latin-American  republics  that 
they  will  not  be  shielded,  and  may  have  to  be  punished, 
if  they  misbehave,  but  at  the  same  time  to  keep  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  prominently  before  the  eyes  of  Europe.  A  con- 
spicuous instance  of  an  attempt  of  this  kind  to  arrange  mat- 
ters eqmtably  between  a  debtor  American  state  and  its 
European  creditors  is  seen  in  the  agreement  with  ^an 
Domingo.  The  trouble  with  this  opportunist  policy  of  the 
administration  is  that  every  intervention  of  a  strong  power 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


117 


in  the  affairs  of  a  weak  one  tends  to  establish  a  protectorate 
of  some  sort. 

The  theory  of  a  natural  separation  between  the  New 

World  and  the  Old  is  an  essential  part  of  the  reasoning  on 
which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  based.  In  conforniity  with 
this  i(l(  a,  in  the  same  breath  in  which  it  protest  a^i;aiiist 
Euroj)ean  colonization  of  America  it  announces  with  equal 
emphasis,  "In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers  in  matters 
relating  to  themselves  we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor 
does  it  comport  with  our  policy  to  do  so."  This  declaration 
has  been  repeated  in  one  form  or  another  many  times,'  and 
has  been  adhered  to.  President  Monroe  himself  had  in- 
tended to  put  into  his  message  of  December,  1823,  an 
expression  of  sympathy  with  the  Greek  revolution,  but  was 
persuaded  by  his  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Adams,  not  to  do  so, 
as  it  would  appear  like  an  interference  in  European  affairs. 
The  same  policy  has  been  followed  ever  since.  Ameilcan 
public  men  have  sometimes  criticised  European  events  with 
rankness,  not  to  say  a  rudeness,  which  has  provoked 
-•r  on  the  other  side ;  but  they  have  had  no  thought  of 
taking  action  in  affairs  which  did  not  concern  them.  Not 
tliat  the  United  States  has  not  felt  the  duty  of  protecting 
its  citizens  and  its  commerce  when  they  have  been  in 
danger  of  suffering  injury.  This  is  a  right  common  to  all 
states ;  but  such  a  thing,  let  us  say,  as  the  sending  of  an 
ironclad  to  Smyrna  to  look  after  American  missionaries 
would  be  a  very  different  matter  from  taking  part  in  a 
congress  to  discuss  the  Eastern  question.  The  United 
States,  while  looking  after  its  own  interests  wherever  they 
have  been  affected,  has  sedulously  kept  out  of  general 
European  politics. 

President  Monroe  talked  only  about  Europe  and  America, 
without  taking  into  consideration  other  parts  of  the  world. 
What  is  the  bearing  of  his  doctrine  upon  Asia?    Is  the 
'  Notably  at  the  first  Hague  Conference. 


118       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Uniti'd  States  confinod  by  traditional  policy  to  the  western 
hemisphere  ?  or,  since  Asia  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Presi- 
dent's message,  is  that  continent  open  to  every  kind  of 

Anicrican  activity? 

Europe  would  have  been  ^\ad  tn  see  the  first  view  pre- 
vail, and  this  was  tlie  one  indorsed  by  the  Deniocralic  )>lat- 
forta  in  1900.  In  truth,  it  seems  absurd  to  assert  that  the 
Atlantic  is  a  natural  barrier  between  peoples,  but  that  the 
Pacific  is  not.  Nevertheless,  the  second  interpretation  has 
won  the  day:  the  Americans  have  taken  an  active  part  in 
the  opening;  up  of  Eastern  Asia,  they  have  frequently 
joined  with  other  powers  in  common  action,  and  they  have 
established  themselves  in  the  Philippines.  After  all,  it 
would  have  been  strange  if  they,  the  nearest  civilized 
neighbors  to  the  Far  East,  had  sat  by  while  their  European 
competitors  disposed  of  it  to  suit  themselves,  and  this,  for- 
sooth, because  a  principle  which  they  had  themselves  in- 
vented for  a  totally  different  set  of  circumstances  might 
be  construed  as  restricting  their  liberty  of  action !  The 
Americans  are  not  given  to  doctrinaire  weakness  of  this 
sort.  When  tlie  question  came  up  in  a  concrete  form,  tluy 
decided  that  their  rule  of  non-interference  in  European  affairs 
did  not  prevent  them  from  acquiiin^  islands  in  the  Pacific, 
no  matter  ir.  which  hemisphere  they  wore  situated.  Cap- 
tain Mahan  says:  "In  my  apprehension,  Europe  construed 
by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  include  Africa  with  the  Le- 
vant and  India.  ...  It  would  not  include  Japan,  China, 
nor  the  Pacific  generally."  This  definition,  though  some- 
what arbitrary  and  not  final,  represents  fairly  well  tlie 
present  geographical  limits  of  the  doctrine  in  the  Ameri- 
car  nind. 

There  is,  however,  another  side  to  this  Asiatic  question 
which  is  usually  overlooked  in  the  United  States.  If  Asia 
does  not  come  within  the  scope  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  why 
should  the  Asiatic  powers  feel  bound  to  observe  it  ?    If  it 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


lid 


has  not  prevented  the  Americans  from  establishing  tliem- 
selves  in  the  eastern  hemisphere,  how  can  it  exclude  the 

J.ipanoso  from  the  western?  Would  Japanese  possession  of 
EcuadDT,  let  lis  say,  be  more  sorious  for  tlio  riiitcd  States 
tlum  American  ownership  of  the  Philippines  is  t\)r  Ja|)an? 
We  can  only  reply  that  facts  have  to  be  taken  as  they  arc. 
Ten  years  ago  Japan  was  not  in  a  position  to  defend  the 
principle  of  "Asia  for  the  Asiatics";  and  to-day  she  has 
to  accept  the  existing  situation,  just  as  the  United  States 
has  to  with  regard  to  European  possessions  in  the  New 
World.  True  as  this  may  be,  the  Americans,  in  forbid- 
ding Asiatic  interference  in  the  western  hemisphere,  cannot 
fall  back  on  the  argument  of  reciprocity  which  they  apply  to 
Europe. 

Yet  even  toward  Europe  their  policy  is  not  quite  what 
it  once  was;  for  it  cannot  be  denied  that  of  late  years  they 
have  shown  a  greater  disj  -sition  than  of  old  to  take  part 
in  European  questions.  As  a  civilized  nation  the  United 
Statt  s  has,  of  course,  appeart at  various  international 
scientific  and  philanthropic  meetings;  it  was  also  repre- 
sented at  the  Berlin  conference  of  1885,  which  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  Congo  Free  State,  and  at  Algeciras  in 
1906,  where  it  helped  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  Morocco,  even 
signing  (if  with  some  reservations)  the  general  act  of  agree- 
ment. Furthermore,  Secretary  Ilay  protested  against  the 
oppression  of  the  Jews  in  Houmania,  and  in  his  official 
capacity  transmitted  to  Russia  a  Jewish-American  petition 
about  the  Kishinev  massacre,  —  acts  which,  whether  we  ap- 
prove of  them  or  not,  were  scarcely  in  consonance  with  the 
traditions  of  American  foreign  policy.  None  of  these  things 
have  been  of  decisive  consequence  in  themselves,  but  they 
may  be  taken  as  indications  of  a  rather  different  attitude 
toward  the  future,  tiie  more  so  as  tliey  are  m  keeping 
with  che  growing  tendency  among  all  nations  to  be  in- 
terested everywhere.    In  the  event  of  a  repetition  of  the 


120 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Armenian  massacres  of  1896,  the  United  States,  whatever 
may  be  the  precepts  of  the  Muiiroc  Doctrine,  would  prob- 
ably not  rcmuin  us  passive  as  it  did  tiicii  ;  and  we  can  con- 
ceive of  its  taking  action  to  protect  tlie  natives  in  tlic 
Cun^^o  Free  State. 

Now  if  this  is  so,  if  the  United  States  is  going  to  aban- 
don that  portion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  forbids 
interference  in  European  affairs,  how  can  it  nsist  that 
Europe  shall  not  ine(hlle  in  tliose  of  America?  Loj,'ic;dly, 
per'.-aps,  it  can  not  ;  hut,  on  tlie  broaii  ^'round  of  national 
welfare,  it  might  maintain  that  its  interests  wore  "para- 
mount" in  one  region  without  necessarily  being  non- 
existent elsewhere.  An  attitude  of  this  sort  woidd, 
however,  be  somewhat  weak  morally,  and  would  ^nve  tlie 
European  powers  a  legitimate  cause  of  complaint  against 
tlu'  restrictions  now  imposed  upon  them.  This  is  one  reason 
why  the  Americans  are  anxious  to  keep  out  of  purely 
European  questions.  Whether  they  will  be  able  to  do  so 
is  another  matter. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

EARLY  in  the  year  1901,  a  foreign  uinbussador  at  Wash- 
ington remarked  in  the  course  of  conversation  that, 

althou  he  had  licen  in  AmiTica  only  a  sliort  time,  he 
liad  seen  two  difTrrcnt  countries,  tlie  United  States  before 
the  war  with  Siiaiii,  and  the  I'liited  States  since  the  war 
with  Spain.  Tliis  was  a  picturesque  way  of  oxpressinj^  the 
truth,  now  generally  accepted,  that  the  war  of  1898  was 
a  turning-point  in  the  history  of  the  American  republic. 
The  reason  therefor  is  usually  summed  up  in  the  phrase 
that  since  that  date  the  United  States  has  he(>n  a  world 
power.  Tills  as.sertion  is,  liou-.  ver,  vitronmsly  disputed  by 
two  sets  of  opponents,  ami  on  ex-ctiy  opposite  grounds. 
Some  writers  labor  to  prove  that  tho  United  States  is  not, 
or  if  it  is,  ought  not  to  be,  a  world  power  to-day;  others 
maintain  that  it  has  always  been  one,  becau.se  ever  since  its 
inde])endence  it  has  been  interested  in  alTairs  in  many 
parts  of  the  world,  —  which  is  also  true  of  H(Uland.  Evi- 
dently the  term  has  not  the  same  meaning  to  the  two 
parties.  But  without  entering  into  discussion,  we  can  con- 
fine ourselves  to  the  indisputable  fact  that  the  Spanish  War 
brought  about  in  American  public  feeling  a  change  im- 
j)ortant  enough  to  mark  the  beginning  of  an  epoch. 

When  we  come  to  analyze  the  causes  of  this  sudden  evolu- 
tion, we  must  concede  that  at  first  sight  the  magnitude  of 
the  result  seems  out  of  all  proportion  to  that  of  the  military 

121 


122 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


operations.  The  war  waa  ii  short ,  bloodless  one  between  two 
nations  of  very  unequal  resources.  There  were  but  three 
battles  worthy  of  the  name,  —  two  on  the  water  and  one 
on  the  land.  The  two  sea-fights  wciv  brilliantly  conductod, 
and  the  completeness  of  the  success,  couj)lcd  \\  ith  the  almost 
entire  ab.setioe  of  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Americans,  consti- 
tuted a  pleasing  testimony  to  the  efficiency  of  their  new 
navy;  but  the  difference  in  strength  between  the  com- 
batants m/.de  the  victory  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  one 
battle  on  land  was  marked  by  creditable  hghting  on  both 
sides,  rather  than  by  any  display  of  ^eiien  '  iliip,  and  the 
forces  engaged  and  the  losses  incurred  were  too  small  for 
the  encounter  to  deserve  the  name  of  a  great  battle. 
Though  the  United  States  had  good  reason  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  outcome,  there  was,  when  all  is  said,  no  cause  for 
undue  elation ;  nor  had  there  been  any  severe  strain  on  the 
country. 

In  considering  the  causes  of  the  war,  we  should  re- 
member, to  begin  with,  that  the  relations  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States  had  never  been  really  cordial,  nor 
was  there  any  reason  why  they  should  have  been.  The 
Americans  had  inherited  the  anti-Spanish  pri^judices  of 
their  English  ancestors,  and  the  trtiditions  of  thei;  feuds, 
and  as  colonists  they  had  taken  part  in  the  wars  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  It  is  true  that 
Spain  had  fought  on  their  side  in  their  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, but  under  compvilsion  as  the  ally  of  France,  and 
after  expressly  warning  the  French  a'-jainst  the  perils  of 
such  a  course  of  iictiou.  The  Spaniards,  in  spite  of  their 
old  hatred  of  England,  could  not  but  see  that  the  success- 
ful revolt  of  the  British  colonies  would  prove  a  dangerous 
example  to  their  own ;  accordingly,  at  the  peace  nego- 
ti;it!ons  in  Paris  in  \~H'A.  the  Sn'inish  iiovernment  did 
all  that  it  could  to  k(>ep  the  territory  of  the  new  re- 
public within  as  nariow  limits  as  possible.    The  Ameri- 


THE  SPANISH  WAR  123 

cans,  on  thoir  part,  had  a  separate  tinderstandinK  with 
Great  Britain  about  the  northern  boiindarv  of  Florida  — 
an  understanding  which  led  to  a  prolonged  boundary  dis- 
pute with  Spain. 

This  boundary  iispute  was  Ut  the  first  of  a  series  that 

la.sted  for  more  a  Keue:ation.    The  plain  truth  was 

that   ho  America:     .  ,  vf  {  tne  valuable  and  thinlv  settled 
bpanish  territories  which  shut  them  off  from  the"  Gulf  of 
Mexico.    On  one  side,  we  find  a  lusty,  rapidly  growing 
nation,  keenly  alive  to  its  own  rights  and  interests  and 
not  too  mindful  of  those  of  others.    Opposed  to  it  was  a 
weak  people  with  a  decrepit  government,  unable  to  occupy 
effectively  mucli  of  the  hmd  it  held,  and  too  feeble  to  keep 
order  m  its  possessions  or  to  prevent  legitimate  cause  of 
complaint  on  the  part  of  its  neighbors.    As  might  have 
been  expected,  the  conduct  of  the  Americans  was  rough  and 
hi^di-handed,  that  of  the  Spanish  shuffling  and  dilatory, 
l^or  years  these  controversies  continued  until  they  were 
ended  by  the  sale,  almost  under  compulsion,  of  East  Florida 
to  the  young  repubUc.    West  Florida  had  been  previously 
occupied  by  force. 

Almost  before  these  matters  were  settled,  the  Americans 
gave  fresh  cause  of  offence  by  recognizing  the  independence 
of  the  revolted  Spanisli  coloni(>s,  -  a  recognition  that 
would  have  been  granted  earlier  if  the  goven  .nent  had 
not  wished  to  make  sure  of  Florida  before  offerhig  Spain 
further  provocation.  A  worse  blow  soon  followed.  In  the 
Hunds  of  the  Americans,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  prima- 
rily directed  against  the  Holy  Alliance,  not  aga.nst  Spain. 
1  hough  they  did  not  believe  that  she  could  reconquer 
her  lost  possessions,  they  did  not  contest  her  right  to 
try.  None  the  less,  from  the  Spanish  point  of  view,  the 
adoption  of  this  principle  was  a  grievous  injury;  for  it  cut 
bpain  off  in  her  hour  of  weakness  from  the  hope  of  outside 
aid,  without  which  she  was  unable  to  recover  her  territories. 


124        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

Suroly  she  could  not  1)0  expected  to  feel  anything  but 
icsrutnient  for  unfriendly  condmt  so  persistent  and  so 
unprovoked.  Yet  in  time  old  grievances  might  have  been 
forgotten,  had  no  new  ones  been  added.  After  her  insur- 
gent children  had  achieved  their  iudepiMidence,  she  no 
longer  held  a  foot  of  laud  on  either  American  coiitin  -nt,  so 
tlicre  would  have  been  nothing  left  to  quarrel  about  if  it 
had  not  been  for  Cuba. 

A  glance  at  the  map  is  enough  to  convince  any  one  of 
the  unique  importance  of  this  island  to  the  United  States. 
Strategically  it  conunands  at  one  end  the  entrance  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  -  the  outlet  to  tlie  huge  Mississippi  Valley, 
—  ;uul  at  the  other  it  fronts  on  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  any 
future  isthmian  canal.  Its  situation  may  be  compared 
with  that  of  Crete  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  but  Cuba 
is  much  the  larger  and  the  richer  of  the  two. 

The  worth  of  this  ''Pearl  of  the  Antilles"  was  so  evident 
that  the  Americans  appreciated  it  from  the  first.  Even 
JetTerson,  who  was  a  cautious,  v  onservative  statesman,  dis- 
iticlined  to  an  adventurous  foreign  poUcy,  admitted  that  he 
had  always  "looked  on  Cuba  as  the  most  interesting  addi- 
tion which  could  ever  be  made  to  our  system  of  states." 
After  the  purchase  of  Florida,  th->  thought  of  owning  the 
furtlier  side  of  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  became  more  attrac- 
tive still.    In  any  event,  the  Americans  were  determined 
that,  if  Cuba  could  not  be  theirs,  it  should  not  pass  into  the 
hands  of  any  strong  naval  power.    For  a  while  th(>y  w(>re  in 
equal  dread  that  Napoleon  might  get  possession  of  it,  and 
that  the  English  might  forestall  him  in  doing  so.    In  1S()S 
President  JeiTersou  officially  declared  that  the  United  States 
would  view  with  alarm  the  cession  of  Cuba  to  either 
England  or  France.    The  same  fears  came  up  again  at 
the  time  of  the  French  intervention  in  Spain  m  1823; 
and  two  years  later  the  government  at  Washington  sent  a 
circular  note  to  its  nunisters  abroad  with  the  declaration 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 


125 


th-t  it  won'  1  oppose  the  tnuisfer  of  the  ishmd  to  any  other 
European  i  (nver.  At  a  later  date  we  find  fresh  anxiety 
of  the  same  kind.  In  1840  the  United  States  went  so  far 
as  to  ofifer  to  guarantee  Cuha  to  the  Spaniards  against 
foreign  au'fxre.ssion,  "•  't  refused  to  join  Kn^dand  and  France 
in  a  triph'  a^'reenient  to  this  end.  Contrary  to  their  usual 
principles  and  to  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 
Americans  did  not  even  wish  to  see  the  island  independent, 
preferring  that  it  should  remain  as  it  was  rather  than  fall 
into  any  hands  but  their  own.  They  regarded  it  as  of 
inuuense  vahie  to  them,  and  they  never  ]i;id  anything  hut 
contempt  for  tlie  miUtary  strength  of  Si);!in.  For  many 
years  the  real  clew  to  their  policy  was  to  be  found  in  the 
negro  question  at  home. 

Unhke  most  of  the  Spanish-American  colonies  on  the 
niaiidand,  Cuba  contained  a  large  servile  population,  whose 
numbers,  after  tlie  nominal  abolition  of  tlie  slave-'rade, 
were  kv\)t  up  till  about  18G0  by  clandestine  shijniK-iits. 
Independence  by  the  aid  of  South  America,  where  slavery 
had  disappearv,d  with  Spanish  rule,  meant  emancipation  of 
the  negroes,  and,  sinc(>  at  that  time  tlie  whites  were  in 
the  minority,  probably  black  domination  in  the  end.  Such 
a  prospect  was  more  than  enough  to  excite  violent  alarm  in 
the  South.  It  is  true  that  even  the  Southern  States  had 
sympathized  with  the  revolt  of  Latin  America;  but  they 
had  never  consented  to  recognize  the  republics  of  Haiti  and 
San  Domingo,  and  had  looked  askance  at  the  Congress  of 
Panama  liecause  those  states  had  lieen  invited  to  participate 
in  it.'  To  the  Southerners  a  rei)ublir  <>{  ematu'ipated  slaves 
was  not  only  a  thing  abhorrent  in  itself,  but  in  their  near 
vicinity  it  meant  a  source  of  contagion,  a  menace  to  the 
whole  structure  of  their  society.  The  American  govern- 
ment therefore  set  its  face  against  proposed  attempts  on 

'  Haiti  and  San  Dnminjro  were  not  recognized  by  the  United  States 
until  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War. 


12G 


THE  UNITi:.iJ  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  part  of  Mexico  and  Venezuela  to  continue  the  war  of 
liber..*'  by  extending  it  to  the  Spanish  islands,  and  it 
thus  hcii-ed  preserve  them  to  Spain  for  another  sixty  years. 

As  the  nineteenth  century  advanced,  the  slaveholders  of 
the  South  became  more  eager  i'  their  desires.  Here,  at 
their  door,  was  a  fresh  supply  of  slaves,  a  commodity 
wiiose  ])rice  was  risin;j;  steadily,  and,  what  was  of  still 
greater  consequence,  material  for  two  or  three  new  slave 
states  by  means  of  which  the  dreaded  preponderance  of 
the  North  might  be  avertetl.  In  the  West,  where  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  Mexican  War  had  stimul.'ted  a  strong  senti- 
ment in  favor  of  national  expansion,  annexation  had  also 
many  partisans.  Between  1845  and  18G0,  therefore,  we 
find  Congress  continually  debating  the  Cuban  question, 
and  successive  administrations  lorming  new  plans  to  get 
hold  of  the  coveted  territory.  In  1848  and  1853  attempts 
were  made  to  bu_.'  it  from  Spain,  but  these  were  sharply 
repulsed  at  Madrid.  In  1854  the  American  ministers  to 
London,  Paris,  and  Madrid  met  and  issued  the  "Ostend 
Manifesto,"  which  proclaimed  the  right  of  the  United  States 
to  take  Cuba  by  force  in  case  a  reasonable  offiM-  of  purchase 
werp  refused.  They  had  gone,  however,  farther  than  the 
country  was  ready  to  follow,  and  were  disavowed  in  Wash- 
ington. By  this  time,  too,  opinion  in  the  Northern  States 
was  becoming  roused  to  such  vigorous  o{  position  that  an- 
nexation finally  ceased  to  be  feasible,  and  a  discreditable 
chapter  in  American  annals  cain(>  to  an  end.  It  was  an 
important  fact  during  the  whole  period  that  the  population 
of  Cuba  itself  remained  quiet  and  apparently  contented. 
There  was  no  rising  of  sufficient  size  to  offer  a  decent  pre- 
text for  outside  interference. 

Soon  the  situation  was  reversed.  Just  as  the  Americans, 
after  th(>  Civil  War  and  the  emancipation  of  the  Southern 
slaves,  had  ceased  to  want  the  island,  an  insurrection  broke 
out  there,  which  a  few  years  earUer  would  have  tempted 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 


127 


them  to  intervene.    In  ISOS  ;in  uprisinnj  took  pl;ice  that 
the  homo  government  was  unal)Ie  to  subdue,  in  spite  of  the 
hvrge  number  of  troops  brought  into  the  field.    For  ten 
years  the  struggle  dragged  along,  without  any  decisive 
results,  but  with  continual  and  unavoidable  friction  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States.    Cuban  sj-mpathizers  pre- 
pared fihbust(  ring  expetlitions  on  American  soil,  some  of 
which  were  checked  by  the  authorities,  while  others  either 
escaped  notice  or  were  connived  at  in  ways  that  gave  rise 
to  much  recrimination  between  Washington  and  Madrid. 
The  ill  treatment  of  American   citizens  residing  in  the 
island  (usually  p^^rsons  of  Cuban  origin)  was  a  perpetual 
cause  of  complaint,  and  various  inconveniences,  especially 
the   disturbance   of   trade,    kept   up   irritation   in  the 
United  States.    Finally  the  shooting  of  Americans  captured 
on  the  filibustering  vessel  Virginius  almost  brought  on 
war.    Yet,  after  all,  peace  was  preserved,  and  the  Span- 
iards were  allowed  to  settle  their  affairs  without  direct 
intervention,  although  this  would  surely  have  come  if  the 
fighting  had  continued  much  longer.    By  the  Convention 
of  Zanjon,  Spain  made  concessions  to  the  insurgents,  who 
thereupon  laid  down  their  arms. 

Then  followed  seviMiteen  quiet  years.  Slavery  was 
al)olished,  and  the  island  prospered.  The  Americans  were 
too  busy  at  home  to  pay  much  atteniioii  to  it,  and  if 
the  Spaniards  had  succeeded  in  contenting  the  natives, 
would  have  continued  indifferent.  Meanwhile  a  consider- 
able amount  of  American  capital  had  been  invested  in 
Cu})a,  the  holder^!  of  which  were  not  in  favor  of  rebel- 
lion or  of  disturbance  from  any  (juarter;  but  their  presence 
made  it  certain  that  if  disorders  should  again  arise,  the 
government  at  Washington  would  have  to  interest  itself, 
whether  it  wished  to  or  not.  In  1895  a  new  revolt 
st.'irted,  which  soon  gathered  strength  enough  to  defy 
the  efforts  to  suppress  it,  and  as  it  went  on  fruitlessly 


128        THE  UMT[:i)  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


month  after  month  and  yoar  nftor  yr:ir,  tin-  f.M-ling  prow 
ever  stroii^'cr  in  tho  Unit(Ml  States  thut  the  situation  was 
intolcraMc.  It  was  not  merely  that  tiie  Americans  had  a 
natural  sympathy  for  the  insurgents  as  a  people  striving 
to  free  themselves  from  tyranny,  but  they  were  tired  of  a 
commotion  at  their  very  door.  The  rotivirtion  took  firm 
hold  that  somcthin>^  imist  be  done  for  the  "  ahateineiit 
of  a  nuisane(\"  if  <>n  no  otlier  aecouiit.  Then  oeourred 
the  mysterious  incident  of  the  blowing'  up  of  the  Maine 
in  Havana  harbor,  which  greatly  excited  the  nation  and 
hastened,  but  did  not  in  itself  cause,  the  actual  outbreak 
of  hostilities. 

There  is  a  curious  resemblance  between  the  conduct  of 
the  United  States  at  tliis  time  and  that  of  iiussia  before  the 
Turkish  war  of  1S77  1878.    In  each  case  we  find  at  the 
head  of  the  government  a  man  of  peaceful  disposition, 
who  consented  slowly  and  reluctantly  to  a  conflict  forced 
upon  him  by  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  and  by  diflicul- 
ties  which  seemed  otherwise  inextricable.    In  each  country 
th(>  i>oi)\dar  passions  were  for  many  months  continually 
inflamed  by  fresh  incidents.    The  risings  of  the  small  states 
of  the  Balkans  and  the  Cuban  insurrection  appealed  to 
the  sympathies  of  the  masses  in  Russia  and  America  re- 
spectively, th(^  sentitnents  arouscnl  being   at   liottom  tlu; 
same,  though  cloaked  under  different  names.    In  one  m- 
stauce,  the  appeal  was  that  of  fellow-Christians,  of  brother 
Slavs,  to  their  traditional  friend  and  protector;  in  the 
other,   it   was    that    of   'ellow- Americans  straining  to 
cast  off   a   European   yoke   and    looking   hopefully  to 
the   great    republic   which   had    always    represented  tho 
cause    of    liberty.      The    Bulgarian    atrocities  and  the 
horrors  of  reconcentration,  both  awful  enough  in  them- 
selves, were  described  ind  exaggerated  by  a  sensational 
and  sometimes  unsc-upulous  press,  till  the  feelings  <>f 
Russia  in  1877  a  d  v<f  the  United  States  in  1898  were 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 


129 


wrniitrlit  up  to  such  ;i  pitcli  th;it  th  -  p^nvornmrnts  dooniod 
that  they  had  no  choice  l)ut  to  yk-Ul.  lioth  Russians  and 
Anicriciins  began  war  with  a  declaration  tliat  they  were 
acting  from  unselfish  motives,  a  statement  which,  as  far  as 
the  groat  majority  of  the  people  were  concerned,  may  he 
regarch'd  as  true.  Later,  when  the  wars  ended  in  vic- 
tory, and  l)oth  countries  helieved  that  they  had  a  right 
to  conijKMisate  themselves  for  their  expenditure  of  (>tTort 
and  for  their  losses,  they  were  at  once  accused  of  hypocrisy 
l)y  the  outside  world,  which  declared  that  their  motive 
from  the  first  had  been  sheer  greed.  But  we  note  a 
ditTerence  in  the  outcome.  After  a  far  more  exhausting 
struggle,  the  triumphant  Russians  got  much  less  in  return 
than  did  the  Americans;  not  because  they  deserved  or 
desired  less,  but  because  the  poUtical  situation  was  sucix 
that  it  was  worth  the  while  of  other  powers  to  restrain 
them  by  force  if  necessary.  We  may  also  note  that  the 
position  of  Cuba  after  Spanish  evacuation  was  not  unlike 
that  of  Bulgaria  immediately  after  the  treaty  of  lierlin. 
Fortunately  for  the»  iselves,  the  Americans  showed  much 
more  tact  in  dealing  with  a  delicate  situation  than  did  the 
Iiussians. 

In  order  to  demonstrate  that  the  United  States  was 
acting  from  no  selfish  motives,  Congress,  in  declaring  war 
against  Spain,  proclaimed  that  its  intention  was  to  fn-e 
Cuba  from  Spanish  rule,  and  not  to  annex  the  island.  This 
self-denying  ordinance  was  voted  in  a  moment  of  excitement, 
and  in  all  sincerity.  When  the  war  ended,  the  country  felt 
that  a  promise  had  been  made;  and  the  promise  was  kept, 
in  si)ite  of  much  temptation  to  break  it,  and  in  spite  of  the 
usual  specious  reasoning  to  prove  that  it  need  not  l)e 
regarded  as  binding.  History  has  shown  that  the  most 
solemn  assurances  of  the  sort,  even  when  made  in  perfect 
good  faith,  somehow  or  other  lose  their  force  as  time  goes 
on.    Other  nations  may  talk  loudly  of  violated  pledges, 


130 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


but  the  olio  iiitorcstcd  can  provo  to  its  own  s;it isf;iction 
that  it  is  no  lougrr  bounil  by  the  word  rashly  given.  We 
must  admit  that  by  the  Piatt  amendment  the  Americans 
attached  conditions  to  the  independence  which  they  be- 
sto'vcd ;  but,  though  we  may  regret  that  there  was  a  flaw 
in  thoir  generosity,  recent  events  have  proved  that  the 
conditions  were  wis(>.  Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  Cuba 
in  the  future,  tlie  treatment  she  lias  received  at  the  hands 
of  the  United  States  in  the  decade  since  she  was  made 
free  will  remain  something  to  be  proud  of. 

The  liberation  of  Cuba  was  not  the  only  result  of  the 
Spanish  War;  the  efi'eets  on  the  United  States  were  many 
and  important.  Considering  how  little  fighting  took  place, 
the  territorial  changes  brought  about  by  the  conflict  were 
very  large.  They  gave  the  Americans  a  stronger  strategic 
position  in  the  Ciulf  of  Mexico  and  in  the  Caribbean  Sea, 
coaling  stations  in  the  Pacific,  and  a  base  of  operations  in 
the  Far  East.  But,  though  they  made  the  United  States 
stronger  for  otTensive  purposes,  in  some  ways  they  weak- 
ened it  for  defensive  ones.  Up  to  1898  Alaska  was  the  only 
possession  which  could  be  seized  by  a  foe  with  a  superior 
fleet;  now  Hawaii,  the  Philippines,  and  other  Pacific  islands, 
as  well  as  Porto  Hieo,  could  hardly  be  defended  against  an 
adversary  who  controlled  the  sea.  None  the  less,  however 
the  gain  and  the  loss  may  balance,  they  both  represent  far- 
reaching  changes  in  the  military  position  of  the  country; 
yet  even  these  are  not  suflicient  to  account  for  the  differ- 
ence in  the  American  attitude  before  and  after  the  war. 

Like  so  many  other  things,  an  attitude  has  two  ^aces,  a 
subjective  and  an  objective  one.  The  people  of  che  re- 
public, if  not  actually  transformed  by  their  short  victorious 
conflict,  were  much  affected  by  it,  both  as  they  saw 
themselves  and  as  others  saw  them.  To  the  greater  part 
of  Europe  the  war  itself,  and  the  course  which  it  took, 
came  as  an  unpleasant  surprise.    During  most  of  the  nine- 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 


131 


teenth  century  the  United  States  had  enjoyed  a  reniarkal)le 
popularity  abroad.    Many  Englishmen  were  well  disposed 
toward  it  because  it  was  inhabited  by  their  kin ;  Frenchmen 
were  proud  of  it  because  they  had  assisted  in  its  creation ; 
Russia  was  a  traditional  friend;  liberals  all  over  Europe 
sympathized    with   its   democratic   institutions;  zealous 
Roman  Calholics  were  pleased  with  the  flourishing^  con- 
dition of  their  chnich  T,cross  the  water.    Countless  Euro- 
pean children  had  delighted  in  the  Indians  of  Fenimore 
Cooper,  and  millions  of  kindly  souls  had  read  and  wept 
over  Uncle  Tom'.s  Cabin.    Travelliii-:  Americans,  though 
sometimes   foith-i)utting,   were   ojK-n-handed   and  good- 
natured.    In  the   later  years  of  the  century  American 
students  in  numbers  had  frequented  the  art  schools  in 
Paris  and  the  universities  in  Germany,  and  had  given  a 
good  account  of  themselves.    The  fame  of  the  country's 
wealth  and  prosperity,  of  the  ingenuity  and  practical  abili- 
ties of  its  inhabitants,  and  especially  of  their  eagerness  to 
make  money,  was  wide-spread.     But  in  the  great  game 
of  international  politics  they  took  little  part.  European 
statesmen  could  usually  leave  them  out  of  their  reckonings. 
Well-informed  persons  were  aware  that  the  United  States 
was  a  power  of  gre  '  resources,  —  how  great  in  a  military 
way  had  been  shown  by  the  Civil  War,  —  and  that,  as  the 
Mexican,  and  quite  lately  the  Venezuelan,  incident  had 
proved,  it  was  resolved  to  stand  by  its  traditional  policy. 
But  if  one  let  that  policy  alone  and  kept  clear  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  in  which  most  of  Europe  had  small  in- 
terest, then  in  practice  the  United  States  need  not  often 
be  taken  into  consideration.    It  belonged,  so  to  speak, 
to  a  different  world. 

All  this  was  changed  by  the  Spanish  War.  Continental 
Europe,  without  defending  Spanish  misgovernment  in  Cuba, 
regarded  the  action  of  the  Americans  as  brutal  aggression 
against  a  smaller  nation.    How  could  it  be  pleased  with 


132        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  (TV,  so  iiftcn  raised  across  the  sea,  that  iMiropcaii  rule 
ill  till-  western  hemisphere  ought  to  be  brought  to  an  end? 
liut  the  Americans  did  more  than  expel  the  Spaniards  from 
Cuba  and  Porto  Kico:   they  proved  that  they  possessed 
a  most  efTicient  modern  fleet,  they  crossed  the  Pacific  and 
estabHshed  themselves  in  the   Far  Fast,  they  threatened 
to  send  ships  to  att  u  k  Spain  in  her  own  waters.    It  was 
evident  tliat  they  had   assumed  a  new  jxisitioii  among 
nations;  that  henceforth  they  would  have  to  be  counted 
with  as  one  of  the  chief  forces  in  international  affairs. 
Although,  as  usually  happens  for  the  victorious,  a  revulsion 
of  sei\timent  soon  took  phice  in  their  favor,  and  many  per- 
sons hastet\ed  to  testify  that  they  had  always  been  on 
their  side,  still  the  appearance  of  a  new  factor  of  such 
magnitude  interfered  with  many  old  calculations.  The 
former  easy  populrrity  of  the  Unitiul  States  was  gone, 
jirobably  never  t-'       :rn.    Some  idealists  niournfidly  de- 
clared that  what  the  I'nion  had  gained  in  political  impor- 
tance it  had  lost  in  moral  greatness;  that  it  had  forfeited 
its  rt>al  eminence,  and  was  now  only  one  more  huge, 
aggressive,  selfish  power    Be  this  as  it  may,  its  situation, 
for  lietter  or  for  wo'    ,  was  radically  changed  in  the  eyes 
*  he  outsid(>  woi  ld. 

The  chanp'  was  equally  decisive  in  the  consciousness  of 
the  Americans  themselves.  The  war  aroused  within  them 
a  feeling  of  strength  which  had  until  then  been  latent.  It 
opened  their  eyes  to  new  horizons,  suggested  new  outlets 
for  their  energies,  and  made  them  confident  that  they 
could  deal  with  problems  which  had  never  liefore  attracted 
their  attention.  They  had  always  been  proud  of  their 
comitry,  —  aggressively  so,  foreigners  thought,  —  but  they 
had  regarded  it  as  something  different  from  the  others,  and 
leading  its  own  life  apart.  Now,  all  at  once,  they  were 
willing  to  give  up  their  isolation  and  plunge  into  the  fray. 
They  felt  that  the  day  had  come  when  they  were  called 


THE  SPAJijlSH  WAR 


133 


upon  to  jjluy  a  puit  in  thv  IjioucIct  iinairs  df  nuuikind 
even  at  the  cost  of  sacrificing  some  of  their  clu  iishtd 
ideals.  They  were  indeed  unable,  as  well  as  unwilling,  to 
return  to  th.'ir  earlier  point  -f  vie'v.  Full  of  joyous  self- 
rcliuucc,  they  were  i)ri'|)ar(>(i  to  uu-ct  all  the  difficulties  and 
to  uccepi  all  the  burdens  of  their  new  position. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  COLONIES 

DUHIN(J  till'  iR'gotiatiuus  which  prccfclcd  the  war  with 
Spain,  us  well  as  in  the  course  of  whe  struggle  itself, 
the  American  people,  regardless  of  party,  supported  the 

policy  of  the  vi  riinu'tit  almost  with  unanimity.  This 
imaiumity  vanished  whi  ii  it  becanio  necessary  to  decide 
what  use  shmild  l)f  made  ol  their  victory.  While  the  public 
as  a  whole  hesitated  l)etweeu  respect  for  its  cherished  tra- 
ditions and  the  allurements  of  the  new  prospects,  the  more 
partisan  on  both  sides  wrangled  fiercely  over  the  question 
whether  the  country  should  or  should  not  retain  its  new 
acquisitions.  The  two  points  of  view  are  usually  <'allt'd  the 
Imperialist  and  the  Anti-imperialist;  but  whereas  the  Anti- 
imperialists  have  adopted  their  name  and  gloried  in  it,  the 
so-called  Imperialists  have  never  quite  accepted  an  ejnthet 
fastened  on  them  by  their  adversaries.  After  all,  the  title 
is  hardly  in  keepin;^  with  American  repul)lican  ideals,  what- 
ever may  be  the  truth  a})out  the  policy  which  it  represents. 

In  the  long  and  bitter  disputes  as  to  what  should  be 
done  with  the  new  insular  possessions,  argument  centred 
on  the  retention  of  tL  >  Philippines.  Anti-imperialists 
did.  indeed,  condemn  the  annoxation  of  Hawaii.  They 
declar(>d  that  the  revolution  by  wliieh  the  queen  had 
been  overthrown  was  a  usurpation  of  power  by  a  handful 

of  foreigners  who  would  never  have  succeeded  but  for  the 

134 


lUl':  ACQULSiflD.N  UF  COLONIES 


135 


landing  of  American  troops,  and  that  the  iglands  properly 

})"l()ri^'crl    to   their   native   irih.ilut.mt.s,   -a   viow  which 
I'reMident  Clevel.MKl  had   taken  whei,  he  uitlulrew  fmm 
the  consideration  uf  the  Senate  the  t     iiv  -ul. muted  l.y 
his  predecessor.    The  anm-xution  wa.s       md    ut  dui,.ii? 
the  excitement  of  the  Spanish  War,  not  hy  treaty,  -for 
fear  that  the  necessary  two-thirds  hiuioritv  amid  not  Ix' 
s.'cured  in  the  Senate,      hut  l.y  joint  rvH.'U.Ui>r^  of  tl  two 
houses   of   ("oii-ress.     However,    lio   o-i,     c.uld    d-ny  the 
unique  naval  situation  of  Hawaii  iii  rh.  Pa.  iHr    and.  innr  1, 
aa  the  Anti-imperialists  might  condenn  the  n.  iris  hv  which 
the  territory  had  been  acquired,  the  fact  that  the  iiatives 
now  formed  a  sinall  and  dwindling  minority  of  the  pop- 
ulation reiidered  it    MTirult  to  put   tliem    ",nee   more  i„ 
control,    in  the  ca^,   of  P..rto  Hie,,,  a!         h       Ju  t\,. 
extreme  Anti-imperialists  weiv  o-.po.sed  to  at-,,  nsition,  tn.-y 
were  deprived  of  their  strongest  pi*  a  by  the  evident 
willingness  of  the  inhabitants  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of 
American  nilo.    In  re^M .  d  to  the  PhiHppines  no  such  excuse 
cc.uld  ho  put  forward.    Here  'here  uas  no  pretence  of  a 
wish  to  come  under  Anieric  iii  domination  ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  islands  had  first  to  he  e(.nqu,  red  fnuu  a  people  that  was 
doing  the  very  thing  with  which  Americans  had  been  taught 
to  sympathize,-  striving'  1.^  obtain  its  independence. 

Amidst  the  multitude  of  conflicting  statements  at  this 
time,  we  can  hm'O'M  a  iv.v  main  contentions  which  re- 
apjx'ar  again  and  again.  In  the  first  place,  iii(>  Anti- 
imperialists  asserted  that  there  were  ph  aty  <>{  unsolved 
Ti-oblcms  at  home  to  which  the  nation  should  devote  all  its 
-r.  .,ies  instead  of  sfpiandering  them  elsewhere,  especially 
as  the  Americans  had  no  experience  in  colonial  matters. 
To  this,  reply  was  made  that  every  colonial  power  had 
duties  to  discharge  at  home,  but  that  the  manage  inent  of 
domestic  affairs,  far  from  being  interfered  with  by  the  care 
of  distant  possessions,  gained  from  the  knowledge  and  the 


136        THE  UMTLD  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


sense  of  rcsi)onsibility  required  in  dealing  with  them ;  that 
II  state  could  never  have  too  many  outlets  for  the  energies 
of  its  citizens;   th:it,  even  if  the  Americans  lacked  ex- 
perience  in   colonial  matters,  they  could  profit  by  the 
experience  of  others,  and  they  were  starting  unfettered  by 
previous  mistakes.    They  were  not  inferior  in  intelligence 
to  other  ruling  peoples;  why,  then,  should  they  not  s\icceed 
even  better?    The  political  and  commercial  arguments 
employed  on  both  sides  turned  on  such  topics  as  the  rela- 
tive advantages  of  extension  and  concentration,  —  on  the 
question  whether  trade  follows  the  flag,  and  kindred  de- 
batable themes, —with  the  result,  of  course,  that  neither 
side  was  in  the  l(>ast  convinced  by  the  other.    But  the 
fiercest  and  nu)st  effective  attacks  of  the  Anti-imperiaUsts 
were  based  on  the  charge  that  the  new  policy  was  an  aban- 
donment, not  only  of  the  wise  traditions  of  the  fathers  of 
the  republic,  but  of  the  noble  ideals  which  had  mudo  the 
Union  honored  throughout  the  world.    Even  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  called  into  service,  but  elicited  the  rei)ly  that 
it  had  no  reference  to  Asia.    Besides,  it  was  not  a  lifeless 
])ond,  but  one  which  could  be  adapted  to  meet  new  cir- 
cumstances. 

The  advocates  of  a  policy  of  expansion  met  the  assertion 
that,  according  to  American  ideals,  government  should  be 
by  the  consent  of  the  governed,  with  the  d(>claration  that 
this  was  true  only  when  the  governed  were  capable  of 
taking  care  of  themselves;  that,  when  they  were  not,  the 
progress  of  the  governed  —  which  mtant  also  the  advance- 
ment of  civilization  —  was  more  important  than  their 
consent.  This  at  once  raised  the  question  whether  th(> 
Filipinos  were  cai)able  of  self-government,  and  if  so  to  what 
extent,  —  a  point  which  no  mere  argument  could  settle. 
With  a  certain  inconsistency,  the  Democratic  party,  which 
had,  at  least  tacitly,  accepted  the  Southern  view  that  the 
negroes  could  not  be  allowed  to  vote  where  they  were 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  COLOMES 


137 


numerous,  proclaimed,  none  the  less,  that  the  FiUpinos  were 
quite  capable  of  ruling  vuemselves.  As  the  Republican 
party,  on  the  other  hand,  hud  abandonod  the  attempt  to 
impose  j)o^ro  suffraKo  on  the  South,  its  refusal  of  inde- 
pendence to  an  "inferior  race"  in  the  tropics  was  less 
illogical. 

The  charge  that  the  acquisition  of  colonial  possessions 
was  contrary  to  the  traditional  poUcy  of  the  United  States 

was  iu(>t  in  one  of  two  ways,  —  cither  by  admitting  its  truth 
but  declaring  that  the  time;  had  now  come  for  a  change,  or 
by  denying  the  historical  accuracy  of  the  statement.  Ac- 
cording to  the  writers  who  support  the  latter  view,  coloni- 
zation has  been  the  dominant  characteristic  of  the  whole 
growth  of  the  country.    Not  only  has  the  United  States 
been  from  tli(>  first  a  rapidly  expanding  power,  adding  to 
its  territories  in  every  generation,  but  it  has  repeatedly 
held  lands  which  were  virtually  colonies,  whose  inhabitants 
did  not  enjuy  the  rights  of  self-government.    Not  to  speak 
of  the  Indians, —  "the  wards  of  the  nation,"  — we  must 
not  forget  that  in  Louisiana,  Florida,  New  Mexico,  and 
California,  there  were  French  and  Spanish  populations 
which  were  in  no  way  consulted  when  they  were  handed 
over  to  the  United  States.    In  each  of  these  cases  the  form 
of  government  first  instituted  was  a  mihtary  despotism, 
albeit  one  of  short  duration.    After  all,  one  might  ask, 
what  is  a  colony?    If  we  declare  that  the  title  cannot  be 
applied  to  contiguous  territory,  then  it  is  a  mistake  to 
term  Siberia  and  Central  Asia  colonies  of  Russia,  as  has 
often  been  done.    The  settlement  of  Siberia  has  taken  place 
in  much  the  same  way  as  the  opening  up  of  the  Ameri- 
can West.    What  importance  has  mere  separation  by  a 
stretch  of  water?    It  has  never  be(Hi  the  custom  to  call 
Iit  huid  an  English  colony,  even  if  it  does  not  touch  Great 
Britain,  and  was  held  down  by  iorce  in  the  i)ast  and  at 
one  time  systematically  coloruzed.    Colonization  is  nothing 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


but  a  form  of  national  growth,  which,  from  being  internal, 
becomes  external  when  the  home  territory  no  longer  offers 
a  sufficient  field  for  expansion.  It  is  no  mere  coincidence 
that,  only  when  the  interior  frontier  disappears  from 
American  history,  does  the  extension  of  the  frontier  be- 
yond the  continent  begin.  Both  movements  are  but  parts 
of  the  same  healthy  process  of  development. 

The  main  trouble  with  the  above  argument  is  that  it 
leaves  out  of  consideration  the  essential  difference  between 
the  acquisitions  of  the  United  States  before  and  after  1S98. 
Granting  that  in  each  case  we  have  a  process  of  expansion, 
and  that  the  second  not  unnaturally  «  ame  after  the  first, 
this  does  not  alter  the  fundamental  d'stinction  between 
the  two  movements.    All  the  territory  acquired  by  the 
Americans  before  the  Spanish  War  was  in  regions  suitable 
for  white  colonization.    Whatever  may  have  been  the  char- 
acter of  its  inhabitants  at  the  time  it  was  obtained,  there 
was  no  doubt  that  beiore  long  they  would  be  submerged 
by  an  American  population  similar  to  that  in  the  older 
parts  of  the  country.    MiUtary  or  even  territorial  govern- 
ment was  thus  but  a  temporary  measure  for  a  period  of 
transition:   the  newest  lands  would  sooner  or  later  be  in 
every  way  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  oldest.    The  one 
exception  was  Alaska,  where,  owing  to  the  inhospitable 
climate,  there  was  not,  and  may  never  be,  a  sufficient 
population  to  form  an  independent  state.    But  it  must  be 
remembered  that  in  1807,  when  Alaska  was  purchased, 
most  Americans  believed  that  Canada  would  shortly  come 
into  the  Union,  after  which  Alaska  would  cease  to  be  a 
detached  fragment,  and  become  the  natural  northwestern 
frontier  of  the  country.   At  any  rate,  a  possession  whose 
incapacity  for  complete  self-government  arises  only  from 
lack  of  inhabitants  does  not  present  any  arduous  pohtical 
problems. 

Tropical  lands  already  thickly  settled  by  natives  foreign 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  COLONIES 


139 


in  epeech  and  civilization  come  under  a  difTcront  cate- 
gory, for  in  them  we  cannot  expect  a  speedy  triumph  of 
Anglo-Saxon  ideals,  or  an  immigration  of  Americans  suf- 
ficient to  modify  the  population.  When  this  population 
belongs  to  races  which  may  not  for  centuries  be  capable 
of  governing  themselves  with  a  fair  amount  of  law  and 
order,  the  attempt  to  apply  the  old  system  breaks  down. 

^  The  American  people  have  in  the  past  been  aware  of  this 
distinction,  and  have  more  than  once  shown  their  repug- 
nance to  holding  alien  dependencies.   We  have  an  instance 
of  this  in  the  history  of  their  relations  with  Liberia.  In 
1820  a  band  of  negroes  sent  by  the  American  Colonization 
Society  founded  a  settlement  on  the  west  African  coast, 
the  United  States  taking  no  official  part  -"n  the  affair 
except  to  send  government  supplies  at  one  time  to  keep 
the  colonists  alive.    In  1837  they  formed  themselves  into 
a  commonwealth,  and  ten  years  later  assumed  the  title  of 
a  sovereign  state,  which,  owing  to  the  feeling  against  free 
negroes  in  the  South,  was  not  recognized  by  the  United 
States  untU  1862,  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War. 
One  might  have  expected  the  Americans  to  maintain  some 
sort  of  protectorate  over  the  httle  black  republic,  especially 
as  they  have  had  occasion  to  make  representation  to 
powers  in  its  behalf.    In  this  connection,  Secretary  Freling- 
huysen,  in  1884,  used  the  phrase  "a  quasi-parental  relation- 
ship"; but  such  a  relationship  is  unknown  to  international 
law.    Although  the  Americans  would  not  view  with  indif- 
ference the  forcible  annexation  of  Liberia  by  a  European 
i'ower,  they  are  not  likely  to  push  their  concern  for  her 
farther.    For  additional  examples  of  the  policy  of  keep- 
ing free  from  outlying  territories  inhabited  by  people  of 
another  race,  we  may  turn  to  the  refusal  of  the  Senate 
to  ratify  the  treaties  for  the  annexation  of  St.  Thomas  (1867) 
;ind  San  Domingo  (1870),  and  to  President  Cleveland's 
withdrawal  of  the  Hawaiian  treaty  (1893). 


140        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


From  the  boginnin!?  of  the  Spanish  War,  thoro  has  been 
another  tale  to  tell.    In  July,  1898,  Hawaii  was  annexed, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  same  year  the  peace  of  Paris  assured 
to  the  United  States  possession  of  Porto  Rico,  of  the  Philip- 
pines, and  of  Guam  in  the  Ladrones.    In  1800,  as  the 
result  of  a  treaty  with  Germany  and  Groat  Britain,  the 
Americans  acquired  the  island  of  Tutuila  and  its  depend- 
encies (in  the  Samoa  group)  as  a  naval  station.    In  1902 
they  concluded  an  arrangement  for  the  purchase  of  the 
Danish  West  Indies,  but  the  treaty  was  not  ratified  by 
the  Danish  senate.    In  1903  they  got  from  the  newly  con- 
stituted republic  of  Panama  practical  possession  of  a  strip 
of  land  on  each  side  of  the  future  Isthmian  Canal.  In 
loot)  the  collapse  of  the  Cuban  government  in  the  face  of 
an  insurrection  led  to  the  landing  of  American  troops,  with 
consequences  still  hard  to  determine. 

For  better  or  for  worse,  the  United  States  has  thus  become 
a  colonial  power  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.    Its  lat- 
est ac(iuisitions,  near  and  far,  are  all  situated  in  the  tropics, 
and  are  therefore  subject  to  the  limitations  imposed  by 
tropical  conditions.    They  are  small  in  extent  as  com- 
pared with  the  holdings  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Holland, 
Portugal,  or  even  Germany ;  but  they  are  thickly  settled, 
and  have  been  so  long  used  to  European  rule  that  they 
have  acquired  a  more  or  less  civilized,  if  foreign,  stamp. 
Owing  to  certain  pecuUar  characteristics,  the  problems  they 
present  are  not  quite  the  same  as  those  of  the  colonies  of 
the  various  European  nations;  and  as  the  special  ideals  of 
their  American  owners  add  another  element  of  variety, 
their  relation  to  the  country  which  holds  them  is  in  some 
ways  novel. 

Before  the  American  government  could  regulate  the  status 
of  the  new  lands  which  had  so  suddenly  come  under  its 
care,  it  had  first  to  clear  up  tiie  iinrertainty  abonl  their 
position  under  the  American     onsiitution,  a  document 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  COLONIES 


141 


not  framed  to  meet  contingencies  of  the  kind.  This  fun- 
damental question  was  settled  in  a  rather  extraordinary 

manner  by  the  two  "Insular  Decisions"  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.  In  each  case  the  court  gave 
its  verdict  by  a  vote  of  five  to  foiir,  and  the  majority  was 
transferred  from  one  side  to  the  other  by  the  vote  of  one 
judge,  who  followed  a  course  of  reasoning  which  appeared 
inconsistent  to  his  eight  colleagues,  not  to  speak  of  the 
general  public.  According  to  these  decisions,  new  terri- 
tories belonging  to  the  United  States  are  from  the  date  of 
their  acquisition  parts  of  the  country,  not  mere  possessions; 
but  only  those,  which,  like  Texas  and  Hawaii,  have  come 
in  by  the  action  of  both  branches  of  Congress,  enjoy  from 
the  first  the  full  rights  of  the  American  Constitution.  Terri- 
tory obtained  by  a  treaty,  like  that  gained  from  Spain,  is 
stihject  to  legislation  of  Congress,  as  if  it  were  a  mere  pos- 
session. Consequently,  taritf  duties  cannot  be  imposed  on 
importations  from  Hawaii,  but  may  be,  and  were  for  a 
time,  on  goods  from  Porto  Rico,  and  are  still  on  those 
from  the  Philippines. 

We  need  not  dwell  on  the  details  of  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment instituted  in  most  of  the  American  colonies. 
Tutuila  and  Guam  are  mere  coaUng  stations,  suitable  for 
naval  purposes,  and  they  have  so  few  inhabitants  that 
they  are  easy  to  rule.  The  Hawaiian  Islands,  too,  are  of 
interest  chiefly  on  account  of  their  commercial  and  strategic 
value.  In  their  social  structure  they  arc  unlike  the  ter- 
ritories obtained  by  the  Spanish  War;  for,  although 
Americans  form  but  a  small  minority  of  the  total  popu- 
lation, their  influence  has  been  dominant  for  many 
years.  Whatever  civilization  the  natives  have  acquired 
is  of  Anglo-Saxon  origin,  and  English  is  the  language  of 
the  government  and  the  schools,  as  well  as  of  the  pubUc 
life. 

The  administration  of  Hawaii  does  not  differ  materially 


142 


THE  UNITED  STATES  A3  A  WORLD  POWETl 


from  that  of  an  ordinary  American  territory  The  {toy 
emor  and  the  judges  are  appointed  from  Washinglcn,  und, 
owing  to  the  political  immaturity  of  the  natives,  >vh  )  K  \c 
at  times  controlled  the  legislature,  the  veto  power  has  been 
frequently  applied.  At  bottom,  the  chief  difference  between 
the  regime  in  Hawaii  and  the  system  of  which  there  have 
been  so  many  examples  in  the  United  States  itself,  lies  in 
the  fact  that,  on  the  mainland,  territorial  government  has 
been  regarded  as  transitory,  as  destined  before  long  to  bo 
replaced  by  full  statehood,  which  has  not  been  presupposed 
for  Hawaii. 

In  Porto  Rico  the  aboriginal  Indians  died  off  many  gen- 
erations ago,  and  their  places  have  been  taken  by  the  descend- 
ants of  Spanish  settlers  and  of  imported  negro  slaves. 
As  Spanish  immigration  continued  throughout  the  nine- 
teenth century,  the  white  inhabitants  to-day — at  least 
on  paper  —  outnumber  the  colored,  most  of  whom  are 
mulattoes.   According  to  the  census  of  1899,  out  of  a 
total  population  of  953,243,  589,426  were  whites;  but 
these  figures,  we  must  remember,  like  similar  ones  in  other 
countries  where  th^re  is  a  difference  of  race,  must  be  accepted 
with  much  allowance.    The  census  takers  have  often  no 
way  of  determining  the  color  of  the  persons  they  put  down 
on  their  lists,  except  by  the  statements  of  those  in- 
terested; and  in  view  of  the  social  prestige  of  the  white 
race,  we  may  feel  suro  that  every  doubtful  case,  besides 
many  that  are  not  doul)tful,  will  be  decided  m  its  favor. 
This  practice  repeated  on  a  large  scale  must  vitiate  the 
statistics.    It  remains  true,  however,  that  Porto  Rico  is 
not  only  a  thickly  inhabited  territory,  but  one  in  which 
the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  regard  themselves  as  being 
of  white,  that  is  to  say,  of  Spanish,  blood,  and  so  heirs  to 
Latin  civilization.    Although  this  is  enough  to  force  up  to 
the  conclusion  that  they  will  not  be  satisfied  with  the  posi- 
tion of  an  inferior  race,  incapable  of  self-government,  un- 


THE  ACXiUISITION  OF  COLONIES 


143 


luckily  it  does  not  prove  at  present  that  they  really  are 
capable  of  it. 

The  annexation  of  Porto  Rico,  being  a  natural  consequence 
of  the  Spanish  War,  mot  with  little  opposition  from  any 
quarter.  At  the  time  of  the  sit^iiing  of  the  arniiatice,  the 
Americans  had  already  overrun  a  large  part  of  the  island, 
and  in  a  few  days  more  would  have  become  masters  of 
the  rest.  Nowhere  had  they  met  with  hostility  from  the 
inhabitants;  on  the  contrary,  they  had  been  welcomed 
by  them  in  a  way  which  made  a  painful  impression  upon 
Spain,  for  it  had  been  supposed  in  the  mother  country 
that,  because  the  Porto  Ricans  were  submissive,  they 
were  loyal.  In  truth,  they  were  excited  by  the  hope 
of  liberty  —  an  alluring  term  of  whose  meaning  they  had 
but  vague  conceptions  —  and  by  the  prospect  of  financial 
prosperity,  to  result  from  their  connection  with  the  United 
States.  The  Americans,  on  their  side,  were  determined 
to  expel  the  Spaniards  from  the  western  hemisphere. 
They  had  taken  Porto  Rico,  and,  not  being  bound  by  any 
promise  of  disinterestedness,  as  they  were  in  regard  to 
Cuba,  they  saw  no  reason  why  they  should  not  keep  it. 
The  island  was  too  small  to  set  up  a  government  for  itself, 
and  since  Porto  Rico  is  an  obvious  stopping-place  between 
Europe  and  Panama,  its  strategic  value  was  great  in  view 
of  an  isthmian  canal.  In  this  instance,  the  American 
Anti-imperialists  themselves  made  no  serious  protest ;  they 
were  busy  enough  elsewhere. 

After  a  first  stage  of  military  rule,  which  was  beneficial 
during  the  period  of  transition,  when  the  resident  Span- 
iards had  occasionally  to  be  protected  against  the  revenge 
of  their  former  subjects,  the  present  system  of  govern- 
ment in  Porto  Rico  was  established.  But  the  inhabit- 
ants, though  granted  such  liberties  as  they  had  never 
known  before,  were  bitterly  disappointed:  they  had 
fondly  imagined  that  their  island  would  at  once  be  made 


144        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


a  full-fledged  state  in  the  American  Union.  This  arrange- 
ment did  not  commend  itself  to  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States,  where  it  was  felt  that  a  territory  with  a 

mixeil  popuhitioii  of  whom  but  seventeen  jxt  cent  could 
read  or  write,  and  with  no  experience  in  self-administra- 
tion, must  pass  throu^'h  a  process  of  education  before  it 
could  manage  its  own  destinies.  The  Americans  were 
sincerely  anxious  to  treat  their  new  fellow-citizens  as 
hberally  as  possible;  and  they  did  act  with  kindness  as 
well  as  with  discretion.  Even  the  temporary  imposition 
of  a  tariff  duty  of  fifteen  per  cent  on  I'orto  Kican  K<^)ods 
brought  into  the  Union,  a  step  roundly  condenmed  at 
the  time  as  an  act  of  oppression,  was  only  an  assertion  of 
principle  on  th(;  part  of  Congress.  The  duty  (which  was 
soon  abolished)  did  not,  while  it  existed,  perceptibly  inter- 
fere with  trade;  and  the  sum  of  money  collected  by  it 
was  presented  to  Porto  Kico,  and  has  since  been  of  wel- 
come service  for  internal  improvements. 

The  form  of  government  established  for  the  island, 
though  a  novelty  as  an  American  institution,  is  not  in  itself 
original.  It  is  much  like  that  of  several  of  the  English 
crown  colonies,  where  we  find  the  same  sort  of  provision 
for  an  assembly  consisting  of  two  chambers,  the  lower 
chosen  by  the  people,  the  upper  composed  of  the  chief 
officials  and  of  native  members  who,  as  well  as  the  gov- 
ernor and  the  judges,  are  appointed  by  the  home  authori- 
ties. In  local  affairs  the  Porto  Ricans  elect  their  own 
officers,  but  there  is  a  low  property  and  educational 
qualification  for  the  suffrage. 

Under  this  system,  thanks  to  wise  administration  and  to 
the  good  sense  shown  by  the  people  themselves,  the  land 
has  been  able  to  profit  by  its  natural  resources,  and  b^, 
the  advantages  of  its  connection  with  the  United  States. 
Prosperity  did  not  come  at  once,  to  be  sure,  for  at  first  the 
sudden  severance  of  its  old  relation  with  Spain  produced 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  COLONIES  145 


an  economic  disturbance,  and  in  1899  a  terrible  hurricane, 
the  most  disastrous  in  the  history  of  the  island,  destroyed 

iibout  nine-tenths  of  the  coffee  bushes.  When  we  remenm- 
ber  tliiit  the  coffee  crop  was  the  chief  source  of  export 
in  S|>,inish  days,  and  that  it  takes  coffee  bushes  seven 
or  eight  years  to  ri!ach  maturity,  we  can  appreciate  the 
extent  of  the  disaster.  It  is,  indeed,  not  likely  that 
Porto  Rican  coffee  will  ever  be  as  profitable  again.  On 
the  Spanish  market  it  was  favored  by  protective  duties 
which  it  no  lonj^'er  enjoys;  in  the  United  States  it  has 
to  compete  with  the  long-established  supply  from  Brazil. 
The  American  people  are  great  coffee  drinkers;  and  as 
the  bean  is  not  raised  in  their  own  country,  coffee  is 
one  of  th(>  few  imports  that  pay  no  duty.  It  is  therefore 
hardly  to  be  expected  that  the  country  as  a  whole  will 
submit,  for  the  sole  benefit  of  Porto  Kico,  to  a  tax  on 
an  article  of  almost  universal  consumption.  The  place  of 
coffee  in  the  island  nas  been  taken  by  other  productions, 
especially  sugar  and  tobacco,  the  export  of  which  has  in- 
creased enormously,  the  total  value  of  trade  in  1906  being 
almost  three  times  as  large  as  it  was  five  years  earlier. 
Most  of  this  growth  has  been  due  to  commerce  with  the 
United  States.  Foreign  capital  has  been  chary  in  com- 
ing in;  for  the  measures  taken  to  prevent  the  island 
from  being  exploited  by  powerful  financial  oi^anizations, 
though  perhaps  necessarj-,  have  tended  to  keep  away  pos- 
sible investors.  Public  works  of  various  kinds  have  been 
undertaken,  and  the  number  of  children  in  the  schools  is 
increasing  steadily.  All  told,  the  record  of  American  rule 
has  been  satisfactory  and  creditable. 

The  j)olitical  future  offers  some  uncertainty.  Thus  far, 
tlie  Porto  Ricans  appear  to  hnvo  made  goofl  use  of  the  rights 
that  have  been  granted  to  them,  tho\igh  they  plunge 
into  politics  with  a  zeal  out  of  proportion  to  the  issues 
involved,  which  are  too  often  personal.     It  stands  to 


146       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


reason,  however,  that  they  will  not  remain  satisfied  with 
their  present  privileges,  which  may  indeed  seem  sufficient 
to  outsiders,  but  which,  so  long  as  they  are  not  the  equal 

of  those  of  other  American  citizens,  bear  with  them  a  cer- 
tain stamp  of  inferiority.  Now,  in  these  days  there  are 
fewer  and  fewer  peoples  who  arc  willing  to  regard  them- 
selves as  inferior,  or  as  incompetent  to  take  charge  of 
their  own  destinies.  The  demand  of  Porto  Rico  for 
more  liberties  will  be  hard  to  deny;  for  the  plea  of  a 
territory  whose  population  is  larger  than  that  of  more 
than  a  third  of  the  states  already  in  the  Union,  appeals 
to  the  American  sense  of  fai'-ness  as  well  as  to  the  old 
liberal  tradition.  On  the  other  hand,  many  Americans 
do  not  believe  that  the  Porto  Ricans,  who  are  still  very 
young  in  political  experience,  will  soon  be  qualified  for 
the  difficult  work  of  governing  themselves  properly.  Once 
a  state,  Porto  Rico  cannot  be  kept  in  leading-strings; 
and  there  is  no  provision  in  the  Constitution  for  tak- 
ing away  the  privilege  of  statehood,  however  much  it 
may  be  abused.  It  is  not  strange  that  the  Americans 
hesitate  before  committing  themselves  beyond  recall. 
The  Porto  Ricans,  on  their  part,  may  well  lament  the 
course  of  recent  events  in  Cuba:  the  people  of  the  two 
countries  are  so  similar  that  there  is  no  obvious  reason 
why  one  island  should  be  more  capable  of  self-govern- 
ment than  the  other.  If  the  Cubans  are  not  competent 
to  manage  their  own  affairs,  why  should  their  kinsmen 
be  more  so? 

Another  question  of  no  small  difficulty  is  what  degree 
of  assimilation  the  United  States  is  entitled  to  expect, 
or  can  rightly  demand,  of  its  new  territory.    Here  the 

matter  of  the  language  is  perhaps  crucial.  As  the  people 
all  speak  the  same  tongue,  and  that  a  great  European  one, 
Spanish,  which  has  a  glorious  literary  heritage,  they  will 
be  slow  to  abandon  it  for  English,  in  spite  of  all  the 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  COLONIES 


147 


efforta  of  the  schools.  Would  it  be  any  more  just  to 
attempt  to  enforce  such  a  change  than  it  was  for  the 
Russians  to  try  like  measures  in  Finland,  a  proceeding 
which  called  forth  lively  indignation  in  America?  Porto 

Rico  may  become  a  state  in  course  of  time,  for  Ameri- 
can traditions  in  favor  of  equality  are  still  very  strong; 
but  we  cannot  foresee  any  near  future  when  it  will 
cease  to  be  a  somewhat  alien  element  in  the  body  politic. 
Happily  it  is  not  large  enough  to  be  a  source  of  positive 
danger,  or  even  of  serious  trouble.  For  the  same  rea- 
son, it  has  attracted  but  little  attention  to  itself,  and 
cannot,  in  the  importance  of  the  problems  it  presents, 
be  compared  with  Cuba  or  the  Philippine  Islands,  a  fact 
for  which  Americans  have  every  reason  to  be  thankful. 


CILM^ER  VIII 


THE  PriL.FM'l    i:  QI  E.STION 

PUEMEDITATION  .n.l  '  desi  n  ;ifv  qualities  v  oh 
iiat  ii)Jis  .-irc  jiroir i  t  ■  m  i!)ut<' t'  dtn  ;u!<it  her,  and 
to  jvckiiowlcdge  in  tluMu-^rlvcs.  Each  is  conscious  of  it!~  »\vu 
hesitations,  fours,  changes  of  mind,  hut  t  judges  the  iuten- 
t  bns  of  others  by  results  only.  This  is  especially  true  when 
the  resuhs  taki'  the  fnnu  of  •errit'  1  gains.  Tlic  rest  of 
the  wftrld  will  never  Iiclicvc'  ihem  >  he  a<  ('id*"tr  al :  it  will 
always  find  proof  to  its  own  satisfaction  that  they  are  the 
fruit  of  l-^ug-niatured  plans. 

In  Europe  this  charge  has  often  be»^n  made  about  the  ac- 
quisition of  the  Philippine  Islands  h\  the  United  States; 
yet  seldom  has  an  (  vent  of  the  kind  he  n  less  <hie  to  fore- 
sight or  ]irenieditation.    We  may  ai'Miit  that  .  inong  those 
who  dreamed  dreams  about  tli<>  Pacific,  tucre  were  jic 
haps  a  few  who  hoped  tliat  the  w(   k,  iil-govi  rued  insui 
possfcssi  i!8  of  Spain  might  fall  into  Anu-riean  hands  som 
(i.iy,  and  naval  officers  have  had  visions  of  coaling  stations 
in    11  '-orts  of  ])laces,  })ut  it  is  safe  to  say  th;;',  when  or  jt- 
were  sent  to  A('miral  Dewey  1     ;iroce(>d  to  Manila,  Presi 
dent  Mcivinley  and  his  eahim  I  tiad  no  tin  tght   ^  ^'ett  n., 
possession  of  the  three  thousand  odd  islands  which  ha  ■ 
since  come  into  American  hands.'    The  feeling  of  the 

'"At  the  beginning  of  the  war  thrre  wm  pprhr-  •  not     ■vnil  m  the 

whole  Hcpuhlir  who  so  mu- h  a.s  thoui:'  ?  of  ;!  '  p<.  lit  ■.  -lis  natiot 
becoming  a  ■sovereign  power  in  the,  Urient." — Rei  ^  trid  PoZt/"> 

p.  64.   Thia  is  s  bit  emphatic. 

148 


THE  PlilLIPPLNf:  ^  iisTioa 


149 


pooplt  about  tlu  Philippines  ;  tl-*  time  has  been  wef 
dttscribpi  by  a  satirical  writiM  who  said,  "They  didn't 
know  wl     M'T  thoy  wcri'  is!  imh  or  canned  go< 

Hno      ■><!  n  - s(     -.v'  Viiicric:i M  !!•  ct  w  s  8ont  to 

M  iiiihi       lh(         lie  K  .   );uii.  h  Win  \v;is  ihiit  thrro 

was  noiiuiit,'  t-l.  voi  -  .»  'Us  lur  it  to  do.  It  could  not 
rcmaiu  in  Hon^  on^  »  r  nether  neutr  il  port;  it  could  not 
ma'h<^  an  iinilun.  us  n  i  oai  to  the  Pacific  eoast  vithout 


excit  lig  ail. 
-.rek  ^  i 


r  at 

V 

'.or  lu' 
ri  tlu 
■n"  ipe 
•iesi 
al  t, 
T  nc 


;  'Sfnt'f 

may  be  ^  uin 
for  taking  ac 

'liet  ftt 
Am»  ic. 
at  :  an 
at  \  liiii 
in  his  si;t'(  ss.  ! 
I  f  tiered  1    sail  av 
ji  d  r      irt.  Ma 
.1    ■  r..  ttnd 

red  thit 
un     But  ^ 
iin  th<^  art 
d  L.  c 
'•    'er  ('. 


me           tli  •  course  left  was  to 

<  (  !^  '      1:  .1  ^ers.    A  proof  of  the 

sIk         ;  li  of  the  goveri  nt 

act          II  visioti  liad  been  .  'de 

liK  s  fl»     off  Cavite,  the 

•  '    I  thai  iie  cou     capture  Maidla 
>ps  Ui  hold  it,  the  an'  rities 
a  ihey  had  no  choice  but  to  )llow 
been  said  that  he  might  have  ?wn 


'  at  once  and  return  home  for  .lies 
people,  including  all  Anti-imj  ^ta, 

f-e  t  at  this  was  not  done,  a. 
1       rake  was  conimittrd  at  thi 
■'[■  would  have  required  great  ci.. 
resident  and  his  advisers,  even  if  liiey 
need,  as  they  were  not,  that  it  was  the 
a  moment  when  t'le  American  jieople  were 
lA        !  iigiit  over  the  brilliant  triumph  of  their  young 
p"l    j"  u.-sappointment  wou  i  aave  been  intense  if 
t(.;  t  had  then  upon  turned  round  and  skulked 

mded  critics  would,  moreover,  have  con- 
ed tlu     hole  expedition  as  a  useless  raid  without  any 


del 

asked  for  troops,  the  natural  thing  to  do  was  to  send  them. 
To  the  question  of  how  many  were  needed,  he  replied  five 
thousand,  —  an  optimistic  estimate  which  was  not  accepted 


ft  ! 


■  '01 


If' 


ii 


150        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

by  the  general  appointed  to  command  the  expedition,  who 
insisted  that  he  must  have  twenty  thousand,  and  got  them. 

But  as  there  were  rone  available  then  and  there,  and  as  no 
means  of  transport  had  been  provided  beforehand,  months 
elapsed  before  they  reached  the  scene  of  action. 

Meanwhile,  many  things  had  happened.  By  the  time 
the  American  army  was  ready  to  take  the  offensive,  not 
only  were  the  insurgents  in  Luzon  masters  of  the  whole 
open  country,  and  besieging  Manila  from  the  land,  but  the 
Spaniards  had  been  beaten  in  Cuba,  and  were  anxious  for 
peace.  Owing,  however,  to  the  fact  that  early  in  the  war 
cable  communication  with  the  Philippines  had  beea  severed, 
the  American  troops  attacked  and,  after  a  pretence  of 
resistance,  captured  Manila  before  news  reached  them  that 
an  armistice  had  already  been  signed  in  Washington  put- 
ting an  end  to  hostilities,  and  handing  over  the  city  to  their 
keeping.  Some  dispute  arose  in  consequence  as  to  the 
tenure  of  the  Americans,  —  whether  they  held  the  »^lace 
by  right  of  conquest  or  under  the  terms  of  the  agreement. 
After  all,  it  mattered  little.  What  did  matter  was  that  this 
fresh  exploit,  prearranged  as  we  now  know  it  to  have  been, 
excited  a  popular  clamor  in  the  United  States  for  the  reten- 
tion of  the  town,  which  appeared  more  precious  as  a  tropiiy 
than  as  a  pledge. 

In  the  Washington  armistice  there  was  a  vaguely  worded 
clause  by  Avhich  the  American  government  intended  to 
reserve  the  question  of  the  disposal  uf  the  Philippines  to  its 
own  later  decision.  Not  only  the  administration  but  the 
public  were  undecided  enough  on  the  whole  subject.  When 
the  peace  commissioners  set  out  for  Paris,  they  were  divided 
in  opinion  among  themselves,  and  had  no  definite  instruc- 
tion? from  President  McKinley,  who  had  not  yet  been  able 
to  make  up  his  mind  as  to  what  was  the  best  course  to 
pursue.  He  appears  very  truly  on  this  occasion  not  as  the 
leader,  but  as  the  representative,  of  the  American  people 


[I  \ 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


151 


in  their  hesiti.  'ions,  groping  rather  blindly  and  thinking 

out  loud. 

Several  courses  of  action  seemed  possible.  The  first 
was  to  retire  from  the  islands,  perhaps  keeping  one  of  them, 
or  a  mere  port,  as  a  coaling  station,  and  leaving  the  Span- 
iards and  the  Filipinos  to  settle  affairs  between  themselves 
as  best  they  might ;  but  after  tlie  alliance  between  Dewey 
and  Aguinaldo  this  would  liavo  been  called  a  betrayal. 

Another  way  was  to  force  Spain  to  evacuate  the  whole 
group  and  to  hand  it  over  to  the  insurgents;  but  many 
people  in  America  doubted  the  capacity  of  the  Filipinos 
for  self-government.  They  also  feared  foreign  greed. 
Whenever  a  nation  hesitates  whether  or  not  to  appropriate 
something,  this  old  cry  is  raised.  Some  rival  is  pointed 
out  as  impatiently  waiting  to  profit  by  the  opportunity, 
and  this  real  or  imaginary  danger  furnishes  an  effective 
argument  in  favor  of  annexation.  In  the  Philippines  the 
dreaded  rival  was  Germany ;  for  the  presence  of  a  strong 
German  fleet  in  Manila  Bay  had  awakenc  d  much  suspicion, 
not  to  say  wrath,  in  the  United  States,  where  it  w^as  be- 
lieved that  the  Germans  were  on  the  watch  to  pick  up 
any  territory  they  could  get,  and  would  upon  the  with- 
drawal of  American  authority  promptly  establish  their 
own,  —  a  proceeding  public  opinion  was  not  disposed  to 
tolerate. 

The  third  obvious  course  was  for  the  United  States  to 
take  the  Phihppines  and  keep  them.  Owing  to  the  success 
of  the  war,  the  country  was  not  in  a  mood  to  abandon 
anything,  or  to  shrink  from  peril  or  responsibilities,  and 
tliis  feeling  of  elation  contributed  more  than  anything  else 
to  turn  the  scale.  Without  quite  knowing  how  they  wished 
to  dispose  finally  of  the  islands,  the  American  people  and 
government  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  immediate 
thing  to  do  was  to  put  an  end  to  all  Spanish  connection 
with  them.   Orders  to  this  effect  were  sent  to  the  com- 


152        THE  UMTED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


missioners  in  Paris,  and  were  carried  out  in  spite  of  the 
protests  of  Spain. 

After  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  Paris,  December  10, 
1898,  the  Americans,  from  their  own  point  of  view,  were 
in  legal  possession  of  the  Philippines,  which,  in  return  for 
a  money  payment,  had  been  formally  ceded  by  their  pre- 
vious owners.  Unluckily  this  possession  much  resembled 
what  is  known  by  the  homely  phrase  of  "getting  the  sow 
by  the  ears":  it  was  equally  hard  to  hold  on  or  to  let  go. 
In  actual  fact,  although  the  Americans  commanded  the 
sea,  they  controlled  little  on  the  land  but  the  city  of  Manila. 
Nearly  everything  else  in  the  islands,  except  where  Spanish 
garrisons  held  on  here  and  there,  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
insurgents.  With  them  relations  had  already  become 
strained,  for  tlie  situation  had  been  false  froni  the  outset. 
In  the  violent  controversy  which  has  raged  over  this  whole 
subject,  even  the  most  ardent  defenders  of  American  policy 
have  seldom  maintained  that  the  history  of  the  transaction 
was  wholly  satisfactory,  and  intemperate  Anti-imperialists 
have  declared  that  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  tow- 
ards its  former  allies  was  marked  by  black  treachery  and 
ingratitude. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Aguinaldo,  the  leader  of  the 
last  native  revolt  against  Spanish  rule,  had  retired  to 
Hongkong  on  the  conclusion  of  a  tr(  .ity  of  pacification  and 
the  payment  of  a  sum  of  money.  -Ivro  the  Americans 
entered  into  negotiations  with  him,  and,  after  coming  to 
an  agreement,  brought  him  to  the  islands  in  a  ship  of  war, 
and  aided  him  with  arms  and  ammunition.  Thus  stimu- 
lated, the  movement  of  insurrection  spread  with  great 
rapidity,  for  the  Spaniards,  caught  be+ween  two  fires,  and 
unable  to  transport  troops  by  sea,  had  no  means  of  repress- 
ing it.  Wilii  Aguii:aido  ujaster  of  the  country  up  lo  the 
gates  of  Manila  and  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Dewey  holding  the 
bay,  the  outlook  for  the  Spanish  garrison  was  hopeless. 


THE  PHILIPPLNE  QUESTION 


153 


For  this  reason,  though  it  was  capable  of  serious  defence, 
it  surrendercil  the  city  by  agreement  as  soon  as  the  place 

was  ass;uilt(>(l.  But  for  the  insurgents,  this  would  not  have 
occurred,  and  wo  need  not  wonder  that  they  were  incensed 
at  being  rigorously  excluded  from  tlie  cai)tured  town, 
which  some  of  them  had  hoped  to  pillage.  As  time  went  on, 
it  became  more  and  more  evident  that  the  conflicting  de- 
signs of  the  two  former  allies  would  soon  lead  to  open  hos- 
tilities. The  ^situation  was  indeed  one  which  it  was  diffi- 
cult to  adjust  by  peaceful  means  unless  one  side  or  the  other 
were  willing  to  surrender  its  ambitions. 

There  has  been  much  heated  discussion  about  the  extent 
to  which  the  Americans  committed  themselves  to  the  sup- 
port of  Aguinaldo  in  their  original  compact  with  him.  He 
and  his  partisans  have  asserted  that  he  came  to  the  islands 
with  the  assurance  of  their  aid  in  achieving  the  independence 
of  his  country ;  and  the  assistance  actually  granted  him  is 
certainly  prima  facie  evidence  in  his  favor.    The  American 
government  has  maintained  that  it  gave  Aguinaldo  no 
promise  whatever.    Indeed,  Admiral  Dewey  and  the  consul 
at  Hongkong  could  ir  no  wise  commit  the  administration  in  a 
matter  of  such  importance.    There  was  nothing  but  a  bargain 
for  mutual  aid  at  a  moment  when  the  interests  of  the 
two  parties  coincided.   In  trying  to  reconcile  the  different 
versions  of  what  was  agreed  upon,  it  nmst  be  remembered 
that  the   negotiating  was  done  through  an  interpreter. 
Translations  of  tliis  kind,  with  tlie  best  intentions  and  every 
precaution,  are  notoriously  unsafe.    If  many  a  treaty, 
even  in  recent  times,  has  been  found  to  differ  in  the  i\vo 
texts  ftdo'  'ed,  a  verbal  agreement  is  obviously  far  more 
^''^'''f"  ^         ^-    We  have  no  proof  that  the  words  exchanged 
I'etweej.     .guinaldo  and  Mr.  Wildman  in  Hongkong,  in 
May,  lh98,  were  correctly  rendered  from  one  to  the  other. 
Who  knows  whether  the  interpreter  even  tried  to  be  exact? 
And  admitting  that  he  did,  a  misunderstanding  is  easy  to 


154        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


conceive.  We  may  also  suspect  that  both  sides  realized 
that  their  ultcHor  plans  mi^^ht  not  be  in  harmony,  and 
preferred  noi  to  look  too  far  ahead.  It  was  enoiit^h  for 
the  inOwi<  nt  that  they  were  so  situat<  d  that  each  was  glad 
of  aid  from  tlie  other,  leaving  the  future  to  take  care  of 
itself.  This  was  all  very  well  for  the  instant,  but  it  now 
seems  extraordinary  that  so  few  Americans  at  the  time  fore- 
saw that  any  kind  of  alliance  with  Aguinaldo  inevitaljly 
meant  beconiinj^'  involved  in  Spanish  internal  affairs  from 
which  it  would  be  hard  to  withdraw.  Bringing  into  the 
game  a  third  party  who  could  not  be  left  out  of  account 
in  the  dual  reckoning  must  give  rise  to  later  compUcations. 
At  the  time,  the  American  authorities  in  the  Far  East  were 
doubtless  thinking  only  the  military  conditions  which 
confronti-d  them,  and  as  yet  probably  fcnv  of  them  im- 
agined that  their  country  would  wish  to  retain  these  distant 
territories. 

In  the  events  that  followed,  Aguinaldo  had  an  advantage 
which  enabled  him  to  act  more  consistently  and  seemingly 
in  a  more  straightforward  manner  than  his  later  antag- 
onists: he  had  a  clear,  detinite  aim,  which  he  had  no  reason 
to  conceal,  —  the  independence  of  the  island,  \vith  himself 
as  the  natural  head  of  the  new  republic ;  and  he  bent  every 
effort  in  this  direction.  The  Americans  were  in  a  more 
complicated  position.  The  military  commp.nders  on  the 
spot  were  only  subordinates,  without  much  influence  on 
the  i)olicy  of  the  government,  and  in  Washington,  and 
indeed  throughout  the  United  States,  as  we  know,  it  was 
long  before  a  decision  was  arrived  at.  By  the  time  it  was 
reached,  and  people  were  re  ady  to  put  it  into  force,  the  in- 
surgents had  made  themselves  masters  of  nearly  all  the 
islands;  they  had  proclaimed  a  republic  with  a  modern 
constitution,  had  organized  a  working  government,  and  had 
despatched  an  agent  to  Washington  to  treat  for  recognition. 
It  may  be  supposed  that  the  two  armies  encamped  month 


THE  PHIUPPLNE  QUEbTIUX 


155 


after  month  cheek  by  jowl  with  one  anMiier  entertained  no 
friendly  feelings,  and  the  wonder  is  not  that  they  finally 

came  to  blows,  but  that  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  did  not 
occur  sooner.  It  would  have  done  so  if  both  sides  had  not 
wished  to  avoid  taking  the  initiative.  As  it  was,  the  news 
of  the  outbreak  came  just  in  time  to  influence  the  waverers 
in  the  Senate  to  vote  for  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of 
peace  with  Spain. 

When  fighting  had  once  begun,  there  was  a  fresh  explo- 
sion of  patriotism  in  the  Ur/ ted  States.    American  blood 
had  been  shed,  and  whatever  might  be  decided  about  the 
ultimate  fate  of  the  islands,  there  could  be  no  talk  of 
negotiation  until  all  armed  opposition  had  been  crushed 
out.    This  patriotic  fervor  began  to  cool,  however,  when 
the  war  degenerated  into  a  fatiguing,  inglorious,  and  end- 
less guerilla  contest,*  and  tiie  Americans  had  to  undergo 
the  same  experience  that  the  English  had  had  in  Burmah, 
and  the  French  in  Tongking,  some  years  before.   It  is  not  a 
severe  task  for  a  well-trained  army  to  defeat  a  disorganized 
Asiatic  host  in  the  open  field,  but  it  is  another  matter  to 
stamp  out  insurrection  in  a  land  of  tro])ical  jungle,  where  the 
seemingly  peaceful  villagers  come  out  to  greet  the  invaders 
with  gifts,  if  they  arrive  in  force,  but  take  to  bushwhack- 
ing at  night,  and  are  ever  ready  to  massacre  small  detached 
parties.    Dacoits,  Blackflags,  and  Lad  rones,  half  robbers, 
half  patriots,  have  reprooented  in  varying  degrees  the  same 
sort  of  resistance ;  always  apparently  on  the  point  of  being 
suppressed  or  exterminated,  they  reappeared  again  and  again 
to  give  the  lie  to  official  optimism  and  to  weary  public 
opinion  at  home.   In  their  exasperation  the  Americans 
retaliated  savagely,  and  resorted  to  that  very  policy  of 
reconcentration  for  which  they  had  loudly  condemned  the 
Spaniards. 

•  Annexation  was  not  definitely  decided  upon  until  after  the  report 
of  the  first  ^Uppine  Commission  in  its  favor. 


156       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

As  might  be  expected,  a  reaction  soon  set  in  in  the 
United  States,  and  affected  both  political  parties.  Many 

Republicans,  while  in.sisting  that  the  insurrection  must  at 
all  costs  be  subdued,  adiuittt'd  that  this  was  only  making 
the  best  of  a  had  job,  and  thoy  w  -aid  ha\<-  been  only  too 
glad  to  see  a  satisfactory  way  of  gt  tting  nd  of  the  islands 
and  everything  connected  with  them.  The  Democrat*,  not 
being  in  power,  were  free  to  critidae  the  acts  ot  the  xov- 
ernment  with  severity.  They  condemned  its  f<  iduct  in 
scathing  terms,  and  proclaimed  themselves  in  favor  of 
eva"uating  the  Philippines,  and  turning  them  over  to  the 
native  inhabitants.  Some,  it  is  true,  conceded  that  order 
must  first  be  restored,  but  a  number  of  the  more  violent 
Anti-imperialists  went  so  far  as  to  give  the  insurgents  open 
encouragement,  —  encouragement  which,  it  is  said,  helped 
to  delude  them  into  prolonging  their  resistance. 

Here  we  come  upon  a  difficult  question  of  ethics,  which  on 
two  notable  occasions  in  recent  years  has  aroused  intense 
feeling.  If  a  nation  is  engaged  in  war,  are  those  of  its  citi- 
zens who  conscientiously  believe  that  that  war  is  unjusti- 
fiable, not  to  say  wicked,  in  duty  bound  to  conceal  their 
opinion  until  the  war  is  over  and  the  iniquity  consummated? 
This  appears  monstrous ;  but  if,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Philip- 
pine and  the  Boer  wars,  the  attitude  of  the  minority  at 
home  helps  to  encourage  the  official  enemies  of  the  country 
to  prolong  a  hopeless  struggle,  what  then?  E.xcited 
patriots  in  America  and  England  averred,  with  some  show 
of  reason,  that  these  irresponsible  critics  were  to  blame  for 
untold  useless  suffering,  for  the  sacrifice  of  many  valuable 
lives  not  only  of  their  fellow-citizens  but  of  the  very  people 
that  they  pretended  to  champion.  It  is  easy  to  understand 
the  exasperation  of  those  who  have  lost  sons  and  brothers 
in  a  war  which  they  are  convinced  would  already  have 
come  to  an  end  but  for  the  interposition  of  their  com- 
patriots, whom  they  brand  as  traitors  and  little  short 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


157 


of  murderers.  This  formidable  moral  question,  which 
Nelson  solved  in  his  own  simple  way,  —  "ray  country,  right 
or  wrong, "  —  is  a  very  old  one,  but  it  has  been  rendered 
more  acute  by  modern  means  of  communicjition,  which 
may  make  an  imprudent  speech  or  newspaper  article 
known  to  the  enemy  within  the  space  of  a  few  hours. 

Another  circumstance  which  disgusted  the  America 
people  was  the  reports  that  came  back  of  the  cruelties  com- 
mitted by  their  own  troops,  and  notably  the  use  of  the 
"water  cure."  In  peaceful  communities  the  general  pub- 
lic canno'  appreciate  the  fearful  strain  to  which  soldiers  are 
subjected  when  fighting  against  savage  or  even  semi-civi- 
lized enemies  who  mutilate  the  dead,  torture  the  wounded, 
and  transform  themselves  from  effusive  friends  into  mur- 
derous guerillas  if  they  can  do  so  with  safety.  Under 
such  conditions  the  best  disciplined  troops  are  guiity  of 
reprisals  to  an  extent  seldom  realized.  Tales  of  harsh,  not 
to  say  barbarous,  treatment  of  Filipinos  by  Americans 
were  repeated  in  an  exaggerated  form  by  the  press,  and 
were  made  the  most  of  by  the  Anti-imperialists. 

All  this  helped  to  make  the  country  so  tired  of  the 
affair  that,  if  in  1900  a  direct  vote  could  h;i  ,e  been 
taken  on  the  abstract  question  of  the  retention  or  the 
surrender  of  the  Philippines,  it  is  certain  that  there  would 
have  been  a  lai^e  majority  in  favor  of  evacuation.' 
But  complicated  problems  can  seldom  be  solved  in  such 
a  simple  manner:  there  are  too  ni my  oiitside  factors  to 
be  taken  into  account.  In  the  presidential  campaign  of 
1900,  the  Philippine  question  was  indeed  the  subject  of 
heated  debate,  but  there  were  other  things  to  be  con- 
sidered, —  the  personality  of  the  candidates,  the  possibility 
of  bringing  up  npiain  the  free  silver  issue,  the  maintf n-'ince 
of  the  protective  tariff.    Though  it  is  beyond  doubt  that 

'  The  sentiment  was  much  the  aame  as  that  in  France  about  Tongkmg 
in  1885. 


158 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


H 


Iff 
li 


the  election  was  decided  by  a  multitude  of  considerations, 
nevertheless,  when  President  McKinley  and  his  party  were 
given  a  new  lease  of  power,  they  felt  that  the  country  had 

indorsed  their  Philippine  policy.  Military  operations  were 
prosecuted  steadily,  Aguinaldo  was  captured,  and  one  island 
after  another  was  pacified,  until  native  resistance  survived 
only  in  the  form  of  occasional  outbreaks  of  Ladronism. 

Meanwhile,  the  administration  at  Washington  and  its  sup- 
porters, vigorously  as  th(>y  replied  to  their  adversaries,  could 
not  help  moved  by  the  criticism  to  which  they  were 

subjected.  They  were  too  intelligent  to  l)lind  themselves  to 
the  fact  that  they  seemed  to  be  trampling  on  American 
traditions,  and  too  upright  not  to  wince  under  the  taunt 
that  their  war,  begun  for  the  liberation  of  the  Cubans,  had 
ended  with  the  enslavement  of  the  Filipinos.  Ever  since  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  the  right  of  a  people  to  control 
its  own  destinies  had  been  too  often  proclaimed  for  any 
American  statesman  to  defend  the  holding  of  subjects  on 
the  ground  of  mere  material  advantage.  While  unshaken  in 
their  belief  that  they  were  acting  in  a  manner  which,  under 
the  existing  circumstances,  was  both  wise  and  just,  they 
knew  that  this  justice  and  wisdom  could  only  be  proved  by 
the  use  they  made  of  their  victory.  It  was  for  the  United 
States  to  set  an  example  unparalleled  in  the  history  of 
colonization.  American  rule  must  mean  not  only  material 
benefit,  but  the  moral  elevation  of  +he  subject  race  to 
the  level  of  the  ruling  one.  The  Filipiaos  must  be  treated 
as  wards  of  the  nation,  not  yet  competent  to  manage 
their  own  affairs,  but  needing  and  enjoying  protectirn 
until  they  should  be  fitted  for  the  responsibility  of  mi 
ing  themselves  or  of  taking  an  equal  share  in  the  life  of  the 
Americiiii  republic.  Thus  were  the  older  ideals  to  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  new  conditions.  The  right  of  self-govern- 
ment was  not  denied  in  theory,  but  was  temporarily  in 
abeyance  in  the  case  of  a  people  too  immature  for  complete 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


159 


emancipation.  This  view,  that  of  Preddents  McKinley  and 

Roosevelt,  is  the  starting-point  for  the  policy  associated 

chiefly  with  the  name  of  Secretary  Taft,  —  a  policy  novel  in 
many  of  its  details,  and  condemned  equally  by  the  two 
other  schools  of  thought  in  colonial  matters. 

Ever  since  1899  there  have  been  three  conflicting  doctrines 
as  to  the  proper  course  for  the  Americans  to  follow  in  regard 
to  the  islands.  The  first  and  simplest  is  that  of  the  Anti- 
imperialists:  that  the  Americans  should  simply  get  out  as 
soon  as  possible  and  hand  over  everything  to  the  natives. 
The  arguments  in  favor  of  this  course  are  based  on  moral 
grounds,  on  the  history  of  the  republic,  and  on  the  unsatis- 
factory results,  so  far,  of  its  colonial  experiences.  The 
Anti-imperialists  laud  the  virtues  of  the  Filipinos,  whom 
they  pronounce  quite  capable  of  self-government,  and  they 
fraternize  openly  with  the  most  discontented  elements 
among  them ;  they  condemn  the  Taft  poUcy  as  hypocritical, 
or  as  incapable  of  realization,  —  human  nature  being  what 
it  is,  they  say,  people  will  always  find  excuses  for  declaring 
that  the  natives  are  not  yet  capable  of  taking  care  of  them- 
selves, and  the  longer  the  Americans  remain,  the  harder  it 
will  be  for  them  to  leave.  The  partisans  of  these  views, 
who  are  most  numerous  in  the  northeastern  states,  stand 
on  firm  moral  ground  in  their  appeal  to  the  higher  prin- 
ciples, to  the  sense  of  justice,  to  the  old  idcJ  of  liberty,  of 
the  American  j)eo])le.  They  are  derided  by  their  opponents 
as  vif-i(Miaries,  but  they  disturb  the  conscience  of  the  na- 
tion; and  their  altruistic  arguments  are  reinforced  by  a 
widespread  impression  that,  for  purely  selfish  reasons,  the 
country  would  be  better  off  without  its  Philippine  encum- 
brance. 

At  the  other  extreme  from  ihr^  Anti-imperialists  are  the 
more  outspoken  expansionists,  who  laugh  at  sentimentaUty, 
and  declare  that  the  Philippines  are  a  possession  fairly 
acquired  and  worth  retaining.  They  admit  that  it  is  the 


160        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POW  KU 


duty  of  the  United  States  to  f;ive  the  islands  as  good  govern- 
ment as  possible,  hut  there  should  lie  '"no  nonsense  about 
it";  they  would  have  them  ruled  justly  hut  firmly,  without 
any  preten'e  thiit  the  inhabitants  an;  capable  of  takinj; 
more  than  a  very  small  part  in  the  work.  Nothing,  in  their 
opinion,  could  be  more  absurd  than  to  talk  of  half-naked 
Oriente.ls  in  the  tropies  as  if  they  were  Americans,  with 
all  t*ie  aptitude  for  se!f-;:j()vernment  acquired  in  fifty  fjen- 
erations.  The  Filipiiu)S  belonj^  to  a  rare  which  has  never 
shown  any  capacity  for  independent  civilization,  and 
which  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  do  so  at  any  time 
that  can  now  he  foreseen ;  but  under  wise  American  domi- 
nation they  will  enjoy  such  benefits  as  they  never  dreamed 
of  before,  and  if  they  show  themselves  unprrateful  for  this, 
it  is  merely  one  more  proof  of  their  incapacity.  Then>  is 
nothing  particularly  new  in  the  problems  to  be  solved ;  the 
English  have  been  familiar  with  them  for  a  long  time,  and 
recently  in  the  Malay  protectorate,  a  neighboring  territory 
inhabited  by  people  of  the  same  race  as  the  Filipinos, 
they  have  set  an  example  of  almost  perfect  aduiinistratiun, 
a  cardinal  feature  of  their  policy  being  the  encouragenu;nt 
of  Chinese  immigration.  This  is  just  what  the  Philippines 
need  as  a  means  of  supplying  them  with  better  laborers  for 
the  development  of  the  neglected  natural  resources  than 
are  the  lazy,  shiftless  natives. 

In  its  extreme  form,  this  opinion  is  probably  not  held  by 
many  people  in  the  United  States,  but  it  gets  its  weight 
from  the  success  with  which  the  English  have  carried 
out  in  their  colonies  the  principle  it  advocates.  It  also 
seems  to  gain  authority  from  being  held  by  the  majority  of 
tlie  Americans  living  in  the  islands,  —  traders,  soldiers, 
and  even  officials,  —  and  is  thus  brought  home  by  the 
passing  traveller,  who  retails  it  as  the  "real  truth"  gath- 
ered from  "those  who  know."  We  must  remember  that 
foreign  colonies  of  a  tlominaut  race  are  seldom  on  good 


TIIK  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


161 


terms  with  the  people  amon^t  whom  they  are  called  upon 

to  live.  Even  among  nations  of  the  same  civilization, 
prniipa  nf  exiles  fire  apt  to  have  no  affection  for  the 
country  in  which  they  have  found  shelter.  Between  Euro- 
peans and  Asiatics  the  antagonism  is  much  stronger:  the 
Englishman  in  India,  the  Frenchman  in  Tongking,  the 
American  in  the  Philippines,  especially  if  he  belong  to 
tlie  trading  class,  is  there  to  make  his  living,  and  he 
is  little  interested  in  the  natives  except  in  so  far  as  they 
contribute  to  this  object.  He  and  they  belong  to  two 
different  worlds,  which  he  has  no  desire  to  bring  closer 
together.  Indeed,  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  his  resent- 
ment against  the  missionaries  is  that  their  standpoint 
is  different,  and  he  regards  the  white  school-teacher  as  an- 
other enthusia.st  of  th^'  same  typo.  Under  such  circum- 
stances race  prejudice  reigns  supreme.  The  American 
commercial  colony  in  Manila  looks  on  the  Filipino  much 
as  the  Anglo-Indian  does  on  the  Hindu,  and  resents  almost 
equally  any  th(  igh:  of  intermarriage.  From  the  nature 
of  their  position,  the  official  classes  are  freer  from  such 
intolerance,  but  they  are  not  exempt  from  it. 

This  arrogant,  but  not  incomprehensible,  attitude  cuts 
to  the  quick  the  sensitive  vanity  of  the  FiUpino,  who,  in 
his  heart  of  hearts,  cares  more  for  social  than  for  political 
recognition.  A  wealthy  and  (  ducat  d  citizen  of  Manila  with 
European  blood  in  his  veins  regards  himself  as  one  of  the 
heirs  of  all  Latin  civilizatieii,  and  does  not  relish  being 
looked  upon  as  a  "nigger"  by  every  "Yankee  adventurer." 
As  in  several  of  the  British  possessions,  the  presence  in  the 
Philippines  of  a  commercial  element  of  the  dominant  people 
tends,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  American  investment  and  en- 
terprise are  crying  needs  of  tiie  islands,  to  innliitter  mther 
than  to  improve  relations  between  conquerors  and  conquered.* 

'  The  coming  of  the  Spaniards  in  greater  numbers  after  the  opening 
of  the  Suez  Canal  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  increased  disomtait  in 
the  islands  in  the  last  half  of  the  oioetewth  century. 


162 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Between  the.-  two  I'xtrenn-  schools  wo  find  the  opinion 
of  Secretary  Tnft  and  those  who,  from  the  Prendent  down, 

support  his  polioy.    It  is  summed  up  in  the  phrase  "the 

Pliiliiipines  for  the  Filipinos."  Its  fundamental  oonreption 
is  fl'.nt  at  the  resent  tiny  the  propic  of  the  islands  are  in- 
t  a  pa.  If  of  eomplete  self-government,  and  that,  as  lonj;  as 
this  continues  to  be  true,  the  Americana  nmst  take  a  part 
of  the  burden  on  themselves ;  but  that  it  is  their  boundcn 
duty  not  only  to  develop  the  country  and  insure  material 
prosperity,  hut,  even  more,  to  educate  the  natives,  who 
are  to  he  ^nvcn  j^rcatcr  liberties  as  fast  as  they  show 
themselves  worthy  of  them.  In  pursuance  of  this  idea, 
extensive  public  works  have  been  undertaken,  the  laws 
have  been  revised,  an  efficient  administration  has  been 
introduced,  and  capable  officials  of  both  American  and 
Filipino  oripin  are  lahorinj?  un  clfiahly  for  the  ^'ood  of  the 
lands  committed  to  their  charge.  The  most  notable 
feature  of  the  system  is  tl  extraordinary  attention  i)aid  to 
the  schools.  Hundreds  of  ichers  have  come  over  from 
the  United  States,  and  they  h;ive  helped  to  train  a  still 
larger  number  of  native  ones.  With  such  energy  has  the 
work  b(>en  pushed  that  there  are  now  tnore  than  half  a 
million  children  attending  scliools  of  one  kind  or  another, 
and  it  is  hoped  that  soon  all  those  of  school  age,  except 
among  the  savage  tribes,  will  be  receiving  some  sort  of 
instruction.  Never  hav(>  the  Americans  given  more  strik- 
ing evidence  of  the  value  they  attach  to  popular  education; 
and  whatever  may  be  the  result  <>f  this  first  attempt  to 
impart  modern  western  knowledge  to  the  whole  new  genera- 
tion  of  an  Asiatic  community,  it  will  be  interesting  to  watch 
its  fate. 

One  evidence  of  this  principlo  of  seeking  the  moral  eleva- 
tion of  the  natives  rather  than  the  most  j^rofitable  ex- 
ploitation of  the  islands  appears  in  the  r(>solve  to  forbid 
Chinese  immigration.  Although  the  prejudices  of  the  Amer- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUEfiiTION 


163 


ir.in  labor-uninrid  were  of  iiiHuoncr  here,  tho  decision  ni;i\ 
be  ascritM?!!  chiefly  to  solicitude  for  tlie  Filipinos.  If,  in 
the  midst  of  the  arduous  and  delicate  experiment  of  try- 
ing? to  reron^trurt  their  system  of  society  on  a  foundation 
of  Ameririiii  (ictiioeriitie  uwhh  and  ^rene^al  «>duration,  they 
wore  to  l)c  .  \ posed  to  an  uiirestrieted  eotnpet  ition  of  Chineso 
labor,  the  outeonie  nii^'ht  well  be  disastrous;  for,  like  so 
many  others,  the  pleas- i-e-loving,  indolent  Filipino  is  no 
match  for  the  hard-working,  thrifty  Chinese.  The  new 
dispensation,  whatever  i,.ay  bo  its  ultimate  success,  will 
in  its  narly  days  be  a  hot-house  plant,  needing  careful 
protection. 

With  characteristic  promptness,  the  Americans  began, 
even  before  Lie  end  of  hostilities,  to  associate  the  Filipinos 
in  the  w  rk  of  administration.    The  new  commission  of 

seven,  whicii,  under  the  Rovornor,  was  to  control  the 
islands,  was  ma.lp  to  includ.-  two  native  members.  The 
same  ])ractice  has  been  p  irsued  ev^r  since  :  natives  are  to 
be  found  in  many  of  the  most  '..  norTant  positions,  and  in 
an  even  k -eater  proportion  in  tae  .  'x  rHinate  ones.  There 
arc  Filipino  judges  in  the  Sup-  »  .  -t;  the  provincial 
gove  nors  are   Filipinos,  some  i,  m   fought  under 

Aguinaldo;  and  the  Icrtion  of  nmnieipal  officers  is  i"  . 
hands  of  the  people  themselves,  the  right  to  vote  be  >; 
subject  to  an  education  qualification.  The  next  step  has 
now  been  taken,  that  of  creating  an  ?>lective  assembly, 
with  somewhat  the  same  ,>ower  as  t-..;  lower  chamber  in 
Porto  Kico  or  in  an  English  crown  Ci^I  <n\. 

As  was  to  be  foreseen,  all  this  is  condemned  by  those 
who  hold  either  of  the  other  two  views  of  the  best  way 
to  treat  the  islands.  So  far  it  has  been  carric  d  out  in  the 
fac^  of  many  difficidtios,  rr--;.  !y  by  the  efforts  of  a  very 
few  men,  high  in  authority.  Many  of  their  subordinates, 
who  serve  them  from  a  sense  of  duty,  have  little  belief 
in  the  ultimate  succeh.-i  of  the  experiment.    It  has  to  over- 


104 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


come  American  prejudice  and  selfish  interests,  and  at  the 
same  time,  it  fails  to  satisfy  the  natives,  who,  believing  that 

thoy  arc  competent  to  nianapo  their  own  affairs,  are  not 
content  with  the  promise  that  their  great-prandchildren 
may  perhaps  be  ^ven  the  privileges  denied  to  themselves. 
The  prevalence  of  this  discontent  was  shown  by  the  victory 
of  the  partisans  of  independence  in  the  elections  for  the 
new  assembly.  In  spite  of  all,  American  public  opinion  so 
far  seems  to  support,  if  in  rather  a  blind  way,  the  present 
policy;  but  this  support  is  not  an  assured  quantity,  nor  is 
the  policy  itself  beyond  the  reach  of  cliange.  By  its  novelty 
it  is  in  keeping  with  the  American  scorn  for  precedents,  and 
the  belief  that  the  United  States  can  accomplish  things 
impossible  to  other  countries ;  by  its  high  ideals  it  appeals 
to  the  best  side  of  the  American  character;  but  for  its 
triumph  it  demands  a  long-continued  unselfishness. 

Admirers  of  the  English  and  Initch  colonial  systems 
over'ook  certain  elements  of  the  Philippine  situation  which 
make  the  problem  to  be  solved  unlike  any  that  the  EngUsh 
or  the  Dutch  have  to  deal  with,  and  which  are  chiefly  due  to 
the  historical  development  of  the  inhabitants.  The  Filipinos 
are,  it  is  true,  of  the  same  race  as  the  natives  of  the  Malay 
Peninsula  and  of  Java,  but,  with  the  exception  of  the  Moham- 
medans in  Mindanao  and  Sulu,  who  may  well  be  governed 
by  English  or  Dutch  mi^thods,  they  are  no  longer  on  the 
same  plane  with  their  kinsmen.  It  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  as  the  Philippine  Islands  have  been  governed  for  cen- 
turies by  a  European  power  wliich  converted  its  subjects, 
the  Filipinos  have  been  for  the  same  length  of  time  under 
Christian  influences,  and  that  the  upper  class  have  the  edu- 
cation and  tradition  of  L.itin  civilization,  of  which  they 
believe  themselves  to  })e  the  children.  It  is  easy  enough  to 
laugh  at  this  assumption  as  childish  vanity;  to  point  out 
that  this  same  upper  class  are  not  pur(;  natives  at  all,  but  of 
mixed  blood ;  to  sneer  at  their  culture  as  being  the  mert-st 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


165 


veneer;  and  to  declare  that  they  are  nothing  but  a  very 
small  minority  of  the  population,  separated  from  the  half- 
naked  peasants  by  a  gulf.  Be  all  this  as  it  may,  the  upper 
class  is  a  representative  of  the  people,  and  an  expression  of 
what  they  are  capable  of.  The  greatest  man  that  the  Malay 
race  has  produced,  the  novelist  Kizal,  was  of  almost,  if 
not  of  entirely,  pure  Malay  descent;  Aguinaldo  is  a  full- 
blooded  native.  As  for  the  masses,  they  are  Christians, 
and  even  admitting  that  they  know  little  of  the  exact 
nature  of  their  faith,  the  same  is  true  in  many  countries. 
For  centuries  the  Filipino  peasant  was  under  the  dose  super- 
vision of  the  church,  indeed  was  almost  completely  con- 
trolled by  the  Friars,  and  though  it  is  impossible  to  say 
exactly  how  this  has  affected  his  mentality,  we  may  safely 
assert  that  his  mentality  is  not  the  same  as  that  of  the 
savage  Mohammedan  of  the  peninsula,  who  has  just  come 
under  British  rule,  or  of  the  Javanese  whom  the  Dutch  have 
so  scientifically  exploited,  rather  than  enhghtened,  for  many 
generations.  Moreover,  though  the  claim  of  the  Filipinos 
to  be  regarded  as  a  Latin  people  may  provoke  a  smile,  it 
is  almost  as  well  founded  as  the  same  pretension  on  the 
part  of  the  inhabitants  of  some  of  the  so-called  Latin- 
American  states :  the  proportion  of  white  blood  is  not  so 
much  greater  in  Bolivia  or  Ecuador  than  it  is  in  the  Philip- 
pines, and  the  American  Indian  can  hardly  look  down  on 
the  Malay.  Why,  then,  should  we  admit  the  contention  of 
one  and  deny  that  of  the  other?  We  must  remember,  too, 
that  if  a  p«>ople  cherishes  a  belief  ot  the  sort,  this  is  an 
important  fact  in  itself,  more  important,  often,  than  the 
question  whether  the  belief  is  or  is  not  well  founded. 
Whatever  our  opinion  may  be,  the  educated  Filipinos  are 
imbued  with  the  idea  that  they  arc  Latins  and  that  the 
Americ.ins,  with  their  rougher,  ruder,  if  more  efficient, 
culture,  are  in  a  sonse  barbarians.  And  these  educated 
Filipinos  cannot  be  contemptuously  brushed  aside,  for  they 


166        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWEH 


are  the  natural  leaders  of  the  others.  One  may  at  least  be 
thankful  that  the  natives  of  the  islands,  on  account  of 

their  European  affiliations,  are  not  separated  from  their 
conquerors  by  u  seemingly  impassable  gulf,  as  are,  for 
instance,  the  Annamites  from  the  French.  They  are  also 
unlike  any  Asiatics  that  the  English  have  to  govern,  and 
they  may  perhaps  best  be  compared  to  thoir  distant  kindred 
in  Madagascar,  now  under  the  rule  of  France.  The  Protes- 
tant Malagasy,  who  have  been  sul)ject  to  English  influences, 
maintain  somewhat  ihe  same  attitude  towards  the  French 
that  the  Catholic  FiUpinos,  with  Spanish  culture,  do  towards 
the  Americans,  but  as  Madagascar  was  never  actually  sub- 
ject to  English  rulo  and  its  Christianity  is  recent  and  not 
widespread,  the  parallel  is  incomplete. 

One  consequence  of  the  Filipinos'  Christianity  and  of  their 
quasi-European  character  is  often  overlooked.    Tlie  sug- 
gestion has  been  made  that,  in  return  fo^  some  compen- 
sation, the  islands  might  be  handed  over  to  Japan;  but 
though  this  has  seemed  to  some  persons  an  excellent  way 
for  the  Americans  to  escape  from  an  embarrassing  dilemma, 
in  reality  the  idf  a  is  i)reposterous.    R'^ligious  sentiments 
may  not  play  in  the  political  world  so  great  a  jiart  as  they 
once  did,  but  it  requires  a  stretch  of  the  imagination  to  sup- 
pose that  Christian  America  would  hand  over  some  seven 
niillion  fellow-Christians  against  their  will  to  the  rule  of 
any  non-Christian  nation,  however  enlightened.  What- 
ever malcontents  may  say  in  the  heat  of  passion,  we  may 
take  for  granted  that  if  svu  h  a  proposal  were  seriously  urged, 
the  Filipinos  would  protest  with  frantic  indignation.  It 
t natters  little  that  ttu  v  have  sufficient  Asiatic  sympathies 
to  find  s;.ti-^faction  in  the  triumph  of  the  Japanese  over  the 
Russians,  and  that  they  have  been  encouraged  by  tliis  proof 
that  the  white  race  is  not  invincible.    It  means  nothing  that 
those  who  hope  to  cast  off  American  authority  turn  to  Jaj)an 
as,  in  their  opinion,  their  mot.c  likely  ally ;  for  they  would 


THE  PHIUPPLNE  QUESTION 


167 


welcome  as  eagerly  Germany  or  Mexico,  if  they  could  hope 
for  aid  from  either  of  those  quarters.  In  spite  of  im- 
aginary tios  bt'twi'cn  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  groups  of 
Asiatic  ishuuls,  tlic  hist  thing  the  Fihpinos  dream  of  is  being 
ruled  by  the  Japanese,  whom  they  look  upon  as  inferior  to 
themselves,  as  representing  a  lower  civilization. 

But  aside  from  considerations  of  history  and  religion, 
the  peaceable  transfer  of  the  PhiUppines  to  any  one  without 
the  consent  of  the  inhabitiuits  is  now  barely  conceivable. 
The  peo}jle  have  too  much  national  self-coii-ciousiicss,  and 
they  have  been  treated  too  long  as  intelligent  beings  with 
u  righi  to  take  part  in  shaping  their  own  destinies,  for  them 
to  be  calmly  bartered  off  like  cattle.  The  public  conscience 
in  America  would  never  permit  such  a  transaction,  and  there 
is  no  real  indication  that  the  Filipinos  would  pivfcr  any 
other  foreign  rule.  They  did  not  revolt  against  Spain  for 
th?  purpose  of  coming  under  the  United  States,  and  they  are 
not  hoping  for  liberation  from  the  dominion  of  the  United 
States  in  order  to  belong  to  some  other  power  under  whom 
they  might  easily  fare  worse.  What  the  discontented  ele- 
ments demand  is  liberty  to  manage  their  own  affairs,  and 
the  mere  suggestion  that  their  country  is  regarded  as  salable 
property  is  enough  to  excite  their  legitimate  anger. 

Advocates  ot  Philippine  independence,  whether  Americans 
or  Filipinos,  usually  do  not  propose  the  severance  of  all 
political  connections  between  the  United  States  and  its 
Asiatic  cfilony,  but  they  talk  vaguely  of  some  sort  of  "pro- 
tectorate." This  term  is  so  loosely  used  that  we  are  wont 
to  forget  what  it  implies.  Any  state  which  undertakes  to 
[protect  another  assumes  toward  the  rest  of  the  world  re- 
sponsibihty  for  its  good  behavior,  —  the  mote  complete 
the  protectio.M,  the  more  extensive  the  responsibility,  —  and 
this  responsibility  involvc's  a  duty  to  iiiterfcrc,  if  need  l)e. 
In  Cuba,  and  to  a  minor  degree  in  San  Domingo,  the 
Americans  have  just  had  experience  of  this  truth.    It  is. 


I 


ij 


I. 


168 


THE  UMTEU  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


indeed,  one  of  the  difficulties  which  the  maintenance  of  the 

Monroo  Doctrine  may  force  them  into  in  tlicir  relations 
with  other  Latin-Aincricaii  republics.  If  the  I'liited  States 
is  to  lie  the  guardian  of  the  Fliitippiues,  it  is  bound  to  inter- 
vene in  case  of  disorders  there,  and  to  take  measures  to 
prevent  their  recurrence.  Moreover,  there  is  no  panacea  in 
the  word  "protectorate,"  for  a  depeiulency  may  have  less 
liberty  than  a  colony:  the  "East  Africa  Protectorat  «"  is  a 
benevolent  despotism;  Cape  Colony  enjoys  u  larjjje  measvire 
of  self-government.  Jn  the  end,  the  j)ower  responsible  for 
the  maintenance  of  order  must  determine  the  extent  of  the 
local  privileges.  To  be  sure,  some  declare  that  the  Filipinos 
are  capable  of  orderly  self-government,  and  therefore  will 
make  no  diliicultii-s  for  the  i)rotectint:  )>o\ver;  but  the 
American  peo[)le,  vvitli  the  example  ol  Cul)a  ln'fore  them, 
are  likely  to  be  slow  in  accepting  this  assurance. 

Another  common  suggestion  is  that  the  islands  should  be 
"neutralized."  To  which  we  may  reply,  why  should  they 
be?  Where  is  the  quid  pro  quo  as  far  as  the  powers  are 
concerned?  Of  cours(<  every  weak  state  would  like  to  be 
neutralized,  -  that  is  to  say,  to  have  the  strong  ones 
promise  not  to  touch  it ;  but  only  in  exceptional  cases  have 
the  latter  found  it  worth  while  to  bind  themselves  in  this 
way.  \\  hen  they  have  done  so,  from  nmtual  jealousy,  as 
they  have  for  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  there  is  no  cer- 
tainty that  the  i)r(inus<  will  be  respected  if  there  is  a  strong 
temptation  to  break  it.  Some  one  has  to  be  ready  to  sup- 
port the  guarantee  by  force  of  arms.  But  why  should  the 
Americans  do  this  if  they  retire  from  the  Philippines  them- 
selves? Provided  they  keep  any  naval  station  they  want, 
and  the  priiu-iple  of  efjual  o})i)ortunity  for  all  is  })reser\ed, 
why  should  tln'V  care  if  Kngland  or  (iermany  should  step 
in?  In  point  of  fact,  mariy  of  them  feel  tt)-day  that,  if 
they  can  only  get  saf**ly  and  honorably  out  of  the  tangle 
in  which  they  are  involved,  the  islands,  as  far  as  they  are 
concerned,  may  go  to  the  devil. 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


169 


It  is  still  too  early  to  sum  up  the  results  of  American 
rule  in  the  last  eight  years.  In  many  ways  it  has  been  a 
disappointment,  for  up  tu  the  j)rcsent  time  it  has  brought 
neither  content  nor  general  prosperity,  Serious  mistakes 
have  been  made  in  details.  Taxation  is  heavy,  and  there 
is  room  for  criticism  about  the  way  in  which  some  of  the 
money  has  Ix-en  spent.  It  seems,  too,  as  if  a  common  mis- 
take in  French  colonization  had  been  repeated  in  ereatinjj; 
an  unnecessarily  elaborate  administrative  machine.  Tlic 
salaries  paid  to  the  American  otiieials  appear  unwarrant- 
ably high  to  the  natives,  who  flatter  themselves  that  they 
could  do  as  well  for  much  lower  pay.  Unfortunately,  this 
grievance  is  unavoidable:  if  \v<'  admit  that  Americans  ai( 
needed  at  all,  we  must  also  admit  that  \vh:it  is  wanted 
is  the  l)est,  and  that  these  can  only  be  obtained  by  a  re- 
nmneration  which  shall  be  some  sort  of  recompense  for  the 
sacrifices  demanded  by  a  life  in  the  distant  tropics.  Among 
those  not  in  sympathy  with  the  policy  of  the  government 
there  has  been  much  criticism  in  regard  to  public  educa- 
tion, which,  it  is  declared,  will  serve  oi.Iy  to  make  the 
natives  lazier  than  they  are  now,  while  on  the  other 
hand  the  violent  partisans  of  the  FiUpino  condemn  as 
both  a  tyranny  and  an  absurdity  the  use  of  English  as  a 
medium  of  instruction  in  the  schools.  The  reply  to  the 
first  charge  is  that  care  is  taken  to  make  the  system  of 
popular  I'ducation  ;is  practical  as  possible;  to  the  second, 
that  there  is  no  one  native  Philipi)ine  tongue,  but  niany 
widely  differing  dialects,  and  that  it  is  for  the  advantage 
of  the  people  to  have  the  mastery  of  one  of  the  great  civil- 
ized languages.  As  l)etween  English  and  Spanish,  it  is 
pointed  out  that,  in  the  long  centuries  of  Spanish  posses- 
sion, the  speech  of  the  ruling  race  was  never  taught  to  the 
people.  Previous  to  the  nineteenth  century,  immigration 
from  the  mother  country  was  discouraged ;  and  until  the 
end  of  Spanish  domination,  the  all-powerful  Friars  preferred 


170       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


that  the  villagers  under  their  charge  should  know  nothing 
but  their  own  dialect,  embelliBhed,  perhaps,  by  a  few  words 
of  Latin.    The  result  is  that  at  the  present  day  only  some 

ten  per  cent  of  the  whole  population  know  Spanish,  so  that 
there  is  no  harshness  in  displacing  it  from  its  position  of 
authority  and  replacing  it  by  English,  which  will  be  a 
more  valuable  means  of  communication  with  the  outside 
world.  The  Spanish  language  in  these  regions  is  doomed 
to  speedy  extinction. 

Criticise  as  one  may  the  details  of  the  present  policy,  no 
impartial  observer  will  deny  that  since  ISOS  the  Atncricans 
have  accompUshed  a  great  deal  in  their  task  of  transforming 
the  islands.  Improved  means  of  communication,  public 
works  of  all  kinds,  modern  sanitation,  justice,  public  security, 
honest  and  efficient  government,  pojMilar  jiarticipation  in 
the  government,  and  a  system  of  general  educatiiju  form  a 
record  to  be  proud  of.  In  all  this,  good  fortune  has  counted 
for  but  Uttle,  for  in  the  last  decade  the  Philippines  have  been 
sorely  tried:  they  have  suffered  from  war  and  from  pesti- 
lence; from  a  plague  which  carried  off  great  numbers  of 
the  buffalo,  almost  the  sole  source  of  wealth  of  nuuiy  of  the 
peasants ;  from  the  loss  of  the  Spanish  market ;  from  the 
low  price  of  sugar ;  and  from  the  failure  of  the  native  tobacco 
to  become  popular  in  the  United  States.  All  these,  and 
other  evils,  have  borne  hardly  on  the  people.  American 
capital  has  not  come  in  in  the  way  that  was  expected,  partly 
on  accoimt  of  the  legislation  passetl  to  ])rotect  the  natives 
against  exploitation,  but  more  particularly  because  ])eople 
have  found  it  safer  and  more  profitable  to  invcEt  their  money 
nearer  home. 

As  in  all  times  of  distress,  there  have  been  bitter  com- 
plaints against  the  government,  though  lu  fair-minded 
person  would  question  the  di'votion  to  duty  that  has 
characterized  its  chief  members.  There  is  a  clamor  for 
reUef  measures  of  one  kind  or  another.    Capitalists  recom- 


THE  PHILIPPINE  QUESTION 


171 


mend  the  admission  of  Chinese  hibor;  but  though  it  might 
be  good  for  the  PhiUppines,  it  wouhl  very  possil)ly  spell  ruin 
for  the  Filipinos.  What  Secretary  Taft  has  demanded  with 
unwearied  persistence  is  that  the  insular  exports  should  be 
admitted  into  the  United  States  free  of  duty,  —  a  privilege 
which  would  be  most  advantageous  to  the  islands,  and 
might  be  profitublc  to  the  Union  itself.  The  concession 
appeals  to  tlie  sense  of  justice  and  to  the  generous  in- 
stincts of  Americans,  and  it  has  been  urged  upon  them 
as  their  sacred  duty  to  the  weak  people  for  whose  des- 
tinies they  have  made  themselves  responsible,  and  whom 
they  have  deprived  of  their  former  markets  without  open- 
ing new  ones  to  them.  Sliall  it  he  said  that  the  PhiUp- 
pines are  in  any  way  worse  off  now  than  tliey  were  under 
Spain? 

All  this  cannot  be  gainsaid,  but  there  are  other  circum- 
stances to  be  considered.  Such  concessions  cannot  long 
be  one-suled,  but  must  mean  reciprority,  and  th(,"  closer 
the  ties  between  any  country  and  its  clients,  and  the 
greater  the  number  of  interests  in  e.ich  dependent  ujjou 
the  other,  the  less  will  be  the  chance  of  their  being  sepa- 
rated in  tlie  future.  Those  who  desire  Philippine  indepen- 
dence shv«uld  r(>alize  that  if  the  islands  are  enriched  by 
American  capital,  and  l)ecome  a  favorite  field  of  Atnerican 
trade,  the  prospect  of  their  ever  shifting  for  themselves  will 
become  more  remote.  But  there  is  pn  objection  of  another 
nature  which  must  be  taken  into  account.  Fn  the  Philip- 
pines the  Am(>ricans  havi;  given  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
practical  pro.)f  th  tt  they  adhen'  to  the  principle  of  the 
"open  door,"  which  th(^y  are  .so  eager  to  enforce  vj)ou  others. 
IIow  can  they  continue  to  ini-ist  on  it  us  fair  to  all,  ii  they 
do  not  observe  it  themselves?  Here  we  return  to  irter- 
national  politics. 


CHAPTER  IX 


ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS 

IF  wc  would  understand  the  .'ittitiKle  of  the  American 
people  after  the  war  of  1898,  we  mu«t  take  into  ac- 
count the  forces  which,  unknown  to  them,  had  been  j^raiiu- 
ftUy  making  them  ready  for  a  new  departure.  The  policy 
which  they  then  adopted  wan  accidental  in  many  of  its 
details;  it  was  as  often  dominated  by  events  as  itself 
donunatin^'  them;  ]nit  it  was  not  what  it  had  been  before, 
for  fresh  elements  had  entered  into  it.  If,  let  us  say, 
President  Grant  had  intervened  in  the  Cuban  insurrection 
of  1868-1878,  and  had  brought  on  a  war  with  Spain,  and 
if  the  military  succciies  tjf  the  United  States  had  been 
decisive  as  they  were  later,  the  after  effects  would 
not  havt  been  the  same.  Li  1898  the  country,  though 
unconscious  of  the  change  that  had  Ijeen  wrought  in  it, 
was  prepared  to  meet  the  situation  with  a  spirit  quite 
uidike  that  which  would  have  animated  it  twenty  years 
earlier.    This  change  v.  :t3  (bio  to  several  causes. 

One  reason  why  th'^  puijii*-  Aas  ready  just  then  to  run 
after  strange  gods  was  that  it  did  not  hai)i)en  to  be  pre- 
occupied with  other  things.  Many  of  the  old  issues  that 
had  aroused  it  in  years  past  had  now  lost  their  burning 
character ;  in  some  cases  had  altogether  ceased  to  be  inter- 
esting;. During  the  larger  part  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  negro  question  in  the  South  had  been  in  one  form  or 
another  a  brand  of  discord  between  two  sections  of  the 

173 


ECONOMIC  00N8IDERATION8  173 

country.  The  prolonKcd  struggle  of  the  Civil  War  left 
bitter  memoriea,  and  it  had  been  followed  by  the  period  of 
Reconstruction,  and  in  some  states  by  nrgro  rule,  which  had 
caused  savage  ill  feeling  among  the  whites.  Not  till  a  gen- 
eration after  the  war  did  the  men  on  either  side  of  Mason 
and  Dixon's  line  accept  a  settlement  tolerably  satisfactory  to 
both  parties.  Then,  on  the  one  hand,  davcry  had  disap- 
peared forever,  and  all  thought  of  secession  had  been  aban- 
doned; on  the  other,  the  North,  after  some  hesitation,  had 
accepted  the  fact  that  the  whites  of  the  South  could  not, 
and  would  not,  allow  themselves  to  be  ruled  })y  the  Macks, 
and  had  acquiesced,  with  but  few  murmurs  of  dissent,  in 
the  virtual  disfranchisement  of  the  colored  population  in 
one  state  after  another.  The  Spanish  War  gave  an  oppor- 
tunity to  former  Confederates  to  serve  again  in  the  army  of 
their  country,  and  thus  to  set  the  seal  upon  the  reconcilia- 
tion. Proudly  as  the  Southerners  cherished  the  memorica 
of  their  former  glories,  and  suspicious  as  they  were  of 
ever3^hing  that  suggested  interference  in  the  race  question, 
they  were  willing  to  let  bygones  be  bygones,  all  the  more 
as  the  rapid  increase  of  their  manufactures  and  the  pros- 
perity of  their  ports  were  creating  a  new  South,  which  looked 
to  the  future  and  not  solely  to  the  past.  In  the  North  the 
Civil  War  was  becoming  a  memory  almost  as  venerable  as 
that  of  the  Revolution. 

Another  smaller  trouble  was  also  ending.  The  hard 
times  and  the  financial  crisis  of  1S93,  with  their  inevi- 
table suffering,  had  produced  much  di.scoii*ent,  which  in 
some  parts  of  the  country  had  taken  the  form  of  sectional 
antagonism.  The  farmers  of  the  Middle  West,  who,  year 
after  year,  had  seen  the  value  of  their  crops  decrease  and 
their  mortgages  iiicrease  in  their  despair  attril)Ut<'d  their 
misfortune  to  the  lack  of  sufficient  currency,  and  talked  of 
a  conspiracy  on  the  part  of  Kastcrn  capitalists.  The  cur- 
rency question  became,  indeed,  the  main  issue  of  the  presi- 


174        THE  LMTED  STATES  AS  A  WOP'.D  POW  m 

dential  rkction  of  1S96.    But  soon  afterwards  it  lost  its 

acuto  inttn  st.  Tlu  ivtant  gn.wth  of  the  output  of  gold 
in8oulh  Africa  i)Ut  ;ui  .  ad  to  the  fear  f  i  (h  i  icnry  in  the 
circulating  mt'diui..,  and  m  th"  We.st  a  wrrics  of  p.od  y^ars, 
which  enabled  the  farmers  to  pay  olT  their  mortgages^ 
removed  their  grievances. 

Even  th.  tariff  issue,  although  it  still  divided,  had  ceased 
to  apitatc  public  opinion;  for  .ifter  the  passage  of  the 
Dingloy  Hili,  m  1897,  foch  as  well  as  friends  of  protection 
were  disposed  to  leave  matters  Jone.  Wi  liin  a  few  ye:us 
the  country  had  seen  three  great  tariff  measures  voted  by 
Congress ;  now  the  general  cry  was  for  stability  in  order  that 
business  in'  rests  might  have  something  on  which  to  base 
their  calcuhitions.  For  the  whil.-  people  had  had  enough  of 
uncertainty.  With  the  return  of  good  ;imes,  the  relations 
between  labor  and  capital  had  improved;  and  the  question 
of  trusts  had  not  yet  come  to  the  fore.  All  told,  inte  rnal 
affairs,  however  important,  were  not  at  that  moment  either 
new  or  ve  ry  exciting,  so  the  public  was  ready  to  turn  its 
attent  ion  elsewhere. 

The  St  )ry  of  the  recent  marvellous  prosperity  ^f  the 
United  States  has  been  told  repeatedly,  with  fresh  addi- 
tions as  the  record  of  each  year's  success  surpassed  that 
of  the  previous  one.  Never,  in  the  history  of  the  world, 
has  such  a  spectacle  »ieen  witnessed  on  so  tremendous  a  scale. 
Pnends  and  rivals  were  alike  impresse,!,  and  among  Ameri- 
cans themselves  it  awakened  a  sentiment  often  little  short 
of  intoxication.  The  pessimist  might  shake  his  head  over 
the  many  evils  which  such  circumstances  created;  the 
economist  might  prove  that  a  peri.  1  of  exaggerated  pros- 
perity ,„,,st  he  foHowed  by  a  reaction;  l)u-.  the  man  in  the 
6t-.  (  .  did  not  f(  ('l  called  upon  to  ](;ok  so  far  ah.  id.  When 
he  knew  that  he  was  making  money,  that  he  was  sucnsiful 
in  his  enterprises,  he  saw  no  reason  why  he  should  not  suc- 
ceed still  better  in  the  future.   Americans  had  long  been 


ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS 


175 


accustomed  to  produini  tluvt  theirs  was  the  "greatest  •  oi.n- 
try  on  earth/'  and  after  1898  it  teemed  as  if  facts  were 
coming  to  their  aid  in  a  way  that  must  convince  all  doubt- 
ers. Throuj^hout  the  nineteenth  century  the  United  States 
furnished  to  Europe  several  of  the  staples  necessary  to  the 
support  of  mankind  and  to  the  development  of  modern 
industry.  In  the  export  of  wheat  and  petroleum  its 
sole  rival  was  Russia;  in  that  of  cotton  it  had  been 
supreme  for  many  generations;  in  that  of  sheep  and  wool 
it  came  next  to  Australia,  in  the  number  of  its  cattle 
it  was  ahead  even  of  .\r;_'entina.  Of  late  it  has  taken  the 
It  jid  in  one  after  another  of  the  chief  industrial  commodi- 
ties :  in  the  production  of  both  iron  and  coal  it  has  surpassed 
Great  Britain,  which  so  long  led  in  those  staples  that  her 
primacy  seemed  unassailable ;  in  copper  the  American  out- 
put is  more  than  a  half  of  the  world's  supply.  Hut  it  is  not 
only  in  raw  materials  that  the  country  has  niadc  such 
startling  progress;  its  manufactures  have  developed  with 
even  more  wonderful  rapidity :  the  American  silk  industry 
is  second  to  none  but  the  French;  the  cotton  is  inferior 
to  that  of  Great  Britain  only;  the  iron  and  steel  leads  the 
world.  Between  IS'.Ki  and  190(»  American  >  ports  almost 
doubled  in  value,  passing  in  1001  those  of  Eiiudand,  which, 
since  the  creation  of  modem  mechanical  industry,  had  been 
the  first  exporting  nation  on  the  globe.  The  huge  immigra- 
tion, which  has  risen  to  over  a  million  a  year,  b  is  been  in- 
sufficient to  supply  the  demand  for  labor;  and  the  railway 
system,  thou^'h  lareer  than  that  of  all  Eurf)|)<\  is  inadequate 
to  the  needs  of  transportation.  All  thi.-^  (<iniributed  to  a 
prosperity  which  was  not  confined  to  one  part  of  Ihe  land, 
or  to  one  class  of  the  community.  Both  capitalists  and 
laborers  shared  in  the  dispensation.  The  Americans  would, 
in  truth,  be  more  tli  i  human  if  they  had  not  at  times  lost 
their  hciids  in  the  midst  of  their  unparalleled  achievements. 
In  1898  this  new  era  had  only  just  begun,  but  it  had 


176         THE  UNITED  STATE8  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


got  enough  of  a  start  for  the  people,  with  their  inborn 
optimism,  to  be  full  of  confidrnce  in  their  powers.  What 
in  ordinary  times  might  have  seemed  pnidence  now 
passed  for  cowardice;  any  arguments  based  on  caution 
were  out  of  keeping  with  the  popular  temper;  hostile 
criticism  from  a  foreign  source  was  attributed  to  jealousy 
or  fear,  and  was  thus  more  flattering  than  praise.  The 
whole  country  was  biirsting  with  a  consciousness  of 
strenj;th.  It  could,  then,  scarcely  be  expected  to  give 
up  its  hold  on  the  PhiUppines,  which  seemed  to  olTer  a 
new  field  for  enterprise,  and  a  base  for  the  expansion  of 
trade  in  the  Far  East.  America  was  now  in  a  position  to 
take  up  her  share  of  "the  white  man's  burden,"  with  all  its 
incidental  advantages. 

The  economic  progress  of  the  United  States  in  the  last 
few  years  has  inevitably  influenced  the  national  poUcy  in 
various  ways,  and  will  continue  to  do  so.  Until  a  short 
time  ago  the  country  belonged  to  the  debtor  rather  than  to 
the  creditor  class  of  states.  It  was  well  off,  but  it  had  no 
investments  of  conseo.uence  beyond  its  borders,  and  it  owed 
the  development  of  its  resources  in  part  to  foreign  caintal. 
To-day  the  situation  is  radically  different :  the  Americans 
have  bought  back  much  of  their  paper  formerly  held  abroad, 
and,  though  they  are  continually  borrowing  afresh  in  order 
to  carry  out  th(>  cmmtless  undctakings  in  which  they  are 
engaged,  they  j-re  no  longer  in  the  same  situation  as  before. 
There  is  a  distinction  between  the  poor  man  who  has  to 
ask  for  a  loan  from  a  well-to-do  neighbor  in  order  to  set  his 
business  going,  and  the  wealthy  financier  who  invites  others 
to  take  shares  in  a  profitaljle  enterprise;  and  the  United 
States  is  now  in  the  position  of  tlie  latter.  It  still  needs 
foreign  capital ;  but  the  Americans  are  themselves  the  great- 
est capitalists  in  the  workJ,  and  though  as  yet  tiicy  find 
uncertain  ventures  at  a  distance  —  as  in  the  Phihppines  — 
less  attractive  than  investments  at  home,  where  they  do 


ECOiNOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS 


177 


see  an  alluring  prospect,— as  in  Cuba  and  Mexico,— they  are 
not  backward  in  risking  their  money.  Of  late,  too,  they 
have  begun  to  hold  the  bonds  of  foreign  governments. 
They  may,  therefore,  now  be  regarded  as  belonging,  and 
likely  to  belong  more  and  more,  to  the  class  of  creditor, 
rather  than  of  debtor,  nations,  and  their  sympathy  will  go, 
not  with  the  repudiation  of  debts,  but  with  the  payment  of 
them.  In  any  case  where  they  themselves  have  large  sums 
at  stake,  they  will  never  permit  their  government  tc  re- 
main indifferent;  witness  the  present  occupation  of  Cuba. 
Though  the  United  States  has  not  been  long  enough  in 
this  new  position  to  have  modified  profoundly  its  foreign 
policy,  there  has  been  a  change:  a  generation  or  two 
ago  it  might  have  hailed  the  Drago  doctrine  with  enthu- 
siasm,—  ten  of  it  states  have  in  the  past  repudiated 
their  bonds,  —  now  it  has  supported  at  The  Hague  only  a 
much  softened  version,  and  it  has  aided  San  Domingo  to 
satisfy  her  creditors,  not  to  defy  them.  Throughout  his- 
tory the  world  has  often  seen  communities  rent  by  the  strife 
between  rich  and  poor;  it  may  yet  see  the  community  of 
nations  divided  into  creditor  and  debtor  .itates,  arrayed 
against  each  other  by  qu(!Stions  of  financial  interest  potent 
enough  to  overcome  ties  of  geography  or  of  nationality. 

Another  element  affecting  the  international  relations  of 
the  United  States  is  the  transformation  which  is  taking 
place  in  its  export  trade.  Greatly  as  its  exports  of  raw 
materials  have  iucreased,  those  of  manufactured  goods 
have  grown  faster  still.  In  1880  they  formed  but  twelve 
and  one-half  per  cent  of  the  total,  in  1896  they  were 
twenty-six  and  one-half  per  cent,  in  1906  thirty- four 
and  one-half  per  cent,  and  the  future  appears  to  belong  to 
them.  With  the  growth  of  the  population  at  home,  the  sup- 
ply of  wheat  for  exportation  must  diminish,  and  may  soon 
disappear  altogether.  The  development  of  an  immense  cot- 
ton industry  which  makes  an  increasing  home  demand  on 


178 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  crop  leaves  less  and  less  for  foreign  countries,  several 
of  which  are  to-day  making  strenuous  efforts  to  find  an 
independent  source  of  supply  in  their  own  colonies.  On 
the  other  hand,  South  America,  Africa,  and  Asia  produce 
sufficient  food  for  their  own  wants  and  are  rich  in  metals, 
and  in  raw  niatcrials  —  Argentine  wheat,  Indian  and  Egyp- 
tian cotton,  and  Burmese  petroleum.  It  is  obvious  that  ex- 
ports to  such  regions  must  consist  chiefly  of  manufactured 
artieles. 

The  political  consequences  of  this  change  are  already 
felt.  In  the  days  when  the  United  Stat(>s  sent  abroad 
nothing  but  the  great  staples  which  all  the  world  needed, 
when  its  rivals  were  mo.stly  backward  states,  and  it  had 
little  to  fear  from  hostile  tariffs,  it  could  tax  as  it  pleased  the 
imports  from  foreign  countries  without  much  danger  of 
retaliation.  Now  it  finds  itself  competing  on  equal  terms 
with  the  highly  developed  industries  of  England,  Germany, 
France,  and  other  manufacturing  countries,  —  and  every 
civilized  country  to-day  aspires  to  be  a  manufacturing 
one.  Each  of  these  countries  pushes  its  trade  by  every 
means  in  its  power,  and  most  of  them  protect  their  indus- 
tries by  high  duties  wherever  they  are  able  to  impose 
them. 

In  course  of  time  it  dawned  on  the  minds  of  Americans 
that  they  could  no  longer  afford  to  look  on  indifferently  at 
the  legislation  or  the  political  activity  of  their  neighbors. 
Merchants  and  statesmen,  seeking  for  new  markets,  realized 
that  within  a  few  years  the  greater  part  of  Africa  had  been 
partitioned  among  the  European  powers ;  that  much  of  Asia 
had  undergone  the  same  fate ;  and  that  the  integrity  of  the 
vast  Chinese  Empire  was  menaced.  This  scramble  for  ter- 
ritory had  been  precipitate  d  by  economic  reasons.  Every 
power  feared  that,  unless  it  acted  at  once,  it  might  be  antici- 
pated by  a  rival ;  and  where  there  was  no  agreement  before- 
hand, ail  but  Great  Britain  protected  their  own  commerce 


ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIC* 


179 


in  their  new  acquisitions  by  duties  disori  a  iting  against 
foreign  goods.  Even  England,  under  the  ^>  ress  of  compe- 
tition, might  follow  the  general  example:  mutterings  were 
beginning  to  be  heard  of  the  advantage  of  an  imperial 
ZoUvercin.'  America  was  thus  confronted  with  the  pros- 
pect of  being  cut  off  from  the  markets  which  she  would  soon 
need  for  her  rapidly  growing  industries.  Already  she  was 
beginning  to  suffer  from  the  change.  She  had  just  had,  for 
instance,  in  Madagascar,  an  object-lesson,  on  a  small  scale, 
of  what  might  be  repeated  elsewhere  with  more  serious 
results.  In  ISOfi,  when  the  island  wa^  annexed  by  France, 
American  exports  to  it  amounted  to  nearly  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars;  in  1899  they  had  sunk  to  eleven  hun- 
dred and  thirty-four  dollars.  It  was  useless  to  complain, 
for  the  French,  in  imposing  a  protective  tariff,  had  acted 
strictly  within  their  legal  rights  as  owners  of  the  place ; 
but  the  incident,  though  too  small  to  attract  much  atten- 
tion, served  as  a  warning  in  Washington,  where  it  was 
not  forgotten. 

When  American  statesmen  set  themselves  to  face  the 
situation,  they  perceived  that  the  policy  of  aiding  and  pro- 
tecting the  national  exports  must  be  adapted  to  circum- 
stances. In  dealing  with  the  European  powers  and  their 
colonies,  no  originality  was  required:  the  United  States 
was  meeting  equals  and,  in  most  cases,  rivals.  There  was 
room  for  a  mighty  development  of  trade,  but  tlie  government 
could  do  little  to  further  it  except  by  insisting  on  fair  treat- 
ment, by  improving  its  consular  service,  and  lastly,  by  con- 
cluding profitable  commercial  treaties,  —  a  matter  in  which 
it  was  less  hampered  by  the  demands  of  foreign  countries 
than  it  was  by  the  unreasonableness  of  the  ultra-protection- 
ists at  home.  Since  the  larger  half  of  Asia,  almost  all  of 
Africa,  and  the  whole  of  Australia  were  in  the  hands  of 

'  First  definitely  outlined  by  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain  in  a  speech 
delivered  June  8,  1896. 


180         THE  UMTEU  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


European  peoples,  a  i^ood  part  of  the  world  was  accounted 
for.  There  remained,  liowovor,  two  -opjions  where  the 
Americans  believed  they  saw  splendid  possibilities  for  the 
future.  But  to  make  the  most  of  those  possibiUties  they 
must  take  decided  action. 

In  the  rej)ubli(  s  of  Latin  America  there  was  no  highly 
developed  native  industry  to  be  feared  as  a  rival.  There 
was  nothing  l)Ut  the  competition  of  Europe,  which  had  too 
long  had  the  field  to  itself,  and  the  Americans  were  con- 
vinced that  they  could  meet  this  competition  victoriously 
if  only  they  made  the  best  of  their  natural  advantages. 
A  first  step  was  to  draw  closer  to  these  fellow-republicans 
to  the  south,  for  the  benefit  of  all  concerned.  This  led  lo 
the  ))olioy  known  as  Pan- Americanism,  which  wc  shall  take 
up  later. 

The  other  tempting  field  for  American  enterprise  was  in 
the  Far  East,  where  hundreds  of  millions  of  human  beings 
were  just  waking  up,  at  the  rude  contact  of  the  outside 
world,  to  the  advantages  of  dealing  with  and  imitating 
the  hated  foreigner.  Here,  indeed,  were  magnificent  op- 
portunities. Ardent  imaginations  pictured  the  countless 
population  of  the  Middle  Kingdom  lighted  by  American 
petroleum,  working  with  Americnn  tools,  dressed  in  Ameri- 
can cottons.  The  competition  of  Japan  and  the  new 
activity  of  the  Cliinese  themselves  had  not  yet  come  to 
mar  these  fair  visions.  Unfortunately,  even  as  it  was,  they 
were  already  threatened  with  destruction. 

Ever  since  the  war  with  Japan,  China  had  seemed  on  the 
point  of  breaking  up,  and  in  danger  of  partition  among 
foreign  powers,  who  would  probably  introduce  preferential 
tariffs  for  their  own  manufactures,  and  then  —  good-by  to 
the  dreams  of  American  trade.  'ihe  peril  appeared  ex- 
treme, and  difficult  to  meet.  Single-handed,  the  United 
States  could  not  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  against  the  rest  of  the  world,  especially  if  that 


ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATION  ri 


181 


empire  insisted  on  going  to  pieces  of  itself.    It  might,  to 
be  sure,  take  part  in  the  general  scramble  and  claim  a 
sphere  of  influence  of  its  own  ;  but  it  had  come  into  the 
field  rather  lute  to  get  a  good  share,  and  public  opinion  at 
home  would  never  tolerate  such  a  proceeding.   The  Ameri- 
cans' only  other  course  was  to  take  up  and  echo  the  newlv 
invented  British  cry  of  the  "open  door."    On  the  face  U 
it,  there  was  something  rather  ludicrous  in  the  spectacle 
of  the  nation  which  had  just  voted  the  Dingley  Bill  waxing 
so  enthusiastic  over  the  justice  of  equal  commercial  oppor- 
tunities for  all.    This  attitude  might  be  natural  enough  in 
Great  Britain,  which  for  half  a  century  had  been  the  free- 
trade  power  of  the  world,  and  could  well  assert  that  she 
had  consistently  stood  for  the  "open  door"  policy;  it  was 
hard  to  see  exactly  how  the  Americans  had  done  so,  except 
in  forcing  the  door  open  in  Japan.    But  nations  are  guided 
in  such  matters  not  by  logic,  but  by  their  interests.  When 
the  English,  with  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  value  of 
American  aid  in  the  Far  East,  proclaimed  that  the  two 
peoples  had  always  been  the  defenders  of  the  "open  door," 
the  latter  cheerfully  assented.    It  mattered  not  that  the 
door  which  they  wished  to  keep  open  was  that  of  some- 
body else,  not  their  own,  and  that,  as  in  the  case  of  most 
tariff  doors,  it  was  to  open  but  one  way.    They  did  not 
stop  for  abstract  considc-ations.    Unless  they  were  pre- 
pared to  see  many  of  the  possible  outlets  for  their  trade 
closed  against  them  at  short  notice,  it  behoved  them  to 
take  a  firm  stand.    Accordingly  they  fell  into  line  with 
Great  Britain  and  demanded  the  "open  door"  of  equal 
chances  for  all,  whatever  territorial  rearrangements  might 
take  place. 

The  first  application  of  this  principle  came  in  a  way  that 
the  Americans  had  not  at  all  expected.  When  they  had 
embraced  the  doctrine,  they  had  had  no  thought  that  it 
might  apply  to  them,  and  by  the  time  that  they  had 


182        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


acquired  colonies  as  a  result  of  the  Spanish  War,  they  had 
oorninitted  themselves  to  it.  How  would  they  act  now 
that  the  shoe  was  on  their  own  foot?  In  Porto  Wwo  and 
Hawaii,  in  spite  of  some  grumbling  on  the  part  of  their 
EngUsh  friends,  they  ;  lade  no  pretence  of  observing  the 
maxim.  But  there  the  situation  was  simple.  In  the  Philip- 
I)ines  it  was  more  complicated.  How  could  the  United 
States  proclaim  the  principle  of  the  "open  door"  in  the  Far 
East,  maintaining  that  Russia  should  not  impose  discrimi- 
nating duties  on  American  wares  in  Manchuria,  or  Germany 
ir  ■  "  antung,  if  at  the  same  time  it  penalized  European 
is  in  territories  under  its  control?  That  it  could  not 
was  too  evident  to  bo  well  gainsaid;  and  the  tn^aty  of 
peace  with  Spain,  by  providit  that  Spanish  goods  should 
for  ten  years  be  admitted  on  terms  of  equality  with  Ameri- 
can, has  insure''  "  open  door  "  for  that  time.  But  to- 
day Secretary  xait  and  other  friends  of  the  Filipinos  are 
anxious  for  free  trade  between  the  islands  and  the  republic, 
—  free  trade  which  can  only  mean  the  application  of  the 
American  tariff  to  the  Philippines.  Heneficial,  almost 
necessary,  as  this  might  be,  it  would  seriously  weaken  the 
moral  authority  of  the  American  attitude.  It  is  all 
very  well  to  explain  that  the  Phi''  '-^^^  and  China  are 
two  very  different  places,  and  th  present  owners 

of  the  Philippines  have  inherited  ik  .r-  Spaniards  the 
right  to  make  what  tariffs  they  pii.asj:  such  distinctions 
are  seldom  convincing  to  other  nations.  The  Philippines 
were  won  by  the  sword,  as  Manchuria  was  won  and  lost. 
The  sacrifices  which  they  cost  were  not  one  tithe  of  those 
which  Japan  made  for  Korea  and  Southern  Manchuria. 
The  moral  position  is  not  very  different,  except  that  the 
United  States  will  soon  be  unhampered  by  treaty  stipula- 
tions or  promises  to  outsiders.  Though  no  other  country 
is  in  a  position  to  oppose  the  taking  of  the  Philippines  into 
the  American  customs  union,  the  act  will  be  resented, 


ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS 


183 


and  uiiiy  sorve  some  others  as  a  precedent.  At  any  rate, 
it  will  be  iiuoted  to  dhow  the  hoUowness  of  Yankee  pro- 
fessions when  they  clash  with  Yankee  interests.  And  yet 
the  advantage  to  seven  million  Filipinos  appears  so  great 
that  one  may  well  hesitate  before  coming  to  any  conclusion. 

To-day  the  "open  door"  idea  is  no  longer  confined  to 
Asia,  since  it  has  been  accepted  at  Algeciras  as  one  of  the 
conditions  of  Morocco.  True,  it  i§  not  applicable  every- 
where. The  United  States,  for  instance,  will  take  good 
care  that  it  never  penetrates  to  the  western  hen\isphere, 
where  it  might  interfere  with  Pan-Anu  ricanisni.  Still,  it 
is,  within  the  [geographical  limits  to  which  it  applies,  one  of 
the  cardinal  principles  of  American  policy.  Its  maintenance 
involves  trouble  and  responsibilities;  but,  with  the  ex- 
pansion of  the  national  trade  and  the  keen  commercial 
rivalry  which  this  brings,  such  trouble  and  responsibilities 
are  unav  idable :  they  are  part  of  the  price  which  the 
country  h.  i  to  pay  for  its  new  greatness. 


CllAI^EU  X 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  FRANCE 

IN  any  review  of  the  relations  lu^tw.  "u  the  United 
States  and  tlie  powers  of  continental  Europe,  it  ia 
but  natural  to  begin  with  France,  the  earliest  friend  of  the 
republic.  On  two  occasions  in  American  history  the  action 
of  the  French  government  has  been  of  so  niou.entous 
(•  msequence  that  one  can  hardly  conceive  what  the  destiny 
of  the  Union  would  have  been  if  that  action  had  been 
different.  Without  French  aid,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether 
the  revolted  thirteen  colonies  could  have  achieved  their  in- 
dependence when  they  did.  Without  the  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase, the  movement  of  Western  expansion  would  have 
produced  other  results.  Had  France  held  Louisiana  long 
enough  to  plant  there  a  considerable  French  population, 
two  rival  nationalities  might  be  struggling  to-day  for  su- 
premacy in  the  Southwest.  Had  she  lost  the  territory 
to  England,  and  had  England  joined  it  to  her  Canadian 
possessions,  what  woidd  have  been  the  future  of  the 
United  States? 

French  and  American  writers  often  speak  in  somewhat 
different  tones  when  describing  the  aid  granted  by  the 
government  of  Louis  XVI  to  the  insurgent  English  colonies. 
The  former  point  out  the  immense  service  rendered  by 
France  to  the  American  cause,  and  are  inclined  to  talk  of  the 
whole  transaction  as  if  king  and  nation  alike  had  been  moved 
by  a  spirit  of  pure  generosity.    American  historians,  on  their 

184 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AMD  FRAMCE 


185 


side,  dwell  on  the  desire  of  the  French  to  avenge  their  late 
humiliations,  and  attribute  their  intervention,  not  to  love 
of  Anicriciin  freedom,  but  to  hatred  of  EiiKland,  a  sentl- 
nient  for  which  one  nec.l  owe  them  no  particular  th  nks. 
Hut  tlie  masses  in  tiie  United  States,  witii  more  ^^enerous 
instinct,  have  recognized  th.  ^  whatever  may  have  been  the 
justifiable  calculations  of  the  statesmen  at  Versailles, 
aid  given  to  their  country  in  a  moment  of  extreme  nceu 
was  not  wholly  selfish.  French  symp.itliy  for  the  Americatis 
was  genuine;  and  the  Americans  hav(>  shown  their  appre- 
ciation of  this  by  tlieir  remembrance  (  1  Lafayette,  whose 
fame,  as  a  hero  of  the  Revolution,  is  second  in  the  popular 
memory  to  that  of  Washington  only.'  The  United  States  has 
been,  and  is,  grateful  to  France,  even  if  such  gratitude 
counts  for  UttU'  at  moments  when  there  is  a  chish  of  interests. 
'  1  return,  France  has  usually  had  for  Aiu(>rica  that  fondness 
we  often  feel  for  those  who  are  under  obligation  to  us,  a  sort 
of  paternal  pride  in  the  greatness  which,  but  for  us,  might 
never  have  existed. 

The  close  alliance  formed  in  1778  between  the  two  countries 
won  its  proudest  triumph  at  vhe  surrender  at  Yorktown, 
which  led  to  the  recognition  of  American  independence  by 
Great  Britain.   There  was,  it  is  true,  some  little  friction  over 
the  peace  negotiations  in  Paris,  where  the  Amen.  ai.  com- 
missioners thought  they  had  not  sufficient  support  fron 
their   allies   in   their   territorial    '  mar    .     Su- ci- 
rightly  or  wrongly,  that  the   French  were   neg  'fiain 
behind  their  backs,  they  made  their  own  terms  with  "  ' 
land,  to  the  anger  of  Vergennes  when  these  were  co 
municated  to  him.    American  writers  in  commenting 
French  lukewarmness  at  this  juncture  are  prone  to  for^ 
that  France  was  the  ally  of  Spain  as  well  as  of  the  Unitec 

•In  the  United  States  to-day  we  find  mie  mountain,  five  counties, 
t^,onty-nine  township.^,  dozens  of  streets  and  squares,  and  one  university 
bearing  the  name  of  Lafayette. 


186 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


States,  and  was  jtistificd  in  paying  attention  to  S'-'inish 
wishes  in  determining^  the  liniita  of  the  new  repuhlic.  Ver- 
gennes  could  feel  that  he  had  done  enough  for  the  Americans 
in  any  case,  especially  ns  they  had  always  made  it  clear  that 
they  would  not  tolerate  a  French  reconqucst  of  ('aiiad;i. 
Here,  pcrh;i|'S,  tlicy  were  short-sii^'htcd,  for  a  Fre  i  h  Canada 
mij^ht,  like  Louisiana,  huvc  been  sold  t<>  them  some  (hiy. 

After  the  concUision  of  peace  the  rehitions  between  the 
two  countries  continued  cordial.  Their  close  a'liance  re- 
mained in  force  until  France  became  involved  in  a  n^w  war 
with  En^'land  under  circumstances  wliieh,  iti  the  )pinion 
of  the  American  j^overnmeiit,  reU'ased  the  Tnitcd  States 
from  its  treaty  ol)li}fation3.  From  tlie  point  of  view  of  in- 
ternational law  tliis  m;  y  be  disputed;  but  tlie  situatioii 
was  beyond  ordinary  rules. 

As  was  natural,  the  Americans  hailed  the  outbreak  of  the 
French  Hevolution,  in  which  they  saw  a  continuation  of 
their  own.  Tliomas  Jefferson  at  Paris  was  on  intimate 
terms  not  only  with  Lafayette,  but  also  with  Barnave, 
the  Lameths,  and  others  of  the  Feuillants.  To  be  sure, 
his  successor,  Gouverneur  Morris,  was  in  close  relation  with 
the  court  and  the  aristocracy  ;  but  Monroe,  who  came 
after  Morris,  went  to  such  l(>n^'ths  in  his  demonstration  of 
republican  enthusiasm  as  to  compromise  his  oflTicial  dij^'iiity. 
American  sympathy  with  the  new  revolution  was  so  strong 
that  if  the  French  republic  had  been  fortunate  enough  to 
send  as  its  representative  a  more  able  man  than  the  Giron- 
dist Genet,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  United  States 
would  have  been  drawn  into  war  witli  England.  To  the 
injury  of  the  cause  that  he  served,  Genet  showed  much 
more  zeal  than  discretion.  His  lack  of  tact  and  his  arrogant 
defiance  of  American  laws  helped  to  produce  a  revulsion  of 
public  feeling,  and  even  Jefferson  was  obliged  to  reprimand 
him  sharply.  Conservative  people  in  the  United  States 
were,  moreover,  soon  alarmed  by  the  increasing  violence  of 


THE  UMILD  j>TATt:8   \M)  F.T 


187 


the  Frrnch  revolutionary  movement.  Wlim  AnicricaiKs  saw 
tlit'ir  former  chaiiipion,  Lafayette,  in  exile,  au'i  the  kitl^,' 
wliu  had  come  to  tlieir  ssi.sturice  sen  tn  th  sciiffold,  nmiiy 
oi  them  began  to  feel  that  the  new  France  wum  not  the 
one  to  which  they  owed  a  debt  of  gratitude. 

President  Washington's  proclamation  of  neutrality  was 
issued  in  1 71)3.  For  the  next  twenty  years  Amerieau  foreign 
puhey  chiefly  consisted  of  not  very  successful  efforts  to  get 
that  neutrality  respected.  In  their  prolon^'ed  and  des- 
perate Struggle  the  two  mj<r»^*v  combatants,  France  and 
England,  paid  little  heed  ^  '  rights  of  weak  neutrals, 
esi)ecially  when  these  neut.  jund  tlie  conflict  lucrative 
to  themselves.  In  179l>  hostiUtics  actually  broke  out  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States,  but  they  were  (!f  short 
duration  and  were  confined  to  some  small  encounters  at  sva. 
The  difficulties  with  England  culminated  in  the  War  of  1812. 

It  was  in  the  interval  of  quiet  which  followed  the  peace  of 
Amiens  in  1803  that  Napoleon,  after  extorting;  Louisiana 
from  Spain,  suddenly  sold  it  to  the  United  States.  The 
Em])eror  had  no  particular  h've  for  the  transatlantic  repub- 
lic, indeed  there  was  no  reason  why  he  should  have ;  and 
Americans,  '>n  their  part,  owe  him  no  gratitude,  though 
the  benefit  them  was  inestimable.  Still,  the  transaction 
eonsftutes  r.other  historical  tie  between  the  two  nations 
(oiic.  •Met,  and  as  such  has  helped  to  promote  good  feeling 
betw    !i  them. 

Duriag  the  period  of  the  Restoration  and  of  the  reign  of 
Louis  Philippe,  Franco-American  relations  were  few  and 
unimportant.  The  French  conquest  of  Spain  in  1823,  by 
awakening  fears  of  European  intervention  in  what  had 
once  been  th.-.'  Spanish  colonies,  U!d  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine ; 
but  ihis  was  not  specifically  directed  against  F'rance.  The 
long  tiresome  wrangle  about  the  French  Spoliation  Claims 
nuiy  be  passed  over.  Napoleon  III  was  unfriendly  to  the 
Union.   During  the  Civil  Wa;  he  would  have  recognized 


188 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  indopendence  of  the  South  if  lie  could  have  been  sure 
of  the  cooperation  of  the  English.  His  Mexican  expedition 
was  a  deliberate  attempt  to  build  up  a  Latin- American 
barrier,  supported  by  France,  against  the  preponderance  of 
Anglo-Saxons  on  the  continent.  The  complete  failure  of 
this  undertaking  prevented  any  lasting  resent tiient  in  the 
Ignited  States,  where  people  were  inclined  to  look  on  the 
enterprise  as  the  personal  policy  of  the  Emperor,  for  which 
his  nation  could  not  fairly  be  held  respondble.  Americana 
did  not,  however,  forget  their  grievance  against  him,  as 
was  shown  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  of  1870. 

Of  late  years,  relations  between  the  two  countries  have 
been  excellei't,  although  the  Spanish  War  gave  rise  to  a 
temporary  but  lively  anti-American  sentiment  among  the 
French.  This  hostility  awoke  a  certain  anger  in  return; 
but  the  more  fair-minded  among  Americans  recognized  that, 
in  view  of  the  close  connection  between  France  and  Spain, 
French  disapproval  f  the  war  and.  sympathy  with  the 
Spaniards  were  to  be  expected.  The  conduct  of  the  French 
government  was,  from  first  to  last,  irreproachable,  and 
its  representative  in  Washington  showed  much  tact  in  the 
delicate  task  of  bringing  about  negotiations  for  peace. 
French  disapproval  was  further  excited  by  what  seem(>d 
an  incomprehensiltle  lack  of  American  enthusiasm  for  the 
Boers  in  their  struggle  for  freedom.  At  one  time,  too, 
the  opposition  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East  to 
Russia,  the  ally  of  France,  threatened  to  make  more  ill-will 
between  the  two  republics.  But  these  clouds  have  now 
happily  blown  over.  The  American  evacuatit)n  of  Cuba, 
which  very  few  Europeans  believed  would  ever  take  place, 
created  a  favorable  im])ression  abroad;  and  President 
Roosevelt's  initiative  in  the  ending  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  was  most  welcome  to  France,  as  was  als^)  the  friendly 
attitude  of  the  Washington  government  during  the  Morocco 
dispute.    Recent  international  amenities,  like  the  Rocham- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  FRANCE 


189 


boau  mission,  tho  reception  of  the  American  sailors  sent 
to  get  the  body  of  John  Paul  Jones,  and,  at  an  earlier 
date,  the  presentation  of  the  Bartholdi  statue  of  Liberty, 
though  not  very  important  in  themselves,  have  helped  to 
make  good  feeling.  Tiie  efforts  of  the  Alliance  Franc^aise  in 
the  United  States,  and  tho  frequent  visits  of  French  lecturers 
in  recent  \  ears,  have  been  influences  in  the  same  direction,  as 
have  the  lectures  at  the  Sorbonno  of  professors  from  Har- 
vard University.  Never  during  the  last  century  have  Franco- 
American  relations  been  on  a  more  satisfactory  basis  than 
they  are  at  the  present  day,  and,  as  far  as  we  can  judge, 
there  is  no  good  reason  why  they  should  not  continue  to  be 
excellent.  Sinall  disputes  will  occur  now  and  then,  but 
in  no  part  of  the  world  have  the  two  countries  interests 
which  seriously  conflict. 

A  few  years  ago,  one  could  not  have  said  this ;  but  cer- 
tain possible  causes  of  trouble  then  existed  which  have  since 
disappeared.  The  dispute  about  the  boundary  between 
Brazil  and  French  Guiana,  unlike  the  Venezuela  controversy, 
has  been  adjusted  without  bringing  in  the  United  States. 
The  recent  settlement  of  the  long-standing  fisheries  question 
between  France  and  England  has  put  an  end  to  the  remote 
eventuality  that  the  Americans,  by  some  strengthening  of 
their  ties  with  Newfoundland,  might  become  involved  in  tho 
affair.  Another  and  very  real  danger  has  been  eliminated 
by  the  failure  of  the  French  Panama  Canal  Company,  and 
by  the  sale  of  its  property  to  the  United  States.  If  the 
canal  had  been  constructed  by  a  foreign  corporation,  the 
interests  of  the  stockholders  would,  sooner  or  later,  have 
come  into  conflict  with  the  political  claims  of  the  American 
people.  France  could  not  well  have  left  unprotected  a 
company  in  which  the  savings  of  so  many  of  her  citizens 
were  invested,  and  the  result  might  have  \)vvn  a  situation 
something  hke  that  which  so  long  exist(>d  in  regard  to 
Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal,  and  which  ended  in  the  triumph 


190        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  the  greater  interest  over  the  older  historical  right.  Such 
Bituations  are  extremely  dangerous.  In  the  Egyptian  ques- 
tion, war  was  barely  averted ;  in  that  of  Panama  we  may 
be  glad  that  the  rights  of  Franco  were  liquidated  as  they 
were  without  more  ill-feeling,  though  we  may  regret  that  the 
price  paid  was  not  a  Uttle  more  generous.  The  French  may 
find  some  consolation  for  their  failure  in  the  thought  that 
the  cost  of  the  enterprise,  as  is  now  evident,  was  too  gigan- 
tic for  private  means.  When  the  canal  is  completed,  they 
will  be  entitled  to  their  share  of  glory  for  actually  under- 
taking a  work  which  others  had  merely  talked  of,  and 
also  for  having  met  and  overcome  many  formidable  initial 
difficulties. 

In  France  political  writers  sometimes  profess  fears  of 
Amjrican  aggression  against  her  West  Indian  Islands. 
One  is  not  surprised  at  this  when  one  remembers  the  re- 
marks of  President  Grant,  Secretary  Olney,  and  others  on 
the  unnaturalness  of  the  connection  between  any  European 
power  and  its  American  colonies ;  n  vertheless,  there  is  no 
real  cause  for  apprehension.  If  the  French  colonies,  like 
Cuba  some  years  ago,  were  seething  \vith  disaffection,  and 
if  exiles  were  trjdng  to  excite  sympathy  and  to  organize 
liberating  expeditions  in  the  United  States,  a  dangerous 
situation  might  ensue ;  but  as  there  is  no  sign  of  such  a  thing, 
we  need  not  anticipate  the  contingency.  As  long  as  France 
and  the  United  Stat(>s  remain  on  friendly  terms,  the  former 
has  no  cause  to  fear  any  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
at  her  expense.  On  the  contrary,  the  doctrine  is  developing 
in  a  sense  favorable  to  her;  for  if  the  Americans  will  not 
tolerate  in  their  vicinity  a  transfer  of  territory  from  one 
European  power  to  another,  Franci'  is  safeguarded  against 
the  loss  of  her  West  Indian  possessions  in  the  event  of  any 
misfortune  to  herself. 

French  authorities  on  the  affairs  of  Oceanica  sometimes 
refer  to  American  designs  on  Tahiti,  an  island  whose  im- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  FRANCE 


191 


portance  as  a  stopping-place  will  increase  after  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Panama  Canal.    American  naval  officers,  like 

those  of  other  nations,  doubtless  dream,  as  we  ha"e  already 
said,  of  new  coaling-stations  in  all  regions  of  the  world; 
but  that  is  a  part  of  their  profession.  Most  people  in  the 
United  States  are  hardly  aware  that  Tahiti  exists. 

In  the  Far  East,  since  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan, 
which  has  modified  the  political  situation,  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  and  France  seem  to  be  in  harmony.  Now 
that  the  partition  of  China,  once  so  much  talked  about,  has 
been  indefinitely  postponed,  and  foreign  powers  are  more 
doubtful  of  holding  what  they  have  got  than  desirous  of 
making  fresh  acquisitions,  the  principle  of  the  "  open  door  " 
may  be  regarded  as  reasonably  secure.  Some  Americans 
may  construe  the  recent  Franco-Japanese  treaty  as  a  proof 
that  in  the  rivalry  between  the  United  States  and  Japan 
in  the  Pacific,  France  must  be  counted  on  the  side  of  the 
latter.  Should  the  Americans  further  get  it  into  their 
heads  that,  according  to  the  guarantee  in  the  treaty,  France 
would  be  bound  to  interfere  if  the  United  States,  after  a 
successful  war  with  Japan,  should  think  it  wise  to  deprive 
her  of  Formosa,  then  their  irritation  might  be  serious.  For- 
tunately, this  is  going  far  afield.  The  Americans  are  not 
looking  forward  to  war,  and  still  less  are  the  French  think- 
ing of  quarrelling  with  them  for  the  sake  of  the  Japanese, 
treaty  or  no  treaty;  indeed  their  own  Asiatic  possessions 
stand  in  somewhat  the  same  relation  as  the  Philippines  to 
Japan,  who  has  been  freely  accused  of  coveting  both. 

Since  both  France  and  the  United  States  are  great  manu- 
facturing powers,  they  come  into  competition  in  many 
markets,  where  each  does  its  utmost  to  push  its  own  trade. 
Their  direct  dealings  with  one  another  are  hampered  by 
the  many  considerations  which  affect  thf  policy  nf  countries 
blessed  with  influential  and  highly  protected  industries,  and 
which  make  commercial  treaties  compUcated  and  thorny 


192        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


matters.  And  yet  there  should  not  be  over  many  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  equable  concessions  and  profits;  for  the 
triumph  of  French  skill  has  been  chiefly  in  articles  requir- 
ing taste  and  care  difficult  to  find  under  modern  American 
industrial  conditions,  and  in  the  rougher  productions 
in  which  French  industry  cannot  hold  its  own  against 
American,  it  has  already  had  to  give  way  to  English  and 
German. 

In  the  United  States,  popular  ideas  about  foreign  lands 

have  from  the  first  been  affecttxl  by  prejudices  incident 
to  an  Anglo-Saxon  heritage,  and  also  by  the  English  sources 
from  which  Americans  have  derived  much  of  their  general 
information.  Even  in  the  days  when  pubUc  opinion  was 
most  hostile  to  England,  educated  Americans,  being  nurtured 
on  English  literature,  unconsciously  imbibed  British  views 
on  many  topics  and  notably  about  the  character  of  the 
French,  in  spite  of  the  facts  that  more  of  them  have  learned 
French  than  any  other  foreign  language  and  that  the  tics 
between  the  United  States  and  France  have  been  not  only 
independent  of  England  but  actually  opposed  to  her.  Then, 
too,  the  press,  from  motives  of  economy  and  from  sheer 
provincialism,  often  took  not  only  its  news  but  its  opinions 
on  foreign  affairs,  except  in  matters  which  concerned  America 
itself,  from  the  London  Times  or  from  the  English  weeklies. 
Thus  there  have  been  for  generations  but  few  native  Ameri- 
cans who  have  not  obtained  most  of  their  conceptions  of 
European  questions  through  a  British  medium,  which  has 
colored  whatever  has  passed  through  it.  In  recent  years, 
the  English  control  of  the  great  cables  of  the  world  and  of 
the  news  agencies  has  been  used  with  effect.  In  the  South 
African  War,  and  even  in  the  Russo-Japanese,  the  tidings  that 
reached  the  American  public  were  likely  to  be  as  much  in 
conformity  with  English  views  as  circumstances  would 
permit.  Indeed,  when  one  considers  the  extent  to  which 
the  Americans  have  bee  dependent  on  the  English  for 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  FRANCE 


193 


instruction,  one  sonAetimcs  wonders  that  they  have  ever 
proved  capable  of  disagreeing  with  their  teachers. 
This  provincial  condition  is  now  being  outgrown.  Every 

7ear  the  number  of  Americans  who  visit  Europe  increases, 
and  if  those  who  take  the  trouble  to  muster  a  fon  ii^n  lan- 
guage are  still  all  too  few,  translations  arc  more  nuinrrous 
and  mjre  prompt  in  appearing  than  of  old.  Thanks  also  to 
the  growth  of  the  American  reviews,  the  reader  who  is  igno- 
rant of  French  and  German  and  is  eager  to  instruct  himself 
on  foreign  matters,  is  no  longer  confined  to  English  sources' 
Sovoral  of  the  Amc  can  newspapers  now  have  direct 
communication  with  distant  lands,  and  ^he  Associated 
Press  is  competent,  o  get  its  own  news  almost  anywhere. 
But  since  the  English  will  always  be  nearer  to  the  European 
continent  and  necessarily  better  informed  as  to  what  is 
going  on  there,  the  American  public  will  remain  somewhat 
dopemlont  on  them  for  its  knowledge  ;  hence  we  may  expect 
its  opinions  about  French  affairs  to  be  favorably  affected 
by  the  present  entente  cordiale,  which  renders  English  com- 
ment to-day  so  favorable  to  France. 

The  number  of  Frenchmen  living  in  America  is  small, 
and  nowhere  are  niany  gatliorrd  in  one  place.  The  Aniori- 
can  volony  in  France  is  concentrated  in  Paris.  It  includes 
a  few  ousiness  men,  a  good  many  students  and  artists,  who 
are  often  poor,  and  a  contingent  of  the  idle  rich.  Foreign 
colonies  of  this  sort  seldom  enjoy  genuine  popularity  in  the 
lanu.  where  they  are  settled ;  ])ut  the  Americans  in  Paris 
seem  to  have  made  thcMnselvcs  about  as  nmch  liked  as  could 
reasonably  bo  expected.  ^  >  n.iny  individual  cases  they 
have  been  very  kindly  ret  d.  Th..y  and  their  hosts  do 
not  always  succeed  in  understanding  each  other,  for  their 
point  of  view  is  not  always  the  same.  To  many  Frenchmen 
the  American  is  the  typical  millionnaire,  rough,  restless, 
active,  in  every  way  the  parvenu,  whose  sole  idea  i.s  money, 
and  whose  womenkind  care  only  for  the  spending  of  it 


194 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWET. 


with  as  much  splurge  as  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  not  an  uncommon  belief  in  the  United  States  that  France 
is  politically  and  morally  decadent.   This  impression  is 

based  on  doubts  as  to  the  stability  of  the  government,  on 
the  fact  that  the  populat'  n  is  stationary,  and  still  more  on 
the  imprespion  of  moral  corruption  which  modern  French 
literature  serves  to  spread  abroad.  It  is  hard  for  a  foreigner, 
especially  at  a  distance,  to  appreciate  the  extraordinary 
vitality  and  power  of  achievement  which,  though  not  always 
evident  on  the  surface,  are  in!  rent  in  the  French  nation. 
Characteristically  enough,  both  the  French  and  the  Ameri- 
cans (as  well  as  others)  are  convinced  that  they  themselves 
lead  the  world  in  civilization,  and  neither  nation  realizes 
that  the  other  looks  on  it  with  a  certain  condescension.  To 
tell  the  iruth,  their  conr  ptions  of  what  is  meant  by  the  word 
"  civihzation  "  are  apt  to  be  different.  To  the  Frenchman  the 
term  suggests  art  and  literature  ;  to  the  everyday  American 
it  means  efficient  telephone  service  and  improved  plumbing. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Americans  are  as  superior  in  such 
important  matters  as  public  libraries,  organized  charities, 
and  particularly  in  generous  gifts  on  the  part  of  private 
citizens,  as  they  are  inferior  in  the  comprehension  of  much 
that  goes  to  make  life  beautiful.  Still,  educated  Americans, 
though  sharing  to  a  certain  extent  the  inborn  British  preju- 
dice against  the  Southern  European,  are  quicker  than  the 
English  to  appreciate  the  French  point  of  view,  and  some 
have  more  than  an  admiration,  they  have  a  real  love,  for 
France. 

The  influence  of  French  thought  on  Americans  has  been 
great.  It  is  true  that  they  have  not  imitated  French  insti- 
tutions, for  the  repubUc  of  the  New  World  is  the  older  of  the 
two,  but  the  fathers  of  the  Constitution  were  steeped  in 
Montesquieu,  whom  they  quoted  on  every  occasion.  Rous- 
seau did  not  appeal  to  their  national  temperament  except 
in  the  case  of  certain  individuais,  the  most  notable  of  whom 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  FRANCE  105 


was  Jefferson.  Of  later  French  political  writers,  the  one 
who  most  affecved  the  Americans  was  De  Tocqueville,  who 
furnished  them  with  what  was  for  long  the  standard  philo- 
sophical study  of  their  character  and  development.  The 
influence  of  French  literature,  art,  fashions,  has  been  groat 
from  the  start  and  shows  few  signs  of  waning.  Paris  has 
always  been  the  Mecca  of  American  students  of  the  arts,  and 
even  in  the  field  of  learning  there  has  been,  of  late  years, 
something  of  a  reaction  among  American  scholars  against 
German  modclt  and  in  favor  of  French  ones. 

Unlike  most  of  the  countries  of  Europe,  the  Ui.ited  States 
is  not  directly  affected  by  the  example  of  France  in  polilical 
matters,  nor  is  it  bound  to  her  by  close  ties  in  foreign 
affairs.  Nevertheless,  it  c;:nnot  be  indifferent  to  what 
happens  to  its  sister  republic.  France  is  a  world  power, 
with  a  territory  and  a  population  larger  than  those  of  the 
Union,  a  great  army  and  na  /y,  and  extraordinary  wealth, 
and,  in  spite  of  t  he  assertions  of  hostile  critics,  her  national 
genius  seems  far  from  exhaustion.  She  still  plays  a  leading 
role  among  the  peoples  of  mankind.  Americans  should  not 
oveuook,  either,  the  immense  prestige  that  she  has,  and  is 
likely  to  keep,  among  the  other  Latin  countries.  Paris  will 
long  lemain  the  capital  of  the  Latin,  including  the  Latin- 
American  world.  It  is  through  the  mec  ium  of  the  French 
mind  and  language  that  the  other  Latin  peoples  have  often 
to  be  reached ;  and  even  in  the  political  world,  any  state 
that  has  to  deal  with  a  Latin  one  will  find  a  smoother  path 
if  it  appears  as  the  friend,  rather  than  as  the  enemy,  of 
France. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY 

IP"  history  and  traditional  sentiment  count  for  mueh  in 
the  relations  Ix^twoeii  the  United  S' ites  and  Franco 
and  ])resent  politics  for  comparatively  little,  precisely  the 
reverse  is  true  of  the  United  Statep  and  Germany.  Here  the 
all-important  facts  are  the  recent  ones,  the  story  of  the  last 
ten  years,  the  questions  of  the  day,  the  aims  and  aspira- 
tions of  the  two  oountries.  In  any  survey  of  the  past  we 
have  also  to  nuike  a  distinction,  now  ceasing  to  exist,  be- 
tween the  relations  of  the  Americans  with  the  Germans  as 
a  people  and  with  the  modem  German  Empire  as  a  state. 
The  Germans  have  played  a  part  in  American  affairs  since 
the  early  days,  the  (!(>rninn  Empire  is  little  more  than  a 
generation  old,  and  only  within  the  last  decade  have  political 
relations  witli  it  become  so  important  for  the  United  States 
that  they  outrank  all  others  except  those  with  England  and 
with  Japan. 

In  America  German  immigrants  have  been  welcome. 
They  have  been  prec'ininently  st(>ady,  hard-working  folk, 
who  have  minded  tlieir  own  Inisinc^ss,  and  who  have  formed 
a  valuable  part  of  the  population  wherever  they  have  set- 
tled. In  the  Civil  War  they  played  a  creditable  part,  and 
they  have  shown  themselves  ready  to  support  their 
adopted  country  on  all  occasions,  even  —  if  necessary  — 
against  their  native  one.  The  small  interest  they  have 
taken  in  politics,  as  compared,  for  instance,  with  th(>  Irish, 
has  prevented  one  possible  cause  of  dislike ;  indeed,  the 

m 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY 


197 


general  feeling  toward  them  has  always  been  cordial.  On 
the  other  hand,  considering  their  large  numbers  and  their 
excellent  quality,  they  have  had  surprisingly  little  influ- 
ence in  forming  Amciican  public  opinion  or  in  affecting  its 
attitude  toward  their  Fatherland.  It  \s  not  they,  but  (I  - 
mans  in  (ieriuany  and  the  native  Americans  who  have  been 
to  (lermany,  who  have  done  most  to  make  the  two  nations 
understand  and  appreciate  one  another. 

The  historical  ties  between  the  two  were  long  slight  but 
friendly.  The  people  of  the  United  States  have  known 
that  Frederick  the  (Ireat,  in  his  resentment  a^^•^inst  Eng- 
land, looked  with  favor  on  their  war  for  independence, 
and  that  he  admired  the  character  of  Washington ;  they 
have  regarded  the  unfortunate  Hessians  who,  in  a  quarrel 
not  their  own,  were  sold  to  fight  against  them,  as  victims 
rather  than  enemies;  and  they  renunnber  that  a  Prussian 
officer,  Baron  von  Steuben,  rendered  valual)le  service  to 
the  colonies  by  drilling  and  disciplining  the  raw  revolu- 
tionary army.  In  their  turn,  the  Americans  sympathized 
with  the  German  struggle  for  liberty  and  with  the  achieve- 
ment of  German  unity.  Their  dislike  of  Napoleon  III,  and 
of  th(>  manner  in  which  the  Franco-(^i(>rman  War  was  ap- 
parently brouj^'ht  about,  rendered  iUany  of  them  pro-German 
during  the  conflict.  They  admired  the  genius  of  Bismarck, 
the  triumphs  of  the  German  army,  and  the  splendid  enei  gy 
of  the  whole  nation  in  every  department  of  human  activity. 
Scholars  from  all  parts  of  the  world  have  flocked  to  the  Ger- 
man universities,  paiticularly  since  1870,  and  have  returned 
singing  their  praises  and  eager  to  cojjy  the  methods  wiiich 
have  given  them  such  preeminence.  Among  these  visitors 
have  been  throngs  of  Americans,  most  of  whom  have  come 
back  with  a  very  sincere  enthusiasui  for  modem  Germany  as 
a  crmntry  which  their  own  has  much  reason  to  respect  and 
none  to  fear. 

The  first  slight  quarrel  occurred  in  1888,  in  connection 


198        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


with  the  fiir-away  Sumoan  Islands,  where  both  had  certain 
claims.  Overzealous  local  officials  made  the  rivalry  more 
intense,  each  of  the  home  governments  sent  ships  of  war 

to  the  scene,  and  the  situation  there  gn  v  critical,  until  a 
storm  destroyed  the  two  fleets.  After  this,  mutters  wen- 
patched  up  by  ail  agreement  signeu  in  Bi'iliii,  i'lat  i)rovi(l(  d 
a  hybrid  form  of  government  for  the  islands.  Under  this 
arrangement  they  continued  to  make  trouble  until,  in  1899, 
they  were  divided  by  a  new  treaty  which  gave  each  side 
what  it  wanted  —  Germany  a  colony,  the  United  States  a 
coaling,'  station. 

Tlie  incident  of  18S8  was  cf  a  kind  to  be  expected  between 
two  states  whose  political  activities  were  beginning  to  ex- 
tend far  beyond  their  own  borders.  Its  importance  lay  in 
its  effect  on  the  American  people,  who  now  began  to  think 
of  Germany  as  a  grasping  power  with  ambitions  that 
might  conflict  with  their  own.  They  were  rather  proud  of 
having  defended  their  claims  in  a  dispute  with  the  great 
Bismarck  himself  at  a  time  when  the  rest  of  the  world  was 
inclined  to  bow  down  before  the  chancellor,  and  they  were 
determined  to  maintain  their  rights  just  as  vigorously  on 
any  like  occasion  that  should  occur.  The  episode  also 
strengthened  the  demand  in  the  country  for  a  stronger  navy. 
After  it  closed,  relations  with  Germany  resumed  their  normal 
course. 

Ten  years  later,  when  the  Spanish  War  broke  out,  the 

Americans  made  the  unpleasant  discovery  that  the  sym- 
pathy of  continental  Europe  was  overwhelmingly  on  tiic 
side  of  Spain ;  so  much  so,  in  fact,  that  there  was  even 
rumor  of  a  combination  to  restrain  the  United  States.  The 
result  was  an  outburst  of  wrath.  It  is  all  very  well  to  talk 
of  the  moral  effect  of  the  opinion  of  the  outside  world ; 
but  when  a  nation  in  the  heat  of  a  struggle  —  the  United 
States  with  Spain,  Great  Britain  with  the  Boors  —  sees  that 
its  neighbors  condemn  it,  it  ascribes  their  attitude  to  envy, 


THE  UNITED  8TATEB  AND  GERMANY 


199 


hatred,  and  malice,  and  is  not  at  all  shaken  in  its  bdiof  in 
the  justice  of  its  own  cause.  As  might  have  been  expected, 
the  Americans  fiercely  resented  all  adverse  criticism,  and 

were  ready  to  fight  any  one  and  every  one  rather  than  yield 
an  inch.  Home  of  them  might  admit  tliat  there  was  a  cer- 
tain excuse  for  France,  owing  to  her  close  connection  with 
Spain,  but  tiiey  saw  none  for  Germany.  Their  anger  against 
the  latter  was  soon  fanned  into  hot  flame  by  her  conduct 
about  the  Philippines. 

The  exact  circumstances  connected  with  the  despatch  of 
the  squadron  of  Admiral  Diednchs  to  these  ishuids  have 
never  been  made  pubHc,  and  perliaps  never  will  be.    It  is 
well  that  at  the  moment  people  in  America  were  unaware 
of  the  relations  which  existed  for  some  weeks  between  the 
Ameiican  and  (lerman  fleets,  relations  so  strained  that,  but 
for  the  attitude  of  the  English  commander  present,  th(^y 
might  perhaps  have  degenerated  into  actual  conflict;  but 
what  the  people  did  know  was  enough  to  arouse  their  anger. 
After  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  while  other  countries,  as 
is  usual  under  such  conditions,  sent  a  few  ships  of  war  to 
look  after  the  interests  of  their  citizens,  Germany,  without 
any  obvious  reason,  hastily  despatched  to  the  scene  of 
action  her  Pacific  squadron  —  a  force  equal  in  strength  to 
the  fleet  of  Admiral  Dewey.   The  Americans  believed  that 
this  force  came  in  no  friendly  spirit,  but  in  the  hope  of 
taking  advantage  of  the  confusion  to  pick  up  something 
for  Germany;   and  their  distrust  was  intensified  by  the 
reports  they  heard  of  its  behavior.    Fear  that  the  Ger- 
mans might  establish  themselves  in  the  Philippines  was  one 
of  the  motives  that  induced  the  United  States  to  take  over 
the  islands.    When,  later,  they  purchased  from  Spain  the 
Carolines  and  the  Ladrones,  this  was  taken  as  proof  that 
the  suspicion  had  been  well  founded.    From  this  time  on, 
many  Americans  were  firmly  convinced  that  Gernumy  was 
not  only  a  covetous,  greedy  powor,  but  also  one  that,  from 


200        THE  UNITED  tiXATEii        A  VVUllLl)  IXiWER 


jealousy,  WhS  willing  to  do  the  United  States  an  ill-turn, 
if  she  could.  As  this  o|)init»ii  was  cxprcsscfl  by  tin-  ih-ws- 
paprrs  with  their  usual  ii.tctnpctatc  frccdoni,  it  provnkfd 
aiiniT  (III  the  other  side  and  violent  reto'ts.  Indiscreet 
words  on  the  part  of  Americun  officers  hcliu'd  to  envenom 
the  situation.  Naval  authorities  everywhere  are  wont  to 
form  their  plans  with  more  or  less  reference  to  some  par- 
tii'uhir  forei^'ii  fleet;  for  Americans,  the(!ermaii  was  now 
the  one  to  keep  in  view  as  a  standard  fur  tlic  strength 
uf  tlieir  own. 

Here,  a^ain,  the  infiuen'>"  of  the  English  press  must  not 
be  forgotten.  Since  the  fall  of  Bismarck,  the  relations  be- 
tween (Ireat  Britain  and  (iermany,  except  at  the  moment 
of  tiie  Jameson  laiti,  had  in  th(>  main  1>e(>n  cordial;  but 
idiout  1S!M)  they  lie;j;aii  to  cliaii^'e  for  the  worse,  and  they 
have  never  regained  their  former  heartiness.  As  the 
EngUsh  have  been  at  the  same  time  quarrelling  with  the 
Germans  and  cultivating  their  new  fii<  ndship  with  the 
Americans,  it  was  ])'.it  human  nature  for  them  to  strive 
to  lihicken  ih.e  character  of  tiieir  Teutonic  rivals,  and  to 
pro  -e  that  the  ambitions  of  the  latter  were  equally  danger- 
ous to  both  Anglo-Saxon  nations.  It  is  true  that  the  Ger- 
mans retorted  in  kind,  but  in  spite  of  the  aid  of  their  trans- 
atlantic kindled,  they  were  not  so  well  able  to  put  their 
views  before  the  American  pu!)lic,  who  can  be  reached  more 
easily  by  the  London  Times  than  by  the  Xcic-Yurker  ^>taats- 
zcitumj. 

Events  in  the  Far  East  did  not  help  to  mend  matters. 
The  United  States  as  well  as  England  disapproved  of  the 
seizuiH"  of  Kiauchau,  and  llioD^-li  the  principle:  of  Secretary 
Hay's  famous  note  on  the  ".''.len  door"  was  officially  ac- 
ee])ted  at  Herlin,  many  persons  were  convinced  that  Cler- 
maiiy  was  instigating  Russian  aggression  in  order  to  bring 
about  the  partition  of  China  —  an  outcome  which  America 
was  anxious  to  prevent.    During  and  after  the  Boxer  rising, 


the  severity  shown  by  the  Germans  was  in  oppotution  to 
the  Aniericun  policy  of  treating  the  Chinese  us  leniently  as 

mi^'lit  !)('. 

The  ^jrowiri;^'  ;ilit'n;itii»ii  Ix'twccii  two  statos  lotij^  on  iiinicji- 
terms  j^rifvi-il  ami  alaniud  Wfll-wi.sliiTs  in  lH)tli.  Ac- 
cordingly, various  means  wen*  tried  to  bring  them  together 
ngnin.  If  we  may  charge  the  Ciermans  with  having  given 
most  of  the  provocation  in  the  first  instance,  we  must 
admit  that  the  attrmnts  at  reconciliation  have  come  from 
iheir  siiU'.  Tiie  Kmperor  in  particular  lias  made  several 
etTorts  to  allay  American  suspicion.  Hid  most  notahle  aet 
of  the  sort  was  the  sending  of  his  brother,  Prince  Henry,  to 
make  a  tour  of  the  United  States  and  to  prck  gift  to 
the  new  Clermanic  Museum  of  Harvard  l^"  '  .ly.  The 
visit  of  the  prince  was  in  a  measure  succes;^  .  personally, 
he  created  a  favorahU'  impression  everyw.  re,  and  the 
American  people  were  anmsed  and  })leased  at  the  attention 
paid  them;  but  if  any  one  imagined  that  they  would 
take  the  whole  thing  very  seriously,  he  misconceived  the 
character  of  a  nation  which  is  too  well  satisfied  with  itself 
and  with  its  own  institutions  to  feel  unduly  flattered  by 
attentions  from  any  foreign  prince,  istili,  the  effect  of  the 
visit  was  ko(  1,  thougli  a  little  marred  by  an  inopportune 
dispute  betv»een  the  English  and  the  German  press  as  to 
the  attitude  assunu-d  by  the  representatives  of  their  respec- 
tive countries  at  W'asliington  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish 
War.  More  unfortunate  was  the  mistake  in  tact  maiK'  by 
the  imperial  government  a  few  months  hiter  in  present- 
ing to  the  United  States  a  statue  of  F.  derick  the  Great 
when  the  French  Rochambeau  mission  was  in  America. 
The  moment  was  ill-chosen.  The  .VuKMicans,  without 
attacliin^'  too  much  importance^  to  the  Kochambeau  fes- 
tivities, which  attracted  less  attention  ,  ,  •  '"^'^  visit  of 
Prince  Henry,  felt  that  the  Germans  v  :>uld  .  done 
better  to  keep  quiet  for  a  while.    It  too!  r?ouie  im!»f;in;  ,tion 


202        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


to  believe  that  the  services  of  Frederick  the  Great  in 
their  behalf  could  be  compared  with  those  of  Rocham- 
beau.  At  all  events,  there  was  no  good  n  ason  for  an- 
nouncing the  gift  at  this  juncture,  when  it  phicod  the 
administration  at  Washington  in  an  awkward  position, 
and,  in  the  eyes  of  the  American  pubhc,  looked  as  if 
the  Germans,  after  having  had  their  fun,  were  trying 
to  spoil  that  of  the  French.  Trifles  of  the  sort  were, 
however,  soon  forgotten  in  the  graver  dissatisfaction 
produced  by  the  turn  events  were  taking  in  Venezuela. 

The  intervention  of  Gorniany,  England,  and  Italy  in 
Venezuelan  waters  provoked  a  violent  irritation  in  the 
United  States.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  the  Americans  were 
convinced  that  Germany  was  "trying  it  on"  to  test  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  for  greater  security  had  persuj.ded 
the  other  two  powers  to  join  her.  The  loud  and  almost 
universal  eondrmnation  by  the  English  people  and  press 
of  the  action  of  their  government  prevented  resentment 
against  England,  and  since  Italy  scarcely  attracted  at- 
tention, all  the  vials  of  American  wrath  were  poured 
on  Germany.  For  a  while  the  situation  was  somewhat 
critical,  and  tho  tone  taken  in  Washington  was  serious. 
Finally,  after  President  Roosev^elt  had  decUned  the  request 
that  he  should  act  as  arbitrator,  the  matter  was,  as  he  sug- 
gested, referred  to  The  Hague.  The  decision  there  pro- 
nounced awoke  fresh  dissatisfaction  in  the  United  States; 
for  the  hen  given  to  the  creditors  on  the  Venezuelan  cus- 
toms looked  like  a  beginning  of  European  control  of  an 
American  state,  and  the  recognition  of  the  priority  of  the 
claims  of  the  belligerents  over  those  of  powers  which,  like 
the  United  States  and  France,  had  kept  quiet,  might  well 
encourage  the  use  of  force  elsewhere  under  similar  circum- 
a+o,if.f^g  Oil  thfMr  nnrt  tho  Germans  liad  sniall  caii!^'*  to  coii- 
gr;.u;late  themselves,  for  though  victorious  in  the  matter 
1"  dispute,  they  had  been  taught  that  the  United  States 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY 


203 


was  determined  to  oppose  even  the  slightest  encroach- 
ment, and  that  the  mere  suggestion  of  another  inter- 
vention of  this  kind  would  excite  American  feeling  to  a 
dangerous  degree.  It  was  also  evident  that  public  opinion 
in  England  would  never  permit  the  government  to  aid 
Germany  against  America. 

Since  then,  passions  have  had  time  to  cool  down,  and 
though  there  still  may  be  some  latent  resentment  on  the 
German  side  and  watchful  suspicion  on  the  American,  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries  are  again  good. 
Before  deciding  whether  they  are  likely  to  continue  so,  we 
must  first  understand  why  their  interests  may  clash,  and 
this  without  the  fault  of  any  one. 

To  begin  with,  the  United  States  and  Germany  are  trade 
rivals  whose  competition  is  keen.  If  we  look  at  the  great 
manufacturing  states  of  the  world  to-day,  we  see  that  all 
are  eager,  as  a  matter  of  economic  life  and  death,  to 
find  markets  for  their  surplus  goods.  England  and  France 
appear  to  us  like  two  rich,  long-established,  and  some- 
what old-fashioned  commercial  houses.  They  have  com- 
peted with  one  another  for  generations,  they  have  their 
specialties  and  their  traditions,  and  they  are  often  inclinet' 
to  let  well-enough  alone  rather  than  to  run  unnecessary 
risks  in  seeking  new  fields.  Compared  with  them,  Germany 
and  the  United  States  are  like  two  young  pushing  firms 
who  have  their  way  yet  to  make.  Confident  in  their  own 
intelligence  and  energy,  they  have  little  doubt  that  in  many 
branches  of  trade  they  shall  be  able  to  drive  their  older 
competitors  from  the  field.  Already  their  achievements 
have  excited  the  alarm  of  their  staid  rivals,  and  they  might 
look  forward  joyously  to  more  brilliant  triumphs  in  the 
future,  if  each  were  not  worried  by  the  presence  of  the 
ij  iiic  r. 

Different  as  have  been  the  methods  by  which  the  Germans 
and  the  Americans  have  attained  this  astonishing  economic 


204        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


success  in  the  last  few  years,  the  results  in  the  two  cases 
are  similar :  each  has  developed  gigantic  industries,  capable 
of  supplying  goods  of  many  kinds,  and  often  the  same 
goods,  in  almost  unlimited  quantities;  each  protects  itself 
at  home  by  means  of  a  tariff,  though  not  of  equal  severity ; 
each  is  supremely  desirous  of  securing  new  markets  abroad; 
and  each  realizes  th:«t,  in  the  fierce  struggle  for  preeminence, 
the  other  is  its  most  formidable  rival.    The  Germans  were 
slightly  the  first  in  the  field,  and  we  can  well  understand  their 
deep  chagrin  when  the  Americans  appeared  on  the  scene. 
The  situation  is  doubly  trying,  because  Germany  is  in  more 
pressing  need  of  out.^ide  markets  for  her  activity  than  is 
the  United  States,  and  is  at  the  same  tin'  >  much  inferior  to 
it  in  natural  resources.    Long-cherished  dreams,  which  had 
appeared  not  too  difficult  of  realization,  must  now  remain 
unfulfilled.   The  Americans,  on  their  part,  looking  out  for 
fresh  commercial  worlds  to  conquer,  ^ee  almost  everywhere 
as  their  chief  competitors  the  hard-working,  energetic  Ger- 
mans.   In  the  Chinese  Empire,  both  have  been  so  successful 
that  they  had  visions  of  dominating  the  markets  until  their 
ideas  received  a  rude  shock  from  the  appearance  of  a  still 
younger  rival,  modern  Japan.    In  South  America,  the  Ger- 
mans were  convinced  that  they  had  found  a  field  of  splen- 
did possibilities,  and  their  progress  in  recent  years  has  been 
startUng  in  its  rapidity ;  but  to  South  America  the  Ameri- 
cans are  turning  much  of  their  attention,  and  with  the  aid 
of  Pun-American  sentiment,  they  hope  to  win  the  first  place 
for  themselves.    Wherever  on  the  globe  there  is  a  good 
opening  for  trade,  there  we   may  expect   to  find  the 
Germans  and  the  Americans  striving  in  ardent  rivalry. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising  if  the  con- 
tinual clash  of  equally  legitimate  iriterests  sometimes  pro- 
duces ill-feeling  between  ihe  Lui.ipetitors,  which  is  soon 
reflected  in  the  press  and  hciizhtened  by  publicity. 

A  second  source  of  difficulty  between  Germany  and  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY 


205 


United  States  may  be  found  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in 
regard  to  which  the  Americans  will  hear  of  no  argument  or 
compromise,  and  are  prepared  to  maintain  their  position 

at  any  cost.  Now  that  England  has  explicitly  accepted  it, 
they  are  inclined  to  believe  that  Germany  is  the  only  power 
from  whom  they  have  anything  to  apprehend  in  this  r(\s|iect. 
They  know  that,  although  the  imperial  government  has 
shown  a  discreet  reserve,  the  Pan-Germanists  have  raged 
furiously  against  the  doctrine,  and  that  others,  of  a  less 
chauvinistic  stripe,  regard  it  with  lively  resentment.  Many 
Americans  are  convinced  that  (lermany  would  jump  at  any 
safe  op],  jrtunity  to  get  a  foothold  in  the  western  hemisphere, 
that  she  was  taking  a  first  step  toward  one  in  her  Venezuela 
intervention,  that  she  would  purchase  the  Danish  islands 
if  she  dared,  and  that  she  used  secret  influence  to  prevent 
their  being  sold  to  the  United  States  in  1902.  In  short,  they 
regard  her  whole  relation  with  Latin  America  with  watch- 
ful suspicion. 

If  this  suspicion  rested  on  any  supposed  wanton  rapacity 
on  the  part  of  the  Germans,  we  might  dismiss  it  with  scant 
ceremony.  What  is  more  disquieting  is  that  we  can  see 
lawful  reasons  why  (lernian  efforts  should  be  directed 
toward  South  America  in  a  way  that  may  bring  them  into 
collisiDi  with  American  interests.  And  we  can  blame  no 
one,  since  the  trouble  lies  in  the  situation  itself  as  nature 
and  history  have  created  it.  We  must,  however,  distinguish 
between  Gcrmi-n  political  dreams,  often  of  an  irresponsible 
nature,  and  legitimate  commercial  aspirations.  It  is  true 
that  the  two  melt  into  one  another,  and  that  the  United 
States  is  in  the  way  of  both. 

In  spite  of  the  extraordinary  achievements  of  the  modem 
German  Empire  in  peace  and  in  war,  and  of  its  splendid 
organized  strength,  if  it  is  to  keep  in  the  future  the  com- 
manding  position  it  holds  in  the  present,  it  will  have 
to  overcome  grave  disadvantages.    Many  of  its  leading 


206        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


men,  conscious  of  the  overcrowding  of  its  great  population 
on  a  small  and  not  very  rich  territory,  are  convinced  that 
their  country  must  either  expand  or  stifle.  Its  industry, 
its  energy,  its  trained  efficiency,  imperatively  demand 
broader  fields  in  which  to  display  themselves.  Its  few 
colonies,  with  one  barren  exception,  —  a  part  of  South- 
west Africa,  —  are  in  the  tropics,  and  incapable  of  sup- 
porting any  large  number  of  white  settlers.  For  trade  with 
the  Far  East  it  is  less  well  placed  than  the  United  States, 
and  in  China  it  will  find  it  ever  harder  to  compete  with 
Japan.  Imperial  customs  preference  would  threaten  its 
commerce  with  the  colonies  of  the  British  Empire.  There 
remains  South  America,  a  whole  continent  of  vast  resources, 
all  of  whose  inhabitants  put  together  are  hardly  equal  to 
one-half  of  those  of  GermaiAy,  and  many  of  whom  are  not 
of  the  white  race.  Here,  then,  would  seem  to  be  a  splen- 
did opening  for  German  enterprise,  a  unique  chanct^  for 
the  nation  to  control  permanently  a  territory  comparable 
to  that  held  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  the  Slav.  In  the 
last  quarter  of  a  century  the  Germans  have  made  long 
strides  in  this  part  of  the  world,  not  by  colonization  — 
for  few  have  emigrated  there  —  but  by  founding  steamship 
lines  and  banking  houses,  by  constructing  public  works, 
by  making  investments,  and  by  building  up  their  tradt'  in 
every  way.  They  are  firmly  intrenched,  skilful  and  ener- 
getic, and  are  advancing  steadily.  Their  chief  obstacle  to 
complete  success  is  An\erican  competition. 

This  competition,  which  bids  fair  to  become  keener  every 
year,  fills  the  Germans  with  apprehension.  They  may 
think  they  can  hold  their  own  on  even  terms,  especially  as 
they  have  a  good  start ;  but  are  the  terms  even  ?  Hamburg 
is,  it  is  true,  httle  farther  from  the  southeastern  coast  of 
South  America  than  is  New  York,  and  if  the  Germans  could 
get  a  port  in  Morocco,  they  would  have  an  outpost  nearer 
than  the  United  States  to  this,  the  most  important,  part  of 


THE  UNITED  GTATES  AND  GERMANY 


207 


the  South  American  continent ;  but  for  trade  further  north 
they  are  relatively  less  well  situated,  and  for  the  whole 
west  coast  their  disadvantage  is  manifest.  Their  inferi- 
ority in  position  is,  however,  small  compared  with  their 

inferiority  in  resources,  and  this  makes  the  prospect  of  com- 
petition ratlier  de{)ressinf^.  Tli'  y  are  also  justified  in  re- 
garding the  Pan-American  movement  as  unfavorable  to 
their  interests ;  for  though  optimists  may  declare  that  South 
America  offers  room  for  the  commerce  of  many  countries, 
it  would  be  hard  to  deny  that  whatever  success  the 
United  States  may  gain  there,  will  be  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent at  the  exj)ense  of  Europe,  and  particularly  of  Ger- 
many. This  may  be  in  the  common  order  of  things,  and 
the  fault  of  no  one,  but  it  will  not  promote  mutual  good 
feeling.  And  this  is  not  the  whole  story.  Germans  have 
dreamed  that  their  economic  preponderance  in  parts  of 
South  Aiiierioa  might  be  made  permanent  by  becoming  also 
a  political  one.  It  is  not  necessary  to  accuse  them  of  covert 
designs  against  any  South  American  state :  what  they  have 
done  is  to  entertain  the  hope  that  sooner  or  later,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  by  peaceable  attraction  or  as  a  result  of 
collision  provoked  by  misgovernment,  some  of  the  Latin- 
Ameiican  republics  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  superior 
race.  This  dream  may  appear  fantastic  to  many  people, 
even  in  Germany  itself,  but  we  need  not  wonder  at  its 
existence,  or  deny  to  it  a  measure  of  reasonableness. 

When  German  public  opinion  began  to  recover  from  the 
exultation  which  followed  the  founding  of  the  new  Emnire, 
gradually  some  unpleasant  doubts  asserted  themselves. 
Men  came  to  realize  that  powerful  and  glorious  as  was  the 
new  Fatherland,  it  occupied  only  a  small  part  of  the  earth's 
surface  compared  with  the  domain  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  the 
Latin,  and  the  Slav,  and  that  however  salisfacLory  was  the 
immediate  situation,  the  prospe(  t  ahead  looked  less  attrac- 
tive.   This  consciousness  of  great  actual  strength  coupled 


208        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


with  anxiety  about  the  future  has  led  to  a  growing  restless- 
npss,  to  a  feeling  that  something  must  be  done.  Germans 
no  longer  regard  their  unity  as  achiev(>d.  as  they  did  in  the 
first  glow  of  triumph  after  1,S71  :  they  now  hope  for  a  greater 
Germany,  to  include  all  in  Kurope  who  speak  their  tongue. 
Even  this  is  not  enough,  —  they  have  visions  of  a  world  em- 
pi  re,  the  equal  of  others,  one  that  will  give  full  play  to  all 
till  ir  eiieru'ies.  and  furnish  homes  for  their  superalnindant 
eluidreii,  who  may  thus  preserve  their  nationahty  instead 
of  becoming  "the  fertilizer"  of  other  peoples,  and  .■issure  the 
sway  of  the  German  language  as  the  idiom  of  hundreds  of 
millions  of  human  beings. 

The  party  known  as  the  Pan-Germanists  have  expressed 
freely  the  extreme  of  ambitions  which  many  qui(>t(>r 
patriots  cherish  in  some  degree.  Unfortunately  for  such 
aspirations,  there  are  but  few  parts  of  the  temperate  zone 
where  it  would  still  be  possible  for  German  colonists  to 
transplant  themselves  in  sufficient  numbers  to  form  new 
branches  of  the  race,  and  those  few  parts  are  guarded  by 
their  preseiit  owners  and  by  international  jealousies.  Aus- 
traha,  with  its  huge  area,  occupied  l)y  a  small  and  slowly 
increasing  population,  is  a  British  colony;  in  Asia  Minor, 
the  Turk  is  not  to  be  lightly  dispossessed,  and  both  Russia 
and  England  nuiy  !)(>  counted  on  to  oppose  Germany ;  in 
Morocco,  England  and  France  stand  in  the  way;  in  the 
United  States,  thouL'h  millions  of  Germans  have  settled 
there,  Deutschtum  has  no  c!       '  of  being  preserved. 

There  remains  '  -  outh  ,i  rica ;  and  here,  in  the  three 
southern  provinceb  of  Brt.  a  population  of  some  four 
hundred  thousand  Germans,  who,  thanks  to  their  high  birth- 
rate, are  increasing  fast,  and  who,  so  far,  have  succeeded  in 
maintair-ng  their  indi\  idiiaHi y.  If  the  few  thousand  immi- 
grants wiio  wandered  there  more  than  half  a  century  ago 
have  grown  up  into  so  considerable  a  nucleus,  can  we  won- 
der that  enthusiasts  have  dreamed  of  the  building  up  of 


THE  UMTED  STATES  AND  GERMANY 


209 


a  German  state  in  this  part  of  the  New  World?  But 
how  different  the  whole  situation  would  be  to-day  if  the 

Prussian  government  had  not  from  1856  to  1S<)3  made  the 
fatal  mistake  of  forhiddin<;  the  departure  of  eoloiiists  for 
this  region,  and  if  but  a  tenth  of  the  swiirm  who  in  those 
years  were  lost  to  the  Fatherland  by  going  to  the  United 
States  had  made  their  homes  in  Brazil!  We  can  well 
understand  the  despair  of  the  German  patriot  when  he 
tliinks  of  the  maf^nifieeut  opportunity  so  wantonly  sacri- 
ficed. Is  Dentsrhtum,  then,  to  he  reckoned  as  without  a 
future  in  tliis  part  of  the  world?  Pan-Germanist  writers 
have  declared  that  it  is  not  too  late  to  hope  and  to  act,  and 
they  have  outlined  possibilities  magnificent  enough  in  their 
eyes,  but  unluckily  quite  out  of  keeping  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Their  flights  of  fancy,  which  English  writers 
have  taken  care  should  not  pass  unnoticed,  have  sharply 
directed  American  attention  to  every  movement  of  the 
Germans  in  Brazil,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  German 
interference  there  would  mean  war  between  Germany  and 
the  United  States. 

Looking  dispassionately  at  the  situation  of  the  German- 
Brazilians  to-day,  one  cannot  help  thinking  that,  if  left  to 
themselves,  they  will  find  it  difficult  to  maintain  a  separate 
existence.  In  the  provinces  where  they  have  settled  they 
are  everywhere  in  a  minority;  even  in  Santa  Catarina, where 
their  proportion  is  highest,  they  form  scarcely  a  quarter  of 
the  population.  To-day  they  are  receiving  almost  no  rein- 
forcements, partly  because  German  emigration  in  any  direc- 
tion has  decreased  in  the  last  few  years,  but  also  because  the 
Brazilians,  alarmed  by  the  danger  they  have  foreseen,  are 
now  discouraging,  instead  of  fa\(iring,  newcomers  from 
Germany.  As  an  offset  they  have  been  bringirv  in  large 
numbers  of  itahans,  who  are  as  prolific  as  Cic-  .ans  and 
more  easuy  Brazilianized,  and  they  are  about  to  introduce 
Japanese.    Finally,  well  as  the  German-Brazilians,  on  the 


210        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


whole,  have  preserved  their  original  type,  some  of  them, 
especially  in  the  towns,  show  signs  of  departing  from  it, 
and  very  few,  whatever  their  national  sympathies  may  be, 

have  any  desire  to  come  under  the  bureaiicratie  rule  of 
Hi'rlin.  If  matters  go  on  quietly,  as  tliev  are  (l(.ing  at 
present,  it  appears  prob  ble  that,  in  spite  of  the  influence 
of  consuls  and  merchants,  of  teachers  and  preachers  and 
patriotic  literature  from  the  Fatherland,  sooner  or  later 
here  too  the  Germans  will  end  by  being  lost  in  the  sur- 
rounding population. 

On  Hie  other  hand,  this  may  not  liappen.    The  rapitl 
natural  increase  among  the  German  settlers  in  tiie  country 
districts  may  more  than  counterbalance  losses  in  the  towns. 
The  old  immigration  may  begin  again,  even  if  it  is  hindered 
by  the  opposition  of  the  Brazilian  authorities,  and  also  by 
the  fact  that  the  population  of  modern  Germany  is  increas- 
ingly urban  rather  than  rural,  and  therefore  less  suited  to 
the  opening  up  of  unsettled  regions.    Or  the  Brazilian 
Germans  may  hold  their  own  and  be  drawn  closer  to  their 
kinsnien  by  commercial,  literary,  a'  "  sentimental  ties,  with- 
out wishing  tu  be  under  the  same        rnnient.    To  this  the 
United  States  could  have  no  o])j(>i;  .on.    Tlie  greatest  dan- 
ger to  peace  would  arise  from  an  antagonism  between  the 
Germans  and  other  Brazilians  that  should  lead  to  armed 
conflict,  during  which  subjects  of  the  Emperor  might  also 
suffer.    It  would  then  be  very  hard  for  the  government  at 
Berlin  to  resist  the  pressure  of  popular  sentiment  in  favor 
of  rendering  some  sort  of  aid  to  the  struggling  brothers 
across  the  sea.    But  such  intervention  would  at  once  lead 
to  action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.    Even  if  the 
Germans  felt  that  their  navy  was  strong  enough  to  risk  the 
perils  of  a  eonflict  with  the  United  States  alone,  they  would 
also  have  to  t.ikn  into  account  not  only  Brazil,  but  prob- 
ably a  South  American  coalition  against  them,  and  there  is 
no  one  from  whom  they  could  expect  help.    Doubtless  all 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY 


211 


this  is  perfectly  appreciated  by  the  statesmen  at  Berlin, 
even  if  it  is  not  by  the  Pan-Germanists. 

At  all  events  there  is  no  present  cause  for  anxiety.  In 
a  study  of  international  relations  one  is  sometimes  in  danger 
of  paying  attention  to  irresponsible  utterances  in  a  foreign 
country  to  which  oii(>  would  not  give  a  thought  in  one's 
own.  There  is  iiideeil  no  more  reason  why  the  imperial 
government  should  let  itself  be  led  astray  by  Pan-Ger- 
manic clamor  than  that  the  authorities  at  Washington 
should  heod  the  vaporings  of  the  American  yellow  press. 
Nor  should  the  fact  that  we  can  discern  clouds  on  the  hori- 
zon make  us  necessarily  expect  a  storm.  Relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Germany  are  excellent,  and 
the  present  trend  is  towards  an  even  better  understand- 
ing. In  the  isolation  in  which  the  Germans  now  find 
themselves  in  Europe,  they  are  more  desirous  than  they 
were  before  of  American  good-will,  and  are  more  dis- 
posed to  second  the  efforts  to  obtain  it  which  the  Em- 
peror has  been  making  for  some  time  past,  —  efforts  the  more 
successful  because  his  picturesque  character  has  always 
appealed  to  the  imagination  of  Americans  in  much  the  same 
way  as  that  of  their  own  President,  with  whom  he  has  so 
often  been  ooiupared.  They  may  not  be  much  imj)ressed  by 
interchanges  of  university  professors,  but  they  do  realize 
that  the  Germans  are  trying  to  be  friendly,  and  they  are  dis- 
posed to  be  so  themselves  in  return.  They  have  now  made 
their  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  so  clear  that 
no  one  can  have  any  excuse  for  misunderstanding  it,  and 
whatever  irresponsible  individuals  may  have  said,  the 
German  government  since  1903  has  shown  no  enmity  to 
it  or  sign  of  desire  to  call  it  in  question.  Suspicion  in 
the  United  States  has  in  consequence  subsided  and  given 
place  to  good-will.  Then  a  slight  sense  of  loneliness 
which  the  Americans  feel  in  the  midst  of  all  these  treaties 
concerning  the  Far  East  in  none  of  which  they  are  included, 


212        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


anil  uiuiTtiiiuty  about  their  own  future  relations  with  the 
Japanese,  increase  their  readiness  to  welcome  German 
advances.  They  have  the  loss  difficulty  in  doing  so  because 

even  in  ihv  djiys  wlicn  they  mistrusted  tho  int(>nti<ins  of 
(icrnijiny  tlic  most,  ihvy  could  not  refuse  to  her  the  tribute 
of  their  sincere  admiratiou. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  UNmSD  STATES  AND  RUSSIA 

OF  all  the  powors  of  to-day,  no  two  prcsont  a  inoro 
striking?  t'xaniplo  of  similarity  and  of  contrast  than 
the  United  States  and  Kussiu.  Their  huge  unbroken  bulk 
gives  them  a  self-sufficing  continental  character,  which  not 
only  offers  them  a  seemingly  limitless  field  for  internal 
development,  but  renders  them,  except  at  their  extremities, 
almost  invulnerable  to  outside  attack.  Each  has  been  a 
world  iji  itself,  and  both  have  been  regarded  as  menaces, 
though  in  different  ways,  to  the  historic  lands  of  older  cul- 
ture. Fvom  one  another  they  can  have  Uttle  to  fear,  and 
they  may  conceivably  be  of  great  mutual  service.  In  the 
past  the  sympathies  between  them  1  we  been  curious  and 
interesting,  but  so  far  their  political  uealings  have  not  been 
highly  important. 

At  the  time  of  the  war  for  American  independence,  the 
Empress  Catherine  II  happened  to  be  out  of  conceit  with 
England.  This  temporary  unfriendliness,  combined  with 
her  high  sense  of  the  dignity  of  her  empire,  prompted  her 
to  get  up  the  League  of  Armed  Neutrality ;  but  though 
this  was  directed  against  the  English,  it  was  of  no  particular 
service  to  the  Americans.  The  Empress  was  not  at  all 
moved  by  sympathy  for  the  revolted  colonies  —  she  had 
a  thorough  dislike  of  insurrection,  and  regarded  such  an 
example  as  infectious;  she  therefore  let  the  agent  sent  to 
St.  Petersburg  by  the  Continental  Congress  wait  in  the  city 
for  about  two  years  without  granting  him  an  audience. 

213 


214 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Cordial  relations  were  not  established  till  the  reign  of 
Alexander  I.   Though  the  Emperor's  political  methods  in 

his  later  years  were  the  antithesis  of  American  ones,  and 
thou^'li  he  was  the  foiimh^r  of  the  Holy  Alliaiice,  whleh  all 
good  Americans  abhorred,  he  seems,  at  least  in  his  earlier, 
liberal  period,  to  have  been  well-disposed  towards  the  United 
States.'  He  corresponded  with  Thomas  JefTersoi* ;  and  on 
two  occasions  he  sent  for  a  copy  of  the  American  Consti- 
tiition,  which  was  i)rol)al)ly  stndied  l>y  his  minister  Speran- 
ski  wheti  planning  a  reform  of  the  imperial  government, 
liussia  at  this  date  was  herself  an  American  power,  and  it 
was  precisely  her  attempts  to  extend  her  territory  to  the 
southward  that  called  forth  the  protests  of  Secretary  Adams, 
whose  views  were  repeated  by  President  Monroe  in  his 
famous  message.  The  actual  difficulty  as  to  the  boundary 
of  Uussian  America  was  ended  by  the  treaty  of  I.S2  I.  Some 
years  later,  the  Kussiuns  abandoned  as  unprofitable  the 
trading  settlement  which  they  had  made  in  California, 
where,  though  thoy  had  not  claimed  political  possession, 
they  had  remained  in  defiance  of  Spanish  protest,  and  were 
looked  at  askance  by  the  United  States.  Otherwise  the 
connection  between  Hus8ia  and  America  was  ;:i!j;lit,  '  ut 
they  remained  on  good  terms,  and  on  several  occasions 
they  acted  in  hanaony  in  the  Far  East,  where  both  bene- 
fited by  the  victories  of  the  English  and  the  French  which 
opened  up  China.  There  is  little  further  to  note  until 
the  outbreak  of  the  American  Civil  War. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war,  Russia  took  her 
stand  ixH  the  unwavering  friend  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. In  1861  she  warned  it  that  attempts  were  being 
made  to  form  a  coalition  against  tht>  United  Stat(>s,  and 
by  her  outspoken  disapproval  of  all  svu-h  plans  she 
helped  to  discourage  them.  iier  despatcli  of  a  tieet  to 
American  waters  in  1863  attracted  great  attention.  The 

'  American  visitors  to  St.  Petersburg  were  conspicuously  well  treated. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  HUSSU 


215 


relations  of  the  United  Statei  with  England  and  France 
were  then  ho  strained  that  they  seemed  likely  to  end  in 

open  hostility,  and  rimny  porsons  were  convinced  at  the 
iiu. incut,  us  others  have  been  since,  th;it  the  Kussiun  squad- 
ron was  not  only  sent  us  un  aniioiible  demonstration,  hut 
was  the  bearer  of  sealed  orders  directing  it  to  give  aid  in 
the  event  of  an  appeal  to  arms.  Though  it  is  now  generally 
believed  that  this  last  impression  was  erroneous,  there  is  no 
trainsayiPK  tlie  op(>n  axid  emphatic  friendliness  of  the  atti- 
tude of  the  liussian  ^^overnment  in  contrast  to  that  of  most 
of  the  otiier  European  ones  in  tliis  the  hour  of  sorest  trial 
to  the  United  States.  We  may  ascribe  this  attitude  to  a 
disapproval  of  insurrections,  to  a  cordial  sentiment  toward 
the  American  rejmhiic,  and,  most  of  all,  to  a  sympathy 
with  the  etTort  to  abolish  slavery  on  the  North  American 
continent  at  a  time  when  Russia  herself  was  freeinj^  her 
serfs.  The  two  proclamations  of  emancipation  were  not 
far  from  S3rnchronous,  and  the  men  engaged  in  carrjang 
out  these  two  social  revolutions,  among  the  most  important 
in  history,  were  naturally  well-disposed  toward  one  another. 
The  Empire  ot  the  Tsars  had  also  sound  political  reasons 
for  drawing  close  to  the  Union;  for  in  this  same  year, 
1863,  a  revolt  in  Poland  led  to  the  diplomatic  interven- 
tion of  England  and  France,  which  almost  culminated  in 
a  European  war,  and  hence  the  idea  of  a  Russo-American 
alUance  against  common  foes  was  rational  enough.  How- 
ever, we  are  not  called  upon  to  go  behind  the  fact  of 
the  indisputable  genuineness  in  Russian  good-will  at  this 
time. 

As  an  expression  of  gratitude  for  this  friendly  behavior, 

Congress,  after  the  close  of  the  war,  seized  the  occasion 
of  the  escape  of  Alexander  II  from  an  att(>mpt  gainst  his 
life  to  send  a  special  envoy  to  convey  to  him  its  congratu- 
lations. The  mission  was  received  with  imposing  cere- 
monies, and  in  return  the  young  Grand  Duke  Alexis  was 


21G 


THE  UMTED  SiTATEri  Ati  A  WORLD  POWEll 


despatched  lo  America,  where  he  was  welcomed  with  popu- 
lar cnthusuisiu,  though  trouble  between  the  admiiustration 
and  the  Kussiaii  minister  at  Washington  interfered  with 
the  perfect  success  of  the  visit. 

Following  these  international  amenities  came  the  pur- 
chase by  the  United  States,  in  18G7,  of  the  Russian  territ  i  y 
in  North  America.  This  transaction,  which  was  acct  tu- 
plished  without  preUminary  disputes  or  we;irisom(>  nego  i  i 
tions,  soon  proved  a  good  bargain  to  tiie  Unittnl  Stales; 
and  it  lielped  to  confirm  American  liking  for  a  country 
that  liad  parted  with  its  possessions  on  reasonable  terms, 
and  had  peaceably  withdrawn  from  the  western  hemisphere, 
thus  freeing  one  more  portion  of  it  from  European  and 
monarchical  rule. 

For  a  generation  afier  those  events  the  friendshi])  b{>- 
tweeu  Uussia  and  America  was  an  accepted  commonplace 
in  both  countries;  and,  if  not  deep-rooted,  it  was  at  least 
sincere.  Between  Russians  and  Americans  there  are,  along- 
side of  many  radical  differences,  not  a  few  likenesses  —  in 
temperament,  in  the  j)rolilems  lliey  have  to  solve,  and  in 
their  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world.  lioth 
have  regarded  themselves  as  young  peoples  with  the  future 
before  them,  and  this  has  led  in  both  to  a  certain  contempt 
for  the  "effete"  nations  of  western  Europe.  The  conscious- 
ness of  rai)id  growth,  iA  being  the  owners  of  vast  territories 
with  huge  undeveloped  resources,  has  inspired  both  with 
the  same  buoyant  confidence  that  their  role  in  he  world  is 
just  beginning.  In  both  Americans  and  Russi;ins  we  find 
the  same  general  absence  of  pettiness,  —  the  "broad  na- 
ture," as  the  Russians  love  to  call  it,  —  the  same  ha])py- 
go-luckv  l)elief  that  they  can  make  tip  by  an  (>ffort  at  the 
critical  moment  for  any  amount  of  previous  negligeiK'e  and 
carelessness.  For  both,  the  questions  of  material  develop- 
ment have  been  much  the  same,  and  both,  though  under 
different  conditions,  have  been  occupied  with  the  task  of 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  RUSSU 


217 


fusing  many  heterogeneous  peoples  into  one  great  nation- 
ality.  When  Russians  and  Americans  have  met,  they  have 
usually  fraternized  without  (lifficiilty.  The  Americans  have 
found  tlu>  Kiisrfiiins  "K'cod  fellows"  without  that  shade  of 
oondosconsion  in  their  iittitude  which  has  sometimes  been 
irritating  in  Englishmen,  Frenchmen,  or  Germans.  The 
Russians,  on  their  side,  have  looked  on  the  Americans  as 
folk  much  Uke  themselves,  for  they  have  been  the  quicker 
of  the  two  in  ap[)re(iating  the  resemblances  between  them. 
They  have  studied  American  progress,  and  have  often  copied 
American  methods  as  those  most  applicable  to  their  own 
conditions.    Even  in  their  high  tarilf  they  have  imitated 
pretty  directly  the  example  of  the  United  States ;  and  the 
hopes  which  they  founded  upon  it  were  based  in  a  measure 
on  the  prosperity  which  the  Americans  have  obtained  under 
a  similar  system.    Russians  also  used  to  believe  that  the 
two  countries  had  one  and  the  same  hereditary  national 
enemy,  England,  with  which  both  had  fought  in  the  past 
and  would  some  day  fight  again.    Finally,  the  absence  of 
conflicting  interests  has  seemed  to  be  a  good  guarantee 
against  serious  dispute.    Such  a  friendship  bade  fair  to 
be  lasting. 

Nevertheless,  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century 
American  sentiment  about  Russia  began  to  undergo  a 
change.  In  the  form  and  in  the  practice  of  the  Slav  autoc- 
racy there  was  too  much  that  was  repugnant  to  the  ideals 
of  Americans  for  them  to  approve  of  it  in  the  long  run. 
Their  feelings  on  th(>  subj(>ct  grew  stron;^er  when,  after  the 
death,  in  1881,  of  the  hberal  Emperor  Alexand.  r  II,  a  policy 
of  reaction  set  in  under  his  successor.  Tidings  of  the  ever 
sterner  rule  of  the  imperial  government  made  their  way 
across  the  Atlantic.  In  1888  1889  the  articles  of  Mr.  George 
A  Jinan  on  tue  -iin  nan  prison  system  were  widely  read, 
and  created  a  lasting  impn^ssion.  Soon  afterwards  the 
repressive  measures  enacted  against  the  Russian  Jews 


218        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


aroused  a  sympathy  among  Americans  which  was  more  than 
academic,  for  the  meaning  was  brought  borne  to  them  by  an 
immense  immigration  of  these  same  uiifortunat  ^.  Tlurty 
years  ago  there  were  few  Jews  in  the  United  States;  to-day 
there  are  some  three-qviarters  of  a  million  in  and  about  New 
York  alone,  and  this  is  i.ie  direct  result  of  the  action 
of  Russia.     \s  might  be  expected,  this  influx  of  d^b- 
titute  aliens  has  awakened  some  alarm,   mingled  with 
resentment    against   the    country  whieh    has  unloaded 
them  on  her  neighbor.    The  liussian  answ(>r,  that  the 
United  States  is  at  perfect  liberty  to  keep  out  the  Jews 
if  it  doesn't  like  them,  is  perhaps  sufficient  from  the 
point  of  view  of  international  law,  but  it  is  otherwise  quite 
unsatisfactory.    If  you  believe  in  a  liberal  policy  yourself, 
it  is  no  consolation,  when  the  conduct  of  another  puts  a 
strain  upon  your  kindness,  to  be  informed  that  you  can 
always  protect  yourself  if  you  wish  to.    A  reply  of  this 
sort  is  nothing  if  not  irritating. 

The  persecution  of  the  Russian  Jews  brought  its  own 
punishment,  for  wherever  they  went  they  carried  with 
them  the  tale  of  their  suffering,  and  everywhere  tl  -y  could 
count  on  the  sympathy  of  th(>ir  brethren.    Although  the 
power  of  the  Jews  in  the  United  States  is  of  but  recent 
origin,  it  is  already  considerable,  especially  in  the  worids 
of  finance  and  of  journalism.    Not  only  do  they  control 
many  of  the  pubUc  prints,  but  their  strength  and  cohesion 
are  such  as  to  make  the  rest  afraid  to  offend  them.    It  was 
no  sUght  thing  for  Uussian  popularity  in  the  United  States 
to  array  itself  against  a  force  of  this  kind ;  for  even  with- 
out the  inevitable  exaggeration,  there  were  too  many 
truths  that  might  be  told,  of  a  kind  to   awaken  the 
indignation  of  the  American  peoi)le.    Nor  were  the  Jews 
the  only  fugitives  from   Russia  to  spir.ul  a  hatred  of 
the   land    they   had    left;    for,    whereas   most   of  the 
other  immigrants  into  the  United  States  are  sincerely 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  RUSSIA 


219 


desirous  of  promoting  good  feeling  between  their  old  and 
their  new  countries,  the  various  Russian  exiles,  like  the 
Irish,  have  brought  with  them  a  deep  hostility  to  those  whom 

they  regard  as  their  former  oppressors.  Very  few  genuine 
Russians,  except  stray  revolutionists,  have  immigrated  to 
America.  The  people  classed  as  such  in  the  census  have 
been  Jews,  Poles,  inhabitants  of  the  Baltic  provinces, 
Armenians,  and  others,  for  the  most  part  animated  by  an 
intense  dislike  of  their  former  masters.  By  means  of  the 
public  press,  and  the  tales  which  they  have  told  in  private, 
they  have  transmitted  their  sentiment  to  other  elements  of 
the  population.  And  here,  again,  we  must  remember  to  how 
great  an  extent  the  Americans  get  their  outside  news,  and 
the  comment  on  it,  from  EngUsh  sources  which  have  rarely 
been  friendly  to  Russia. 

Profound  as  has  been  the  effect  of  these  various  influ- 
ences, the  traditional  friendship  was  not  to  be  easily  shaken. 
We  may  say  that,  in  spite  of  everything,  Russia  and  the 
United  States  remained  on  satisfactory  terms  until  about 
1898.  The  changed  relations  which  characterized  the  next 
few  years  may  be  ascribed  to  the  directici"'  taken  by  the 
political  activity  of  the  government  at  St.  Petersburg,  both 
in  internal  and  foreign  affairs. 

Although  the  American  people  applauded  the  idea  of 
the  Hague  Conference,  which  won  for  Emperor  Nicholas 
a  short-lived  popularity,  the  favorable  impression  which 
this  step  had  produced  was  soon  obliterated  by  the  aggres- 
siveness of  Russian  diplomacy,  and  by  the  growing 
tyranny  of  the  internal  administration,  culminating  in  the 
regime  of  the  late  Baron  von  Plehve.  As  tales  of  the  sav- 
age repression  of  everything  resembling  liberal  tendencies 
reached  the  American  public,  often  doubtless  in  a  distorted 
form,  yet  with  only  too  much  truth,  indignation  waxed  hot. 
The  witlidrawal  of  the  liberties  of  Finland  excited  wide- 
spread compassion;  the  complaints  from  Poland  and  the 


220        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Baltic  pniviiicos  fcHiiid  an  echo  across  tho  water;  the  suffer- 
ings of  tlic  Arrn<  iiiaiis  evoked  pity.    Above  all  these,  the 
massacre  of  Kishinev  hlled  millions  uf  people  in  America 
with  horror ;  for  they  believed  it  to  be  due,  not  to  a  mere 
outburst  of  mob  fury,  but  to  the  instigation  of  the  authori- 
ties.   So  stronsj;  was  this  feeling  that  the  government  at 
Washington  took  the  extraordinary  step  of  meddling  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  another  great  state,  by  asking  if  a 
petition  of  Ameiican  Jews  would  be  accepted  in  St.  Peters- 
burg.   A  negative  answer  was,  of  course,  returned,  but  the 
wording  of  the  petition  had  been  ri'peated  in  the  inquiry, 
and  was  thus  given  the  widest  possible  publicity.'    The  furi- 
ous rejoinders  of  the  Russian  ])ress  and  of  its  allies,  calling 
attention  to  the  details  of  Ivnchings  in  America  and  of  the 
" water  cure "  in  the  PhiUpiunes,  counted  for  nothing:  the 
American  people  are  not  in  the  habit  of  reading  foreign 
newspapers,  least  of  all  Russian  ones.  Whether  the  nation's 
horror  about  the  Kishinev  massacre  was  expressed  in  a  cor- 
rect diplomati:  manner  or  not,  it  was  genuine,  and  to  as- 
cribe it,  as  many  forei^^iiers  did,  to  Anglo-Saxon  hypocrisy, 
showed  superficial  judgment.  The  condemnation  of  the  out- 
rage at  Kishinev  was  strongest  in  those  parts  of  the  United 
States  where  lynching  is  vinknown,  and  where  its  existence 
hi  the  country  is  regarded  as  a  stain  on  the  national  honor. 
Even  in  the  regions  where  it  is  not  so  generally  deplored, 
people  maintained  that  there  was  no  parallelism  between 
the  two  cases,  and  though  we  may  perhaps  question  their 
logic,  we  cannot  doubt  their  sincerity.   The  impression  which 
the  story  of  Kishinev  produced  was  universal  and  profound. 

In  the  meantime  a  revolution  was  taking  place  in  int(M- 
national  relations.  After  the  Spanish  War,  England  could 
no  longer  be  looked  upon  as  the  permanent  foe  of  the  United 
States  as  well  as  of  Russia ;  on  the  contrary,  the  two  Anglo- 

»  President  Roosevelt  gave  expression  to  the  national  sentiment  about 
the  massacre  in  his  annual  message  of  1004. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  RUSSIA 


221 


fiaxon  countries  wore  now  on  the  best  of  terms.    In  the  Far 
East,  America  had  adopted  tlie  English  fornmla  of  the 
"open  door";  indeed,  during  the  temporary  effacenient 
of  Knghmd  at  the  time  of  the  Boer  War,  she  had  appeared 
as  its  chief  champion.     In  1899,  when  Secretary  Hay 
demanded  that  the  powers  adhere  to  the  doctrine,  all  gave 
at  least  their  nominal  approbation,  but  Ixussia  sn  worded 
her  answer  as  to  leave  its  exact  meaning  obscure,  thereby 
arousing  American  suspicion.    By  a  curious  chance  't  hap- 
pened that  it  was  in  northern  China,  and  especially  in 
Manchuria,  tlmt  American   trade  had  lately  grown  with 
particular  rapidity,  and  th(>   poUtical   preponderance  of 
Russia  there  appeared  a  menace  to  it,  the  more  so  as  the 
advance  of  the  Russians  was  accompanied  by  strenuous 
efforts,  at  enormous  expense,  to  aevelop  the  resources  of 
the  country  for  their  own  sole  benefit.  Ordinary  competition 
on  even  terms  the  Americans  were  not  afraid  of.    They  had 
adUiifcd  the  building  of  the  Trans-Siberian  railway,  and 
they  did  not  begrudge  Russia  any  legitimate  advantages 
she  might  derive  therefrom.    What  they  did  object  to  w^s 
competing  against  subsidized  industries,  and,  still  more, 
being  kept  back  by  the  various  hindrances  which  a  rival 
in  control  of  Mancliuria  could  easily  put  in  their  way. 
The  conduct  of  the  Russian  authorities  in  the  years  pre- 
ceding the  war  with  Japan  was  most  unskilful;  at  least, 
if  the  Russians  cared  to  retain  the  good-will  of  the  United 
States.    Americans,  when  their  interests  are  concerned, 
may  not  be  more  scrupulous  than  oth(>r  people;  but  they 
are  frank  —  not  to  say  brutal  —  rather  than  tortuous,  and 
they  appreciate  frankness  in  others.    If,  after  the  Boxer 
rising,  the  government  at  St.  Petersburg  had  declared  its 
intention  of  retaining  possession  of  Manchuria,  as  the  spoils 
of  conquest,  the  Americans  might  have  grumbled,  but  in 
tlieir  heart  of  hearts  they  would  have  accepted  thedccision 
as  not  extraordinary.    Instead,  the  Russians  repeatedly, 


'  if  I 


222        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

and  even  unnecessarily,  announced  an  intention  of  evacuat- 
ing the  territory,  while  at  the  same  time  they  strengthened 
their  position  and  made  every  preparation  to  remain. 
Though  this  contradictory  behavior  may  be  explained, 
in  part,  by  a  struggle  of  opposing  opinions  at  court, 
the  American  public,  which  had  long  accepted  the  Eng- 
lish tradition  of  the  wiUness  and  unscrupulousness  of  Rus- 
sian diplomacy,  regarded  the  whole  proceedini-  with 
unconcealed  wrath,  — wrath  mixed  with  disgust  aroused 
by  tales  of  the  boundless  corruption  of  Kussian  officials 
in  the  Far  East.  These  facts  in  themselves  are  sufficient 
to  explain  why  the  Americans,  even  apart  from  their 
old  fondness  for  Jai)an,  had  become  so  thoroughly  pro- 
Japanese  by  February,  1904. 

When  war  finally  broke  out,  to  the  surprise  of  the 
Russian  government,  and  to  the  perfect  bewilderment  of 
the  people,  who  had  never  taken  the  dispute  in  the  Far  East 
seriously,  their  first  thought  was  that  the  Japanese  would 
never  have  ventured  to  run  such  a  risk  without  the  prompt- 
ings of  some  stronger  power.  Popular  cartoons  represented 
a  small  Japanese  showing  fight  on  the  strength  of  the  en- 
couragement he  was  getting  from  a  big  Englishman  anc  a 
big  American  in  the  background.  That  England  should 
favor  Japan  was  to  be  foreseen,  —  she  was  her  ally  and  the 
constant  enemy  of  Russia,  —  but  that  the  United  States, 
whom  the  Russians  had  supposed  to  be  their  friend,  should 
thus  desert  them,  was  a  grievous  surprise,  f(^r  they  were 
unaware  of  any  change  in  American  sentiment  and  had  suj:)- 
})osed  that  the  transatlantic  repubhc  was  still  their  well- 
wisher.  Their  astonishment,  of  course,  turned  to  anger, 
which  was  heightened  by  the  emphatic  tone  taken  by  the 
American  government  in  protecting  the  neutral  rights  of 
its  citizens.  For  their  part,  the  Japanese,  as  was  natural, 
did  what  they  could  to  increase  the  estrangement  by 
comniittiiig  their  citizens  in  Russia  not  to  English  but 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  RUSSIA 


223 


to  American  care,  during  hostilities,  and  by  giving  promi- 
nence to  the  demonstrations  of  sympathy  from  across  the 
water. 

Since  thon  there  has  been  a  reaction  towards  the  old  bet- 
ter feeling.  Tlie  Japanese  have  shown  that  they  did  not 
need  the  help  of  the  United  States  or  of  any  one  else  in 
order  to  carry  on  a  successful  war.  The  vast  majority  of 
Russians  hated  the  conflict,  and  they  were  thankful  to 
President  Roosevelt  for  taking  the  first  step  towards  its 
termination.  His  act  also  proved  that  the  United  States 
was  not  hostile  to  them,  but  only  to  a  pohcy  for  which  no 
one  in  Russia  itself  now  has  a  good  word  to  say.  Ameri- 
can opinion  is  again  disposed  to  be  friendly,  and  particulariy 
to  sympathize  with  the  efforts  of  Russian  liberals  in  their 
struggle  for  a  new  system  of  government.  The  causes  which 
have  alienated  the  two  countries  have  for  the  most  part 
disappeared,  while  several  of  the  factors  which  in  the  past 
made  for  amity  still  remain.  In  the  affairs  of  Eastern  Asia 
their  interests  ought  not  to  clash  again  as  they  once  did. 
To  be  sure,  this  may  happen,  and  for  the  same  reasons  as 
before ;  but  it  is  perhaps  less  probable  than  an  understand- 
ing between  them  in  regard  not  only  to  China  but  to  Japan, 
an  understanding  which  in  case  of  serious  complications 
with  the  latter  might  be  of  great  value  to  the  United 
States.  Until  Russia  has  worked  out  of  her  internal  crisis, 
whose  end  no  one  can  now  foresee,  her  influence  must  re- 
main diminished  among  nations.  But  though  she  is  far 
from  the  proud  threatening  position  which  she  held  five 
years  ago,  the  real  sources  of  her  strength  have  not  been 
touched  by  war  or  revolution.  She  will  remain  one  of  the 
leading  powers  in  the  world,  and  Americans  will  do  well 
to  strive  for  a  reestablishment  of  the  genuine  good  feehng 
which  so  long  prevailed  between  the  two  nations. 

As  for  the  other  states  of  continental  Europe,  we  need 
not  linger  here  over  American  relations  with  them.  With 


224 


THE  UNITED  tsTATEiS  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


all,  there  have  been  the  usual  interchanges  of  expressions  of 
good-will  and  negotiations  of  various  commercial  and  other 
treaties.    Tho  present  conditions  of  intercourse  with  them 

aro  normal  and  satisfactory. 

Now  tliat  Spain  no  longer  o\v  sa  foot  of  land  in  the  New 
World,  Americans  have  towards  her  that  kindly  feeUng 
which  people  are  wont  to  cherish  for  those  over  whom  they 
have  triumphed  without  too  much  cost  to  themselves. 
It  is  \v r.rth  notin;^'  that  Americans,  and  in  particular  Ameri- 
can olllcials  connected  with  Culia  or  the  Philippines,  appre- 
ciate Itetter  tlian  they  did  of  old  the  difficulties  with  which 
Spain  had  to  contend  in  governing  her  possessions.  They 
are  much  less  inclined  to  sweeping  condemnation  of  her 
motliods  than  they  used  to  be,  —  in  truth,  they  find  not 
a  little  to  admire  in  them.  With  Spain  herself  the  dealinirs 
of  the  United  States  aro  now  insi,u'nificant  ;  but  with  the 
children  of  Spain  in  the  New  W'orld  they  are  of  ever 
growing  consequence. 

W'^ith  Austria-Hungary  the  Uiiitc^d  States  has  never  had 
much  to  do.  It  applauded  the  Hungarian  insurrection  of 
IS'lO;  it  hailed  the  visit  of  Kossuth  with  tremendous 
enthusiasm.  In  1S.5.'?  occurred  the  affair  of  Koszta,  a 
Hungarian  refugee  who  had  declared  his  intention  of  be- 
coming an  American  citizen.  He  was  seized  in  a  Turk- 
ish port,  and  put  on  an  Austrian  man-of-war,  which  as 
obligetl  to  release  him  upon  the  threat  of  an  American 
vessel  of  superior  strength  to  take  him  away  by  force.  In 
ISGG,  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  soldiers  who 
supported  Archduke  Maximilian  as  emperor  of  Mexico, 
the  American  government  vetoed  a  plan  of  filling  their 
places  with  Ai  strians.  Of  late  years  Austria  and  Hungary 
have  fuiiiishe  .  a  large  contingent  to  the  immigration  into 
the  United  States. 

For  the  Italians  in  their  struggle  for  liberty  Protestant 
America  felt  the  warmest  sympathy.    She  welcomed  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  RUSSIA 


225 


new  kingdom  of  Italy  into  the  community  of  nations,  and 
the  two  were  long  on  excellent  terms.  This  harmony  was, 
however,  rudely  disturbed  l)y  the  famous  lynching  in  New 
Orleans,  on  March  15,  ISOI.  It  should  lie  n'tufMuhcred 
that  this  incident  cannot  be  compared  with  most  of  the 
lynchings  which  have  done  so  much  to  disgrace  the 
country  in  the  eyes  of  foreign  nations.  The  New  Orleans 
"massacre"  was  a  d(>liberate  act  of  leading  people  in  the 
town,  who  took  the  law  into  their  own  hands  because  tliey 
believed  that,  under  tlie  system  of  terrori/.at ion  establislied 
by  the  Mafia,  the  co\uts  of  justice  were  incapable  of 
bringing  the  culprits  to  punishment.  The  object  aimed  at 
was  attained,  for  there  was  no  more  trouble  with  the 
Mafia ;  but  the  lawlessness  of  the  episode  put  Amorifa 
in  a  de])lorable  liglit  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  It  also 
l)laced  her  in  an  awkward  situation  when  Italy  made 
complaint  of  the  treatment  inflicted  upon  her  citizens. 
The  Americans  had  no  fear  of  forcible  measures  on  the 
part  of  the  Italians,  although  the  latter  at  that  time  had 
the  stronger  navy;  but  they  realized  that  their  form  of 
federal  government  left  the  Washington  authoiities  with- 
out means  of  defending  foreigners  against  popular  vio- 
lence. Secretary  Blaine  made  the  best  that  he  could 
out  of  the  case,  declaring  that  the  United  States  was 
bound  by  treaty  to  protect  Italian  citizens  only  in  so  far 
as  it  could  its  own,  and  it  could  not  protect  ihcm  in 
New  Orleans.  This  re  ily,  which  was  rather  a  humiliating 
confession  in  itself,  failed  to  satisfy  the  government  at 
Rome.  On  both  sides  the  ministers  were  withdrawn,  and 
for  some  months  there  was  a  diplomatic  coolness,  until,  in 
1892,  Congress  voted  an  indemnity  to  the  families  of  the 
Italian  subjects  who  had  V)een  lynched,  and  Italy  accepted 
this  reparation.  The  New  Orleans  incident  lias  been  but  one 
of  several  which  have  caused  no  little  vexation  to  the  United 
States.    On  these  occasions  the  republic  has  appeared,  in 


226 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  eyes  of  the  outside  world,  as  a  power  unable  to  enforce 
in  its  dominion  the  observance  of  the  rights  of  foreigners 
which  it  has  formally  guaranteed,  rights  which  it  expects 
other  nations  to  'Icfend  in  the  case  of  its  own  citizens  abroad. 
Attention  has  just  been  sharply  drawn  to  this  state  of  affairs 
by  the  anti-Japanese  disturbances  in  San  Francisco,  and 
President  Roosevelt  has  urged  legislation  on  the  subject. 
In  consequence  of  the  large  number  of  Italian  laborers  in 
the  country  and  the  dislike  felt  towards  theiu  by  some  of 
th(ir  competitors,  outrage  upon  them  is  always  jjossible. 
Its  occurrence  would  excite  justifiable  indignation  in  Italy. 
Otherwise  relations  are  pleasant  enough,  though  some 
ItaUan  chauvinists  may  regret  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  would  as  effectually  prevent  Italian  iiitcrvcntiun  in 
aid  of  their  fellow-countrymen  in  the  Argentine  KepubUc 
as  it  would  German  action  in  Brazil. 

With  the  Ottoman  Porte  the  United  States  has  been 
on  an  amicable  footing  despite  the  openness  of  American 
sympathy  with  the  different  Christian  nationalitic^s  subject 
to  Turkey,  in  their  desire  for  freedom,  and  notably  with 
the  CJreeks  in  their  war  for  indcpcndonce.    American  in- 
dignation about  the  Armenian  massacres  was  so  intense 
that  in  the  event  of  their  repetition  the  United  States  might 
be  roused  to  intervene,  contrary  to  its  traditions  as  such 
action  would  be.    In  the  c:ise  of  Turkey,  as  in  that  of  China, 
one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  iov  the  \\  ashiiHJton  govern- 
ment and  the  officials  on  the  spot  is  the  protection  of  the 
American  missionaries.    Impartud  testimony  is  distinctly 
in  favor  of  the  good  work  which  they  do.    They  may 
doubtless  have  lacked  tact,  and  have  yielded,  from  the  best 
of  motives,  to  the  temptation  to  meddle  in  matters  not  of 
their  concern;  but  wi  can  well  believe  that  the  majority 
of  the  charges  brought  against  them  by  the  Turkish  au- 
thorities have  been  grossly  exaggerated  when  not  wholly 
false.    It  is  the  clear  duty  of  the  home  government  to  sup- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  RUSSIA 


227 


port  the  missionaries  against  persecution  as  long  as  they  do 
not  go  beyond  the  riphis  guaranteed  them  by  treaty.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  can  understand  why  the  Turkish  au- 
thorities should  rcpird  them  as  a  (laIl^^erous  miisaiTc.  Even 
if  they  ("trclully  r<'fr;iin  frnin  tcachin^^  disloyalty,  the  wIkiIc 
spirit  of  tlu'ir  instruction  cannot  tend  to  make  t)ie  dissatis- 
fied elements  of  the  population  more  content  with  existing 
Turkish  rule.  The  mere  presence  of  these  protected  strangers, 
the  representatives  of  a  hii^her  and  freer  civilization,  must 
stimidate  aspirations  which  the  Turks  "-"^ard  with  aversion. 
We  can  also  understand  why  the  government  of  the  Sultan 
should  stron},'ly  object  to  the  return  of  its  native  Syrian  or 
Armenian  subjects  who,  by  emigrating,  have  obtained  the 
privileges  of  American  citizenship.  In  its  eyes  they  are 
firebrands  of  the  worst  kind,  and  this  belief  is  not  without 
justification. 

If  the  United  States  were  to  interpose  its  protection  be- 
tween the  Turks  and  their  subjects,  it  would  soon  be  involved 
in  the  mazes  of  the  Eastern  question,  which,  like  the  various 
European  balances  of  power,  has  hitherto  possessed  for  it 
only  an  academic  interest.  Until  n(>w  it  has  steered  clear 
of  strictly  European  affairs;  and  it  has  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  partition  of  Africa,  except  in  so  far  as  it  has  safe- 
guarded its  trade  interests.  In  the  future,  even  if  it  cannot 
always  avoid  entanglements  which  it  has  escaped  in  the 
past,  it  may  well  hesitate  before  abandoning  the  policy 
which  has  spared  it  many  burdens  and  responsibilities. 


CHAI^ER  XIII 


TllK  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 

IN  tho  (liplotiiatic  sorvico  of  aiiy  c-untry  tlioro  i'^  usually 
one  fon  i^rn  post  of  prinir"  ini})oi  t  aiicc  aiuUspi'cial  iu)iu)r, 
which  is  looki'il  upon  us  the  crown  of  a  career.  Until 
lately  the  United  States  has  had  no  real  diplomatic  service, 
preferring  to  make  its  foreign  appointments  in  a  haphar  Md 
fashion,  seldom  taking  the  matter  very  seriously.  One 
place,  however,  has  be-n  appreciated  at  its  true  value  from 
the  first,  and  has  lu'en  well  filled.  The  oflice  of  American 
representative  to  London  has  been  one  often  of  weighty 
responsibility  and  always  of  high  consideration,  for  the  rela- 
tions of  the  United  States  with  Great  Britain  have  been, 
first  and  last,  more  important  than  with  any  other  power 
on  the  globe. 

The  r.  asons  for  this  are  plain.  The  American  republic 
is  of  English  origin  and  inheritance.  Its  people,  nmny  of 
them  of  EngUsh  descent,  speak  English  as  their  language, 
and  have  more  ideas  in  common  with  the  iuliabitati' s  of 
England  than  witii  those  of  other  lands.  The  L>r>:est 
foreign  trade  of  Anu-rica  iias  always  been  with  the  British 
Isles,  (ireat  Britain  holds  in  Fei  ■  ida  and  the  West 
Indies  outposts  of  the  utmost  strategic  importance  for  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  of  the  United  States,  and  farther  north 
the  two  powers  have  a  contiguous  frontier  several  thou- 
sand miles  long.  In  the  past  their  .-lations  have  rarely 
been  harmonious.     Their  interests   have   clashed,  their 

22S 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


229 


pasHions  have  again  and  again  been  excited  ugi.inst  one 
another;   and  although  they  have  had  hut  onv  actual 

war  since  the  Americans  established  tlu-ir  indi  pt  lulciice, 
they  liccii  several  tinier  <iii  the  veij^c  of  heist  ilit  ics, 

lideed  tlicrc  has  never  been  ;i  period  of  ten  }(':iis  in  which 
th<  y  hav  not  li  1  some  proionj^ed  controversy,  not  to  say 
ix  heated  dispute.  Yet  now,  in  the  face  of  all  this,  the 
intercourse  between  the  two  governments  is  marked  by  an 
V  lit  cordi  lity,  which  fairly  reflects  the  sentiment  pro- 
line bet  ei-ri  the  tuo  peoples.  The  s[>rct;icle  is  so  new 
thai  the  rest  of  the  ,.orld  has  nt)l  yet  ^oX  (juite  used  to  it, 
aii'i  finds  it  difruult  to  believe  that  violent  friendship  fol- 
lowing so  fast  on  traditional  dislike  can  be  of  long  duration. 
But  before  venturing  any  prediction  about  the  future 
relations  between  t'  •  i  wo  countries,  we  Miust  view  tin  cir- 
(  •  <\\ro<  whii  '  h;ive  alienated  theui  from  each  other 
in  w.  i'asl,  am!  iiiosr  whicli  have  bruugiit  tliem  logetlier  in 
the  last  few  years. 

After  the  close  of  the  American  Revolution,  the  causes 
of  ill-feeUng  betwtt  n  England  and  her  former  coloines 
wep-  still  nninifold.  We  need  not  wonder  that  the  long 
\ears  of  struggle  had  engeii<lered  much  liitteiiiess  on  both 
sides.  The  Americans,  who  had  experienced  all  the  hard- 
ships of  a  war  about  their  own  homes,  especially  resented 
the  use  against  them  of  Indians  and  of  German  mercenaries. 
The  mother  country,  smarting  under  lier  defeat,  could 
scarce  bo  expected  to  entertain  a  kindly  disposition  toward 
tlie  undutiful  children  who  had  allied  themselv.  s  with 
her  old  enemies  against  her.  On  the  other  hand,  a  part 
of  the  nation  had  always  condemned  the  acts  which 
had  driven  the  colonics  to  resistance,  —  Englishmen  could 
put  the  blame  for  what  had  occurred  on  the  blind  obstinacy 
of  the  King  and  his  counsellors,  —  and  there  was  ••oom 
for  hope  that  it  would  be  easy  for  the  Americans,  ;  s  il 
generally  is  for  the  ictors,  to  forgive  and  forget.    As  soon 


230        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


as  hostilities  came  to  an  end,  a  brisk  trade  again  sprang  up 
between  the  recent  foes,  and  there  seemed  good  prospect 
that  with  the  healing  influence  of  time  their  relations  might 

becomo  amicable. 

Unluckily,  the  currying  out  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
of  peace  gave  rise  to  prolonged  disputes.  The  weak  govern- 
ment of  the  American  Confederation  was  unable  to  enforce 
the  promises  it  had  made,  in  not  very  good  faith,  of  giving 
compensation  to  the  American  loyalists  who  had  been 
despoiled  of  their  property.  In  their  turn,  the  English 
delayed  the  evacuation  of  military  posts  in  the  western 
territory  which  they  had  by  treaty  recognized  as  American, 
and  this  provoked  sharp  protest  and  rejoinder.  These 
first  quarrels  were  soon  followed  by  others  of  a  commer- 
cial nature,  and  then  came  compUcations  caused  by  the 
treatment  of  American  neutral  vessels  in  the  years  of  con- 
flict between  Great  Britain  and  Napoleonic  France,  —  com- 
plications that  led  to  the  War  of  1812,  which  sowed  a 
fresh  crop  of  hatred  and  settled  nothing. 

The  long  list  of  Anglo-American  dissensions  between 
that  date  and  this  need  not  be  repeated  here  in  chrono- 
logical order;  for  our  purposes  a  clearer  idea  of  them 
may  be  gained  by  grouping  the  most  important  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  subject. 

Among  the  first  to  begin  and  the  last  to  end  have 
been  the  boundary  disputes  between  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  By  the  treaty  of  peace  in  1783  the  St.  Croix 
River  had  been  fixed  as  the  hue  of  division  in  the  extreme 
east;  but  unhappily  it  was  discovered  later  that  people 
were  not  agreed  as  to  what  was  the  St.  Croix  River.  For 
many  years  the  debate  dragged  on  to  no  purpose.  The  at- 
tempts to  arrive  at  a  solution  at  th*^  peace  of  Ghent  in 

J  O  X  r    \  lii    i  .11  i  '^i  1  V   ,      I  iiv    it      »i  :  ^  t    :  : :  iiviT.     tj^     t  : :-,  ^   \-i  \ 

Netherlands,  in  1S27,  was  accepted  by  neither  side,  and 
it  was  not  until  the  Ashburton  treaty  of  1842  that  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


231 


matter  was  at  last  disposed  of.   The  middle  section  of  the 

boundary,  extending  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  l^ocky 
Mountains,  had  been  estabUshed  "vvith  Httle  trouble  in 
1S18,  but  in  the  ref^ions  beyond  the  mountains,  where 
neither  party  was  willing  to  concede  the  other's  demands, 
a  provisional  status  of  joint  occupation  had  to  be  accepted. 
This  was  renewed  in  1827;  but  postponing  an  agreement 
meant  keeping  open  a  sore  which  steadily  got  worse,  and 
finally  the  arrangement  was  denounced  by  the  United  States. 
Tlien  followed  threats  of  war,  until,  in  1846,  tlie  affair  was 
compromised  in  the  obvious  and  rational  manner  by  pro- 
longing the  line  of  the  middle  section  westward  to  the 
sea,  a  solution  that  might  just  as  well  have  been  reached 
in  the  beginning.  Even  this  did  not  prevent  a  later  dis- 
agreement about  the  island  of  San  Juan  da  Fuca,  which 
the  United  States  obtained  in  1871  by  the  arbitral  award 
of  the  Emperor  of  Germany.  With  Alaska,  the  Americans 
acquired  another  disputed  boundary,  which  was  not  settled 
until  1903,  one  hundred  and  twenty  years  after  they  had 
begun  to  establish  the  line  of  demarcation  between  their 
territories  and  those  of  Great  Britain, 

A  second  set  of  quarrels,  also  due  to  proximity,  have  been 
those  connected  with  the  fisheries.  The  most  persistent  has 
been  the  one  relating  to  the  status  of  the  American  fisher- 
men in  the  waters  of  Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland,  where, 
as  British  subjects,  they  had  enjoyed  riglits  previous  to 
the  Revolution  which  they  were  not  williiig  to  forego  after- 
wards, and  where  by  the  treaty  of  peace  they  had  gained 
concessions  whose  extent  has  been  wrangled  over  ever 
since.  Questions  of  this  sort  are  notoriously  complicated, 
owing  to  the  many  uncertainties  connerted  with  fishing, 
and  to  diffirulties  abort  the  limits  of  maritime  jurisdiction. 
Until  the  treat.v  of  1904  ErH'jjvnd  lofit*'  b,!ul  "-T!  (^vff!  w^or°f 
disagreement  with  France.  That  with  America  still  con- 
tinues, but,  with  the  reference  of  the  matter  to  the  Hague 


232        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Tribunal,  there  is  hope  of  a  satisfactory  termination  in 
the  near  future.  In  the  Behring  Sea  controversy,  in  which 
the  United  States  supported  a  cause  that  was  good  morally 
l)ut  weak  legally,  it  was  worsted  at  the  Paris  Tril)unal 
of  1893.  The  result  has  been  the  virtual  externiinatiou 
of  the  seals.  Finally,  among  other  disturbances  due  to 
proximity,  we  might  quote  the  abortive  and  absurd  Fenian 
raids  in  the  sixties,  of  which  Canada  had  just  cause  to 
complain. 

Another  batch  of  contentions,  which  the  Americans  car- 
ried on  chiefly  under  the  banner  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
grew  out  of  the  interests  of  the  British  in  Central  America 
and  the  desire  of  both  peoples  to  control  the  proposed 
isthmian  canal.  The  Americans  were  not  long  in  repent- 
ing of  the  Clayton-Buhver  treaty  of  1<S50,  which  had 
brought  a])out  a  temporary  calm,  and  they  chafed  under 
the  restrictions  it  imposed  until  these  were  done  away 
with  by  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901. 

During  the  Civil  War,  at  the  moment  of  the  Trent  affair 
and  before  the  detention  of  the  Confederate  cruisers,  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  were  on  the  verge  of  hos- 
tilities, and  they  might  soon  have  been  again  if  tlie  latter 
power  had  not  yielded  in  the  matter  of  the  Alabama  claims. 
In  spite  of  the  ample  satisfaction  which  the  Americans  on 
this  occasion  received  by  the  award  of  the  Geneva  Tribunal, 
they  were  long  in  forgiving  the  unfriendhness  which  in 
their  hour  of  need  hail  been  shown  them  l)y  the  English, 
the  people  who  had  been  loudfsi  in  condemnation  of 
slavery.  As  for  the  Southerners,  they  felt  no  gratitude  for 
sympathy  which  in  the  end  had  availed  them  nothing, 
when  what  they  wanted  and  had  hoped  to  obtain  was 
material  assistance. 

1  u  incnilH-rin^'  tii.it  all  tiu'se  aud  various  oincr  contro- 
versies between  England  and  the  United  States  were  carried 
on  not  only  in  the  despatches  of  statesmen,  but  even  more 


THE  UxMTED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


233 


in  the  public  press,  which  envenomed  them  and  excited 

passion  on  both  sides,  we  cannot  wonder  that  the  two 
nations  were  constantly  irritated  with  one  another.  Tliis 
was  particularly  the  case  in  the  United  States,  for  such 
quarrels  loomed  larger  in  tlie  foreign  horizon  of  the 
American  republic,  where  they  held  the  chief  place,  than 
among  the  world-wide  interests  of  Great  Britain.  For  a 
si.nilar  reason  the  American  mind  was  inflamed,  by  popu- 
lar education  and  by  current  literature,  about  matters 
which  had  almost  ceased  to  attract  the  attention  of  the 
British  pubUc. 

It  is  an  accepted  theory  that  a  foremost  duty  of  the 
school  history,  and  of  the  teacher  who  explains  it,  is  to 
imbue  the  youthful  mind  with  patriotic  principles,  to 
train  the  child  to  admire  the  national  heroes,  to  arouse 
his  en+'^usiasm  for  the  triumphs  of  his  country;  but  such 
teaching  carries  with  it  the  inevitable  temptation  to  repre- 
sent the  enemies  of  the  country  somewhat  in  the  character 
of  the  villain  in  the  play.    Until  the  Spanish  War  of  1898 
the  United  States  had  never  had  a  conflict  with  a  Euro- 
pean power  except  England.    It  had,  to  be  sure,  had  a 
Civil  War  on  a  gigantic  scale,  and  a  war  with  Mexico, 
not  to  speak  of  many  encounters  with  Indians;  but  the 
Indian  battles  had  been  small  affairs  which  had  long 
ceased  to  be  of  much  account,  the  victories  of  the  Mexican 
War  had  been  over  a  weaker  nation  that  had  been  forced 
into  the  conflict,  and  the  Civil  War,  full  as  it  was  of  heroic 
episodes,  was  a  strife  between  brothers,  a  thing  which  good 
patriots  should  not  dwell  upon  too  much.    There  remained 
only  the  glories  of  the  struggle  for  independence  and  the 
acliievements  l)y  sea  (not  by  land,  except  at  New  Orleans) 
of  the  War  of  1812.    England  was  thus  marked  out  as  the 
natural  foe,  defeated  in  tlic  Pu  vuluii 'u,  repulsed  in  l?sl2 
but  ever  threatening  and  dangerous.    The  effect  of  such 
teachings  on  millions  of  children  is  not  to  be  lightly  esti- 


234       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


mated,  especially  as  it  was  reinforced  by  boys'  stories, 
sensational  novels,  Fourth  of  July  orations  and  other  elo- 
quence of  the  kir.d. 

Still  another  element  making  for  hostility  to  England 
was  furnished  by  the  immigrant  population.    For  over 
three-quarters  of  a  century  the  Irish  have  been  coming 
in  swarms  until  they  and  their  children  are  now  numbered 
in  the  United  States  by  millions.    With  a  warm  affection 
for  their  own  unhappy  land  they  have  brought  a  corre- 
sponding hatred  of  the  people  whom  they  have  regarded 
as  their  hereditary  oppressors.    They  have  told  the  tale 
of  their  woes,  they  have  continued  to  sympathize  with  the 
sufferings  of  their  brethren  at  home,  and  they  have  never 
forgotten  their  enmity  against  the  hat'^d  Saxon.    In  a 
measure,  the  loyalty  to  the  mo+her  country  of  the  English 
and  Scotch  immigrants  has  tended  to  counterbalance  this ; 
but  these  latter  have  shown  less  interest  in  their  former 
homes,  have  held  together  much  less,  and  have  not  taken 
so  prominent  a  place  in  public  life.    The  important  part 
which  the  Irish  have  played  in  American  politics  has  given 
them  an  influence  out  of  proportion  to  their  numbers.  It 
has  also  made  it  particularly  worth  while  to  win  their 
favor ;  and  what  was  an  easier  and  cheaper  way  for  the 
American  politician  to  do  this  than  by  "twisting  the  lion's 
tail"?    Naturally,  the  politi.ian  made  the  most  of  his 
opportunity.    If  he  could  gain  votes  in  this  way,  that  was 
enough  for  him.    It  is  true  that  the  largest  contingent  of 
the  immigrant  population,  that  from  Germany,  long  had  no 
motive  for  disliking  England.  Of  late,  however,  owing  to  the 
changed  relations  between  the  two  countries  and  to  the  effort 
of  both  to  stand  well  with  America,  the  German- Americans 
have  been  inclined  to  be  anti-English.    The  rest  of  the 
Euro|ji'an-born  have  no  strong  feeling  on  the  subject,  one 
way  or  the  other,  but  most  of  them  are  recent  arrivals, 
and  in  the  nineteenth  century  all  of  them  put  together 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


235 


did  not  play  on  American  soil  a  political  role  comparable 
to  that  of  the  Irish. 

For  long  the  English  enjoyed  one  distinction  which  we 
may  take  as  an  involuntary  tribute  to  them.  They  alone 
havo  been  able  to  make  the  Anicrican  people  angry  by  their 
remarks.  In  times  past,  .ibuse  from  others  rarely  got 
across  the  ocean,  and  when  it  arrived  it  was  received  with 
indifference,  or  was  looked  on  as  a  sign  of  malicious  envy, 
which  was  complimentary  rather  than  the  reverse;  but 
Eno;lish  criticism  instantly  stung  the  Americans  to  a  wrath 
which  found  vent  in  violent  answer. 

The  feeUng  of  the  English  towards  the  Americans  was 
much  less  marked.  It  was  not  hatred,  but,  rather,  con- 
temptuous dislike.  Englishmen,  not  without  reason,  were 
inclined  to  think  of  their  transatlantic  kin  as  noisy,  ill- 
mannered,  vain,  and  boastful.  They  resented  the  diatribes 
launched  against  them;  they  objected  to  the  aggressiveness 
of  American  policy,  which  so  frequently  came  into  col- 
lision with  their  own ;  and  they  detested  the  high  commercial 
tariff  in  the  United  States,  which  they  believed  to  be  aimed 
at  them  especially,  and  to  be  a  serious  injury  to  their 
interests.  It  was  hard  for  them  to  understand  how  any 
one  could  sin  against  the  sacreJ  doctrine  of  free  trade  except 
from  malicious  motives.  All  told,  especially  among  the 
upper  class,  their  opinion  of  the  Yankees  was  far  from 
flattering. 

So  numerous  indeed  were  the  causes  of  antagonism  be- 
tween the  two  English-speaking  peoples  that  it  was  easy  to 
forget  the  influences  which  were  in  steady  operation  to 
bring  them  together.  The  two  were,  after  all,  of  one  stock, 
with  a  common  language,  a  common  literature,  the  same 
system  of  law,  the  same  ideals  of  government  and  well- 
being,  the  same  standards  of  morality  and  taste, —  in 
short,  much  the  same  outlook  on  life.  Commercial  and 
other  ties  brought  them  into  continual  intercourse  with 


236       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


one  another,  au  ir  tercourse  which  the  decline  of  provincial 
self-assert'on,  on  er  e  side,  and  of  conservative  prejudice, 
on  the  other,  a^ade  more  easy  than  of  old.  Mr.  James 
Bryce's  remarkable  book  on  The  American  Common- 
wealth lit  the  same  time  made  the  United  States  better 
appreciated  in  England  and  pleased  Americans  by  showing 
that  the  English  were  capable  of  appreciating  them.  Eng- 
lishmen and  Americans  meeting  in  any  foreign  land  at 
once  felt  they  were  closer  to  each  other  than  to  any  of  the 
people  about  them.  The  famous  saying  "Blood  is  thicker 
than  water"  docs  represent  a  truth,  wiiich,  though  it  may 
be  forgotten  for  the  moment,  cannot  help  teUing  in  the 
long  run.  You  may  hate  your  brother,  but  this  does  not 
alter  the  fact  that  you  belong  to  the  same  family,  and  have 
something  in  common,  shared  by  no  outsider,  something 
which  is  always  there  to  bring  you  together  if  you  can  get 
over  the  grounds  for  estrangement. 

Since  hostility  had  always  been  less  active  on  the  part  of 
the  English,  they  were  the  first  to  entertain  friendlier  senti- 
ments. As  a  race  they  have  always  had  an  honest  admira- 
tion of  success,  and  the  Americans  of  late  had  been  amaz- 
ingly successful.  By  degrees  public  opinion  In  Great  Britain 
came  more  and  more  to  have  about  the  United  States  the 
sort  of  feeling  that  a  father  has  for  a  son  who  has  often  been 
disobedient  and  is  still  disrespectful,  but  who,  after  all,  has 
grown  up  into  a  fine,  lusty  young  fellow,  a  little  uncouth, 
but  very  vigorous,  — in  short,  one  a  father  may  well  be  proud 
of.  This  benevolent  disposition  had  grown  strong  enough 
by  1S95  to  survive  the  violent  shock  of  the  Venezuelan  dis- 
pute, which,  in  spite  of  its  rather  humiUating  termination, 
left  surprisingly  little  rancor  in  the  English  mind.  People 
accepted  it  as  another  bit  of  American  assertivonoss,  dis- 
agreeable in  itself,  but  showing  an  energy  that  deserved 
respect. 

Meanwhile  American  sentiment  about  England  was  going 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


237 


through  a  somewhat  similar  modificiition.  This  had  {)ro- 
gressed  farther  than  was  apparent  on  the  surface,  even  if 
it  was  still  too  weak  to  (jrevent  an  outburst  of  anti-English 
chauvinism  in  LSOo.  Three  years  later  we  find  a  very  dif- 
ferent state  of  aiTairs, 

There  has  been  much  discussion  about  the  attitude  of 
several  of  the  European  powers  at  the  moment  of  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  between  the  United  States  and  Spain. 
We  may  never  know  the  full  truth  on  the  subject,  but 
there  is  reason  for  supposing  that  some  sort  of  collective 
intervention  to  clieck  the  Americans  was  talked  of  —  we 
cannot  say  how  seriously.  The  assertion  of  the  English 
that  their  attitude  alone  prevented  a  European  coalition 
has  been  denied  emphatically  by  other  nations :  no  one  will 
now  admit  haviiig  thought  of  such  a  thing.  Whatever 
may  be  the  facts  in  the  case,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
general  sentiment  in  most  of  the  European  coimtries, 
especially  at  first,  was  altogether  in  favor  of  Spain.  w»-:ij 
the  sympathy  of  Great  Britain  —  of  both  government  and 
people  — was  with  America.  English  neutrality  through- 
out the  war  was  of  the  friendUest  kind,  and  Americans 
felt  that,  in  case  of  need,  they  could  rely  on  English  good- 
will and  moral  support,  if  not  on  something  more.  The 
impression  which  all  this  produced  in  the  United  States 
was  decisive.  The  national  pride  had  been  lashed  to  fury 
at  the  mere  suggestion  of  a  hostile  league  of  the  Euro- 
pean powers,  and  tlie  very  different  tone  taken  by  the 
English  awak(>ned  a  lively  sense  of  gratitude.  The  Ameri- 
can people,  Jill  at  once,  abanduned  the  tradition  that  the 
British  were  their  natural  enemies,  and  acclaimed  them 
instead  their  friends  and  brothers.  It  was  a  rather  violent 
transformation,  but  this  new  era  of  cordiaUty  between  two 
peoples  whose  sentiments  towards  one  another  had  been 
the  reverse  of  cordial  has  lasted  to  the  present  day. 

The  reasons  for  the  pro-American  attitude  of  Great 


238 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Britain  in  1S!)S  appear  to  have  boon  twofold.    First,  there 
was  a  vc'r\-  genuine  popular  feeling  that  the  Americans 
were  kinsmen,  to  whom,  in  their  struggle  with  a  decaying 
power  and  an  unenlightened  government,  English  sympathy 
should  go  out.    The  new  war  was  only  one  more  in  the  long 
scries   of   contests    between    the    Anglo-Saxon   and  the 
Spaniard,  which  had  followed  one  after  another  since  the 
days  of  Philip  II,  and  which  had  done  so  much  to  change 
the  face  of  the  world.    Secondly,  there  were  sound  practi- 
cal considerations  to  guide  the  instincts  of  the  masses  as 
well  as  to  determine  the  conduct  of  statesmen.    The  posi- 
tion of  C5reat  Britain  during  the  closing  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  was  difficult.    Her  policy  of  "splendid 
isolation"  had  thus  far  failed  to  produce  satisfactory 
results.    In  the  Near  East  she  had  found  herself  reduced 
to  helplessness,  at  the  time  of  the  Armenian  massacres,  by 
the  combination  of  Russia,  Germany,  and  France,  and  in 
the  middle  of  this  crisis  America  had  threatened  her  with 
war  from  another  direction.    In  Persia  aad  China,  the 
Russians  were  ominously  active,  and  England  might  be 
called  upon  at  almost  any  moment  to  opjiose  them  by 
force  of  arms.     In  the  Sudan,  Colonel  Marchand  was 
alr(\'V(ly  approaching  Fashoda,  and  the  British  govern- 
ment, which  more  than  suspected  this  fact,  was  fully 
determined  to  fight  France  rather  than  permit  him  to 
remain.    It  was  certain  that  a  fresh  crisis  would  occur 
before  long  in  South   Africa,  and   recollecting  the  Go"- 
man  Emperor's  telegram  to  President  Krugcr  after  the 
Jameson  raid.  Englishmen  might  well  doubt  whether  a 
Boer  war  would  not  soon  lead  to  a  general  European  one, 
in  which  the  British  Empire  would  have  to  fight  for  its  life. 
Vast  as  \v!T(>  England's  resources,  she  could  not  face  the 
whole  world  at  once.    In  view  of  the  menacing  questions 
which  pressed  for  solution  in  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  what 
could  be  wiser  than  for  her  to  free  herself  from  all  appre- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


239 


hension  in  at  least  one  quarter?  The  friendship  of  the 
United  States  at  this  moment  was  well  worth  serious  sacri- 
fices, not  only  of  pride  but  of  inatorial  interests. 

Seldom  hiis  the  wisdom  of  a  policy  of  concession  been  ao 
fully  justified  in  so  short  a  time.  When  the  South  African 
War  broke  out  in  the  autunm  of  1899,  pubhc  ojnnion  on  the 
European  continent  was  overwhelmingly  pro-Boer.  Europe 
expected,  too,  that  American  sympathy  would,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  be  enlisted  on  the  same  side  —  an  expectation 
that  was  quite  justifiable.  If  we  look  at  the  whole  history 
of  American  ideals,  since  the  earliest  days  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  nation,  we  may  say  that  there  never  wivs 
a  cause  more  calculated  to  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
people  than  that  of  the  handful  of  Dutchmen  fighting  hero- 
ically for  their  freedom  a}j;ainst  the  infinite  resources  of  the 
greatest  emj)ire  of  the  world.  The  Boers  were  more  like 
the  "embattled  farmers"  of  Lexington  and  Bunker  Hill 
than  any  other  insui^ents  in  the  last  hundred  and  twenty 
years,  and  the  enemy  they  had  to  face  was  the  same.  The 
analogy  of  the  two  struggles  was  so  obvious  that  it  seemed 
as  if  it  must  appeal  to  the  American  imagination ;  and  in 
truth,  it  did  so  appeal,  but  it  was  met  and  neutralized  by 
counter-considerations.  If  the  Boer  War  had  occurred 
a  few  years  earlier,  there  can  be  Uttle  doubt  that  sympathy 
in  the  United  States  would  have  gone  out  unreservedly 
to  the  Dutch  farmers,  who  would  have  been  continually 
compared  to  the  heroes  of  the  Revolution.  Now  the 
situation  was  changed.  Young  as  the  new  Anglo-American 
friendship  was,  it  had  already  struck  deep  root.  When 
England  had  stood  by  the  United  States  against  the  enmity, 
and  —  as  the  EngUsh  declared  —  against  a  coaUtion,  of  the 
European  powers,  was  the  United  States  to  combine  with 
those  same  powers  when  England  in  her  turn  found 
herself  isolated?  Such  an  act  would  look  like  the  black- 
est ingratitude.    If  the  English  and  the  Americans  were 


240       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


brothiTs,  ;is  hixd  just  luM'n  so  loudly  trumpotcd,  should 
not  brothera  support  ejich  other  in  time  of  need?  It 
may  be  imagined  that  the  Eu^rlish  wore  not  sparing  in 
their  use  of  this  argument,  of  which  the  Americans  recog- 
nized the  force. 

There  wus  ;ilso  ivnother  crucial  re:if<ou  why  the  Ajnoric;in 
public  did  not  feel  free  to  declaim  about  English  oppres- 
sion in  the  good  old  way :  the  insurrection  in  the  Philippines 
was  just  then  in  full  hhist,  and  thou^,'h  it  was  all  very  well 
to  declare  that  the  l-'ilipinoa  and  the  Boers  wer(>  very  dif- 
ferent people,  and  that  the  senseless  revolt  of  the  Malay 
islanders  against  their  benevolent  protectors  was  quite 
another  matter  from  the  heroic  struggle  of  the  Dutch 
pioneers  to  maintain  their  independence,  nevertheless  an 
uncomfortable  consciousness  remained.  If  one  lectured 
the  English  on  their  sins,  the  retort  was  too  obvious.  Al- 
together, it  was  not  a  hapi)y  moment  for  the  Americans  to 
hold  forth  on  the  sacred  right  of  "government  with  the 
consent  of  the  governed." 

The  cause  of  (Ireat  Britain  would  in  any  case  have  found 
partisans  in  the  United  St  -(s.  The  strug^de  in  South 
Africa  could  be  depicted  as  one  for  Anglo-Saxon  supremacy 
or  as  one  between  modern  progress  and  hide-bound  con- 
servatism. The  contention  of  England  that  all  she  had 
demanded  was  fair  treatment  for  her  citizens  settled  in  the 
Transvaal  appealed  to  American  love  of  justice.  In  conse- 
quence of  all  these  opposing  claims  on  their  sympathy  the 
attitude  of  the  Americans  on  the  subject  of  the  South 
African  War  was  :iin)j;ularly  hesitating.  There  were  warm 
friends  of  both  combatants;  still  more  people  condemn  .! 
neither  of  them,  and  all  were  glad  when  the  wearisome  con- 
flict came  to  an  end.  Bat  this  attitude  of  hesitation  was 
of  immense  service  to  England.  If  the  United  States  had 
from  the  outset  shown  itself  in  favor  of  the  Boeir^,  the 
European  powers  who  wishea  to  intervene  might  well  have 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGL.\ND 


241 


taken  heart  to  do  so,  and  have  brouglit  on  a  wur  whose 
results  would  have  been  incalculable. 

From  this  time  on  nothing  occurred  to  ruffle  the  good 
relations  between  the  two  lMi^'li.sh-s[)eakiii!.r  pcofile,  except 
the  short  episode  of  .\n^^lo-(  lerinaii  iiiterventiiin  in  Venezuela 
in  l!)()2,  which  indeed  an^^ered  the  Americans;  hut  when 
English  publii,  opinion  unanimously,  as  well  as  vociferously, 
condemned  the  action  of  the  ministry,  they  turned  all 
their  ire  aj^ainst  the  Germans.  Since  then  Great  Hritain 
has  continued  her  policy  of  "^'raceful  c. .iicessioiis."  By 
tlie  second  1  lay-l*auncefote  treaty  she  consented  to  release 
the  Americans  from  the  irksome  Clayton-Bulwer  u^^reement, 
and  to  give  them  a  free  hand  on  the  isthmus  for  the  con- 
struction of  an  intoroceanic  canal.  In  the  settlement  of 
the  Alaska  boundary  (iisi)ute,  they  a^ain  ^ot  the  better  of 
the  bargain,  either  on  account  of  Knglisli  desire  t(.  be  con- 
ciliatory, as  the  Canadians  have  charged,  or  becau.se  they 
really  had  the  better  case,  as  is  more  likely;  for  the  high 
character  of  the  EngUsh  arbitrator,  the  only  impartial 
member  of  the  commission,  appears  a  sufficient  guarantee 
that  tlie  decision  was  just.  To  be  sure,  it  would  be  foolish 
to  expect  the  .Xmericans  to  be  grateful  for  wliat  they 
have  obtained  in  this  way,  —  the  winner  in  any  contro- 
versy believes  that  his  success  is  but  a  proof  of  the  right- 
eousness of  his  cause,  —  still,  they  appreciate  the  fact  that 
the  English  in  the  last  few  years  have  gone  out  of  their  way 
i)e  agreeable  to  them,  and  they  are  themselv(>s  well 
disposed  in  consequence.  At  the  present  day,  the  two 
l)eoples  are  on  the  friondliest  footing,  and  both  believe  that 
there  is  every  ren^on  why  they  should  remain  so. 

Most  foreigners  are  mclined  to  doul)t  this,  and  to  point 
to  their  many  quarrels  in  the  past  ,  but  the  causes  of  the 
majority  of  these  quarrels  h  we  now,  in  one  way  or  another, 
been  removed:  the  boundaries  arc  at  last  fixed,  the 
canal  question  is  settled,  ICngland  has  accepted  the  Monroe 


242       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORL?>  PtWER 


Doctrine  even  to  '  'u'  extent  of  with  ii  i  aIuj^  most  of  hcf 
forces  from  Amoricun  waters,  all  but  a  few  of  ihe  fwals  in 
Bohrinf?  St'a  have  been  ^  illed  off;  only  the  isherie  (jueti' 
tion  reiii.iitis,  aii'l  this  hiSt  is  soon  f.  be  adj  -ati'd  by  the 
Ila^ue  Tribunal.  p.     i'  ti<'   ii     irinii  ,.>n  of    ^  iiuT 

Aineri  a  ii"  I'mj^'er  in cUh  t'   look  (»n  Kuglan-;  aS  the  rer' 
tary   toe.     lionianee^    >   'i   now  »ie;il  with   the  r  j-  ini 
\m<  rican  War,  or  th     ontest  in  the  Philippines,  or  the 
inarch  on  Peking.     New  s       rts  of  'lisputt    m  i,     pri  i^ 


tf 


ar 

le 

pile 


uj),  but  to-day  tfi    li  riz.  x  rene. 

the  two  onnntrie';  hiv  v  follu  ve. i  <     hu  <■ 
"  ir  their  interest-  nave  eoinen   i..     Gra% . 
between  the  Uni  -d  St-  'es  and  Ja,.an  mi'-'iJ 
Britain  in  an  awkward  position,  but  Gn  at  B 
sell  is  not  entir.  y  free  from  difficult  es  wit!   .1;  . 

hou},'^!   trade   ri    ilr\    will  continue  t 
so  ki   II  III  '     I  I    i'^n^laiid  and  the  Ui  ^ 
bet  veeii  •     ii  '  '  tlieiu  and  '  lerniai  y.  -n 
taritf  is  no  longer  looked  on  ;iR  a  specitica!?v  ni 
invention,    some  En^jli.  .imen  ind(-.  i  are  iVio\.« 

nd  thfp    '  11    he  no  (h>ul)f    that     :e  ■  ntv 

Li  on  iiii'ler  a  hi;^hlv  pro'-   tjve        '    ..       s  a.  ■ 
to  -tiinul    v-  the  iaoveni''nt  ai  d    at  Briiaui 
reforn!.'" 

Meanwhile,  the  pr^  ''•es«  of   ime  a  id  th( 

•  'hei 


.\8t 
V, 
H 

'It  Co  it 


ain  h( 
ax.  \ 
is 

aS  i- 


It, 

the 

h 

n 


m-  anf  of  comi'  'iiiii-  ' 
pi        ity,  wdii  rh(  j 
sarily  reason 
reverse     l)Ut  where 
for  m-  ual  understan 
and  iiiterchaage  i<i< 


'mp 


18 


betwe« 


Lon 


.10 


of 
Mere 

n(  <'es- 
just  the 
it  makes 
le  travel 
aerica ; 


■  If  ax   novcmont  .shoi      t  mpb 

gainer-  So  far  they  ?iavp  f  t      tn  iiiir. 

h'lt  II  ipf"       'isjtonis  ■    ■.,     .r  high 

cortai  i,.  urablf  t.  tl,  m. 


leans  w  not  b<>  the 
I'css  to  Brit  ish  marketii, 


le  An 
icted  . 

•referential  duties  would  alnuwt 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND 


243 


alp  idy  i  <:r  s  a  considcrutilc  Ameriran  colony  in  i,on- 
(loii,  ami  intcriiati  .al  niarriap  H  art'  ut  infn-f  u  ni  ;  tiio 
KhoUefi  scholarships  bring  uome  American  Htu'icnts  to 
Oxford  i  lough  most  prefer  the  oontin>iit);  tin  arf  in- 
tcri  itioi  1  races  and  tournamon'  of  v;iri(«us  kiinis ;  i  )r- 
taiit  liook  ,1  'pcar  simidtancously  m  (Ircat  liritaMi  ami  tlui 
IJiiiU'd  St.itcH,  and  any  really  surci  ssfid  play  k>  sure  to  i>e 
seen  in  both,  —  in  short,  visible,  as  well  as  invisible,  ties 
bind  the  t\\  >  countries  ever  closer  together. 

One  last  <i  icstion  to  be  considered  in  judging  of  the  per- 
raanoncp  of  An^l  i-.\nirri<  in  liar  runy  is  u  thcr  ho  prcst  nt 
friendship  is  i'  -('piiiij;  with  'In-  };cn(<ral  ti  ii'l  cf  the  mod- 
ern world.    \\       n  aflirni  without  Ik  sitation  th.it  it  is. 

\t  different  p*  riods  in  the  hi^tc  of  mankind  nations 
h  •  shown  a  tendency  to  group  t  nisei ves  according  to 
Oh  or  another  cnmmon  senMnient.  \t  tiint  >  has  In  ti 
the  relii^ious  lotive :  wihics';  CI,  i.sti.ui  coalition  of  the 
Crusades  atra,  st  the  Mohamnu-dan  Ea.^  and  agaiii  the 
hostile  Caiholi  and  Protestant  Icjigucs  m  the  sixteenth 
and  sevent'  r  centuries.  At  other  moments  similar  prin- 
ci[  les  of  ,  fnent  have  led  to  political  groupings,  as 
when,  aftc"  nonarchical  Europe  gathered  about  the 

Holy  Allian-  ^  the  id*  a   that  the  free  r(>pulilics  of 

the  Wvat  hu>  itural  coriununity  of  interests  was  the 

basis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    But  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury the  feeling  of  nationality  was  the  most  potent  instru- 
ment in  uniting  peoples,  notably  in  the  case  of  Italy  and 
Germany.    This  l  ist  si  ntini'  nt  is  still  in  full  forco,  as  is 
shown  by  the  pres'  iit  Pan-Germanic  and  other  movements, 
an<l  it  is  coming  to  i.iclude  not  merely  members  of  the 
same  nationality,  but,  in  some  vague  way,  the  people  of 
kindred  nationalities.    We  thus  have  the  Pan-Slavic 
tion,  r'io  dreams  of  Latin  union,  Pan-lberiaiiism, 
sonu>  Pan-Teutonic  aspirations,  although  th  '  l- 
are  not  flourishing  just  now.    Whether  any  of  ihe. 


244       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


movements  will  lead  to  permanent  political  results  may 
perhaps  be  doubted,  but,  taken  together,  they  pr.  v*e  that 
at  present  kinship,  real  or  imac^nary,  is  potent  in  deter- 
mining the  sympathies  of  nations.  Looked  at  from  this 
point  of  view,  tlir  reeent  revolution  in  the  feeling  of  the 
two  Enghsh-spcaking  peojjles,  instead  of  being  an  isolated 
event,  is  but  a  manifestation  of  a  general  tendency.  The 
discovery  that  "blood  is  thicker  than  water"  is  but  the 
Anglo-Saxon  way  of  expressing  a  belief  whicli  has  affected 
most  civilized  peoples  in  recent  times.  It  niatt(M-s  not 
that  American  blood  in  the  future  will  l)e  quite  a  differ- 
ent mixture  from  English  —  children  by  adoption  count  as 
members  of  the  same  family.  Many  people  in  Italy  and 
France  hail  the  South  American  republics  as  "Latin  sisters," 
though  some  of  them  are  rather  black  or  brown  ones. 

To  sum  up,  we  may  say  that  there  seems  to  be  good 
reason  for  optimism  aboiit  future  relations  betwd  i  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States.  We  must  not  forget,  how- 
ever, that  if  the  disappearance  of  past  causes  of  dissen- 
sion, on  the  one  hand,  and  the  strengthening  of  natural 
ties,  on  the  other,  promise  well  for  the  continuance  of  the 
present  cordiality,  they  cannot  guarantee  it.  Ther(>  may 
again  be  sucli  sharp  divergences  of  interest  as  to  reawaken 
former  animosities,  if  not  to  lead  to  r,ctual  conflict.  Eng- 
lishmen and  Americans  would  equally  deprecate  any  such 
occurrence,  and,  as  far  as  they  alone  are  conc(>rned,  there 
is  snuvll  ground  for  apprehension.  But  in  the  dealings  of 
the  I'nited  States  with  (Ireat  Britain,  the  Dominion  of  Can- 
ada nmst  be  of  increasing  importance.  Before  many  years 
elapse,  Americans  may  be  called  upon  to  put  their  relations 
with  the  Dominion  in  the  forefront  of  their  national  inter- 
ests and  cares.  If  this  should  happen,  it  could  not  fail  to 
affect  their  attitudi  toward  the  nioth(>r  countrv.  which  pro- 
tects Canada;  and  it  would  be  additional  ground  for  de- 
siring her  good-will. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 

IN  any  consideration  of  the  political  future  of  the 
Dominion  of  Canada,  and  particularly  in  a  survey  of 
its  relations  with  the  United  States,  we  should  begin  by 
recalling  two  fundamental  facts.  They  are  sometimes  lost 
sight  of  by  Canadians,  and  they  arc,  we  may  admit,  less 
important  than  they  once  were,  but  they  are  permanent, 
and  will  always  exert  an  influence. 

The  first  of  these  facts  is  that,  as  has  been  well  said  by  an 
eminent  Canadian  writer,  "whoever  wishes  to  know  what 
Canada  is,  and  to  understand  the  Canadian  question,  should 
begin  by  turning  from  the  political  to  the  natural  map.  The 
political  map  displays  avast  and  unbroken  area  of  territory, 
extending  from  the  boundary  of  the  United  States  up  to 
the  North  Pole  and  equalling  or  surpassing  the  United 
States  in  magnitude.  The  physical  map  displays  four 
separate  projections  of  the  cultivatal)le  and  habitable  part 
of  the  continent  into  arctic  waste."  These  four  "projec- 
tions" are  tlie  Maritime  Provinci  s,  Old  Canada,  the  North- 
west, and  British  Columbia.  They  are  separated  from  each 
other  by  thinly  inhabited  wildernesses  or  by  mountain 
ranges,  and  though  this  separation  is  less  marked  than  it 
was  when  Mr.  (Joldwin  Smith  wrote  the  above  words  and 
will  bccomt^  less  marked  still  as  (Canada  fills  up,  nevertheless 
it  remains  true  that  the  Dominion  consists  and  will  consist 
of  four  separate  geographical  regions.  This  might  not  matter 

246 


246       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


in  itself,  were  it  not  that  each  of  these  regions  has  a  closer 
natural  connection  with  the  American  territory  to  the 
south  cf  it  than  it  has  with  the  iieurest  Canadian  section. 

Secondly,  alon^!;  the  four  thousand  odd  luiles  of  frontier, 
for  the  most  part  ;ieeid(>ntal  and  artificial,  the  population 
north  and  south  of  the  dividing  line  is  largely  the  same. 
An  exception  must  be  made  in  the  cast,  where,  in  spite  of 
the  large  Canadian  colonies  south  of  the  boundary,  there 
exists  a  national  as  well  as  a  fairly  satisfactory  treoj^rapluoal 
separation  between  th(»  French  Canadians  and  their  neigh- 
bors of  New  Kn^'land  and  northern  New  York.  Everywhere 
else  we  find  essentially  the  same  folk  on  both  sides:  they 
speak  the  same  language ;  they  have  the  same  laws,  ideas, 
and  general  characteristics.    The  Nova  Scotian  is  more  like 
the  New  Englander  than  the  New  Englander  is  like  the 
Vir^'inian ;  between  the  people  of  Ontario  and  those  south 
of  the  Lakes  the  difference  is  shght ;  and  from  Lake  Superior 
to  the  Pacific  there  is  virtually  none  anywhere.   From  one 
ocean  to  the  other  the  differences  between  the  English-speak- 
ing population  on  the  two  sides  of  this  far-flung  line  are 
smaller  than  those  between  the  inhabitants  of  north(<rn  and 
southern  France,  Germany,  or  Italy,  and  are  insignif ';ant 
compared  with  those  between  the  dwellers  in  English  and 
French  Canada. 

In  view  of  these  truths,  and  that  they  are  such  is  hardly 
to  be  gainsaid,  we  cannot  avoid  the  double  conclusion  that 
tue  union  of  Canada  into  one  Dominion,  less  tlian  half  a 
century  a^o,  was  a  somewhat  artificial  jirocess,  and  that  the 
present  separation  of  Canada  and  the  United  States  is  the 
result,  not  of  natural  forces,  but  of  historical  accident.  Both 
the  union  and  the  separation  may,  none  e  less,  W  per- 
manent. Modern  science  has  overcoi,  iny  obstacles, 
and  t--"-'''-r"-  trPtP,!?!^ !»ntip.e!!t :>!  railw;-.  the  Canadian 
provinces  are  now  Ixnind  tc  cne  another  in  a  way  that 
would  have  been  impossible  a  century  ago.    Moreover,  in 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


247 


the  last  few  ycj^rs,  there  have  grown  up  a  sentiment  for 
Canada  and  a  pride  in  her  which  have  created,  over  and 
above  the  old  common  loyalty  to  the  British  crown,  a 
new,  stronger  bond  of  common  patriotism,  felt  in  all  the 
Dominion,  by  French  as  well  as  English.  There  is,  then, 
a  Canadian  nationality,  as  there  is  a  Swiss  and  a  Belgian, 
and  this  nationality,  when  not  actually  hostile  to  the 
Americanism  of  the  United  States,  is  at  least  consciously 
differentiated  from  it.  The  question  of  the  future  is,  Which 
are  going  to  prevail  in  the  long  run,  the  geographical 
and  ethnographical  influences  that  tend,  and  must  tend,  to 
draw  Americans  and  Canadians  together,  or  the  historical 
circumstances  which  keep  them  apart? 

After  the  cession  of  Canada  to  Great  Britain  by  the  peace 
of  1703,  most  of  the  colonists  who  had  the  meaoy  to  re- 
turn to  Franco  left  the  New  World.  There  remained  only 
some  seventy  thousand  peasants,  with  no  one  to  guide  them 
save  their  priests.  These  held  them  firmly  together,  and 
have  remained  their  leaders  till  the  present  day.  At  first 
the  English  government  tried  to  Anglicize  its  new  subjects; 
but  later  it  abandoned  this  policy,  to  the  regret  of  ardent 
patriots  to-day,  who  declare  that  a  httle  persistent  firnmess 
would  in  time  have  made  Canada  English  in  every  respect. 
This  assertion  appears  hazardous  when  we  remember  the 
tenacity  shown  by  the  French  Canadians  in  the  maintenance 
of  their  own  nationality.  If  they  had  been  oppressed,  they 
might  in  their  discontent  have  thrown  in  their  lot  with  their 
neighbors  across  the  border.  As  it  was,  when  the  American 
Revolution  broke  out,  they  did  nothing  of  the  kind.  They 
had  no  reason  to  love  Great  Britain,  but  the  British  American 
colonists  were  their  particular  .hereditary  otiemies,  for  the 
colonial  wars  of  the  eightcM-nth  century  had  been  carried 
on  less  by  the  regular  troops  from  home  than  by  the  settlers 
on  both  sides,  and  had  left  a  legacy  of  ill-feeUng  behind. 
What  the  Canadians  would  have  prf.'ferred  was  a  return  to 


248       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

French  rule,  but  this  the  Americans  would  not  consent  to 
under  any  circun.stances.    It  was  clearly 
treaty  of  alliance  of  1778  that  France  might  regain  all  that 
she  could  in  the  West  Indies,  but  was  not  to  claim  her  former 
possessions  in  the  North.    The  readiness  with  which  she 
agreed  to  this-the  Americans  were  not  in  a  position  to 
enforce  such  terms-may  be  ascribed  to  the  exaggerated 
importance  attributed  to  the  West  Indies  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  and  to  the  absurdly  inadequate  understanding  of 
he  vaL  of  Canada.    It  is  not  certain  that  the  An.encans 
have  not  lost  by  this  poUcy.    As  has  been  said  if  Canada 
had  become  French  in  17S3,  it  would  not  improbably  have 
fallen  to  the  United  States  ere  now. 

English  and  Canadian  writers  have  descanted  eloquently 
on  the  aid  rendered  by  the  Canadians  to  Great  Britain  dur- 
ing the  American  war  for  independence.   There  is  exaggera- 
tion in  this,  for  in  the  critical  days  when  Montgomery  and 
.\rnold  attacked  Quebec  in  1775  and  1776,  the  local  popula- 
iion  remained  almost  neutral.    Later,  it  is  tme  they  took 
H  more  active  part,  when  they  had  been  embittered  by 
the  lack  of  respect  shown  by  the  colonial    roops  to  the 
Catholic  churches,  and  by  the  fart  tliat  the  soldiers  perforce 
paid  for  the  stores  they  took  with  the  continental  currency 
'hich  was  worthless  to  the  recipients.     The  f^lui^  of 
Arnold  decided  that  Canada  should  not  be  a  part  of  the 
United  States.   The  defeat  of  Burgoyne,  on  his  counter- 
invasion  of  New  York,  assured  American  independence. 
In  the  peace  negotiations  at  Paris,  Frankhn  asked  for 
Canada,  in  order  to  avoid  further  .lispute  between  England 
and  America  ;  but  when  his  suggestion  was  rejected,  he 
did  not  press  the  matter,  feeling  doubtless  that,  as  the 
region  was  whoUy  in  English  hands,  he  had  no  tenable 
cl^m.    The  Americans  did  succeed  ir.  ^biammg  the  O  no 
Valley,  which,  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  colonies  after 
its  ceiion  by  France,  had  been  united  to  Canada,  but 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


249 


had  been  conqiu^red  by  the  Americans  during  the  war. 
Patriotic  Canadians  have  deplored  this  as  the  first  of  the 
scries  of  England's  "surrenders"  of  their  welfare  to  "Yankee 

claims." 

F or  Canada,  the  most  immediate  result  of  the  Revolution 
was  that  she  received  all  at  once  a  larger  accession  of 
English  population  than  she  would  otherwise  have  got 
fur  many  years.   The  Revolution  had  been  a  prolonged 
civil  war,  in  wl)ich,  as  happens  in  such  cases,  the  defeated 
party  had  suffered  severely  at  the  hands  of  their  neighbors. 
First  and  last,  some  fifty  thousand  Loyalists,  or  Tories,  fled 
to  Canada,  where  the  British  government  did  its  l)ost  for 
them,  settling  them  in  the  Maritime  Provinces,  and  more 
especially  in  the  present  province  of  Ontario.  They 
brought  with  them  the  memory  of  thnir  sufferings,  and  the 
intense  bitterness  against  their  oppressors  which  is  pecuHar 
to  exiles  who  have  been  driven  from  their  homes  by  pohtical 
strife.    The  story  of  their  hardships  has  been  handed  down 
to  later  generations,  and  must  be  taken  into  account  in  any 
study  of  the  causes  of  Canadian  hostility  to  the  United 
States.    By  the  Canada  Act  of  1790  the  home  government 
divided  its  territory  into  the  two  provinces  of  Upper  and 
Lower,  or  English  and  French,  Canada,  wliich  were  equally 
unfriendly  to  the  new  republic. 

The  War  of  1812  is  recounted  very  differently  in  American 
and  Canadian  histories.  American  writers  describe  it  as 
having  been  brought  about  by  a  succession  of  British  out- 
rages on  the  high  seas.  They  devote  comparatively  httle 
space  to  the  rather  insignificant  battles  by  land,  except 
to  the  defeat  of  the  attack  on  New  Orieans.  Thei  atten- 
tion is  taken  up  with  the  gallant  exploits  of  the  young 
American  navy.  Canadians  depict  the  war  as  a  mean 
iiitempt  (.f  the  United  St;.t-.H  to.  gr^i])  their  country  at  a 
time  when  Great  Britain  was  engaged  in  a  life-and-death 
struggle  with  Napoleon.    They  show  slight  interest  in  the 


250       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

battle  of  New  Orleans  and  none  at  aU  in  the  sea-fights. 
Instead,  they  dwell  on  the  patriotism  o    the  Canadxan 
population  of  both  nationaUties,  the  gallantry  of  their 
militia,  the  brilUant  and  successful  defence  o  a  lon^'  hne  o 
frontier  against  a  foe  of  greater  power.    They  look  back 
on  the  conflict  ^vith  a  proud  satisfaction,  seldom  sus« 
pected  hv  n.ost  people  in  the  United  States   who  are 
unaware  of  il     importance  their  neighbors  attach  to  it, 
and  faa  to  realize  that  north  of  the  frontier  the  memones 
Ti  the  war  are  still  cherished  and  help  to  keep  the  two 
nations  apan. 

Tt  w  i<  inrvitul.le  that  the  long-spun  boundary  disputes, 
lu.^huun..  With  the  one  about  the  northern  frontier  of  Maine 
too  ainbiguously  determined  in  1783,  and  ending  with  the 
establishment  of  the  boundary  of  Alaska  in  1903,  should 
make  bad  blood  between  the  two  parties.    The  Canadians 
as  the  weaker,  have  felt  a  more  vital  interest  in  these 
contentions,  and  having,  on  the  ' 
the  agreements,  they  have  attributed  their  ill  fortune  to 
the  readiness  of  England  to  sacrifice  them  in  order  to  avoid 
trouble  with  the  United  States;  and  they  have  been  cor- 
respondingly embittered.    This  belief,  we  may  remark  rests 
on  the  comfortable  assumption  that  they  ^wre  in  the  right 
on  every  occasion,  and  that  whatever  they  lost  in  the  final 
decision  was  a  "surrender."  ^    r  n  in 

During  the  nineteenth  century  the  growth  of  Canada, 
though  steady,  was  not  rapid.    In  1811  the  two  provinces 
were  united,  and  in  time  immigration  from  Great  Britain 
made  the  English-speaking  inhabitants  ^  f  ^Jj^ 
number  of  settlers  from  Scotland  and  from  the  North 
of  Ireland   has  been  so  great  that  this  sturdy  loyal 
element  forms  a  much  more  considerable  ingredient  of  the 
population  than  it  does  farther  south.    As  for  the  Irish 
Cathohcs,  circumstances  have  assigned  to  them  au  cs- 
peciaUy  important  role,  not  wholly  in  keeping  with  their 


Ti.i5  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA  251 

behavior  elsewhere,  that  of  ruodf  :a^.rs;  for  it  is  they 
who  prevent  national  and  nliiriuus  antagoui.sni  in  the 
pn.vituTs  from  coinciding.  The  .'xtreme  Protestants  of 
Otitano  tlH>  ,l,>votrd  Fronch  Catholics  of  Quebec  are 
sc'puratm  troni  eadi  oth<-r  l.y  h  deep  religious  hostility,  as 
well  as  by  their  difTcrenc.s  of  speech  and  of  racial  charac- 
tenstics.  It  is  most  formate,  then,  that  there  is  a  strong 
Insh  contingent  to  '  ,  o  one  side  in  questions  of  language, 
to  the  other  in  matt        lating  to  the  church. 

With  Lord  El^rin's  tieaty,  in  1851.  a  new  period  began  in 
the  history  of  the  trade  between  Cana.hi  and  her  southern 
neighbor.    So  profitable  did  this  ,,rove  to  the  former  coun- 
try that  the  latter  came  to  feel  that  it  had  got  the  worst  of 
the  bargain.    It  was  also  incensed  by  the  sympathy  which 
Canada  showed  for  the  South  during  the  Gvil  War  In 
consequence,  when  the  period  for  which  the  trade  treaty 
was  made  came  to  an  end  in  1865,  the  agreement  was 
not  renewed.    Justifiable  as  such  action  may  have  been 
from  a  commercial  point  of  view,  it  was  none  the  less 
short-sighted.    If  the  Americans  believed  that  Canada  would 
one  day  come  into  the  Union,  they  should  have  prepared 
tiie  way  for  tlie  ever.t  by  cultivating  close  trade  relations, 
even  If  the  weaker  state  did  in  the  meantin.e  get  the  greate^ 
profit  from  them.    Wise  foresight  would  have  dictated  the 
same  sort  of  policy  in  the  United  States  as  was  shown  by 
Prussia  m  her  formation  of  the  German  ZoUverein  -a  will- 
ingness to  sacrifice  small  temporary  advantages  in  favor 
of  large  aims  for  the  future.    But  a  popular  government 
IS  seldom  guided  by  such  long  views  if  they  mean  im- 
mediate  loss. 

The  purchase  of  Alaska  by  the  United  States,  in  18(i7,  was 
an  unwelcome  stroke  to  the  Canadians.  Thanks  to  it  the 
Aniericans,  especially  since  the  boundarv  dispute  was  set- 
ued  to  their  advantage,  have  held  British  Columbia,  with 
her  small  sea-coast,  as  it  were  in  v.  vice.    The  steady 


252       Tilt:  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

t      Artificial  ...atio.,,  favored  by  f^e  «oven.- 
rno.,t  .md  acceded  to  slowly  and  uiuviUm-ly  by  the  Mantin  e 

P^ret Td  by  Briti.  c„,  i.i.,  <."^';-"i':;-„:;: 

1871     Prince  Edward's  Island  came  m  m  18/3 ,  ^c^Mo^xna 

'tor a' I;"-...  new  Do^nion  «.ew  but  dow^-, 
and  ln  il  tl.e  building  of  the  Canadian  Pacific  .t.  consUtU" 

^th  Ontario.   At  each  Canadian  census  tl>o  slow  proves 
71  country  with  such  splon.lid  possibiht.os  awoke  fresh 
d  sappointnfont.    Contrasted  with  the  rapid  growth  of  the 
fru bho  to  the  south,  it  was  painful  to  national  pnde. 
Tlu"    L  the  desire  for  American  markets  was  strong  m  the 
lindL  of'n>any  Canadians,  and  as  the  X-- 
memories  of  former  disputes,  there  was  f"'  »  '  "'^J^J™. 
aderal.lc  thousrh  never  active,  feehng  in  fa^or  of  annex. 
ti„r        th  a  l;   ...  f..storin«  care  the  An.ortcanB  rmght 
{:::;  nu;«.d  thi.  *ntune„t  into  •         'o™;  »' 
which  they  oevei  troubled  their  heads  "^out 

One  thing  above  all  others  smeyed  P^'*" 
the  steady  emigration  across  the  border,  aetllt.s 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA  253 


attracted  to  the  southward  by  the  greater  activity  and 
prosperity  which  they  found  there,  and  year  after  year 
they  went  over  in  thousands,  obtained  profitable  employment 
and  remained  permanently.  According?  to  the  United  States 
census  of  lOOO,  there  were  then  nearly  twelve  hundred  thou- 
sand people  of  Canadian  birth  in  the  United  States.  If 
we  add  to  them  the  children  bom  in  the  United  States  of 
Canadian  parents,  we  get  a  total  of  some  two  million,  two 
hundred  thousand  lost  to  the  Dominion,  or  about  thirty 
per  cent  of  what  its  total  population  would  have  been  at 
that  date  if  they  had  remained  at  home.  Even  this  does 
not  tell  the  whole  story,  for  it  leaves  out  of  account  many 
immigrants  to  Canada  from  Great  Britain  who  have  after- 
wards gone  southward.  The  English-speaking  Canadians 
have  scattered  throughout  the  Northern  States,  and  have 
followed  occupations  of  all  kinds.  In  most  cases,  they 
have  soon  had  themselves  naturalized,  and  are  not  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  Americans  about  them.  The  French 
Canadians  also,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  clergy  to 
keep  them  back,  have  wandered  away  in  large  numbers, 
and  have  settled  chiefly  in  the  mill  towns  of  New  England. 
At  first  they  left  Quebec  with  the  intention  of  returning,  as 
many  have  done,  but  most  have  come  to  stay  in  their  new 
homes.  To  counterbalance  this  terrific  loss,  the  Canadian 
census  of  1901  could  show  only  127,899  Americans  in  the 
whole  Dominion. 

W "iih  the  opening  years  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  tide 
at  last  began  to  turn.  Although  the  population  of  the 
Maritime  Provinces  remains  almost  stationary,  and  that  of 
the  central  region  is  not  increasing  very  fast,  the  new  western 
part  of  the  Dominion  is  advancing  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
Men  have  discovered  that  wheat  .  be  cultivated  much 
farther  north  than  had  previously  been  supposed ;  indeed, 
the  conditions  of  climate  and  soil  appear  to  be  more  favor- 
able to  its  growth  in  Canada  than  in  the  territory  im- 


254       THK  UNITED  STATES  A8  A  WORLD  POWER 

tiiodiatrly  to  tlu'  south  of  hor.    Moroovrr,  .is  tlu-  Unit.-d 
StuU'rt  is'dailv  getting  in()r(>  crowdrd,  and  us  it  has  now  no 
^rcat  new  regions  left  to  opi  n  up,  it  may  before  long  cease 
to  produce  more  than  enough  grain  for  its  own  consump- 
tion.   Its  place  as  the  chief  wh(  at-oxporting  country  in 
the  world  is  coveted  by  Canada.    And  ^'rain  is  not  her 
sole  relianc(^ :  h(>r  forests  will  be  called  on  more  and  more 
to  supply  the  lumber  which  their  depleted  American  rivals 
will  be  unable  to  furnish;  her  fisheries,  both  in  the  east 
and  in  the  west,  are  of  untold  value;  she  has  copper  north 
of  Lake  Superior,  coal  in  Nova  Scotia  and  elsewhen>,  mint  d 
wealth  of  all  kinds  in  her  Rocky  Mountains  only  wai*ui^ 
to  bo  exploited,  and  near  the  Alaska  frontier  the  goUl  of 
the  Klondike.    These  resources,  which  are  just  beginning 
to  be  developed,  hold  forth  a  brilliant  promise  for  the 
future.   Thanks  to  all  this,  and  also  to  very  strenuous 
advertising,  immigration,  which  in  1901  was  still  under  fifty 
thousand,  in  1006  had  risen  to  215,912;  and,  a  greater 
triumph  still,  the  number  who  came  from  the  United 
States  had  risen  in  these  years  from  less  than  eighteen 
thousand  to  nearly  sixty-four  thousand.   The  Canadians 
are  tasting  the  sweets  of  revenge. 

One  need  not  wonder  if  this  new-born  prosperity  has  had 
an  almost  intoxicatinj?  effect  on  their  imatjination.  Their 
dreams  an;  indeed  of  the  rosiest  kind.  They  see  no  Umit 
to  their  growth,  and  talk  of  the  day  when  their  land  shall 
support  hundreds  of  millions  of  inhabitants.  As  they  put 
it,  "The  United  States  has  been  the  country  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  Canada  will  be  that  of  the  twentieth."  Even  the 
climate,  which  is  rather  dreaded  by  people  at  a  distance, 
is  lauded  as  one  of  the  attractions  of  the  Dominion. 

Of  course,  we  must  not  take  the  words  of  such  enthusiasts 
too  seriously.  Americans,  in  particular,  are  so  familiar  at 
home,  with  the  buoyant  optimism  which  revels  in  a  fair 
future,  while  overlooking  some  of  the  ugly  realities  of  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


255 


present,  that  they  can  afTord  to  be  indulgon*  wlien  they  find 
it  in  others,  especially  when  there  is  so  much  justification. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Canada  is  at  last  developing 
rapidly,  that  she  has  iinri'onse  unexplored  resources,  and  is 
capable  of  supporting'  a  }>.  ,/ulation  several  times  larger  than 
the  one  now  living  within  her  borders.  We  nuiy  not  share 
all  her  admiration  for  her  climate,  —  it  has  been  well  said 
that  the  heat  of  the  stove  is  as  debilitating  as  that  of  the 
sun, — yet  the  winter  is  not  only  endurabh'  for  the  white 
race,  but  it  is,  on  thn  whole,  healthful  and  bracing.  In 
character  antl  resources  Canada  resembles  Siberia  more  than 
she  tloes  any  other  territory  ;  but  her  elinuite  is  less  rigorous, 
her  scenery  finer,  and  the  p.Dportion  of  her  good  land  is 
somewhat  greater.  Granting  that  her  wheat-fields,  like 
Siberia's,  extend  much  farther  north  than  was  once  sup- 
posed possible,  she  has,  after  all,  a  vast  extent  of  barren 
wilderness  which  can  never  be  of  much  value.  Wheat 
lands,  too,  desirable  as  they  are,  do  not  need  a  very  large 
population  to  work  them  in  our  day  of  improved  machines 
and  extensive  cultivation.  Canada  can  never  possess 
the  variety  of  staples  produced  by  the  United  States  with 
its  much  more  varied  conditions.  Cotton,  silk,  tobacco, 
sugar-cane,  rice,  many  kinds  of  fruit,  and  other  Southern 
products  are,  in  the  nature  of  things,  impossible  of  culti- 
vation there.  The  mineral  wealth  is  immense,  but  we 
may  well  doubt  whether  it  is  equal  to  that  of  the  United 
States,  —  at  present  the  output  is  not  a  fifteenth  of  the 
American.  When  all  is  said  and  done,  Quebec  was  founded 
before  New  York,  and  if  the  resources  of  Canada  were  greater 
than  those  of  her  southern  neighbor,  the  world  would  have 
discovered  the  fact  before  now. 

There  is  also  nothing  in  the  beginning  of  an  emigration  to 
the  northward  that  need  alarm,  or  even  astonish,  Aiiiciicans, 
especially  while  it  is  st'll  only  a  twentieth  of  what  they 
themselves  are  receiving  from  outside.    It  is  true  that  this 


256       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

,  nuu-ratinn  is  nuidr  up  of  .srvWvnX    Wnm  Ks,-  [H'rha|.s  the 
best  tl.M  CanadH  is  ^?Ht.n^,  -  1-  -t  the  niowrnvni  m  lt«*'lf 
is  natural,  and  is  the  continuation  of  one  tl  ;.t  has  run 
through  the  history  of  the  Unifd  States.     W  .t  .  <v.  ry 
di-cado  the  frontier  lino  of  (•ul.mi/ati.m  uas  pu.h.'d  farti.  r 
and  farther  1u  the  ^v.-st^va.d,  ui.t.l,  t..Nvai(l  tl;.  md  of  the 
„i„Hr..nth  ceiituiv,  there  were  no  new  traets  to  open  up, 
except  Okhihi.ina,  and  no  part  of  Canada  haa  grown  m  the 
last  ten  vears  as  OWahoma  has.    But  U8  the  frontu-r  whi.h 
has  played  such  a  part  in  the  hist-ry  c,f  th,  AnuMwai* 
West  disappeared,  men  diseoveivd  that  in  (  a.ia.h.  tliere 
uere   vet   un..p.  led  re^h.ns,   and  the  old  movement  set 
in  aKuin,  this  tinu-  to  the  northward.    The  original  settlers 
who  have  pressid  on  after  finishing  their  pioneer  work 
in  their  first  homes,  have  not,  howevt  r,  left  a  waste  be- 
hind them:  their  j.laee  has  been  filled  by  ne     on.ers.  who 
have  increased  with  the  di  veh.pment  of  tl.  .ouutry.  ihe 
farmer  who  has  s..ld  his  land  in  Iowa  to  seek  virgin  soU 
in  \ll)crta  i.uiv  be  tlie  sun  of  a  man  who  parted  with  his 
acres  in  Ohio  to  go  to  Iowa,  and  the  grands.)n  of  ..ne  who 
left  New  York  or  Pennsylvania  for  Ohr>.    And  f.^r  froni 
being  left  vacant,  New  Y.  'k  and  IVnns>    ania  have  eaeh 
to-day  a  larger  iM.pulatioi.  than  that  of  the  whole  Donun- 
ion.    Aiiieneans,  then,  have  no  cause  to  be  alarmed  at  the 
prosperity  of  their  n.  ighbors  any  more  than  they  have  to 
depreciate  it.    Unluckilv  they  must  put  up  with  the  fact 
that  one  of  its  effects  has  been  to  heighten  national  con- 
sciousneas  and  a  sense  of  rivalry  with  them. 

It  is  in  the  nature  of  things  that  then>  should  hi-  much 
nu.re  hostility  to  the  Lnited  States  among  Canadians 
than  there  is  to  Canada  among  Americans.  This  is  to  be 
expected  between  two  peoples  of  unequal  strength,  when 
the  weaker  has  a  succession  of  grievan. .  s  against  the 
stronger,  and  is  suspicious  of  its  desi-ns  f<.r  the  tuture. 
For  instance,  we  might  conceive  of  the  Belgians  hatmg 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


267 


the  French  when  the  Fn'nch  were  innomil  of  hostile 
feeling,  or  perhaps  of  any  feeling  at  all,  toward  the  Bel- 
gians. Canadu  is  as  I  rge  as  the  United  States,  but  the  differ- 

cnro  lu  tw. en  tlictn  ii  population  and  developed  resources  b 
^Tcatcr  than  that  Ix  ween  Franrc  and  Hel^'iiini.  W'v  roed 
not  be  surpriHed,  th*  efore,  if  Canadian  newspapers  abound 
in  hits  at  America,  while  the  American  ones  botlu  r  tin m- 
selves  little  about  Canadian  affairs.  But  in  order  to  get  a 
complete  understanding  01  the  attitude  of  the  Canadians, 
we  must  exaniiiie  separately  the  several  elements  that 
make  up  the  popuhit ion. 

Of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Dominion,  the  Irish  Catholics 
are  probably  the  most  friendly  to  the  United  States.  They 
have  inherited  little  loyalty  to  England  and  her  King, 
and  they  know  that  millions  of  their  fellow-eountrymen 
have  found  a  happy  home  south  of  ti  e  border.  They 
have  nothing  to  lose  by  annexation,  nor  have  th{>y  cause 
for  sentimental  repugnance  to  it ;  they  may  therefore  be 
counted  as  an  influence  tending  to  draw  the  two  countries 
closer  to  one  another. 

Th(  French  Canadians  are  in  a  different  position.  Al- 
though thev  are  still  affected  by  inherited  national  and 
'igious  antipathy  to  the  Americans,  th(<  old  reasons  for 
'u)stility  have  in  ^r'^a*  measure  disappeared.  Time  has 
softened  the  meir«  ncs  of  the  colonial  feuds,  and  the 
Fnited  States  1.  >  mts  among  its  inhabitants  some 
fifteen  million  thriving  and  contented  people  of  their 
fj'ith.  Ilumir.ds  of  thousands  of  the  French  Canadians 
''■emselves  h.^ve  fc.nJ  a  home  and  a  living  in  the  iNew 
i'f.gland  States.  To-day  the  prejudice  of  the  French 
Canadians  is  hardly  stronger  against  Americans  than  it 
is  aga'Mst  tlieir  fellow-Canadians  of  I'jiglish  stock.  Never- 
theless 've  fl'.d  among  tli'  !ca(l(  s  of  the  French  an  invin- 
cible rep  .gnance  to  the  idea  of  annexation,  a  repugnance 
based  no  longer  on  prejudice  but  on  a  simple  calculation. 


258       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

Theybeliov.  that  annexation  would  b.  fatal  to  their  future 
It  is  true  that  tlu-ir  old  dream  that  the  Hench  element 
in  the  Dominion  might  in  time  outnumber  the  English, 
is  now  impossible  of  fulfilment;  still,  the  Fi.nch  bid  fair 
to  be  an  important  fraction  of  the  population  as  bng 
as  Canada  remains  independent.    Bat  if  she  should  be 
annexed  to  the  American  republic,  they  would  at  once  be 
reduced  to  a  position  of  hopeless  insignificance,  so  hopeless 
that  one  may  doubt  whether,  in  the  long  run,  they  could 
preserve  their  nationality.   The  clergy  too  are  fearful  of 
ihe  more  liberal  spirit  of  the  Catholic  church  in  the  I. ni  ed 
Sfites     Thev  have  already  notice.l  that  their  flocks  in  ^ew 
En,4and  are 'less  dorile  than  at  home,  where  the  paynient 
of  rithes  IS  enforced  by  law.    Considerations  hke  these 
explain  the  well-known  saying  that  the  last  shot  in  defence 
of  British  sovereignty  on  the  American  contment  will  be 

fired  bv  a  Frenchman.  ,  ,>     •  , 

The  En^'lish  and  the  Scotch  of  the  central  1  rovmce  of 
Ontario  are  the  lull  embodiment  of  the  typical  Canadian 
and  old  anti-American  sentiment.    In  the  Maritime  Prov- 
inces this  feeling  is  less  strong,  and  the  new  West,  with  its 
mixed  population,  is  subject  to  other  influences:  but  in 
Ontario  there  is  still  the  inherit.  ^  anta-onisn.  of  the  Loyal- 
ists who  i\i-d  fron>  the  revolted  colonies.    Memories  of  their 
.vrmiK^s  and  sufferings,  as  well  as  later  ones  of  the  glonous 
repulse  of  the  invaders  ir  the  War  of  1812,  have  be.Mi  per- 
petuated in  legend  and  in  popular  literature.  Traditions 
of  the  sort  arc  not  v:.>\\y  h^rpotteii. 

The  patriotisn.  nf  rar-adians  has  besides  been  kept  warm 
bv  their  kn..wlr,l^'e  ti>at  any  fresh  war  between  the  United 
^td.s  nul  England-  and  we  know  how  often  one  has  been 
tluvatened-must  begin  with  an  invasion  of  their  ter- 
ritorv,  which  thev  would  have  the  utmost  difficulty  m 
repei'ing.  In  truth,  the  calm  way  in  wl>ich  the  Aniericans 
have  taken  for  granted  -  wrongly  or  rightly  -  that  they 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


259 


could  occupy  Canada  without  much  trouble  whenever  they 
tried,  has  caused  natural  resentment  across  the  border.  It 
must  be  admitted,  too,  that  the  general  tone  of  careless 

rondosronsion  which  has  marked  both  the  public  and  the 
l)riv;ito  utterances  of  Americans  when  speaking  of  their 
kinsmen  in  the  Dominion  is  a  sufficient  cause  for  anger  in 
itself;  such  phrases  as  "manifest  destiny"  and  "paramount 
position  in  the  western  hemisphere"  are  highly  irritating. 
This  has  long  been  endured,  but  the  national  pride  of  the 
Canadians,  always  well  developed,  has  at  last  something 
sulistantial  to  feed  upon.  The  present  growth  and  pros- 
perity of  their  country  and  its  brilliant  outlook  for  the 
future  are  a  consolation  for  the  slights  they  have  had  to 
put  up  with.  They  are  cured  of  all  desire  for  annexation 
or  feeling  of  dependence,  and  they  were  never  less  in  a 
mood  to  make  concessions. 

By  a  certain  poetic  justice,  now  that  the  Canadians  are 
no  longer  seeking  for  American  favor,  people  in  the  United 
States  are  beginning  to  regret  their  own  previous  indifference 
towards  Canada.  Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  they 
held  the  comfortable  belief  that  somehow  or  other,  as  a 
result  of  a  war  with  En},'land  or,  more  probably,  of  "p(>acr- 
ful  attraction,"  the  northem  half  of  the  continent  would 
come  to  them  by  "manifest  destiny."  Although  this  opin- 
ion has  been  expressed  with  the  franknes."  characteristic  of 
American  utterances,  nothing  has  been  done  to  aid  destiny: 
the  treaty  of  ISf)!  was  not  renewed,  only  a  futile  protest 
was  made  against  the  formation  of  tlr^  Dominion,  and  the 
increasing  American  tariff  duties  have  never  taken  Cana- 
dian wishes  into  account.  Of  late,  howe\er,  men  have 
perceived  that  the  United  States,  in  its  dealings  with  its 
northern  sister,  has  not  made  the  most  of  its  favorable 
position.  Canada  has  suffered  from  American  tariff  restric- 
tions, liiif  s(i  far  f"ii:n  haviti^r  been  brought  to  her  knees 
by  them,  she  has  artificially  built  up  lier  native  industries 


260       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

un.lor  tlu-  sh.'lt.r  of  u  high  taritT  of  hrr  own,  first  under  the 
uovcrnnu  ut  of  th.  Conservative  party,  and  now  under  that 
of  the  Liberals,  who  used  to  be  tho  worn  partisans  of 
free  trade.  To-day,  on  both  sUh  s  -f  liu-  l.nr.U  r  ilu  re  are 
powerful  influences  oi.posr.l  to  rlnsc-r  trrule  re.atu.ns  _ 

iTi  these  davs  of  popular  n„vernnient  and  protected  in- 
terests the  making  of  .-onuuercial  treaties  i.  Kottn.g  more 
and  mc-e  difficult.    No  one  interest  shows  any  rea.hness  to 
let  itself  be  sacrificed  for  the  general  good,  and  i-a.'h  <  ai> 
exact  the  support  <.f  others  by  thrr:.tening  to  .lesert  tlu  .u 
in  turn.    A-ain,  the  selhsh  .opposition  of  a  nnnontv  to  eveiy 
measure  that   tlnvatens  to  be  t.>  th.-ir  disadvantage  is 
usv.  illy  luueli  nu.re  determined  and  persistent  than  the 
action  of  a  majority  inspired  only  by  zeal  l\«r  the  general 
welfare.    Both  Canada  and  the  Tnit.-d  States  now  hav 
high  duties  on  each  otlu  r's   ,'oods.  a  .l  n<..ther  s.-e.ns  to 
be  in  a  temp-r  to  vi,  Ul  ar.ythin:.'.    It  is  true  tliat  son.e  per- 
sons in  tlu-  Stat.s  are  ben.r.ung  convinced  that  closer  con- 
nection witli  the  Dominion  is  most  desirable.     Ihis  is 
particularly  the  case  in  New  England,  where  the  manti- 
facturers  are  eager  f-^r  the  free  importation  of  leather,  wool, 
and  Nova  Scotia  coal.    But  it  does  not  look  at  tlie  present 
moment  as  if  the  rfforts  of  New  E.igland  were  likely  to 
load  to  nu,cl>      espe.  ially  as  they  meet  ^vith  little  encour- 
agement from  any  quarter.    And  yet  Boston  is  the  natural 
port  of  eastern  Canada. 

Since  the  Canadians  d..  not  receive  for  their  exports  to 
the  United  States  nr.-l>alf  the  money  they  expend  on  their 
in.ports  fron,  there,  tl>ey  are  convinced  that  they  are  m  a 
pu.nion  to  stnke  the  harder  of  the  two  in  the  ev-ent  of  an 
•utual  tariff  conflict.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans 
have  alwavs  in  reserv.-.  in  ease  of  financial  war,  th.>  sus- 
pension of"  the  bondinu'  vn^^\r^r.  As  th.e  St.  Lauien.'e  ,s 
frozen  in  winter,  and  Halifax  and  St.  John  are  foggy  and, 
if  the  passage  through  Maine  were  closed,  would  be  far 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


261 


away,  this  is  a  weapon  of  considerable  potency,  but  one 
to  be  used  only  at  last  resort.* 

To  Americans  the  relations  between  Canada  and  ot!ier 
British  possessions  are  not  without  itnportaiice.  It  was  at 
Canadian  instigation  tliat,  in  IS'.K),  the  lihiine-Bond  Con- 
vention of  the  United  States  and  Newfoundhuid  was  dis- 
approved by  the  imperial  government.  Newfoundland 
may,  sooner  or  later,  enter  the  Dominion ;  but  the  Americans 
have  no  reason  to  be  eaj^er  for  a  consununation  wliich, 
anionti;  other  tiiin<rs,  will  hariUy  tend  to  make  the  fisheries 
dispute  easier.  Another  possible  contingency  that  would 
affect  them  is  the  union  which  has  been  suggested  between 
the  Dominion  and  the  British  West  Indies.  Now  that 
England  has  aljandonetl  her  old  rivalry  for  the  predomi- 
nant ])ositi()n  in  the  Caril)))(>an  Sea,  and  has  withdrawn 
from  liieie  jiiost  of  her  soldiers  and  shijis,  the  Ameri- 
cans wi)uld  not  welcome  newcomers  upon  the  scene. 
We  should  hear  before  long  of  Canadian  interests  in  the 
Panama  Canal.  Indeed,  the  annexation  of  the  British  West 
Indian  Islands  would  give  Canada  somewhat  the  same  ad- 
vantaiiie  of  jiosition  as  regard.-  the  l  iiited  States,  though  in 
a  lesser  degree,  that  the  Americans  obtained  over  her  by 
the  purchase  of  Alaska.  It  would  also  provide  her  with  a 
tropical  territory  of  her  own,  whose  prosperity  she  might, 
and  probably  would,  stinmhite  by  a  bonus  on  its  sugar  and 
other  exports.  In  rejtiindcr  the  United  States  cduld.  if 
it  wished,  hit  ])ack  very  hard:  an  import  on  fruit  from 
Jamaica  would  pretty  nearly  ruin  the  island.  Fimdly,  it 
is  worthy  of  note  that,  though  the  Dominion  is  the  largest 
of  the  American  countries,  it  is  still  only  a  foreign  colony, 
not  a  free  republic,  and  it  lias  therefore  not  been  invited 
to  send  representatives  to  tlie  Pan-American  congresses. 

'  Tiic  '-ii-<p('tisiiiii  iin(;li(  l)c  :i|i|ilicil  in  part  ;  f'>r  iii-^tam  c,  against 
K<mh1s  from  unothor  country  la-iu'liliug  by  preferential  duties  denied 
the  United  States. 


262       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

\t  present,  the  political  situation  of  Canada  offers  her 
many  advantuges;  for  she  enjoys  almost  compUte  solf- 
govemment,  and  is  at  the  same  time  protected  by  the 

power  of  the  British  Empire.    This  arranRem.Mit  eannct, 
ho\vev(M-,  hist  in.h'tinitely.    In  a  generation  or  two,  when 
the  Dominion  eomes  to  cont  .in  a  population  approaching 
and  tlien  surpassmg  in  numbers  that  of  the  mother  coun- 
try it  will  scarcely  remain  contented  with  the  status  of 
a  mere  possession,  whose  official  head  is  appointed  from 
abroad,  whose  acts  are  Uable  to  the  veto  of  the  home  gov- 
ernment, and  whose  diplomatic  rehitions  witli  ioreign  powers 
•ire  directed  from  London.    It  is  in  the  last  particular  that 
changes  mav  first  be  expected.    Where  and  how  they  ^y^\\ 
end  cannot  as  yet  be  foretold,  but  then-  are  three  possible, 
and  not  unlikelv,  stAutionsto  the  pro])lem  of  the  future  of  the 
country;  namelv,  imperial  fc.U'ratinn,  complete  indepen- 
dence, and  annexation  to  the  United  States.   W  Inch  of  these 
shall  prevail  is  a  question  of  supreme  interest  to  Americans. 

The  arguments  in  favor  of  an  imperial  federation  —  of  a 
Greater  Britain,  of  whichCanada  sliall  be  a  vital  part  -  are 
both  sentinu-ntal  and  practical.    Tlie  (U-votion  to  England 
of  her  children  in  the  western  hemispliere  lias  been  mani- 
fested on  more  than  one  occasion,  and  notably  at  the  time 
of  the  South  African  War.     Even  admitting  that  the  con- 
tingent which  Canada  sent  into  the  field  was  hardly  largi 
enough  to  warrant  the  stir  made  about  it,  we  need  not 
doubt  that  if  the  mother  country  were  engaged  in  a  more 
desp(>rate   struggh',  one   putting  a  greater  strain  on  her 
resources,  —  for  instance,  the  protection  of  India  against 
invasion,  —  the  colonies  would  give  far  more  aid  than  was 
necessary  against  a  handful  of  Boers.    Recently  Canada  has 
afforded  another  proof  of  her  pro-Britisli  sentiment  —  and 
that  under  a  French  pn-mier  —  in  the  preferential  tanlT, 
amounting  on  some  goods  to  thirty-three  i.nd  one-third  per 
cent,  granted  to  England  and  to  some  of  the  other  British 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AXD  CANADA 


203 


colonics.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  idea  of  being  an  equal 
member  in  the  eomniunity  of  the  hirgest  and  most  popu- 
lous empire  hi  the;  world  is  one  to  aj)peiil  to  the  imagina- 
tion, a  magnificent  dream  capable  of  rousing  the  utmost 
enthusiasm  in  those  who  glory  in  the  greatness  of  the 
English  name.  It  is  also  one  which  has  for  the  Canadian 
farmer  attractions  of  a  more  prosaic  kind.  Such  an  em- 
pire would  pretty  certainly  be  bound  together  by  prefer- 
ential duties,  if  not  actual  free  trade  between  the  menibers 
and  a  protective  tariff  against  outsiders,  and  this  would 
give  Canadian  wheat  a  decided  advantage  on  the  London 
market  over  rival  grain  from  Russia  or  Argentina.  There 
is  no  valid  reason  for  regarding  this  dream  as  chimerical 
simply  because  the  principles  which  it  embodies  received 
a  check  at  the  last  English  election.  In  one  form  or 
another  the  federation  of  Greater  Britain  is  quite  possible, 
and,  though  the  issue  will  not  be  settled  in  a  day,  it  bids 
fair  to  become  within  a  generation  one  of  the  most  mo- 
mentous in  politics. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  United  States  tliere  would 
be  no  cause  to  welcome  this  federation.  If  it  should  be 
based  on  internal  reciprocity  with  protection  against  other 
nations,  American  exports,  both  raw  materials  and  manu- 
factured goods,  would  suffer.  So  vast  are  the  markets 
included  in  the  domain  of  (Ireater  Britain,  so  imposing  is  its 
situation  almost  everywhere,  that  if  tliis  greatest  of  empires 
were  to  follow  a  policy  of  exclusion  toward  others,  it  might 
provoke  a  le.ague  to  break  its  power.  In  such  a  league,  too, 
the  United  States  might  conceivably  have  a  place ;  for,  from 
the  closeness  of  its  relations  with  British  America,  it  might  be 
forced  either  to  become  a  part  of  this  ( irenter  Britain  or,  as  a 
matter  of  self-preservation,  to  oppose  it.  Tins  may  be  fanci- 
ful speculation  about  the  distant  future,  but  it  is  a  fact  of 
the  present  that  the  drawing  together  of  Great  Britain  and 
Canada  is  in  no  sense  to  the  benefit  of  the  United  States. 


204       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  VVORLU  i'OW  ER 

So  f;ir,  however,  Canadian  pubUc  opinion  is  inclined  to 
look  forward  not  to  absorption,  but  to  ultimate  indepen- 
dence, with  friondship,  uiid  perhaps  an  alliance,  with  (livater 
Britain.    Canadians  to-day  are  so  full  of  life  and  confidence, 
so  proud  of  their  resources,  and  so  entranced  with  their 
dreams  of  their  own  future  that  nothing  could  seem  niore 
glorious  to  them  than  the  destiny  of  Canada  herself.  Ihc 
prospect  of  her  being  merged  in  a  larger  empire  does  not 
appeal  to  thein.    Above  all,  it  possesses  no  attraction  for 
the  French  (^anadians,  who  would  be  an  even  more  insig- 
nificant minority  in  Greater  Britain  than  in  the  American 
Union.    Besides,  though  traditional  fealty  to  the  old  coun- 
try and  to  the  crown  is  strong  (except  among  the  Irish)  in 
Ontario  and  the  Maritime  Provinces,  in  the  far  West  it  is 
an  exotic  plant,  too  delicate  to  flourish  in  such  sod  In 
these  new  regions,  with  their  mixed  population  imbued 
with  the  materialisiu  of  frontier  Ufe,  the  whole  tone  is 
latter-day  Amencan  rather  than  English/   The  people 
are  too  matter-of-fact,  too  much  taken  up  with  their 
everyday  affaire,  to  indulge  in  such  luxuri(^s  as  loyalty 
to  a  distant  throne;  to  them  it  seems  very  unreal  senti- 
mentality. ,j 
From  an  independent  Canada  the  United  States  would 
have  Uttle  to  fear.    Strong  and  respected  as  such  a  state 
might  be,  it  could  hardly  be  dangerous.    Cana.hms  who 
believe  that  their  interests  have  repeatedly  been  sacrificed 
by  the  mother  count rv  are  wont  to  declare  that  they  could 
nuanage  their  foreign  affairs  l)etter  themselves.    Once  in- 
dependent, they  would  have  full  Uberty  in  this  respect. 
But  the  Americans  would  certainly  not  complain  if,  m 
future  discussions  with  their  northern  neighbors,  they  no 
longer  had  to  think  of  such  .  ontin-iMicies  as  the  blockading 
of  New  York  and  San  Francisc.j  by  English  fleets. 

'  The  English  immigrants  in  Canada  are  far  from  being  generaUy 
popular. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA 


265 


There  remains  the  third  possibility  for  the  Dominion: 

direct  annexation  to  the  United  States,  or  union  of  some 
kind  with  it,  either  with  or  without  a  previous  period  of 
coiiiph'te  independence.  This  possibility,  which  for  over  a 
century  most  people  in  the  United  States  and  not  a  few  in 
Canada  expected  soon  to  be  realized,  never  seemed  farther 
off  than  at  the  present  day.  Annexation  is  for  the  moment 
a  dead  issue.  The  United  States  is  not  eager  for  it,  and 
CaiKidians  are  almost  unanimously  opposed  to  it.  They  no 
Ioniser  care  even  for  reciprocity,  which  they  once  longed 
for.  In  each  country  the  community  as  a  whole  is  well 
satisfied  with  the  present,  and  confident  of  the  future,  and 
it  feels  no  need  of  a  combination  which  must  demand  some 
concessions,  not  to  say  sacrifices.  In  each  country,  too, 
there  is  a  protective  tariff,  whose  beneficiaries  will  not  of 
themselves  give  up  a  jot  of  their  individual  advantage  in 
order  to  help  along  some  general  political  idea.  Why,  then, 
should  the  Dominion  and  the  republic  ever  unite,  when 
each  is  so  well  off  alone? 

The  answer  is,  to-day  is  not  eternity  or  even  to-morrow. 
.Men,  parties,  protective  tariffs,  national  ambitions,  change, 
and  change  suddenly :  the  forces  of  nature  remain.  Noth- 
ing can  alter  the  fact  that  the  natural  connection  of  every 
part  of  Canada  is  with  the  lands  to  the  south  of  it  rather 
than  wiih  those  to  the  east  or  the  west.  Railways  and 
tariffs  may  turn  the  chaimeis  of  trade  in  other  directions, 
but  with  what  diflicvilty  is  shown  by  the  nmch  more  rapid 
increase  of  .'vmericau  than  of  English  importations  into  the 
Dominion  in  the  last  few  years,  in  spite  of  a  tariff  hostile 
to  the  United  States  and  favorable  to  Great  Britain.  And 
even  if  i)olitii-al  reasons  can  prevent  men  from  dealing 
freely  with  their  most  obvious  customers,  such  hindrances 
must  be  but  for  a  time.'    In  the  eiui,  other  interests  will 

'  "The  actioh  of  the  great  forces  is  often  suspended  by  that  of  second- 
ary forces;  but  in  the  end  the  great  forces  prevail."  —  Golowin  Smith. 


266       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  1>0\VL:11 

win  tlu'  chiv.    Uemenibering,  too,  the  essential  amilarity 
between  tlio  populations  on  the  two  sides  of  a  purely 
artificial  boundary,  we  .  uii  not  conceive  of  their  ulwaj-s 
remaining   separated.    Kvery    new   nuhvuv,    ^^^'^y  JT" 
wa^'on  road,  that  .T-sses  this  Une  of  lour  thousand  nules, 
tuHkes  it  a  restrirtiou  harder  to  observe.    If  aenal  naviga- 
tion shoukl  so  improve  in  the  next  few  years  that  peoj^e 
could  go  with  ease  in  any  direction  they  wish.n  ,  the  ditti- 
calty  of  maintaining  a  customs  Une,  and  partieuhirly  one  s., 
long  as  that  between  the  United  States  and  (  anachi,  would 
become  abnost  insuperable.    Even  without  this  improved 
„u,uis  of  locomotion,  as  .\merican  and  Canadian  towns 
erow  MP  within  a  stone's  throw  of  one  another  the  task 
of  keei.u.-  them  separate  will  be  ever  more  complicated. 
We  need  not  take  overseriously  the  l.i.-kerin^B  of  the  mo- 
ment    Political  and  commercial  unions  are  not  always 
prece<l.-l  bv  an  era  ..f  ^'ood  feeling;  on  the  contrary,  two 
nations,  like  two  rival  trading  companies,  may  quarrel 
with  and  hurt  one  another  until  it  becomes  evident  to  both 
that  the  only  wise  course  is  to  sink  their  diff(>nmces.  If 
we  restrict  our  observations  to  present  political  conditions, 
we  may  sc.-  no  reason  why  either  ih.  United  States  or  Can- 
ada should  (>ver  wish  to  be  merged  in  one  larger  whole; 
but  if  we  tak(>  into  account  the  great  permanent  forces  of 
geography  and  nationaUty,  we  may  weU  feel  disposed  to 
repeat  the  words  of  the  marriage  service,  -  "  Hu-se  whom 
God  hath  joined  together,  let  no  man  put  asui-der. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CANAL 

THE  relations  of  the  United  States  with  England  in 
the    western  hemisphere   luiv*'    not   been  coufiiu-d 
to  questions  concerning  Canada.    Even  without  the  Do- 
minion, Great  Britain  occupies  a  position  in  the  New 
World  which  Americana  have  always  to  take  into  acconnt. 
In   the  fortified    and    almost  impregnable  coral  islands 
of  Bermuda,  she  jxjseesses  an  ideal  l)ase  ot    if>ei  'ims 
from  which  a  hostile  fleet  could  threaten  the  %vii<,l  co.-ist 
from  Maine  to  Florida.    Farther  south,  the  Bahama  grouj) 
commands  the  entrance  to  the  Florida  channel,  Jamaica 
watches  over  Niearngua  and  Panama,  British  possessions  in 
r.uiana  and  the  Lesser  Antilles  guard  the  eastern  entrariees 
to  the  Caribbean  Sea.    Tixe  chain  of  posts  is  a  formidable 
one.    The  strongest  of  them,  the  Bermudas,  stand  by 
themselves,  and  have  given  rise  to  no  dispute.  Altliougii 
the  United  States  may  not  relish  their  being  in  British 
hands,  there  is  nothing  to  be  done  in  the  matter.    It  has 
therefore  turned  its  attention  all  the  more  to  the  waters  in 
and  about  the  Caribbean  Sea,  where,  during  most  of  the  nin(  - 
teenth  century,  it  found  itself  in  fierce  rivalry  with  England, 
—  a  rivalry  which  has  only  just  come  to  an  end. 

The  great  American  Mediterranean  is  composed,  like  the 
European  one,  of  two  distinct  halves,  the  Gulf  c  f  Mexico 
and  the  Caribbean  Sea,  which  are  connected  vith  •  .u-h. 
other  by  only  a  narrow  passage,  somewhat  similar  to  that 


268       THK  UNITKU  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

betwevu  Sicily  unci  Tunis.    Th.'  T.ulf  of  M.xi.-o  U.h  but 
two  outl.  N     to  th..  ..st    tin.   Flurubt  channel  loudmg 
int..  th..  Atlantic ;  to  the  south.  u«t  the  straits  of  Yucatan, 
which  upon  into  the  Caribbean  Sea.    Between  the. a,  am 
doininating  them  but!-,  is  the  western  e.ul  o   the  splendu 
isl.nd  of  Cuba.    The  Caribbean  Sea  is  hmdlock.  n  un  the 
west  and  the  south:  at  th.  north  is  the  broken  barrier 
forme  l  bv  Cuba,  Haiti,  and  Porto  lUco.  with  Jamaica 
us  au  tdvanced  pont ;  at  the  east  is  the  chain  of  the  Lesser 
Antilhs,  a  line  of  small  islands  pierced  by  divers  passages, 
and  belonging  to  various  powers.    Along  the  coasts  of  the 
American  M.nlit.-rranean  are  many  points  o   "trat.gic  and 
commercial  advantage,  but  t..  ^^'H'^J^^^        -^^^''-^  = 
Orleans  on  the  north  shore  of  the  (Julf  of  Mexico,  at  the 
.uouth  of  the  Mississippi,  which  drains  the  huge  inland 
Dlain  of  the  United  States;  and  sccomllv,  on  the  southern 
edge  of  the  Caribb.       Sea.  the  canal  whn  h  will  <'..nnect 
two  ue,.an8.    From  tl.  .  ariiest  days  of  their  in.l..pendence 
th,.  \n.ericans  covetrd  N.  w  Orleans;  they  acqmred  it  m 
1SU  {     \  century  later,  after  several  generations  of  dispute 
with  Great  Britain,  they  obtained  definite  control  of  the 

site  of  the  future  canal.  ,  .  v 

The  West  Indian  Islands  were  the  fust  part  of  the  ^ew 
World  discovered  by  Columbus,  and  the  first  tern  tones  to 
be  settled  bv  the  Spaniards.    In  time  they  were  invaded 
bv  other  nations,  and  during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  they  were  the  scene  not  only  of  the  exploits  of 
the  buccaneers,  but  of  many  a  fight  by  land  and  sea  be- 
tween the  regular  forces  of  rival  powers.    Th.>  English  were 
the  fivst  intruders  to  estal)U>h  ttuunselves  in  this  .Spanish 
domain  bv  their  conquest,  in  1.15:,,  of  Jamaica,  to-day  their 
oldest  colony.   The  French,  the  Dutch,  and  even  the  Danes 
and  the  Swedes  soon  followed,  all  striving  to  get  what  they 
could  of  this  favored  part  of  ilie  world  ;  for  in  ear  v  days 
an  extraordinary  value  was  Attached  to  the  possession  of 


THE  KSTIIMIAN  CANAL 


209 


these  islands,  most  of  which  have  now  sunk  into  insi^nifi- 
vancv.    With  the  fortunes  of  war  several  of  them  changed 

h.iruls  inure  than  Mhc. 

in  I7s:\,  Jitter  the  ((nielusion  of  the  |H'.ire  of  Paris,  Spain, 
who  hud  won  hark  I'  loridii  nixd  kept  LouiHiuna,  h(  Id  uil 
the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  as  well  as  the  continental 
ones  of  the  Cariltbcan  St'u,  bendcs  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  San 
Dondnjjo,  iind  Trinidiid.  I  lor  j^nisp  was  weak,  but  she  had 
an  overwlielnnii^'  superiority  of  positioti.  C'otnpared  with 
her  territories  in  this  quarter  of  tlie  },'lobe,  those  of  tlir  other 
European  nations  were  mere  outposts,  although  Haiti  and 
Jamaica  were  proverbially  wealthy  and  flourishing.  The 
new  American  power,  the  United  StaJrs,  did  not  as  yet 
possess  a  foot  of  land  o  ^  tlic  (hdf,  !)Ut  as  the  owner  of  the 
eastern  head  waters  of  the  Missi.^sippi  it  was  already 
interested  in  (iulf  affairs. 

Hero,  as  elsewhere,  the  next  sixty  years  witnessed  great 
changes.  Spain,  during  the  first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth 
n  iitury,  lost  all  her  continental  possessions  in  the  New 
^\  orhl,  which  went  to  form  a  number  of  \'.i  ak  iiHlcpendeiit 
rt'pid)lics  or  i)a-~sed  into  American  hands.  I'V.uici  ,  during 
the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  Empire,  let 
slip  her  fine  colony  of  Haiti,  which  became  an  indepen- 
dent n(  ^:ro  republic,  as  did  later  San  Domingo.  England 
f^ained  .s(  veral  more  West  Indian  Islands,  planted  herself  on 
the  South  American  continent,  at  the  evpense  of  Holland 
in  Guiana,  and  began  to  get  a  footing'  in  Central  .\merica. 
The  United  States  obtained  its  first  footli  i<l  on  the  (Julf 
by  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  to  which  it  soon  added 
West  Florida,  then  East  Florida,  and  finally  Texas,  so 
that  it  eame  to  own  the  whole  nortlurii  coast.  The 
ra])id  devcloiiment  of  these  lands,  and,  still  more,  the 
strength  of  tlie  nation  as  a  whole,  jussured  to  the  North 
American  republic  an  importance  on  the  Gulf  much  su- 
perior to  that  of  the  feeble  Spanish-American  states,  or, 


MICROCOPY  RESOLUTION  TEST  CHART 

I  ANSI  ond  ISO  TEST  CHART  No  2i 


270       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


in  spite  of  the  matchless  situation  of  Cuba,  of  Spain  herself. 
Its  only  real  rival  was  Groat  Britain,  who,  though  holding 
a  conii)aratively  small  area  of  territory,  nevertheless  was 
firmly  intrenched  in  certain  choice  positions,  from  which, 
as  ruler  of  the  waves,  she  could  sweep  these  seas  with 
her  fleets.  On  the  other  hand,  the  economic  decay  of  hor 
West  Indian  possessions  in  the  nineteenth  century  lessened 
their  value  in  her  eyes. 

A  curious  fact  about  the  rivalry  between  the  two 
English-speaking  powers  in  West  Indian  waters  was  that 
it  was  concerned  not  so  much  with  any  actual  opposing  in- 
terests as  with  an  ()l>ject  that  did  not  yet  exist,  —  namely, 
the  canal  which  should  oonnert  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans  and  b<>como  one  of  the  chief  highways  of  the  world. 
The  idea  of  such  a  canal 's  as  old  as  the  days  of  Philip  II, 
and  ever  since  his  time  people  have  taken  for  granted 
that  sooner  or  later  it  would  be  dug.    Indeed,  many  have 
kept  expecting  that  it  would  be  begun,  not  to  say  finished, 
before  long,  for  the  tremendous  difficulties  of  the  under- 
taking have  only  very  lately  been  grasped.    To  the  old 
mistress  of  the  seas,  and  to  young  America,  the  question  of 
the  control  of  the  future  thoroughfare  seemed  equally  vital. 
No  one  knew  for  certain  where  it  would  be  made;  but 
whether  it  was  to  go  through  Nicaragua,  or  Panama,  or 
was  to  take  some  other  route,  the  interest  remained  the 
same,  and  both  countries  were  keenly  alive  to  it. 

In  their  contentions  on  this  subject  we  find  two  sharply 
defined  periods,  separated  from  one  another  by  the  calm 
that  followed  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  of  1S50.  We  need 
not  cite  the  details  of  the  various  manoeuvres  and  nego- 
tiations that  were  entered  into,  but  we  must  note  the 
ditfcrent  standpoint  of  the  United  States  in  the  first  and 
in  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  During  the  first 
period,  while  England  was  trying  to  strengthen  her  posi- 
tion in  such  a  way  that  the  canal,  which  men  commonly 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


271 


supposed  would  be  dvp,  throuf^h  Nic;ira<jiia,  should  bo  as 
much  as  possible  within  her  reach,  the  United  States 
watched  every  movement  of  hers  with  the  utmost  suspi- 
cion, protested  violently  in  the  name  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine against  her  action,  and  upheld  the  theory  that  this 
international  waterway  should  not  be  under  the  control  of 
any  one  country.  Its  whole  attitude  was  the  defensive 
one  of  the  weaker  power. 

The  interest  of  America  in  any  passage  connecting  the 
two  oceans  was  obvious  from  the  start,  and  the  whole 
course  of  her  development  tended  to  make  it  ever  greater. 
Her  tra(l(>  with  the  Pacific,  which  had  begun  immediately 
after  the  establishment  of  her  indepeiuience,  soon  became 
flourishing.  In  1803,  as  a  result  of  the  expedition  of 
Lewis  and  Clark,  she  first  laid  claim  to  land  on  its  shores. 
That  she  kept  vigilant  watch  in  this  part  of  the  world 
was  shown  by  her  sharp  protest  in  1823  against  Russian 
advance.  In  184(5  the  Oregon  treaty  defined  her  Pacific 
t(^rritory  in  its  northern  limits,  and  the  acquisition  of 
California  extended  it  to  the  south.  Since  these  possessions 
of  the  republic  could  be  reached  only  by  long  weeks  of 
travelling  overland,  amidst  many  hardships,  the  necessity 
of  a  quicker,  er.sier  route  was  evident,  and  it  kept  the 
desire  for  a  canal  constantly  before  the  American  mind. 
The  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  with  the  ensuing  rush 
of  people  there  from  all  parts  of  the  world,  brought  the 
question  of  transport  more  to  the  front  than  ever,  and 
lines  of  vessels  were  started  from  the  principal  United 
States  ports  to  the  two  sides  of  the  isthmus. 

There  was  thus  reason  enough  why  the  I'^nited  States 
should  view  with  alarm  each  step  of  Great  Britain's  which 
seemed  likely  to  strengthen  her  already  dangerous  hold 
on  the  line  of  a  future  interoceanic  route.  The  story  of  the 
moves  and  the  counter-moves  of  the  two  powers  is  long 
and  intricate,  and  was  brought  to  a  close,  men  hoped,  by 


272       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


tlie  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  provided  that  neither 
Bliould  i^ave  control  over  the  waterway,  or  build  fortifica- 
tions along  it,  but  that  it  was  to  remain  open  to  all.  Much 
as  the  Americans  repented  later  of  having  signed  the  com- 
pact, at  ths  time  they  got  the  best  of  the  bargain ;  for  they 
attained  their  main  object,  which  was  a  defensive  one.  In 
return  for  their  recognition  of  English  i)oss(>ssi()n  of  British 
Honduras,  whic1\  they  had  vainly  protested  against,  they 
obtained  a  Guflicient  guarantee  that  England  would  not 
build  and  dominate  the  future  canal.  It  is  true  that  the 
United  States  bound  itself  in  Uke  manner,  but  at  this 
time  it  was  scarcely  in  a  position  where  it  could  hope  for 
supiemacy. 

In  spite  of  some  misunderstanding  as  to  the  exact  mean- 
ing of  the  treaty,  and  discussion  about  the  so-called  Mos- 
quito Coast  of  Nicaragua,  —  where  England  had  certain 
claims  which  she  did  not  surrender  until  18G0,  —  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer agreement  was  successful  in  producing  at  least 
a  lull  in  the  dispute.    For  other  reasons,  too,  the  agitation 
in  favor  of  the  immediate  construction  of  a  canal  subsided 
for  a  while.    The  building  of  the  Panama  railway  lessened 
the  immediate  need  of  one,  and  the  completion  of  the  Union 
Pacific,  in  1869,  made  CaUfornia  more  accessible.  More- 
over, the  United  States  was  soon  engrossed  by  the  Civil 
War  and  its  after  effects,  and  England,  upon  the  opening 
in  1809  of  the  Suez  Canal,  which  gave  her  a  short  route  to 
the  East,  became  less  eager  for  a  western  passage.  Thus 
the  matter  slumbered,  although  various  plans  were  evolved, 
in  one  of  which  the  Enii)eror  Napoleon  III  was  interested. 
Meanwhile  ])ublic  opinion  was  beginning  to  turn  away  from 
the  Nif'aragua  route  in  favor  of  the  Panama. 

With  the  organization  of  the  French  Panama  Company 
by  M.  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  flushed  by  his  achievement  in 
Egypt,  the  question  became  once  more  a  live  one.  But 
American  sentiment  had  changed:  a  feeling  had  grown 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


273 


that  the  future  canal  should  be  controlled  by  the  United 
State.-^.  President  Grant  had  held  this  belief,  and  dur- 
ing his  administration  various  government  surveys  of  the 
isthmus  had  been  undertaken,  and  negotiations  for  a  con- 
cession had  been  entered  into  with  the  United  States  of 
Colond)ia.  The  de  Lesseps  Panama  plan  was  therefore 
looked  at  askance.  President  Hayes,  in  his  message  of 
March  8,  1889,  declared  that  "  The  policy  of  this  country  is 
a  canal  under  American  control.  The  United  States  cannot 
consent  to  the  surrender  of  their  control  to  any  European 
power.  .  .  .  If  existing  treaties  betwetm  the  United  States 
and  other  nations,  or  if  'he  right  of  sovereignty  or  property 
of  other  nations,  stand  in  the  way  of  this  policy,  —  a  con- 
tingency which  is  not  apprehended,  —  suitable  steps  should 
be  taken  by  just  and  liberal  negotiations  to  promote  and 
establish  the  American  policy,  on  this  subject,  consistently 
with  the  rights  of  the  nations  to  be  affected  by  it.  .  .  .  An 
interoceanic  canal  across  the  Amencan  Isthmus  will  essen- 
tially change  the  geographical  relations  between  the  Atlan- 
tic and  Pacific  coasts  of  the  United  States  and  between 
the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  will  be 
the  great  ocean  thoroughfare  between  our  Atlantic  and  our 
Pacific  shores,  and  virtually  a  part  of  the  coast-line  of  the 
United  States." 

M.  de  Lesseps  met  the  situation  with  much  tact.  Con- 
stantly insisting  on  the  private  nature  of  his  company,  he 
formed  a  special  American  committee  to  interest  the 
American  public  and  obtain  support  in  favor  of  his  plan. 
Still,  what  really  prevented  opposition  in  the  United  States 
from  assuming  an  active  fo'-ni  was  the  witlespread  doubt 
whether  his  enterprise  would  succeed.  Had  it  done  so,  there 
would  have  been  trouble. 

President  Hayes's  declaration  had  formulated  the  new 
poUcy  of  his  country,  but  his  assurance  that  any  interference 
arising  from  the  rights  of  other  nations  was  "a  contingency 


274       THE  UxNlTEl)  STATi  ^  AS  A  V  ORLD  POWER 


which  is  not  approhoud(>d  "  wn'^  to  say  the  least,  optimistic  ; 
for  i>y  the  Chiyton-Biiluvr  treaty  the  United  States  had 
expressly  pven  up  aU  ri^dit  to  "American  control"  of  any 
proposed  interoccanic  canal.  In  18S1,  Secretary  Blaine 
took  up  the  matter,  and  began  "liberal  negotiations"  to 
get  over  this  obstacle.  Unfortunately,  his  inj^enious  argu- 
ments were  refuted  without  much  difficulty  by  Lord  (Jraii- 
ville,  and  those  of  Secretary  Frelin^  lysen,  who  succeeded 
Mr.  Blaine  and  continued  the  discussion,  fared  no  better. 
The  wording  of  the  treaty  was  clear  enough ;  there  was  no 
date  set  on  which  it  should  expire ;  and  the  English  govern- 
ment evinced  no  desire  to  abandon  or  to  change  it.  \\  hen 
the  negotiations  came  to  an  id,  the  Americans  felt  that 
they  had  not  only  been  worsted  in  debate,  Init  had  been 
left  in  a  most  unsatisfactory  position,  from  which  they  saw 
no  way  of  escape  except  by  denunciation  of  the  treaty. 
Although  this  course  was  urged  by  irresponsible  individuals 
in  and  out  of  Congress,  sol  rer  men  felt  ttiat  it  would  be  a 
breaking  of  the  national  word,  and  an  act  of  the  most  serious 
character. 

Another  lull  of  some  years  followed.  The  increasing 
difficulty  and  final  failure  of  the  French  Panama  Company 
rather  dampened  the  enthusiasm  of  would-be  canal  builders, 
and  also  helped  to  bring  people  over  to  the  Nicaragua 
route,  which,  in  contrast  to  the  Panama,  was  recommended 
to  patriotic  sentiment  as  an  Amer'can  enterprise. 

During  the  Spanish  War  the  spectacular  cruise  of  the 
Oregon  from  the  distant  waters  of  the  Pacific  to  join  the 
blockading  squadron  bef->re  Santiago,  while  it  thrilled 
the  nation  with  i)ride,  at  the  same  time  brouudit  vividly 
before  it  the  disadvantage  \mder  which  the  American  navy 
labored  owing  to  the  immense  detour  that  had  to  be  made 
to  transport  its  forces  from  one  ocean  to  the  other.  By  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  Spain  forfeited  her  last  foot  -  f 
land  in  the  New  World,  which  she  had  discovered.    In  her 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


275 


stead,  the  United  States  greatly  strengthened  its  position  in 
both  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  in 
reference  to  any  future  canal.  It  was  now  in  a  eituation,  as 
well  as  in  a  mood,  to  take  up  the  canal  question  with  an 
energy  it  had  never  b(>fort>  shown.  If  it  had  still  been  on 
as  unfriendly  terms  with  England  as  it  was,  with  little 
interruption,  from  the  Declaration  of  Independence  to 
the  Spanish  War,  there  would  have  been  danger  of 
friction  almost  at  once;  but  English  sympathy  with  the 
United  States  during  the  war  had  produced  a  revolution 
in  American  feeling.  Never  had  such  cordiality  reigned 
between  the  two  nations.  This  was  all  very  well  for  the 
moment;  the  question  was,  would  it  last?  Fortunately  the 
British  government  grasped  the  situation.  For  good  and 
sufficient  reasons  it  had  determined  to  win  American 
friendship,  and  it  had  succeeded ;  but  it  saw  that  that 
friendship  would  not  endure  if  England  placed  herself 
squarely  on  the  grouni.  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
and,  by  refusing  all  modifications,  thwarted  a  plan  on  which 
the  Americans  had  set  their  hearts.  Permanent  good-will 
between  the  'wo  countries  could  only  be  obtained  by  put- 
ting an  end  to  the  rivalry  between  them  in  West  Indian 
waters,  —  a  rivalry  all  the  more  difficult  for  England  to 
maintain  since  her  power  in  this  part  of  the  world  had  stood 
still,  if  it  had  not  declined,  during  the  greater  part  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  whereas  that  of  the  United  States  had 
progressed  immeasurably.  English  statesmen  had  made  up 
their  minds  that  the  time  had  come  for  England  to  adopt 
n  different  policy,  and  that  the  benefits  she  wouhl  gain  by 
it  would  more  than  compensate  her  for  sacrifices  she 
i^^ight  be  called  upon  to  make.  The  events  of  the  next  few 
years  in  Africa  and  the  Far  East  were  to  prove  that  they 
were  right. 

Having  nnf^o  decided  e.n  itf?  frmrBe  of  action,  the  Jjondon 
government  did  not  allow  itself  to  be  influenced  by  the 


270     thl:  UNirED  states  as  a  world  power 


laments  of  a  f.>w  people  at  home,  cr  by  the  siuM-rs  of  foreigners 
at  British  weakness.  Not  only  did  it  consent  to  ne^'otiations 
for  a  rrvision  of  the  Chiyton-liuhver  treaty,  but  when  a  new 
agreeini  nt,  the  first  Ilay-Lanedowne  treaty,  proved  un- 
satisfactory to  the  American  Senate,  it  consented  to  a  seeond 
one,  which  satisfied  all  American  demands ;  for  it  provided 
that  the  United  States  nii^dit  not  oidy  const  met  the  ean;il, 
Init  control  ;in<l  fortify  it.  Followin-  this,  British  garrisons 
wn>  reduced  in  the  W.^st  Indies,  and  British  ships  with- 
drawn. In  a  word,  luigland  virtually  rf  agnized  American 
supremacy  in  this  long-disputed  regior 

With  this,  the  greatest,  obstacle     -.noved  from  their 
path,  the  Americans  ( «ndd  now  go  ahead  with  their  canal 
])rojects.    The  (irst  thing  to  do  was  to  decide  upon  the 
best  ror'c.    While  the  majority  of  the  people,  for  senti- 
mental reasons,  still  believed  in  Nicaragua,  exper'  igi- 
neers  had  quietly  come  to  the  conclnsi<in  that  the  Panama 
course  would  be  the   better  one.    The  government  at 
Washington  accepted  their  opinion,  and,  using  the  Nica- 
ragua projiMt  to  l)ring  the  French  Company  to  terms, 
made  an  oifer,  not  characterized  by  generosity,  to  buy  it 
out.    Thus  pressed,  the  old  Panama  Company  accepted 
the  hard  bargain,  and  a  treaty  was  negotiated  with  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  to  determine  the 
status  of  the  future  canal.    The  rej-ction  of  this  document 
by  the  Colombian  Senate  led  to  the  Panama  Revolution 
and  the  establishment  of  a  new  republic,  which  hastened 
to  agree  to  a  fresh  compact,  the  Hay-Bunau  Varilla  treaty. 
In  return  for  the  payment  of  ten  million  dollars  — pre- 
viously pronus(Ml  to  ('..hunbia  —  and  a  later  annual  subsidy, 
the  ri.itrd  Stat(>s  acquired  pra(  tical  sovereignty  over  the 
two  ends  of  the  route,  and  a  strip  of  five  miles  breadth 

on  each  side  of  it. 

The  moraUty  of  American  action  in  tlus  affair  has  been 
often  questioned.    There  is  no  doubt  that,  though  the  gov- 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CAN  ' 


277 


ernmcnt  at  WaMhington  \v;is  not  an  actual  party  to  the  plans 
(•oncertod  in  Now  York  and  chcwhcn'  whii  h  resulted  in 
tljc  overthrow  of  Colombian  sovereignty,  it  may  have  had 
more  than  a  suspicion  of  thoir  existence,  and  it  did  nothing 
to  interfere  with  their  buccchs.    To  forbid  the  hvnding  of 
Colombian  troops  was  to  stretch  the  meaniuf:  of  the  old 
Americim  rii^ht  to  maintain  order  aloii^'  tlie  line  of  the 
railway  to  an  extmt  hardly  justifiable  in  dealiuj^'  with  a 
friendly  nation,  and  the  haste  with  which  the  administration 
at  Wsihington  recognized  the  independence  of  the  new 
republic  and  concluded  a  treaty  with  it  appeared  to  many 
people  indecent.    The  truth  was  the  AmcTicans  did  not 
feel  that  they  were  dealing  with  a  friendly  nation.  They 
looked  upon  the  rejection  of  the  llay-llerrau  treaty  by 
the  Colombian  Senate  as  what  they  would  call  a  "hold- 
up"—  a  scheme  to  interfere,  for  the  8"ke  of  personal 
profit,  with  a  work  which  was  to  benefit  al.  humanity.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  ihe  relations  betwven  the  Colom- 
bian President  and  Senate  were  such  as  to  preclude  the 
belief  that  the  government  ot  Bogota  lunl  been  acting 
ir.  an  honorable  way  in  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  and 
its  subsequent  refusal.    It  happened,  too,  that  the  political 
'Stances   at   Panama  were   such   that   the  United 
was  able  to  get  all  it  wanted,  almost  without  moving 

.:ni,er.  It  had  little  more  remorse  about  brushing  away 
Colombian  opposition  in  tliis  manner  than  a  railway  com- 
pany would  feel  in  disposing  of  the  claims  of  an  Indian 
squatter  which  happened  to  interfere  with  its  line. 

For  some  time  after  the  signing  of  the  Hay-Bunau 
Varilla  treaty  and  the  taki?ig  over  of  the  Panama  Canal 
by  the  Americans,  matters  did  not  proceed  so  well  as  it 
had  been  hoped  they  would.  American  optimism  and  self- 
confidence  had  underestimated  the  difficulties  to  be  dealt 
with,  —  difficulties  which  seem  to  increase  rather  than  . 
diminish  as  time  goes  on.   But,  whatever  they  are,  they  are 


278       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


at  the  worst  only  of  a  temponvry  nature,  and  at  prosont  it 
seonis  that  they  are  beinj?  met  with  miceesH.  No  one  can 
doubt  that  sooner  or  1  'i-r  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  dug: 
tlie  wealth  of  the  United  States  is  in  itself  a  sufficient 
guarantee  that,  though  the  cost  may  be  enormqus,  the  un- 
dertaking will  be  pushed  to  a  sue;  essful  conclusion.  The 
difference  of  a  year  or  two  in  the  date  of  its  eompletion,  or 
of  a  score  or  two  of  inilhon  dollars,  inon  or  less,  in  the  tmt- 
lay,  iH  insigniticant  compared  with  the  importance  of  the 
result.  We  can  see  now  that  no  private  company  could 
have  met  the  necessary  expenses ;  for  a  company  must  pay 
returns  to  its  investors,  whereas  a  government  may  rest 
satisfied  witli  indirect  profits.  One  smiles  as  one  recalls  the 
conhdent  underestimation  of  all  tlie  earlier  i)lans. 

When  the  Panama  Canal  is  at  last  completed,  the  ad- 
vantages to  the  United  States  must  be  great.  Even  if 
it  disappoints  the  expectations  of  those  wlio  thinl<  it  will 
equal  its  rivnl  at  Suez  in  the  traffic  which  it  carries,  it 
cannot  but  stinudate  American  trade.  New  York,  as  well 
as  the  Gulf  ports,  will  be  brought  within  a  short  distance 
of  the  western  coast  of  South  America,  and  will  also  be  able 
to  communicate  with  Australia  and  the  Far  East  to  more 
advantage  than  at  present.  How  much  this  will  amount 
to  it  is  hard  to  say,  —  greater  distance  does  not  prevent 
Bremen  from  competing  successfully  with  Marseilhvs  in  the 
same  regions,  —  yet  it  must  count  for  something.  The 
gain  to  the  American  navy  is  still  more  evident;  for  the 
canal,  by  giving  it  a  safe  line  of  inner  communication,  will 
enable  it  to  concentrate  at  short  notice  its  whole  strength 
in  either  ocean. 

The  :  upremacy  of  the  Americans  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
the  Caribbean  Sea  is  to-day  firndy  established.  Great 
Britain  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to  renew  her  former 
rivalry  in  this  part  of  the  world,  even  if  she  would;  the 
other  European  powers  count  for  but  little  here;  and 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


279 


though  the  iippearunce  of  Canada  might  be  annoying,  it 
need  not  be  taken  tra^'ically.  And  there  are  indications 
that  the  United  States  will  not  rest  content  with  its  present 

situation,  siitisfuctory  as  it  is,  but  that,  guided  by  natural 
forces  and  inhcritinl  tr.'ulitions  rather  than  by  any  set  pur- 
poses, it  will  be  led  still  further  to  fortify  its  position. 
The  fate  of  the  Danish  Wet  Indies  is,  we  may  believe,  not 
yet  finally  settled.  San  Domingo  is  likely  to  come  under 
American  supervision,  and  perhaps  Haiti.  The  connection 
of  Cuba  with  her  protector  seems  to  be  destined  to  grow 
closer,  rather  than  looser,  as  the  years  f^o  by. 

When  thinking  of  the  future  of  these  W(>st  Indian 
Islands,  we  must  always  remember  the  immense  tempta- 
tion which  the  prospect  of  free  accera  for  their  tropical 
productions  to  the  protected  American  market  holds  out 
to  them.  The  prosperity  of  Porto  i\ieo  is'in  itself  an  object- 
lesson  ;  and  the  economic  advantaj^c  of  free  trade  with  tlx? 
I'nited  States  is  enough  to  explain  the  strong  sentiment  of 
tlie  property  holders  in  Cuba  in  favor  of  annexation.  Again, 
in  the  cast;  of  Jamaica,  the  recent  welfare  of  the  island 
is  due  to  its  fruit-trade,  which  the  United  States  could 
destroy  by  adverse  tariff  legislation.  So  great  indeed  is 
the  attraction  which  the  American  market,  the  wealthiest 
in  the  world,  exercises  on  the  West  Indian  Islands  that 
there  is  scarcely  one  of  them,  of  whatever  nationality,  which 
would  not  welcome  annexation  if  it  were  accompanied  by 
complete  freedom  of  trade.  As  long  as  this  state  of  affairs 
continues,  —  and  we  can  sec  no  reason  why  it  should  soon 
come  to  an  end,  —  .\merican  preponderance  in  these  regions 
rests  on  a  firm  basis. 

But  poUticai  expansion  in  the  West  Indies,  following 
upon  economic,  raises  a  host  of  diflBcult  questions.  To 
begin  with,  it  will  be  hard,  without  violating  American 
traditions,  to  treat  any  prirts  of  the  New  World  as  subject 
colonies,  especially  if  they  have  already  enjoyed  self-govern- 


280       THE  LMTKU  Sl  AriiS  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

ment.   How,  then,  arc  vvv  to  reconcile  the  annexation  of  new 
territories  irhabited  <  hiefly  l.y  negroes  with  the  prenent  po- 
sition of  the  Huine  ix'opK  in  the  Southern  States?    Are  the 
l,hick8  in  the  i«huul8  nioir  worthy  of  the  baUot  than  those 
who  have  grown  up  under  Anglo-Saxon  institutions?  If 
not,  why  should  they  enjoy  greater  privileges?   The  ailem- 
ma  is  evident.    And  there  are  other  considerations  which 
cannot  be  left  out  of  account.    It  must  lu.t  b.-  fort,'otten 
th-it  Cuba  I'ort.)  Ki<-o,  San  Doinin^'o,  and  Panunu*  lu'lung 
to  what  we  call  Spanish  America,  and  the  United  States 
cannot  separate  its  deaUngs  with  them  from  the  V)road 
question  of  its  relations  with  all  the  Latin  repubUcs  of  the 
western  hemisphere. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

AMONG  all  tne  foreign  questions  with  which  the  govern- 
ment at  Washington  has  to  deal,  none  are  of  more  far- 

rc:ichinj,'  consf  qucnce  than  those  that  conoeni  the  relations 
of  the  I'liited  States  .  ith  the  difTereiit  repuhhcs  of  Latin 
America.  And  none  nuiuire  more  tuct  and  patience  in 
small  matters  or  more  clear-sightedness  in  'arge  ones. 
The  situation  is  in  some  respects  new;  for  though  the 
affairs  of  South  America  have  always  had  a  certain  impor- 
tance for  tlie  northern  power,  and  have  called  forth  the 
most  characteristic  expression  of  its  jiolicy,  the  connection 
between  the  two  continents  has  not  been  close  until  recent 
years.  We  can  sum  up  the  chief  historical  ft'  s  in  a  few 
words. 

As  was  natural,  the  inhabitants  of  tae  United  States 
sympathized  with  the  Latin  Americans  whm  they  rose  against 
the  long-continued  misgovernn,  >  "  of  the  /..otlier  count. 
The  movement  was  a  counterpart  to  their  own  successful 
revolution,  and  could  not  fail  to  enlist  the  approval  of  a 
people  who  had  fought  for  and  won  their  freedom  from 
Euiopean  rule.  Accordingly,  they  furnished  volunteers  to 
the  insurj^-ent  armies,  and  they  were  the  first  to  recognize 
olhcially  the  independence  of  the  revolted  Spanish  colonies. 
The  enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was,  it  is  true, 
made  primarily  in  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  but  it 
was  at  the  same  time  an  act  of  extreme  friendliness  to  the 

281 


282       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


weak  republics  of  thr  South.  All  this  wus  logical,  even  if 
the  two  stru^'gles  for  freedom  were  unlike  in  nuiny  ways 
and  the  i^arallel  which  has  been  drawn  between  George  Wash- 
ington and  Bolivar  serves  to  bring  out  differences  rather 
than  resemblances.  American  sympathy,  however,  did  not 
go  far  enough  to  produc;'  a  desire  for  joint  action :  witness 
the  tardy  and  hesitating  dc^spatch  of  delegates  from  Wash- 
ington to  the  first  atten^pt  at  a  Pan-American  Congress,  the 
abortive  conference  of  Panama  in  1826.  After  this,  for 
more  than  half  a  century  relations,  in  most  cases,  were 
unimportant,  amicable  but  distant.  In  general,  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  republic,  while  ])rotecting  its  weaker  sisters  in  virtue 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  has  been  content  to  leave  them 
to  their  own  devices,  and  most  of  its  citizens  have  known 
little  and  cared  less  about  what  was  going  on  in  the  terri- 
tories south  of  the  isthmus. 

With  Mexico,  its  immediate  southern  neiglibor,  the  deal- 
ings of  the  United  States  have  not  been  oi  a  kind  to  reassui 
the  other  American  republics,  or  make  them  desire  its  ap- 
proach.   It  is  to  be  expected  that  Mexicans  will  never 
entirely  forgive  or  forget  the  treatment  they  received,  and 
that  their  fate  will  be  held  up  as  a  warning  to  others.  But 
there  is  no  real  reason  for  them  to  dread  a  repetition  of  the 
events  of  two  generations  ago.    The  Gadsden  Purchase, 
following  a  territorial  dispute,  was  not  perhaps  an  entirely 
voluntary  cession  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  but  since  that  time 
the  relations  of  the  two  republics  have  been  untroubled  and 
as  cordial  as  could  be  hoped  for.    By  compelling  the  with- 
drawal of  tli-  FrtMicli  troops  who  supported  the  Emperor 
Maximilian,  the  United  States,  while  enforcing  a  principle 
wliose  maintenance  it  believed  to  be  necessary  to  its  own 
security,  also  did  the  Mexicans  a  service  in  freeing  them 
from  foreign  domination.    For  that  service  it  made  no 
attempt  to  exact  compensation .    With  the  disappearance  of 
slavery  north  of  the  Kio  Grande,  and  with  the  increase  of 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 


283 


population  and  the  achievement  of  order  south  of  the  river, 
the  former  causes  of  American  aggression  have  disappeared. 
For  forty  years,  Mexico,  under  the  strong  rule  of  President 
Diaz,  has  enjoyed  a  political  tranquillity  unknown  in  her 

ix'cvious  history ;  she  is  in  a  peaceful,  prosperous  condition, 
and  on  excellent  terms  with  her  northern  sister. 

Central  America  has  in  the  past  attracted  the  attention 
of  the  United  States  chiefly  by  its  proximity  to  the  site 
of  the  future  interoceanic  canal/  Thus,  the  Americans 
supported  the  claims  of  Ni('ar:i<j;ua  against  Great  Britain 
for  the  possession  of  the  Mosquito  Coast,  and  long  refused 
to  recognize  the  English  occupation  of  Belize.  Tliey  also 
did  much  negotiating  with  Nicaragua  on  their  own  account ; 
but  this  chapter  of  canal  history  has  come  to  a  close. 

The  story  of  the  political  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  different  republics  of  South  America  since 
the  establishment  of  their  independence  is  brief  enough. 
In  regard  to  Ecuador,  Peru,  BoUvia,  and  Uruguay,  there 
is  nothing  to  be  noted  here.  The  Argentine  Republic 
asserts  that  it  has  actually  lost  territory  to  a  European  power 
by  American  intervention,  and  has  vainly  demanded  an 
indemnity  therefor.  In  1831,  owing  to  the  seizure  of  three 
American  saiUng  vessels  for  violating  fishing  regulations  in 
the  Falkland  Islands,  the  ship  of  war  Lexington,  sent  by 
President  Jackson,  removed  the  Argentine  colony  settled 
there.  Two  years  later  the  islands  were  occupied  by  Great 
Britain,  which  had  claims  upon  them,  and  the  Argentine 
Ucpuhlic  has  ever  since  maintained  that  her  loss  of  this 
possession  was  the  direct  consequence  of  American  action. 

With  Paraguay  the  United  States  had  a  more  serious  diffi- 
culty. In  1850  it  was  obliged  to  send  an  armed  expedition 
to  exact  satisfaction  for  hostile  treatment  of  a  ship  sailing 

'  Walker,  the  American  filibuster,  who<»  exploits  an  a  would-be  dictator 
were  brought  to  an  end  by  liis  execution  in  ISGO,  never  obtained  official 
countenance,  though  lie  had  many  partisans  in  the  South. 


284       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

under  its  fi:ig  in  the  Paraguay  River,  but  this  small  show 
of  force  was  enough  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  settlement 
of  the  affair. 

In  the  case  of  Brazil,  we  need  only  mention  that  in  1893, 
during  a  civil  war,  the  American  fleet  present  in  tiie  harbor 
of  Rio  Janeiro  almost  came  into  conflict  with  the  Brazilian 
vessels  which  were  blockading  the  port.  As  the  Brazihan 
navy  was  then  in  the  hands  of  the  party  who  were  in  the 
end  unsuccessful,  harmony  between  the  United  States  and 
Brazil  was  not  disturbed. 

With  Chile,  the  chief  South  American  power  on  the 
Pacific,  and  one  of  the  most  enterprising  on  the  continent, 
there  have  been  a  number  of  unfortunate  incidents,  due 
not  to   any  necessary  divergence  of  interestfi  between 
Americans  and  Chileans,  but  to  a  succesuon  of  accidental 
circumstances.  In  1881,  the  attempt  of  Secretary  Blaine  to 
moderate  the  demands  of  Chile  after  her  triumphs  over 
Bolivia  and  Peru  ang(^red  the  victorious  belligerent.  Ten 
years  later  it  so  happened  that,  during  the  civil  war  between 
President  Balmaceda  and  the  Chilean  Congress,  the  Ameri- 
can minister  in  Santiago  was  friendly  to  Balmaceda,  whereas 
the  sympathy  of  most  Europeans  was  on  'the  side  of  the 
Congress.     The  affair  of  the  Itata,  in  which  the  United 
States  government  was  preparod  to  use  force,  if  need  be,  to 
get  back  a  fugitive  vessel  loaded  with  supplies  for  the  troops 
of  the  Congress,  increased  the  anger  of  that  party,  whose  sub- 
sequent triumph  gave  the  occurrence  a  semi-international 
character.    While  feeling  in  Chile  was  still  sore  on  this  sub- 
ject, a  riot  occurred  in  Valparaiso,  in  which  sailors  of  the 
American  cruiser  Baltimore  were  attacked  by  a  Chilean 
mob.     An  unsatisfactory  correspondence  ensued,  till  a 
circular  note  of  the  Chilean  foreign  mmister,  couched  in 
undiplomatic  language,  led  to  an  ultimatum  from  Wash- 
ington. Chile  submitted,  but  the  incident  has  rankled. 
When  the  United  States  supported  Venezuela  against 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  285 


Great  Britain  in  1895,  tho  Latin  Americans  were  jubilant 
over  this  defence  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Shortly  after- 
wards, however,  when  war  broke  out  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  their  emotions  were  conflicting.  They 
sympathized  wUh  Cuba  ii.  her  revolt,  which  was  but  the 
last  of  the  series  by  which  they  had  freed  themselves 
from  Spanish  rule;  but  on  the  whole,  the  bonds  of  com- 
mon language  and  civilization,  and,  still  mure,  fear  of  the 
expansion  of  the  all-too-powerful  Anglo-Saxon  republic, 
outweighed  thi  ir  enthusiasm  for  Cuba  and  for  Pan-Ameri- 
can ideals.  Their  apprehension  seemed  to  be  justified  by 
the  annexation  of  Porto  Kico,  and  again  by  the  events 
that  took  place  in  Panama  in  1904.  It  was  not  that  they 
cared  for  Colombia  rather  than  for  her  revolted  province, 
but  they  were  alarmed  by  the  spectacle  of  the  United 
States  summarily  getting  rid  of  the  opposition  of  a  sister 
republic,  abetting  the  dismemberment  of  her  territory,  and 
securing  for  itself  practical  sovereignty  over  the  canal  zone. 
Fin.  ily,  the  arrangement  made  with  San  Domingo,  how- 
ever good  the  reasons  were  that  might  be  urged  in  its 
defence,  suggested  a  disguised  protectorate,  or  one  more 
step  toward  extending  Anglo-Saxon  sovereignty  over  Latin- 
American  territory. 

In  order  to  still  the  fears  thus  excited,  the  United  States 
has  repeated  its  assurances  of  friendly  intentions,  pointing 
out  that,  in  Panama,  all  it  has  desired  is  the  requisite  con- 
trol of  a  canal  -vhich  it  is  ready  to  build  at  its  own  expense 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  world  ;  and  that  in  San  Domingo 
it  is  endeavoring  to  maintain  the  indei)endence  of  a  bank- 
rupt state,  threatened  with  foreign  interference.  But  it 
has  had  a  more  convincing  argument  than  these:  it  has 
been  able  to  dwell  on  the  fact  that  the  Americans,  in  spite 
of  all  temptation  to  the  contrary,  kept  their  promise  to 
evacuate  Cuba,  when  the  rest  of  the  world  believed  they 
would  never  surrender  so  valuable  a  possession.  Their 


:86       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

faithfulness  to  this  promise,  though  somewhat  marred  by 
the  Phitt  Ameiuhnent,  did  indeed  produce  an  excellent 
effect  in  Latin  America  as  well  as  in  Europe.  For  some 
years  the  island  was  quiet  and  prosperous,  presenting  a 
spectacle  they  could  well  point  to  with  pride  as  a  refuta- 
tion of  the  charge  that  they  coveted  further  territory  m 

the  Now  World.  ■    n  u 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  recent  troubles  in  Uuba 
have  a  significance  that  goes  far  beyond  the  immediate 
limits  of  the  island.    Much  turns  on  the  success  of  the  ex- 
periment being  tried  there.    We  must  remember  that  to-day 
people  in  the  United  States  are  hesitating  over  the  question 
whether  those  of  the  so-called  Latin- American  countries  m 
which  there  is  a  large  proportion  of  colored  blood  are 
capable  of  satisfactory  self-government.     As  long  as  this 
question  remained  an  outside  one,  men  did  not  need  to 
make  up  their  .:Ands  decidedly,  one  way  or  the  other; 
but  with  Porto  Rico  eager  for  statehood,  and  with  the 
Philiiipines  clamorir  ;  for  independence  or,  at  any  rate, 
extensive   autonomy,  the  matter  has  become  pressing. 
President  Roosevelt  has  recommended  further  pnvdeges 
for  Porto  Rico,  the  first  Philippine  assembly  has  already 
met,  and  before  long  tlie  American  people  must  come  to 
some  decision  al)out  the  future  of  these  territories,  bince 
the  conditions  in  them  are,  in  most  respects,  so  nearly  the 
same  that  what  is  true  of  one  is  likely  to  be  so  of  the 
others,  the  conduct  of  the  Cubans,  who  have  been  given 
a  fair  start,  cannot  help  affecting  public  sentiment  m  the 
United  States  about  the  wh-le  question  of  the  ability  of  the 
Latin-Ainerican  population  of  mixed  blood  to  rule  them- 
selves without  disturbance.  _ 
No  fair-minded  observer  can  doubt  the  honesty  of  1  resi- 
dent Roosevelt's  administration  in  its  dealings  with  Cul):in 
affairs.    American  troops  were  landed  on  the  island  only 
after  the  government  collapsed,  when  it  was  obvious  that 


THE  UMTED  STATES  AND  LATLN  AMERICA 


287 


something  must  be  done  to  prevent  anarchy ;  and  they  will 
be  withdrawn  if  there  is  a  reasonable  hope  that  the  Cubans 
can  keep  the  peace  anionpj  themselves.  The  outlook,  how- 
ever, is  very  discouia^ng;  for  thout^h  we  may  take  for 
granted  that  the  majority  of  the  natives  prefer  indepen- 
dence, and  may  even  be  ready  to  fight  for  it,  the  property 
holders  of  all  nationalities  appear  to  desire  i  union  with  the 
United  States,  which  would,  they  hope,  bnng  hem  not  only 
protection,  but  free  access  to  the  American  markets,  with 
resulting  financial  profit.  The  mass  of  the  inhabitants  — 
more  of  whom  are  of  negro  blood  than  arc  acknowledged 
as  such  in  the  statistics  —  are  densely  ignorant,  they  have 
the  tradition  of  insurrection,  and  they  live  in  a  country  -i 
which  sleeping  out-of-doors  is  no  hardship,  and  which,  with 
its  alternation  of  field  and  forest,  mountain  and  plain,  is 
ideally  suited  to  guerilla  warfare.  To  the  insurgents  whc 
took  part  in  the  movement  that  caused  the  resignation  of 
President  Palma,  the  whole  affair  was  one  long  picnic :  for 
a  month  they  lived  at  the  expense  of  otherfi ;  they  had  no 
fighting  to  do  ;  and  in  the  end  they  were  allowerl  to  keep  for 
their  own  use  the  horses  which  they  had  appropriated,  for 
it  would  have  been  worse  than  useless  to  try  to  get  tliem 
back.  And  even  if  the  masses  are  of  themselves  dis- 
posed to  keep  quiet,  it  is  not  Inconceivable  that  some 
of  the  property  holders  may  think  it  worth  *,heir  while 
to  stir  them  to  miscnief,  in  ordei  to  force  American  inter- 
vention. 

Feel  about  Cuba  as  we  may,  it  is  certain  that  the  Ameri- 
can government  will  and  must  interfere  in  the  event  of  a 
menace  to  the  foreign  property  in  the  island.  Not  only  are 
tliere  probably  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  niil!i')n 
dollars'  worth  of  American  investments  there,  ])iit  there  are 
English,  Gern^ian,  French,  and  Spanish  holdings  of  value, 
which  cannot  be  left  exposed  to  the  whim  of  a  few  half-clad 
negroes  who  in  a  few  hours  can  work  vast  damage.  Already, 


288       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


before  the  troops  were  sent  to  Cuba  this  last  time,  several 
foreign  governments  had  inquired  at  WashiiiK'ton  what  stops 
tho  I'liitrd  States  was  prepared  to  take.  Now,  no  nation 
will  j,'o  to  the  trouble  and  expense  of  eontinually  oeeupying 
and  then  evacuatiiig  an  unruly  region.  As  history  runs, 
we  may  wonder  that  the  Americans  ever  evacuated  Cuba 
at  all.  If  they  do  it  a  second  time,  they  '.vill  deserve  still 
more  ennlit.  But  if  the  Cubans  rise  in  insurrection  before 
the  Americans  lea  /e,  and  have  to  be  repressed,  perhaps  at 
the  cost  of  a  lon^'  and  arduous  campaign,  or  if  they  soon 
force  the  American  army  to  return  once  more,  the  occu- 
pation may  be  a  long  one,  and  the  days  of  Cuban  inde- 
pendence numbered. 

The  effect  of  the  Cuban  situation  on  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  i  already  evident.  Those  who  have  alwa"S 
declared  that  the  abandonment  of  the  island  was  a  mistake, 
and  that  haif-breed  Latin  Americans  are  incapable  of  gov- 
erning themselves,  now  repeat  triumphantly,  "I  told  you 
so."  Others  who  have  approved  with  some  reservations 
the  policy  of  Pan-Americanism,  cannot  help  being  con- 
firmed in  their  doubts. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Latin-American  republics  are  dis- 
posed to  accept  the  i)olicy  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba 
as  the  touchstone  of  its  sincerity.  Annexation,  however 
veiled,  and  however  justified,  could  not  fail  to  excite  their 
fears.  They  would  believe  it  to  ])e  dictnt<Hl  at  bottom  by 
greed  and  bv  Irst  of  dominion,  and  would  regard  it  as  full 
of  menace  to  themselves.  They,  too,  are  liable  to  internal 
troubles  which  might  endanger  the  property  of  foreigners, 
and  which  could  furnish  reasons  enough  for  intervention. 
In  spite  of  the  special  circumstances  which  may  demand 
that  th(>  Cubans  should  be  treated  as  children  who,  for  the 
;,wAn)!M>t  U'.'ist,  .are  incapable  of  takiiitr  care  of  themselves, 
the  fact  remains  that  whatever  policy  is  adopted  toward 
them  will  react,  not  only  on  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines, 


THE  HMTED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  289 


but  on  the  whole  of  Latin  America  in  its  relation  to  the 

United  Statos. 

By  virtue  of  tiie  Mdiiroe  D.iotriiie,  even  the  weakest  and 
the  must  disorderly  of  tiie  American  republics  have  hitherto 
been  shielded  against  foreign  aggression  without  having 
to  render  any  service  in  return,  whereas  their  protector, 
in  the  mainteuance  (;f  the  doctrin.,  has  b(>en  called  upon 
to  meet  without  flinching  the  con. plications  with  European 
states  which  this  policy  has  entailed.  Of  late,  however, 
questions  of  a  new  order  have  arisen,  which  threaten  to 
involve  it  in  difficulties  with  its  i)roteges  rather  than 
with  the  European  powers.  Secretary  Olney  declared 
in  1S05  that  the  United  States  was  "paramount"  — 
whatever  that  may  mean  —  on  the  Ar^erican  continent, 
and  that  it  would  defend  its  weaker  sist(Ms.  This  is  all 
very  well,  but  suppose —  as  has  happened  in  the  past  — 
foreign  nations  have  legitimate  grievances  to  be  righted. 
Then,  of  course,  the  United  States  does  not  pretend  to  inter- 
fere, unless  the  righting  of  these  grievances  leads  to  results 
that  violate  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  But  every  dispute  has 
two  sides  to  it,  with  something  io  be  ^aid  for  each,  and 
who  is  to  determine  which  way  the  balance  inclines?  The 
United  States  has  no  desire  to  assume  the  position  of  ar- 
biter in  matters  of  this  kind,  even  if  the  other  great  powers 
were  willing,  as  they  are  not,  to  recognize^  its  right  to  pass 
ju(lgni(>nt  on  every  controversy  between  a  European  and  an 
American  country.  And  if  it  should  act  as  arbner,  how 
would  its  decisions  be  carried  out?  Would  the  European 
plaintiff,  if  in  the  right,  be  allowed  to  take  any  method  he 
pleased  to  enforce  the  verdict,  or  would  the  United  States 
,-(Tve  also  as  .sheriff,  and  carry  out  its  own  decrees  against 
rt^fractory  American  republics?  Neither  prospect  is  at  all 
alluring. 

President  Roosevelt  deserves  praise  for  the  admir- 
able way  in  which  he  has  recognized  an''  faced  the  diffi- 

V 


290       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


cultips  of  the  situation.  In  his  message  of  February  7, 
1905,  to  the  Senate,  he  declared:  "It  has  for  some  time 
been  obvious  that  those  who  profit  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
must  arcppt  certain  responsibilities  along  with  the  rights 
wluch  it  confers,  and  that  the  same  statement  applies  to 
those  who  uphold  the  doctrine.  ...  An  aggrieved  nation 
can,  without  interfering  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  take 
what  action  it  sees  fit  in  the  adjustment  of  its  disputes  with 
American  states,  provided  that  action  does  not  take  the 
shape  of  intrrference  with  their  form  of  government  or  of 
the  despoilment  of  their  territory  under  any  disguise.  But 
short  of  this,  when  the  question  is  one  of  a  money  claim,  the 
only  way  which  remains,  finally,  to  collect  it  is  a  blockade 
or  bombardment  oi  seizure  of  the  custom-houses,  and  this 
means  .  .  .  what  is  in  effect  a  possession,  even  though 
only  a  temporary  possession  of  territory.  The  United 
States  then  becomes  a  party  in  interest,  because  under  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  it  cannot  see  any  European  power  seize 
and  permanently  occupy  the  territory  of  one  of  these 
republics,  and  yet  such  seizure  of  territory,  disguised  or 
undisguised,  may  eventually  offer  the  only  way  in  which 
the  power  in  question  can  colirrt  any  debts;  unless  there 
is  interference  on  the  part  of  the  United  States."  Return- 
ing to  the  subject  in  his  message  of  December  5,  of  the 
same  year,  he  wrote :  — 

"We  must  make  it  evident  that  we  do  not  intend  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  Ix'  used  by  any  nation  on  this  continent 
as  a  shield  to  proter-t  it  from  the  consequences  of  its  own 
misdeeds  against  foreign  nations.  If  a  republic  to  the  south 
of  us  commits  a  tort  against  a  foreign  nation,  such  as  an 
outrage  against  a  citizen  of  that  nation,  then  the  Mt)ni-oe 
Doctrine  does  not  force  us  to  interfere  to  prevent  punish- 

assume  the  form  of  territorial  occupation  in  any  shape. 
The  ease  is  more  difficult  when  it  refers  to  a  contractual 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 


291 


obligation.  Our  own  government  has  always  refused  to 
enforce  such  contractual  obligations  on  behalf  of  its  citizens 
by  an  appeal  to  arms. 

"It  is  much  to  be  wished  that  all  foreign  nations  would 
take  the  same  view.  Hut  they  do  not ;  and  in  consequenee 
we  are  lia))le  at  any  time  to  l)e  brought  face  to  face  with 
disagreeable  alternatives.  On  the  one  hand,  this  country 
would  certainly  decline  to  go  to  war  to  prevent  a  foreign 
government  from  collecting  a  just  debt ;  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  very  inadvisable  to  permit  any  forei^ni  power  to  take 
poss  ision,  even  temporarily,  of  the  cust()m-hous(>s  of  an 
American  republic  in  order  to  enforce  the  payment  of  its 
obligations ;  for  such  temporary  occupation  might  turn  into 
a  permanent  occupation.  The  only  escape  from  these 
alternatives  may  at  any  time  be  that  we  must  ourselves 
undertake  to  bring  about  some  arrangement  by  which  so 
much  as  possible  of  just  obligation  shall  be  paid.  It  is 
far  better  that  this  country  should  put  through  such  an 
arrangement,  rather  thai:  allow  any  foreign  country  to 
undertake  it." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  President  emphasizes  the  dis- 
tinction between  torts  and  contractual  obli^,Mtif)ns,  and  rec- 
oirnizes  the  right  of  the  European  powers  to  take  action  in 
tlic  former  cases.  Indeed,  unless  the  United  States  were  to 
declare  a  protectorate  over  Latin  America,  this  is  the  only 
tenable  ground;  for  we  cannot  expect  that  any  great  self- 
respecting  nation  will  submit  to  another's  meddling  in  its 
disputes  unless  that  other  is  willing  squarely  to  accejjt  all 
the  responsibilities  involved.  But,  in  practice,  the  Presi- 
dent's distinction  does  not  help  much.  Contractual  dis- 
putes may  easily  be  complicated  by  torts,*  and  it  will  be 
hard  to  make  the  American  people  ai)pr."ciate  the  differ- 
ence between  the  two.    They  are  iiicliued  to  view  with 

'  For  instance,  the  treatment  by  President  Castro  of  the  French  Charge 
a'ASgires  in  Veneisuela. 


292 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


iiicicasitij,'  inipatiriK'o  and  suj^picion  all  military  artioii 
of  Eurojx  an  powers  in  the  New  World,  and  yet  they  are 
iinwilHnf;  to  substitute  themselves  for  the  injured  party. 

This  is  easy  to  understand.  Apart  from  their  natural  disin- 
clination to  put  thcnisclvcs  out  for  matters  wliicli  do  not 
interest  tliem.  they  know  well  that,  if  they  undertake  to  en- 
force justice  apiinst  a  Latin-American  delimiuent,  they  will 
immediately  be  rejjarded  as  tyrants  who,  under  cover  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  are  trying  to  become  dominant  over  the 
whole  western  hemisphere.  The  role  of  forcible  mediator 
is  a  most  uncomfortable  one.  The  Americans  have  shown 
u  creditable  willin^^ness  to  defer  to  arbitration  the  contro- 
versies ui  which  they  themselves  have  been  enj^a^ed,  and 
they  have  good  reason  to  desire  that  the  practice  should 
be  adopted  in  all  the  disiKites  in  which  Latin  America  is 
concerned.  Nothing'  could  do  more  to  relieve  them  of  their 
present  (Mubarrassments. 

In  the  particular  case  with  which  PrCvsident  Roosevelt 
was  dealing  in  his  m«'ssa}:e,  that  of  San  Domingo,  he  recom- 
mended a  remedy  which  consisted  in  playing  the  part  of 
both  jud^'e  and  benevolent  policeman.  The  American  gov- 
ernment had  brouirht  about  an  agreement  between  San 
Domin-";  and  her  creditors  's  to  the  proportion  of  the 
Donunican  customs-duties  t  ha.  should  be  devoted  to  settling 
their  claims;  and,  in  order  to  insure  that  the  payments 
should  really  be  made,  AnuTican  officials  were  appointed 
to  take  charge  of   the  Dominican  custom-house.  The 

•ranger.ient  set  nis  equitable  enough  in  itself,  and  avoids 
inunediate  trouble,  iiut  who  can  blame  the  outside  world, 
and  especially  the  Latin  Americans,  for  regarding  it  as  a 
sort  of  disguised  protectorate  over  San  Domingo?  No 
wonder  that  th(>  Senate  hesitated  to  ajiprovo  the  measure, 
wiili'h  iiad  io  lie  twice  ifiodined  b<ft>re  it  vnTis  ccMinrnirri. 
No  wonder,  too,  that  it  produced  some  disturbances  in  San 
Domingo  itself,  and  altliough  it  is  in  active  operation,  has 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 


211.1 


not  yet  Ihimi  ratified  there.  If  the  next  <»f  tlie  many  Do- 
minican insurrections  should  start  in  tlic  orthodox  way  with 
a  st'izure  of  the  custom-house  (the  only  place  where  there 
are  available  funds),  the  United  States  nii^rlit  ]»e  forced  to 
act  a'  once.  It  is  easier  to  see  the  beginning  than  the  end 
•  if  sucii  inti  I'ventions. 

In  its  i)ohcy  toward  San  I)oniin}:;o  the  udniinistration  at 
Washington  was  doubtless  influenced  by  the  recollection  of 
the  blockade  of  Venezuelan  ports  in  1902.  The  incident 
liad  produced  so  f^reat  irritation  in  the  United  States 
that  the  international  situation  \v;is,  for  a  moment,  pre- 
carious; and  the  outcome  left  American  puMic  opmion 
profoundly  dissatisfied.  The  guarantee  of  tiiirty  per  cent 
t)f  the  Venezuelan  customs  to  the  creditor  powers  gives 
them  a  hold  on  the  country  which  may  be  menacing; 
it  also  may  easily  lead  to  trou])h'  with  the  native  ^govern- 
ment. To  make  matter.-,  worse,  the  decision  of  the  Ila^ue 
Tribunal,  granting  priority  to  the  claims  of  those  n;  '  ions 
Avhich  had  taKcn  steps  to  enforce  them,  was  a  tlistinct  invi- 
tation to  creditor  powers  to  press  their  demands  without 
delay,  for  fear  of  l)ein<;  forestaHed  by  the  action  of  others. 
It  was  to  preclude  another  crisis  of  tlie  sort  tliat  the  Sati 
Domingo  arrangement  was  entered  into;  but  the  question 
ai  ises,  What  next  ?  ' 

The  whole  subject  of  the  relations  between  debtor  and 
creditor  states  is  big  with  possibilities  of  trouble  for  the 
future.  Th;-  modem  development  of  capital  among  civil- 
ized nations,  and  its  investment  in  all  i)arts  of  the  globe, 
liave  greatly  complicated  the  situation;  the  more  so,  as 
international  law  has  not  yet  expressed  itself  clearly  on 
some  of  the  points  at  issue.    So  far,  strength  alone  has 

'  In  the  sti!!  uufinishcd  disputo  botwcen  Frjuic'  awl  XViic/iiol.it,  it  hfts 
looked  as  if  France  were  remaining  quiet  on  the  as.suran(  (}  tliat  the  United 
States,  which  has  grie\  ances  of  its  own  .'iKtiinst  Venezuela,  will  not  forget 
the  French  ones  when  the  day  of  reckoning  comes. 


294       THE  UNITED  STTATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


(l.'cid.'d  such  cast's.  Take,  for  iiistaiu'e,  the  ti'iestion  of  re- 
piuliution.  When  a  community  has  been  itrong  enough, 
like  the  Ottoman  Empire,  or  in  a  safe  enough  position,  like 
some  of  the  Amcricun  states,  to  rcpudiatr  its  d('l)ts,  the 
(Toditors  have  liad  to  suffer  without,  re<li(  ss;  when  it  has 
])een  weak,  Hke  K^'Vpt,  it  hn>'  been  exposed  to  the  dan^'cr 
of  seeing  itself  deprived  of  inch'pendence  for  the  benefit  of 
those  who  hold  its  bonds.  If  the  Russian  Empire  were  to 
go  into  bankruptcy  to-day,  France  could  do  nothing  to  save 
herself  from  enornious  loss;  bvit  if  Persia  were  to  repudiate 
tlu"del)t  she  has  contracted  with  English  and  Russian  bunks, 
t^he  wotdd  he  taken  in  hand  at  once. 

The  matter  of  private  investment  in  foreign  lands  is  more 
difficult  still.    Civilized  states  have  protected  the  interests 
of  their  citizens  abroad  by  treaties  insuring  to  them,  as  far 
as  possilile,  the  rights  enjoyed  by  the  native  population. 
When  they  have  had  cause  of  coniphiint  on  this  score,  tiH'> 
have  had  to  remain  content  with  protests  if  opposed  by 
equals,  but  if  dealing  with  weaker  or  barbarous  communi- 
ties, they  have  often  resorted  to  force.   Never  have  people 
been  iinigratiug  so  freely  as  to-day;  uever  has  capital  been 
invested  in  foreign  lands  to  the  same  extent;  hence  op- 
t unities  for  conflicts  are  being  multiplied.    At  present, 
iig  to  the  disappearance,  within  a  generation,  of  many 
Asiatic  and  African  statea  where  Europe  has  had  to  inter- 
fere in  the  past,  danger  from  those  quarters  is  less  to  be 
feared.    It  is  in  some  of  the  Latin-American  countries 
that  we  meet  thr  conditions  best  suited  to  produce  inter- 
national difficulties  of  a  financial  kind,  frequently  compli- 
cated by  ill-treatment  of  resident  foreigners.    When  wc 
find  an  ignorant  mixed  population,  a  government  con- 
sisting of  a  few  greedy  politicians  grouped  about  a  dic- 
tator soon  to  be  uverthio      by  some  rival  and  las  L-ana, 
and  this  iti  regions  whose  splendid  natural  resources  in- 
evitably tempi  foreign  capital,  which  is  now  scanning  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  296 


whole  world  for  chances  of  profituble  investment,  we  have 
almost  ideal  conditions  for  trouble.    What  makes  matters 

worst'  is  that  the  partiivs  to  such  a  dispute  arc  often  not 
I  Ik  ISC  ulio  made  the  ori^'iiial  transaction.  An  irrcsfxjiisible 
Ivistrrn  prince  or  Latin-American  presi(h>nt  may  profit  hy 
Ills  l)rief  lease  of  power  to  conclude  a  loan  with  foreign 
hunkers  on  terms  which  constitute  a  crushing  burden  for 
the  future  of  the  unfortunate  people  over  whom  he  is  mo- 
mentarily ruling.  He  disappears,  and  they  are  left  to  pay 
the  bill.  On  the  otiier  side,  a  group  of  shady  capitalists, 
advatuing  money  under  these  circunistances,  \vill  hasten  to 
unload  their  bonds  on  the  unsuspecting  public  of  investors, 
to  whom  the  transaction  is  represented  as  a  reasonable  and 
normal  one.  The  debtor  country  objects  to  suffering  in- 
definitely for  the  caprices  of  some  conscienceless  Khedive, 
as  in  ICgypt,  or  dictator^  as  in  parts  of  Latin  America; 
l)ut  the  state  where  the  bond-holders  reside  feels  obliged 
to  do  its  utmost  to  protect  the  interests  of  its  citizens, 
who  have  believed  that  their  legitimate  investment  was 
guaranteed  l)y  the  honor  of  an  established  government. 
It  is  notorious,  too,  that  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  some 
Latin-American  states,  owing  to  corruption  or  to  subservi- 
ence to  tlie  Executive,  cannot  be  accepted  as  f^-;al  by  the 
rest  of  the  world.  To  cap  the  climax,  in  son.e  of  these 
same  countries  legislation  has  been  made,  forbidding  for- 
ei;:iiers  to  appeal  to  their  home  governments  for  protection. 
Al!  this  helps  to  make  the  outlook  rather  discouraging  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  United  States,  which  is  trying  to 
keep  the  pea^e  without  shielding  the  wrong-doer. 

The  last  few  years  have  witnessed  the  birth  of  the  so-called 
Drago  Doctrine,  according  to  which  all  states  should  be 
fnrbi(ld(>n  by  international  law  from  coll(>cting  debts  from 
aiiOiiRi'  t;y  iwrce.  »\n  was  ic>  fx-  expuH  icd,  tnis  prin- 
ciple has  met  with  much  scorn  in  Europe,  but  has  been 
hailed  as  a  new  gospel  by  niauy  Latin-American  countries. 


296       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


There  iimy  well  ho  two  opinions  as  to  its  inherent  justice. 
If,  after  many  centuries  of  contention,  the  world  has  not  yet 
made  up  its  mind  as  to  the  exact  limits  of  the  rights  of 
debtors  and  creditors  among  individuals,  we  need  not 
expect  any  prompt  a^^reement  when  in  the  phice  of  individ- 
uals we  have  states,  or  collections  of  individuals,  often  less 
resjxuisible  than  are  private  citizens.  The  Latin-Aniericau 
re{)ublics  look  at  the  question  from  their  point  of  view,  that 
of  comparatively  weak  communities  owing  money.  It  is 
not  surprising  that  at  the  recent  conference  of  Hi(.  Janeiro, 
tnanv  i^f  the  delegates  desired  to  s(>(>  the  new  creed  a(h)i)ted 
bv  the  powers  represented,  and  above  all  by  the  United 
States. 

The  position  of  the  latter  is  delicate.    It  is  evident 
that  it  would  be  relieved  of  much  responsibility  if  the 
European  powers  were  prevented  by  international  law 
from  trying  to  compel  American  republics  to  T)ay  their 
del)ts.    Incidents  like  the  latest  Venezuela  one  would  then 
be  inipossiltle,  and  the  burden  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would 
be  appreciably  lightened.    But,  as  we  know,  the  United 
States  is  becoming  more  ;ind  more  .\  creditor  itself,  and 
its  interests  are  not  in  favor  of  protecting  irrespi  nsible 
del  tors.    In  thf>  t^'ourse  of  time,  if  Pan-American  dreams 
are  realized,  it  may  have  more  money  than  any  other  coun- 
try invested  in  the  domains  of  the  sister  republics,  and  in 
that  case  it  will  be  more  solicitous  than  any  other  that  such 
investments  receive  fair  treatment.    At  Rio  Janeiro  its  n>p- 
resentatives  careftdly  avoided  expressing  an  o))inion  on  the 
Drago  Doctrine,  whi<-h  was  referred  to  The  Hague.  There 
its  conuiiissioners  succeeded  in  putting  througli  a  resolu- 
tion —  one  of  the  few  tangible  achievements  of  the  Con- 
ference—  that  no  nation  should  attempt  to  collect  debts  by 
force  till  arbitration  had  been  tried  and  had  failed. 

As  fa.  as  it  goes  the  principle  is     md,  and  its  adop- 
tion at  this  juncture  was  a  hrilli-nt  stroke  of  ai])lomacy. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  297 


The  debtor  Latin-American  states,  while  not  obtaining  all 
they  wanted,  did  acquire  a  certain  protection  for  cases  in 
which  they  should  act  in  good  faith,  and  the  creditor  Euro- 
pean powers  did  not  abdicate  the  right  to  enforce  the  pav- 
iiu  nt  of  claims  justly  due  them,  but  only  consented  to  try 
{jeaceuble  nusaiis  first.  The  United  States  was  able  to  ap- 
pear as  the  friend  of  both,  and  of  abstract  justice,  without 
having  to  commit  itself  in  one  wav  or  the  other  on  the 
tlit'ories  of  Sefior  Drago. 

If,  at  the  time  of  the  promulgation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, it  appeared  to  Americans  that  the  New  World  differetl 
from  the  Old  chiefly  in  being  the  home  of  free  governments 
in  contrast  to  the  lands  ruled  by  the  principle  of  authority, 
to-day,  at  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century,  one  of  the 
main  distinctions  between  Latin  America  and  western 
Europe  is  that  between  debtor  and  creditor  nations,  but 
the  interests  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  republic  are  no  longer 
entirely  on  the  side  of  the  former. 

Secretary  Root's  declaration  in  Rio  Janeiro  that  the 
United  States  "does  not  and  will  not  collect  private  debts," 
though  received  with  enthusiasm  as  meaning  adherence  to 
the  Drago  idea,  docs  not  disj^ose  of  the  question.  We  may 
bt>  sure  that  the  United  States  will  do  its  best  to  protect  the 
property  of  its  citizens  wherever  circumstances  so  demand. 
The  causes  which  have  forced  it  to  intervention  in  Cuba 
would  lead  to  similar  action  in  Haiti  or  Nicaragua,  if 
American  interests  there  were  of  equal  magnitude;  and  it 
would  never  tolerate  either  wanton  destruction  or  confis- 
cation, even  if  confiscation  were  sanctioned  by  the  verdict 
of  some  Latin-American  court.  Already,  American  invest- 
ments in  Mexico  are  so  great  that  we  cannot  conceive  that 
the  government  at  W^ashington  would  remain  inactive  in 
case  they  were  menaced;  and  what  is  true  of  Mexico 
lo-day  may  be  equally  so  of  Vene/ueia  to-morrow.  As 
matters  stand,  if  the  United  States  should  formally  accept 


298       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  Drago  Doctrine,  it  could  not  be  with  the  understand- 
ing that  it  was  thereby  precluded  from  defending  the 
large  present  and  prospective  interests  of  its  citizens  in  the 
regions  in  which  it  is  so  eager  to  promote  thorn  to-day. 
And,  on  the  otlier  hand,  we  must  not  forget  that,  from  the 
Latin-American  point  of  view,  the  intervention  of  the 
United  States  would  be  regarded  as  perhaps  more  dangerous 
to  the  independence  of  the  southern  republics  than  that  of 
any  European  power,  and  that  foi.-ibU"  measures  against  one 
would  almost  certainly  alar:n  them  all.  Even  such  salutary 
disci]>l.ne  as  compelling  tlie  :jrl)ulent  little  communities  of 
Central  America  to  keep  the  peace  with  one  another  must 
be  or:  forced  with  all  possible  tact,  and  the  United  States 
government  has  been  wisely  inspired  in  seeking  the  coop- 
oration  of  xMexico  in  its  recent  efforts  in  this  direction. 

The  idea  ihat  all  tlie  republics  of  the  New  World  should 
draw  closer  lou'ether  was  first  taken  up  with  energy  by 
Secretary  Blaijie.  lu  many  ways  it  is  a  development  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  —  one  to  which  Bolivar  had  already 
tried  to  give  premature  expression.  We  may  say  that 
Pan-.\moricanism,  :.s  the  conception  is  usually  called,  is 
based  ou  two  consiut  rations.  The  first  is  the  sentimental 
one,  which  is  dwelt  upon  chiefly  on  state  occasions.  It 
proclaims  the  na+'iral  community  of  ideals  and  aspirations 
of  tl  Ameriean  republics.  This  community,  be  it  remem- 
bered, applies  only  to  th  '  .s;df-governing  nations  of  Englisli 
or  Latin  tongue:  it  was  ai  p'l  able  to  Brazil  when  it  had  just 
censed  to  be  a  monarchy,  and  to  Cuba  when  it  became  in- 
dependent ol  Spain,  but  it  does  apply  to  Canada  even 
now,  although  the  Dominion,  if  we  take  into  account  its 
Arctic  domains,  is  the  largest  of  all  American  states. 

The  second  consideration  is  of  a  more  practical  nature,  of 
a  kin<l  to  .'inpeal  not  merely  to  enthusiasts,  but  to  hard- 
headed  business  men.  In  spite  of  natural  sympathies,  of  the 
workings  of  the  iMouroe  Doctrine,  and  other  forces  of  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  299 


sort,  the  trade  between  the  Anglo-Saxon  republic  and  the 
Latin  ones  of  the  western  hemisphere  has  been,  and  is, 
unreasonably  small.    European  critics  declare  that  South 

America,  a  new  country,  has  preferred  intercourse  with 
those  lands  from  which  she  has  had  most  to  gain,  the 
lands  of  historical  traditions  and  aged  civilization,  rather 
than  with  a  new  and  comparatively  crude  nation  in  much 
the  same  state  as  herself.   The  American  explanation  is, 
of  course,  different.    It  is,  in  substance,  that  the  manufac- 
turers and  merchants  of  the  United  States  have  been  so 
busy  elsewhere  that  they  have  neglected  the  regions  to  the 
south  of  them.    Without  denying  that  there  is  some  truth 
in  each  of  these  theories,  we  may  accept  as  more  satisfactory 
the  explanation  that,  until  lately,  the  United  States  has  been 
an  exporter  almost  entirely  of  raw  materials,  many  of  which 
South  America  either  possesses  herself,  or  has  not  felt  the 
l  ek  of.    American  wheat  is  not  needed  in  Argentina,  nor 
can  it  be  expected  to  compete  in  the  long  run  with  the 
wheat  of  Argentina  in  the  markets  of  Brazil.    And  South 
American  industry  has  not  been  sufficient  in  the  past 
to  make  much  demand  on  the  United  States  for  cotton. 
But  to-day  conditions  are  tli.mged;  for  the  manufacturing 
industries  of  the  United  8t:i.tos  have  doveloned,  and  are 
developing,  at  such  a  rate  that  the  American^  .  ;e  not  afraid 
to  meet  their  European  rivals  in  almost  any  branch  of  trade. 
It  was  to  be  expected  that  they  should  turn  their  gaze  to 
the  southern  half  of  their  own  hemisphere,  where,  yet, 
thoy  are  only  beginning  to  get  a  good  commercial  foot- 
lioUl,  but  where  the  future  appears  to  offer  them  golden 
opportunities.    Why  should  the  American  merchant  leave 
thid  splendid  field  to  be  exploited  by  the  Englishman  or  thp 
r^erman  ?  Is  it  not  the  plain  duty  of  his  government  to  aid 
•ind  encourage  his  enterprise  in  every  possible  way?   As  for 
the  easy  sneer  that  Pan-Americanism  combines  business 
and  sentimentality,  we  may  answer  that  the  same  is  true 


300       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  most  ntitioiifil  friendships,  as  well  as  of  many  private 
ones.  An  obvious  initial  stop  to  bring  about  amity  between 
people,  especially  in  these  modern  days,  is  to  bind  them 
by  commercial  ties  which  shall  be  to  the  advantage  of 
both. 

The  first  Pan-American  Congress  was  held  at  Washington 
in  the  winter  of  18S!)  1S90.    It  lasted  many  weeks,  some 
of  which  were  devoted  to  a  special  trip  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  United  States  to  the  Latin  delegates.  Numer- 
ous speeches  were  made,  and  expressions  of  good-will  were 
freely  exchanged.    In  so  far  as  the  ()1)ject  of  the  Conference 
was  to  promote  harmonious  relations,  it  may  be  called  suc- 
cessful; but  its  concrete  achievements  were  not  imposing. 
All  thought  of  a  customs-union  was  soon  abandoned,  and 
most  of  the  various  resolutions  and  recommendations  that 
were  passed  did  not  lead  to  action  on  the  part  of  the  gov- 
ernments represented.    The  most  definite  creation  of  the 
Congress  was  the  Bureau  of  American  Republics,  an  institu- 
tion which  has  had  a  career  of  modest  usefulness.    At  its 
headquarters  in  Washington  it  has  gathered  a  library  of 
some  fourteen  thousand  volumes ;  it  has  published,  besides 
its  regular  bulletins,  a  series  of  monographs  on  the  conditions 
and  the  resources  of  the  different  Latin-American  countries, 
and  also  a  commercial  directory.    So  far,  its  work  has  been 
ch  ^fly  that  of  a  bureau  of  information. 

m  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Congress  as  well  as 
with  Secretary  Blaine's  own  policy,  the  Secretary  and  his 
successors  negotiated  a  number  of  reciprocity  treaties  with 
different  Latin-American  states;  but  the  moment  chosen 
was  an  unfortunate  one.  The  McKinley  Tariff  Bill,  by 
which  the  American  government  committed  itself  to  a 
principle  of  extreme  protection,  was  just  going  into  effe  ct, 
and  ilif  highly  protected  industries  had  no  thought  of  allow- 
ing their  profits  to  suffer  for  the  sake  of  promoting  friend- 
ship and  closer  relations  with  Latin  America.    So  strong 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  301 


was  their  influc>nco  tliat  these  treaties,  like  certain  later 
ones  with  European  countries,  fell  to  the  ground  without 
even  being  submitted  to  the  Senate  for  ratification.  The 
manufacturer  in  the  United  States  means  to  conquer  the 
Latin-American  market,  if  possible,  but  he  does  not  intend 
to  sacrifice  any  of  his  own  advantages,  if  he  can  helj>  liimself. 

This  attitude  is  comprehensible,  Imt  it  limits  the  ideal  of 
Pan-Americanism.  After  the  high  hopes  that  had  beea 
cherished,  and  the  exaggerated  language  in  which  enthu- 
siasts had  indulged,  such  a  result  was  meagre.  Foreign 
writers  proclaimed  the  whole  movement  a  fiasco,  and 
they  have  joyfully  held  that  opinion  ever  since,  although 
each  new  congress  has  awakened  fresh  trepidation.  Some 
Americans,  on  the  other  hand,  have  attempted  to  conceal 
the  small  ness  of  the  results  by  fine  language  about  the 
moral  effect  produced  by  the  conferences  and  the  affection 
which  the  repuhli-  s  of  the  New  World  have  come  to  enter- 
tain for  one  another.  Stripped  of  rhetoric,  this  view  has 
some  truth  in  it :  the  Pan-American  congresses  have  tended 
to  produce  good  feeling  between  the  United  States  and  its 
sister  republics.  Even  the  actual  creations  have  been  of 
value,  if  for  nothing  else,  as  stepping-stones  toward  future 
l)rogresK.  But  progress  has  been  slow.  The  second  Con- 
gress, that  of  Mexico,  in  1901-1902,  accomplished  very  little. 

When  the  third  meeting  was  called  in  Kio  Janeiro  in  1906, 
men  had  profited  by  experience.  In  a  session  which  lasted 
l)ut  six  weeks  this  Congress  achieved  more  than  its  pre- 
decessors. Avoiding  general  discussions,  it  did  its  real  work 
in  committees,  and,  laying  aside  all  ambitious  dreams,  it 
confined  itself  to  a  modest  programme  of  practical  objects 
which  were  attainable. 

The  Bureau  of  American  Republics  was  made  an 
■  ;;cuti\c  organization,  entitled  to  correspond  with  the 
different  American  governments;  to  call  their  attention  to 
the  necessity  of  ratifying  treaties  or  recommendations,  — 


302        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


in  ponoral,  to  tiiko  action  in  Pan-American  matters.  The 
Bureau  will  also  prepare  the  programmes  for  future  Con- 
gresses, its  scope  as  purveyor  of  information  is  to  be 
enlarged,  and  it  is  t(  make  investigations  of  common 
American  interests.  It  is  to  have  a  buihiing  of  its  own, 
which,  thanks  to  a  private  gift,  is  to  be  a  considerable 
one,  and  which  will  probably  become  a  club  for  Latin 
Americans  in  the  city  of  Washington.  Each  of  the  gov- 
ernments represented  has  been  called  upon  to  appoint  for 
its  country  a  permanent  Pan-American  commission,  and 
certain  bureaus  dealing  with  sp(>cial  sul)jects  are  to  be 
established  in  some  of  the  South  American  cities.  Even 
this  total  is  not  startUng,  but  it  represents  distinct  prog- 
ress. In  connection  with  the  Congress,  Secretary  Root's 
journey  to  South  America  made  an  excellent  impression, 
and  one  can  only  regret  that  the  unfortunate  outbreak 
in  Cuba  which  threatened  to  undo  much  of  what  he  had 
accomplished,  occurred  even  before  he  got  home.  To  sum 
up,  we  can  say  that  the  Pan-American  movement,  which 
is  being  wisely  kept  within  moderate  limits,  has  so  far 
achieved  satisfactory  if  not  brilliant  results,  and  promise 
well  for  the  future. 

Many  foreigners  have  declared  that  Pan-Americanism 
is  nothing  but  militant  Monroeism  and  the  beginning  of 
an  attempt  to  impose  Yankee  domination,  political  and 
commercial,  on  the  whole  western  hemisphere.  Kindliness 
is  not  to  be  looked  for  in  the  judgments  of  those  who 
feel  that  their  interests  are  menaced  by  unwelcc  (om- 
petition,  and  we  may  exjiect  that  most  Europeans  wii 
regard  this  part  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  as 
a  cloak  for  covert  designs.  We  also  need  not  wonder 
that  many  people  in  the  LHtln-America.  republics  enter- 
tain suspicions  of  the  same  kind.  No  fair-minded  observer 
can,  however,  deny  that  the  aims  of  Pan-Americanism 
have  so  far  been  legitimate,  and  the  means  of  carrying 


THE  UNITED  STATES  A^J)  LATIN  AMERICA  303 


them  out  unobjoctionaMo.  Like  the  Triple  AHiance  or  the; 
entente  cordiale,  Pun-Americanism  can  chvim  that  it  is  not 
directed  against  any  one,  but  is  an  association  for  mutual 

benefit,  of  which  no  one  has  a  riglit  to  complain.  It  is 
the  Ijusiness  of  other  nations  to  make  the  most,  in  their 
turn,  of  sucli  ties  as  may  be  beneficial  to  themselv(>s. 

This  is  true  as  fur  as  it  goes,  but  though  in  theory  the 
commerce  of  Latin  America  may  develop  to  such  an  extent 
that  all  the  peoples  trading  there  may  sell  more  goods  than 
they  do  at  present,  in  practice  some  of  them  arc  likely  to 
s\ifTer  l)y  competition.  It  woukl  then^fore  be  idle  to  ])reteii(l 
that  Am(>ricau  rivahy  in  these  regions  is  not  a  menace  to 
the  commerce  of  several  European  countries.  This  may  be 
deplored  by  the  philanthropist,  but  in  the  present  stage  of 
industrial  competition  it  seems  unavoidable.  If  my  shop 
sells  better  or  cheaper  goods  than  any  other,  my  rivals  are 
likely  to  be  disagreeably  uff(  cted,  ])ut  not  throvigh  my  fault. 
All  we  can  ask  is  that  competition  shall  be  fair.  Among 
nations,  reciprocity  treaties  with  mutual  concessions  are  re- 
garded as  within  the  rights  of  all.  If  the  European  powers 
were  to  join  together  in  a  customs-union,  the  United  States 
would  have  no  grountl  for  protest,  vwn  if  it  suffered  by  the 
combination;  but  it  would  b(>  ])erfectly  justified  in  trying 
to  detach  any  member  from  that  union,  just  as  (lermany 
is  at  liberty  to  make  a  better  commercial  treaty  than  the 
United  States,  if  she  can.  In  many  cases  the  odds  are  not 
all  on  one  side ;  for  instance,  it  is  not  probable  that  Ameri- 
can friendship  will  lead  Mexico  and  Argentina  to  forget  that 
Spain  was  their  motlu^r  country,  any  more  tluin  tli(>re  is  an 
immediate  prospect  that  the  literary  and  a\sthetic  standards 
of  New  York  will  supplant  those  of  Paris  at  Rio  Janeiro  or 
Huenos  Ayres. 

The  gravest  difficulties  in  the  way  of  Pan-American- 
ism are  those  which  are  inherent  in  the  social  and  ])()liti- 
cal  conditions  of  the  New  World  itself.    To  begin  with, 


304       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


althouph  such  topics  ;iro  avoided  in  pul)lic  discussion,  it  is 
useless  to  blink  the  fact  that  the  average  citizens  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  Latin-American  republics  are 
not  overcongenial  to  one  another.    There  are,  of  course, 
numerous  (v\cei)ti()(iR  to  this  rule,  Init  not  enoui^h  to  affect 
the  (.'eiieral  truth  that  the  people  of  the   I'uited  Stat  i 
have  a  rough  contempt  for  the  Latin  Americans,  espe- 
cially when  they  are  of  mixed  blood,  and  the  latter  sus- 
pect and  dislike  their  Anglo-Saxon  brothers.    To  the  Latin 
Americans,  the  Yankee  frequently  appears  J)rutai,  egotis- 
tical, arrogant,  and  lacking  in  appreciation  of  the  a'stht'tic 
side  of  civilization.    To  the  citizen  of  the  I'nited  States, 
his  Southern  neighbors,  when  he  sto])S  to  think  of  them  at 
all,  often  seem  vain,  childish,  and,  above  all,  incompetent 
to  maintain  decent  self-government.    Time  and  better 
acquaintance  will,  let  us  hope,  do  much  to  eradicate  these 
mutual  prejudices;  but  we  nuist  recognize,  as  one  of  the 
obstacles  to  good  feeling  to-day,  the  fact  that  the  two  races 
do  not  find  it  easy  to  understand  and  apj)reciate  each  other. 
In  Paris,  for  instance,  where  there  is  a  large  colony  of  both, 
they  seldom  flock  together:  both  have  far  more  to  do  with 
the  French  than  with  one  a. of  her.    We  must  remem})er, 
however,  that  comparatively  few  people  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
rt  public  and  the  Latin-American  ones  come  into  actual 
contact,  hence  their  lack  of  natural  affinities  may  not  prove 
a  serious  obstacle  to  good  relations.    Then,  too,  nations 
can  esteem  those  of  very  different  character  from  tlumvseb"  s : 
the  great  masses  on  both  s'ulvs  do  not  know  each  other  suffi- 
ciently to  appreciate  how  much  they  diffc^r. 

It  is  the  political  suspicion  which  many  Latin  Americans 
entertain  of  their  Northern  neighbors,  and  which  Europeans 
will  always  be  ready  to  keep  alive,  that  is  perhaps  the  greatest 
bar  to  closer  connections.  Without  paying  attenti  on  to  irre- 
sponsible writers  who  have  declared  th  t  it  is  the  destiny 
of  the  United  States  to  rule  the  whole  western  hemisphere, 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  305 


and  witliout  quest iuniiig  tlie  tiincerity  of  the  American  people 
any  more  than  that  of  the  government  at  Washington  in  seek- 
ing the  friendship  of  the  Latin-American  countries,  we  must, 

iievertlieless,  a<hiiit  that  this  suspicion  is  not  without  foun- 
dation. History  shows  that  the  close  association  of  weak 
states  and  stroni<  ones  may  he  danj^erous,  sooner  or  later, 
to  the  independence  of  the  former.  At  the  present  moment, 
the  United  States,  as  regards  strength,  is  in  somewhat  the 
same  position  as  was  Prussia  toward  the  other  members  of 
the  German  Zollverein,  tliat  is  to  say,  it  lias  a  larger  popula- 
tion, greater  actual  wealth,  more  available  resources,  in 
a  word,  is  stronger  in  almost  every  respect,  not  only  tliaii  any 
one  of  the  Latin  American  republics,  but  than  all  of  them  put 
together.  Such  a  disproportion  is  formidable  to  the  weaker 
states,  and  thouj^'h  with  the  growth  of  Argentina  and 
Hrazil  it  will  diminish  before  lou^,  the  day  when  any  likely 
combination  of  the  Latin  republics  will  be  the  equal  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  one  is  still  far  ahead.  We  must  admit, 
too,  that  the  history  of  the  growth  of  the  United  States  is 
ot  entirely  reassuring  to  the  Latin  Americans;  in  par- 
■!ular  the  story  of  the  Mexican  War  will  always  frighten 
them.  With  such  fears  in  their  minds,  they  are  prone  to 
scrutinize  closely  each  act  of  their  powerful  neighl)or,  to 
take  offence  at  any  semblance  of  a  slight  to  their  dignity, 
and  to  view  with  angry  alarm  every  step  which  can  in 
any  way  be  interpreted  as  menacing  to  their  independence. 
Incidents  which  in  the  United  States  have  hardly  attracted 
a  moment's  attention,  careless  words  of  public  men  to 
which  peopl(>  at  home  have  never  thought  of  attachin.u' 
weight,  —  these,  rejjeated  abroad  and  magnified,  are  capable 
of  producing  among  a  sensitive  pecjple  a  resentment  danger- 
ous to  all  friendly  relations.  To  make  matters  worse,  pubhc 
men  in  the  United  States,  as  well  as  private  citizens,  are  by 
disposition  notoriously  reckless  of  possible  consequences  of 
their  words  and  deeds,  and  often  quite  indifferent  to  the 


306       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


npiiiinti  of  iiiiy  jxTHoiis  but  those  to  whom  their  remarka  are 
iiuiiu'diately  jiddressed. 

American  statesmen  who  have  been  trying  to  bring  about 
better  relations  between  the  countries  of  the  New  World 
appreciate  all  this,  ;ind  are  uware  that  the  first  task  for 
the  ^'ovcriiriicnt  at  WashiiiKtoii  must  ti>  cKiivincc  the 
Latin  Americans  that  tliey  have  nothing  to  fear.  This  was 
one  object  of  the  circular  voyage  of  Secretary  Root  already 
mentioned.  In  his  speech  at  Kio  Janeiro  he  declared,  with 
equal  tact  and  empliasis:  "We  deem  the  independence  and 
equal  ri^^hts  of  the  smallest  and  weakest  members  of  th(> 
family  of  nations  entitled  to  as  nmch  respect  as  those  of 
the  t;reatest  empire,  and  we  deenx  the  observance  of  that 
respect  the  chief  guaranty  of  the  weak  against  the  oppression 
of  the  strong.  We  neither  claim  nor  desire  any  rights  or 
privileges  or  powers  that  we  do  not  freely  cop-ede  to  every 
American  Hepublic."  This  idea  Americans  will  have  to 
repeat  without  ceasiu}:;  if  they  wish  to  dispel  the  suspicions 
which  their  superior  strength  cannot  help  exciting.  They 
will  also  have  to  act  in  such  a  manner  that  their  conduct 
shall  not  give  cause  to  doubt  the  sincerity  of  their  words. 

For  their  part,  enlightenetl  l.atin  Americans  find  nmch 
to  admire  and  imitate  in  the  history,  institutions,  and  char- 
acter of  their  Northern  neighbors  ;  ihey  admit  that  they  owe 
a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  United  States  for  protection  in  the 
past,  and  they  realize  that  the  intention  of  its  government 
is  excellent.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  beginning  to  feel 
pretty  well  able  to  defend  themselves  against  Iviropcan 
attacks,  which  tliey  do  not  now  oread  as  nmch  as  they  do 
North  American  preponderance.  They  are  very  touchy  on 
the  subject  of  their  own  dignity,  and  they  wish  to  see  their 
nations  treated  on  an  equal  footing  with  all  otliers.  Per- 
haps the  most  important  result  of  the  recent  Congress  at 
The  Hague  was  the  new  prominence  it  has  given  to  the  Latin- 
American  countries.    They  appeared  there  not  at  all  as 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  307 


quiet  followers  in  the  train  of  the  United  States:  on  the 
contrary,  they  assumed  an  independent  attitude,  —  one 
that  on  certain  occasions  brought  them  into  open  collision 
with  the  United  States  m  a  way  ill-suited  to  further  the 

cause  of  Pan-Ainericanisin.  We  may  consider  them  as 
havinj^  for  the  first  time  thorou^^hly  estahlislied  their  (  (jtial- 
ity  and  »>btaiued  a  recognized  status  in  world  politics.  They 
are  ceasing  to  feel  the  need  of  a  protector,  much  less  of  a 
guardian. 

Af^ainst  Pan-Americanism  some  persons  in  the  southern 
repul)lics  have  set  up  the  standard  of  Pan-Ilj(>rianism,  in 
furtherance  of  which  a  congress  was  held,  in  11)04,  in  Madrid. 
In  the  course  of  eloquent  speeches,  former  feuds  were  con- 
signed to  oblivion,  bonds  of  blood  and  language  were  exalted, 
and  the  dangers  of  Anglo-Saxon  predominance  were  more 
than  hinted  at.  Yet  nothing  more  practical  than  a  flow  of 
soul  was  sought  for,  and  so  far,  the  first  effusion  has  had 
no  successor.  Pan-Iber.  j,nism  is  a  comprehensible  ideal, 
and  we  can  understand  why  many  a  man  hi  Mexico  or 
Chile  should  prefer  it  to  Pan- Americanism:  many  people 
in  the  United  States  care  more  about  friendship  with  Great 
Britain  than  with  the  sister  re]iul)li'"s.  But  however  elevated 
a  sentiment  in  itself,  Pan-ll)erianism  scarcely  belongs  to  the 
domain  of  practical  politics.  Close  alliance  with  Spain  and 
Portugal  would  do  little  to  fortify  the  Latin-American 
countries  against  the  United  States.  Though  nothing  can 
be  more  proper  than  that  they  should  do  all  they  can  to 
strengthen  the  intellectual  and  moral  ties  which  bind  thvm 
to  their  old  mother  countries,  their  salvation  must  come  from 
themselves. 

When  we  come  to  examine  in  detail  the  present  dealings 
of  the  separate  Latin-American  republics  with  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  one,  and  the  outlook  for  the  future,  we  perceive  that 
unH-^rneath  a  certain  general  resemblance  in  the  relations 
there  are  great  differences,  and  that  these  are  likely  to  in- 


308       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWEll 


croasc  rather  than  to  diminish.  Without  cntcrinj;  into  the 
condiderutions  afTrctinj?  each  particular  case,  we  may  divide 
these  republics  into  three  or  four  groups  as  regards  their 

coiuicction  with  the  Unitrd  States. 

Tlic  iiiDst  iinpoit.int  of  these  i^roups  is  eoniposcd  of  four 
states  lira/.il,  I  nij^'iiay,  Arj,'eT.tiiia,  and  Chile.  'Ini^'ct her 
lliey  inchide  two-thirds  of  tiie  South  Atnerioan  continent, 
and  almost  the  whole  of  its  non-tropiral  portion.  They 
have  great  undeveloped  resources,  nearly  three-quarters  of 
the  total  ])oi)ulatioii,  and  nineteen-t w-'iitieths  of  the  white 
l)h)nd;  and  with  the  exception  of  Chile,  they  are  rereivin-,' 
a  larjxe  iinnii<;rat ion,  that  ought  to  continue.  Tln'y  are 
modern  organized  communities,  which,  if  not  yet  free  from 
the  danger  of  revolutions  such  as  have  troubled  them  in 
the  past,  at  least  seem  to  be  setthng  down  to  orderly  gov- 
ernment and  good  progress,  and,  in(hvid\ially  or  in  roni- 
hination,  they  should  be  able  to  take  rare  of  themselves, 
and  to  ])iay  tlieir  fair  part  in  the  world.  To  ail  intents 
and  puri)oses,  they  are  about  as  far  from  the  United 
States  as  from  Europe,  so  far,  in  fact,  that  some  persons 
maintain  that  it  is  absurd  to  include  then-  tho  gco|.'c 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Nevertheless,  llie  doctrine  is 
certainly  an  advantage  to  them,  for  it  insures  tlu  ni  against 
perils  to  which,  owing  to  the  presence  of  many  ioreigners 
within  their  borders,  they  might  otherwise  be  exposed. 
The  Americans,  on  their  side,  hope  for  better  relations. 
The  United  States  which  to-day  receives  more  than  lialf 
of  the  experts  of  Brazil  furnishes  in  return  only  about 
eleven  per  cent  of  its  imports,  —  less  than  Germany,  and 
far  less  than  Great  Britain.  Even  in  the  case  of  Chile, 
w^hich  after  the  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal  will  be 
much  nearer  than  it  now  is  to  the  eastern  coast,  there 
is,  in  s])ite  of  past  difficulties,  no  ground  for  permanent 
estrangement;  the  disputes  of  a  few  years  ag(^  were  due 
to  chance  events,  not  to  permanent  opposition  of  inter- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  300 


est.  As  for  Brazil  and  Aij^cntina,  unless  they  compromise 
their  future  through  some  fauU  of  their  own,  they  should 
pnjoy  before  long  a  much  more  prominent  international  posi- 
tion than  they  havo  to-day.  And  lumv  of  thrso  four  south- 
ern royiublirs  need  entertain  the  slightest  fear  of  their  North 
American  sLster. 

Since  Paraguay  and  Bolivia  have  no  sea-coast,  it  is  not 
likely  that  the  United  States  will  ever  have  very  much  to 
do  with  them. 

The  northern  rei)ul)lics  of  South  America,  those  of  Cen- 
tral America,  and  the  two  insular  ones  of  Haiti  and  San 
Domingo  nuiy,  for  convenience,  be  groujx-d  together;  they 
differ  in  size  and  pojjulation,  but  they  have  many  char* 
actenstics  in  common:  all  are  situated  in  the  tropica 
and  have  hut  few  white  iidial)itant.s  compared  with  the 
colored  ;  all  have  been  the  homes  of  revolution  ;  most  are 
burdened  with  debt,  and  in  danger  of  financial  disputes 
with  foreign  creditors  Although  they  have  in  their  splen- 
did natural  resources  a  promise  of  better  days,  they  are 
not  making  rapid  progress  at  pnvsent,  and  they  attract  but 
little  immigration.  Here  are  the  lands  tliat  threaten  to 
make  trouM<  Ihc  T'nit<'d  St:U(s,  which  has  come  into 
more  immediate  contact  with  thev\  since  it  has  established 
itself  in  the  waters  of  the  Caribbtan  Sea,  and  will  come 
into  closer  contact  still  when  the  Panama  Canal  is  completed. 
In  none  of  them  are  the  governments  stable  enough  as  yet 
to  give  permanent  assurance  of  law  and  order,  and  several 
are  likely  at  almost  any  moment  to  break  the  ])eace,  or  to 
become  involved  in  dispute  with  European  nations  whose 
citizens  have  made  investments  in  their  territories.  The 
United  States  may  at  any  time  be  called  upon,  as  it  has 
already  been  in  San  Domingo,  to  perform  police  duty  the 
ultimate  consequences  of  which  will  iie  hard  to  limit.  .\ 
first  task  will  be  to  keep  the  peace  between  them.  This 
applies  particularly  to  Central  America,  whose  miniature 


310       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


states  are  ready  to  fly  at  each  other's  throats  with  or  with- 
out provocation.  The  time  will  soon  be  past  when  small 
nations  in  any  part  of  the  world  will  ue  allowed  to  settle 
their  quarrels  by  f.)rre  :  this  will  become  a  privilege  of  those 
countries  which  are  strong  enough  to  fight.,  not  only  their 
immediate  enemy,  but  whoever  tries  to  stop  them.  Just  as 
Europe  would  not  tolerate  to-day  hostilities  between,  let  us 
say,  Holland  and  Portugal,  so  very  soon  America  will  com- 
pel the  smaller  Latin-American  states  to  live  at  peace, 
wheth-r  they  like  it  or  not.  It  is  here,  if  anywhere,  that 
the  "big  stick"  of  the  United  States  should  be  used  when 
the  occasion  demands. 

The  republic  of  Mexico  must  be  considered  by  itself. 
Along  a  boundary  of  many  hundred  miles  it  is  in  direct 
proximity  to  a  far  stronger  power,  and  such  a  position  can- 
not l)e  quite  free  from  danger,  —  a  danger  which  the  mem- 
ories of  the  Mexican  War  will  never  allow  to  be  quite 
forgotten.  It  is  a  land  in  which  the  native  Indian  ele- 
ment is  more  numerous  than  the  white,  and  which  as  yet 
attracts  but  few  foreigners.  Its  resources  are  extraordinary, 
as  American  capitalists  have  of  late  been  discovering. 
Although  tlie  Americaii  colony  in  the  country  numbers  less 
than  fifty  thousand  (not  one-third  of  one  per  cent  of  the 
population),  more  than  half  the  imports  of  Mexico  are 
from  the  United  States,  nearly  three-quarters  of  its  ex- 
ports go  there,  and  the  investment  of  American  capital  in 
Mexican  enterprises  of  many  sorts  is  already  very  exten- 
sive, and  likely  to  increase.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  this 
peaceful  taking  possession  constitutes  a  peril  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Mexican  republic.  Not  that  the  American 
capitalists  are  working  in  favor  of  annexation, — on  the 
contrary,  they  are  well  satisfied  with  conditions  as  they  are; 
but  if  Mexico  were  to  fall  back  again  into  lier  old  slough 
of  revolutions,  and  especially  if  these  were  complicated  by 
anti-foreign  policy,  we  may  feel  sure  that,  in  view  of  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATL\  AMERICA  311 


immense  interests  involved,  intervention  from  the  North 
would  come  sooner  or  later.  It  would  be  the  story  of  Cuba 
apjain  on  a  larger  scale.  The  best,  indeed  the  only,  way 
for  Mexico  to  avoid  this  peril,  is  to  maintain  orderly  govern- 
ment. For  more  th  in  a  generation  now  she  has  been 
peaceful,  in  strikin:^  contrast  to  her  condition  at  earlier 
periods  in  the  1  story  of  t>  o  country.  Whether  this 
stabiHty  is  perma  I  'l  t  or  not  it  is  still  too  soon  to  say;  it 
is  so  much  the  woiK  oi  ui-.,,  r  -in.  Not  until  some  time  after 
President  Diaz  has  disappeared  from  tlie  scene,  can  we 
judge  whether  the  order  which  he  has  established  will  be 
lasting.  As  long  as  it  holds,  Mexico  need  have  little  fear, 
for  the  United  States  is  not  meditating  unprovoked  aggres- 
sion against  her. 

Stable  government  is  the  first  condition  which  all  the  Latin- 
American  republics  must  accept,  if  they  wish  to  keej)  clear 
of  difficulties.  The  more  responsible  they  become,  the  more 
they  will  win  the  respect  of  the  world,  and  the  more  secure 
they  will  be  against  interference  from  outside.  They  have, 
too,  another  means  of  self-defence  which  no  one  could  deny 
them,  and  which  might  go  far  to  insure  their  safety:  they 
can  combine  into  larger  units.  Although  these  new  count  ries 
could  treat  with  the  United  States  more  as  equals  than  their 
individual  components  are  able  to  do  now,  American  public 
opinion,  far  from  op])osing  such  unions,  would  regard  them 
as  thoroughly  sensible ;  for  nothing  could  be  further  from 
its  conceptions  than  the  idea  of  playing  one  Latin-American 
power  against  another,  or  of  fearing  any  combination  of 
them.  The  North  American  republic  is  too  conscious  of 
its  own  strength  to  stoop  to  thoughts  of  this  kind.  If,  for 
instance,  Bolivia,  Uruguay,  antl  Paraguay  should  unite 
with  Argentina;  if  the  old  United  States  of  Colombia 
should  be  reconstructed  to  include,  as  onci'  before,  Vene- 
zuela and  Ecuador,  with  the  possible  addition  of  Peru ; 
if  the  Central  American  republics  should  at  last  succeed  in 


312       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


forming  a  stable  federation,  and  perhaps  joining  with  Mexico ; 
Latin  America  would  then  consist  of  a  'ew  largo  states, t  ucli 
of  sufficient  importance  to  claim  a  diKiiified  place  in  the 
modern  world,  and  to  he  safe  against  aggression  on  the 
part  of  any  outside  power.  It  is  one  of  the  clearest  proofs 
of  the  political  backwardness  of  the  Latin-American  peo- 
ple, as  well  as  an  unfortunate  inheritance  of  Spanish 
temperament,  that  where  there  are  so  many  essential  sim- 
ilarities between  them,  they  persist  in  i)olitical  divisions 
which  are  but  historical  accivleiits.  In  spite  of  the  ol)stacles 
in  tlie  way  of  such  combinations  as  the  above,  —  the  diffi- 
culties of  communication,  diversity  of  interest,  inherited 
feuds  and  jealousies,  —  we  may  hope  that  some  day  the 
natural  forces  which  make  for  union  will  prevail.  The 
formation  of  these  larger  Latin  republics  would  be  ap- 
plauded by  the  world,  and  by  no  country  more  cordially 
than  by  the  United  States.  Their  birth  would  relieve  it 
of  cares  from  which  it  would  gladly  be  free. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

IN  the  days  when  the  Americans  first  assumed  their  place 
among  nations,  neither  they  nor  others  foresaw  how 
soon  tlu'v  would  turn  their  attention  towards  the  distant 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  play  a  leadinf^;  part  on  its  shores.  Not 
only  liad  they  no  territory  there,  but  they  did  not  even 
send  their  first  exploring  party  across  the  continent  until 
nearly  a  generation  later.  The  thirteen  original  states  were 
all  situated  on  the  North  Atlantic.  Boston  was  farther 
in  actual  time  from  China  or  Japan  than  were  London  and 
I'aris,  or  St.  Petersburg;  and  yet,  scarcely  had  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  Great  Britain  been  signed,  when  American 
vessels  made  their  way  to  the  South  Seas.  Since  then, 
in  a  century  and  a  quarter,  the  United  States  has  ac- 
quired a  coast  r  ic  of  some  thousand  miles  on  the  (astern 
<n{v  of  the  (Ireat  Ocean,  it  has  established  its(4f  firm'y  in 
the  middle  and  in  the  west,  and  has  proclaimed  to  the 
world  its  dream  of  the  dominion  of  the  whole.  In  all 
liistory  such  momentous  changes  have  rarely  taken  place  in 
so  short  a  time. 

If  we  examine  the  reason  why  American  ships  penetrated 
so  early  into  these  remote  waters,  we  find  that  their  hardi- 
hood is  easier  to  explain  than  it  would  seem  at  first  glance. 
ll>e  people  of  New  England  had  been  active  in  com- 
mercial and  maritime  affairs  in  the  old  days  of  British 
rule.  As  colonists,  they  had  carried  on  a  thriving  trade, 
much  of  which  was  closed  to  tliem  when  they  i;rr-ame 
foreigners,  cut  off  by  tlie  English  shipping  laws  from  their 
former  privileges.    They  were  too  energetic  not  to  look 

813 


314       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


elsewhere  for  compensation.  Like  Scandinavia,  if  in  less 
measure,  their  rocky,  wooded  country,  with  its  severe 
■  '  mate  and  many  excellent  harbors,  afforded  little  tenipta- 

.11  to  iigriculture,  but  puslied  its  inhabitants  to  ship- 
Imildiii^  and  a  inaritiine  life.  In  17S4,  within  a  year  after 
the  cunclusion  of  i)eae<  with  Great  Britain,  the  first 
American  vessel  reached  Canton.'  So  successful  were  its 
operations  that,  two  years  later,  the  number  of  ships  from  the 
United  States  had  risen  to  five,  and  three  years  after  that  to 
fifteen,  a  number  exceeded  by  those  from  (ireat  liritain  only. 

The  situation  was  indeed  very  favorable  to  the  Ameri- 
cans in  their  commerce  with  the  Far  East,  and  though 
they  encountered  many  risks  and  hardships,  they  reaped 
enormous  profits,  for  they  had  marked  advantages  over 
th  'ir  rivals.  The  English  were  hampered  by  the  fact 
that  tiieir  Cliina  trade  was  in  the  hands  of  the  East  India 
Comi)any,  which  did  not  deal  in  furs,  the  most  profit- 
able articl.rf  that  could  be  sold  in  China.  The  French  and 
others  soon  suffered  by  the  European  wars  which  broke  out 
in  1792  and  lasted  until  1815.  The  Russians,  who  had  almost 
a  monopoly  of  the  fur  trade  in  the  Northern  Pacific,  were 
fettered  by  the  Chinese  regulations  which  excluded  them 
from  Canton,  and  confined  their  commerce  to  Kiakhta  on  the 
borders  of  Mongolia.  In  consequence,  the  furs  they  had 
obtained  were  obliged  to  make  a  long,  expensive  journey 
overland  before  they  even  crossod  the  Chinese  frontier. 
The  Americans  were  free  from  such  restrictions.  After 
killing  their  fur-bearing  animals  in  the  South  Seas  or  on 
the  northwest  coast  of  America,  or,  oftener  still,  buying  the 
skins  from  the  natives,  they  sold  them  at  Canton,  and  re- 
turned home  with  a  cargo  of  tea,  silks,  and  other  valuable 
Chinese  goods.  In  1801  we  find  them  importing  into  Can- 
ton four  hundred  and  twenty-seven  thousand  sealskins 

'  Dnrinf;  tho  last  part  of  its  voyage,  it  was  escorted  and  aided  by  two 
French  iiicn-of-war,  which  it  had  met  on  its  way. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC 


315 


alone,  besides  skins  of  otter  and  other  animals.  It  is  true 
their  own  country  did  not  as  yet  produce  much  that  the  Chi- 
nese wanted,  nor  was  it  rich  in  gold  and  silver;  but  some 

v<  ssols  carried  oroods  which  they  were  able  to  dispose  of  in 
P(>rsia  or  the  Indies,  where  they  loaded  up  with  others  that 
found  a  market  in  China. 

In  their  wanderings  through  tlie  length  and  breadth  of 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  American  skippers  felt  the  need  of  a 
convenient  stopping-place  where  they  could  repair  damages 
to  their  craft,  dry  the  skins  they  had  on  board,  and  pass 
the  worst  of  the  winter  months.  .4s  a  haven  of  this  ki?  ',  no 
place  was  so  well  situated  as  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  which 
had  been  discovered  by  Captain  Cook  ir.  1778.  So  obvious 
were  their  attractions,  with  their  equable  climate,  gentle 
natives,  and  j^lentiful  resources,  that  Cook's  successor, 
Vancouver,  found  Americans  already  located  there  in  1792. 
The  newcomers  soon  discovered  a  fresh  source  of  profit  for 
their  commerce.  Sandalwood  was  abundant  in  the  islands, 
and  as  it  was  much  in  demand  among  the  Chinese,  the 
Americans  exported  it  in  large  quantities.  From  the  first, 
they  were  the  largest  and  most  influential  foreign  element 
III  Hawaii,  which  they  looked  upon  as,  in  a  way,  their  own 
domain.  Thus,  by  one  means  or  another,  their  trad(>  in 
the  Pacific  grew,  till,  within  a  few  years  of  the  time  when 
they  made  their  appearance  there,  it  formed  an  im- 
portant part  of  the  national  commerce,  and  their  influence 
had  become  dominant  in  the  only  convenient  stopping- 
place  in  mid-ocean. 

Overland  their  progress  was  slower,  for  they  did  not 
cross  the  continent  until  1803,  and  Astoria,  their' first  trad- 
ing station  on  the  Pacific,  was  swept  away  by  the  War  of 
1812.  When  peace  was  restored,  they  returned,  and  in 
time  their  numlx^rs  increased.  It  was  not,  however,  until 
the  compromise  treaty  of  ISKi  that  they  secured  undis- 
puted possession  of  the  whole  territory  south  of  the  forty- 


316 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


ninth  ])arallel.  California  they  took  from  Mexico  just  before 
the  discovery  of  gold,  wiiich  l)rou};ht  into  it  sucii  ii  rush  of 
population  that  it  soon  became  a  full-fledged  state.  Never- 
theless, until  the  completion  of  the  first  transcontinental 
railway,  California  was  in  many  respects  more  like  a  distinct 
self-governing  colony  than  an  integral  ])art  of  tli'-  rejjublic. 
To-day  the  Pacific  coa.-l  is  hound  tu  the  rest  of  the  Union 
by  five  lines  of  rail,  the  land  behind  it  is  no  longer  vacant, 
and  though  the  Pacific  States  retain  certain  characteristics 
of  their  own,  they  are  not  a  detached  portion  of  the  country, 
but  the  western  front.  As  their  resources  (h'velo])  and  their 
population  increases,  the  United  States  will  be  assured  an 
ever  firmer  position  on  the  Cheat  Ocean.  Without  Alaska, 
the  actual  Pacific  coast-line  of  the  republic  is  shorter  than 
that  of  Chile,  but  it  is  backed  by  a  much  larger  territory, 
and  it  faces  directly  towards  China  and  Japan,  instead  of 
towards  the  South  Sea  Islands.  The  acquisition  of  Alaska 
has  nipjted  in  the  bud  Canadian  rivalry  in  this  part  of 
the  world,  and  when  the  Panama  Canal  shall  have  brought 
the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  into  easy  communication  by 
water  with  the  Pacific,  through  a  passage  which  the  United 
States  can  close  at  will,  its  situation  will  be  \inassailable. 
Even  the  unfortunate  break  in  continuity  caused  by  British 
Columbia  does  not  seriously  weaken  its  strength. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  the  nuieteenth  cen- 
tury, when  the  fur-bearing  animals  had  become  less  abun- 
dant and  the  sandalwood  of  Hawaii  was  almost  exhausted, 
American  vessels  in  the  Pacific  began  to  devote  them- 
selves chiefly  to  whaliig,  an  occupation  which  they  had 
followed  in  the  days  when  the  colonies  belonged  to  Great 
Britain.  Hawaii,  however,  remained  as  important  a  centre 
as  ever  for  resting  and  refitting.  In  1822,  twenty-four 
whaling  vessels  were  in  the  harbor  of  Honolulu  at  one  time; 
in  1845,  according  t  ■  the  local  records,  407  whalers,  manned 
by  14,905  sailors,  visited  tlie  islands,  and,  oi  the  total,  some 


THE  UMTED  STATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC 


317 


three-fourths  flew  the  flag  of  the  United  States.  But  earlier 
in  the  nineteenth  century,  another  class  of  Americans,  the 
Protestant  missionaries,  had  found  thoir  way  thorp.  Bfforc 
long  thry  sucpoodod  in  convert injTj  the  Kinj^  and  the  princi- 
pal chiefs,  and  the  larger  part  of  the  population,  over 
whom  henceforth  they  exercised  much  influence.  French 
Catholic  priests,  it  is  true,  came  afterwards,  and  also 
made  many  converts;  but,  as  later  arrivals,  they  never 
were  so  successful  as  the  Protestants  in  bringing  the 
natives  into  their  fold.  As  u^ual,  the  missionary  element 
and  the  foreign  commercial  one  bore  little  love  to  each 
other. 

So  thoroughly  had  the  United  States  become  interested 
in  Hawaiian  affairs  that  in  1S42,  five  years  before  the 
acquisition  of  California,  and  before  the  Oregon  dispute  with 
(Jreat  Britain  was  settled,  —  that  is  to  say,  before  the 
Americans  held  a  foot  of  uncontested  territory  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  —  the  President  declared  in  a  message  to 
Congress  that  the  republic  would  oppose  the  seizure  of  the 
islands  by  any  foreign  power,  and  in  1851  this  assurance 
was  repeated  by  Dani  ^1  Webster  as  Secretary  of  State.  In 
1S74,  and  again  in  1889,  when  there  were  local  disturbances, 
American  marines  were  landed  to  guard  the  legation.  After 
the  acquisition  of  California,  a  direct  trade  had  sprung  up 
between  San  Francisco  and  the  Far  East,  in  consequence  of 
which  the  unique  position  of  Hawaii  as  a  stopping-place 
and  as  a  strategic  point  became  more  evident  than  ever. 
The  Americans,  without  as  yet  wishing  to  possess  it,  were 
determined  that  it  should  never  become  a  hostile  outpost 
in  the  hands  of  someone  else  to  menace  their  Pacific  coast, 
in  the  way  that  Bermuda  does  their  Atlantic. 

On  the  high  seas,  and  in  Chinese  waters,  the  United  States 
i-oiiliiiued  to  be  well  represented  unti!  aixvr  the  mi(idie  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  In  its  dipV  matic  intercourse  with 
China,  it  followed  in  the  wake  of  England  and  France,  but 


318       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWEIl 


in  the  opening  up  of  Japan  it  took  the  lead.  Soon  after 
this,  however,  it  met  with  reverses.    During  the  Civil  War, 

owin^  to  tlie  depredations  of  Confederate  cruisers,  and  to 
the  fear  of  tliera,  American  vessels  almost  disappeared  from 
the  P;icifi)  At  another  moment  the  misfortune  might  have 
been  short-lived ;  but  it  occurred  just  at  the  period  when 
sailing  vessels  were  giving  way  to  steam,  and  wooden 
ships  to  iron  ones.  In  the  construction  of  wooden  sailing 
vessels,  the  New  England  builders  fe.-  r-d  no  competitors; 
but  the  American  iron  and  steel  industry  at  that  date  was 
not  sufficiently  developed  to  compete  with  the  European, 
and  the  registration  laws  of  the  United  States  forbade  the 
purchase  of  foreign  ships.  At  just  about  this  time,  too, 
the  whaling  industry  declined,  owing  to  the  decrease  in  the 
number  of  whales,  and  the  substitution  of  mineral  oil  for 
whale  oil  for  lighting  purposes.  From  these  and  other 
causes,  the  American  flag,  once  so  common  all  over  the 
Pacific,  became  rarer,  and  in  many  regions  almost  un- 
known, for  the  navy  long  shared  in  the  decay  of  the  mer- 
chant marine.  Politically,  too,  for  some  thirty  years  the 
influence  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East  remained 
stationary,  or  declined.  But  the  country  itself  grew  and 
prospered;  its  different  parts  became  more  closely  knit  to- 
gether, and  the  purchase  of  Alaska  doubled  the  American 
coast-line  in  the  Pacific,  and,  through  the  Aleutian  Islands, 
first  brought  it  near  to  Japan.  Meanwhile,  relations  with 
Hawaii  became  more  intimate  as  the  years  went  on.  In 
1876  the  islands  were  granted  a  reciprocity  treaty  which 
bound  them  close  to  the  continent  by  economic  ties;  for 
with  free  access  to  the  American  market,  the  exportation 
of  sugar  to  San  Francisco  increased  enormou  ly.  In  1884 
the  United  States  obtained  a  lease  of  Pearl  Harbor  for  a 
naval  station. 

It  has  been  generally  supposed  that,  in  the  event  of  a 
war  with  England,  the  American  navy  would  make  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC 


310 


destruction  of  British  commerce  its  chief  object.  But  if  it 
possessed  no  base  of  operations  beyond  San  Francisco,  it 
could  hardly  inflict  much  damage  on  British  trade  in  the 
Eiist.  To  ovorcoino  this  difficulty,  Atiicrican  Kcamon  were 
desirous  of  socurin^'  more  advanced  posts,  wiiich  they  l)e- 
lieved  would  be  invaluable  to  the  country  for  successful 
warfare,  either  offensive  or  defensive.  Hawaii  was  un- 
rivall(>d  a«  a  first  stopping-place;  and,  still  farther  away, 
though  the  American  public  scarcely  realized  the  fact,  the 
Uiiit(>d  States  had  acquired  claiitis  in  Samoa. 

The  primary  caus(!  of  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  in  IS!»S 
was  the  change  that  had  taken  place  in  its  poijulation,  which 
rendered  the  old  system  of  government  impossible  to  main- 
tain in  the  long  run.    As  is  well  known,  the  Hawaiians,  like 
their  kindred,  the  Tahitians,  and  the  Maoris  in  New  Zealand, 
belong  to  a  race  which,  though  unusually  attractive,  has 
so  far  not  shown  the  ability  to  adapt  itself  to  civilization. 
The  relations  between  the  whites  and  the  islanders  had 
been  good.    Indeed,  from  the  first  coming  of  the  foreigners, 
the  natives  had  followed  their  advice,  and  under  the 
guidance  of  the  missionaries  had  made  credit al)le  progress. 
They  remained  children  in  character,  yet,  if  they  could 
have  held  their  own  in  numbers,  they  might  have  kept  in 
power  for  some  time  longer.    But  they  have  been  dimin- 
ishing at  a  fearful  rate.    In  1830  they  numbered  about  one 
hundred  and  thirty  thousand,  already  considerably  less 
than  when  the  islands  were  discovered;  by  1850,  they  had 
sunk  to  eighty-four  thousand,  and  by  ISUU  to  thirty-ninn 
thousand;  to-day,  with  less  than  thirty  thousand,  they 
do  not  make  more  than  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  total  popula- 
tion of  their  own  country.    On  the  other  hand,  ever  since 
the  treaty  with  the  United  States  had  procured  a  free; 
entrance  for  Hawaiian  sugar,  the  whites,  who  had  ended 
by  acquiring  most  of  the  land,  had  been  importing  laborers 
by  the  thousands  to  work  on  the  plantations.    The  natives 


320        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  l'0\v  ER 


were  too  indolent  for  this  toilsome  labor ;  Polynesians  from 
other  islands  also  proved  unsuitable;  Portuguese  from  tlu- 
Azores  soon  left  the  fields  :iml  took  to  occuimtions  like 
market-^'jinlcnin^',  in  which  thoy  have  since  thriven.  The 
Chinese  did  well,  as  usual,  but  proin])tly  he^'an  to  flock  into 
the  towns  and  to  go  into  shopket'ping  in  such  numbers 
that  the  supi)ly  on  the  plantations  could  be  kept  up  only 
by  further  importations  that  would  threaten  the  rest  of 
the  inhabitants  with  i)einp  submer^'ed.  Partly  un.ler  the 
influeiic(>  of  aiit i-( 'liiiiese  s(>ntinient  in  the  United  States, 
tlie  imniiKn-ation  from  China  was  restricted,  and  Japanese 
were  next  tried,  again  with  success  in  the  beginning,  but 
with  somewhat  the  same  disadvantage  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Chinese,  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  they  had  the  support 
of  a  watchful  government  at  home  which  was  determined 
to  secure  to  them  their  rights. 

In  ttiis  state  of  unstable  equilibrium,  the  kindly,  indolent 
natives,  redi     1  to  ever  greater  insignificance  between 
white  capitahais  and  Asiatic  laborers,  could  not  maintain 
for  long  even  a  show  of  political  domination.    The  very 
fact  that  the  Hawaiian  sovereigns  had,  as  a  rule,  f(.llowed 
wise  foreign  advice  and  governed  well  made  it  certain  that, 
when  a  less  inte   „'ent  ruler  should  act  differently,  a  rising 
of  some  sort  could  not  fail  to  take  place.    The  actual 
circumstances  that  led  to  the  revolution  of  ISO.?,  the 
attempt  of  the  Queen  to  change  the  constitution  and  her 
overthrow,  are  unimportant.    The  much-del)ated  question, 
whctluM-  the  landing  of  the  American  marines  who  were  in 
the  harbor  did  or  did  not  render  aid  to  the  movement,  is 
also  idle  to-day.    Admitting  that  the  prompt  appearance 
of  the  American  force  gave  such  moral  backing  to  the 
insurgents  that  the  party  of  the  Queen  was  terrifi. d  into 
submission,  we  may  still  feel  sure  that  tiio  marines  would 
in  anv  case  have  been  obliged  to  land  within  a  few  hours. 
Whatever  we  may  think  of  the  way  in  which  the  revolu- 


TIIK  UNITED  8TATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC  321 


tion  was  brought  about,  we  can  see  that  something  of  the 
sort  was  inevitable. 

The  weiI-nio!int  uttcmpt  of  President  Clovoliind  to  restore 
tho  sovereif^Tity  of  the  Qiuumi  proved  uhortivo.  The 
republic  which  was  then  (•(uistitiMcd,  (hiriii}^  its  short  exist- 
ence, ruled  wisely  and  well.  From  the  naiivivs,  after  one 
feeble  attempt  at  revolt,  it  had  little  to  fear;  but  the 
growing  strenglh  of  the  Japanese,  couph'd  with  a  readiness 
on  the  part  of  the  j^overnment  at  Tokio  to  uphold  their 
d(>mands,  made  tlie  whites  on  the  islands  feel  that  they 
must  have  American  protection.  Tlie  outbreak  of  the 
Spanish  War  brought  the  question  once  more  to  an  issue. 
In  the  prosecution  of  hostilities  the  Hawaiian  Islands  were 
almost  indispensable  as  a  haltinj»-plaoe  on  tiie  long  journey 
from  »San  Francisco  to  the  Philippint  s.  Had  thry  remained 
iKMitral,  the  task  of  supplying  Dewey's  squadron  wouhi 
liave  been  much  more  burdensome;  but  as  it  was,  they 
made  no  pretence  of  neutrality.  They  were  definitely 
annexed  to  the  Union  on  July  7,  1898. 

In  tho  case  of  Samoa,  the  United  States  was  drawn  into 
unexpected  complications,  pa'-tly  through  the  zeal  of  its 
own  officials  tliere,  and  partly  through  anger  at  tiie  over- 
bearing conduct  of  the  Germans,  who,  it  is  fair  to  remem- 
ber, had  the  largest  interests  in  the  islands.  The  result 
was  a  situation  that  no  one  for  u  time  knew  just  how  to 
^'ot  out  of.  In  iS72,  Admiral  Meade  had  concluded  a  treaty 
with  the  native  chiefs  which  granted  to  the  United  States 
as  a  coaling-station  the  excellent  harbor  of  Pago  Pago  in  tlie 
island  of  Tutuila.  Although  the  Senate  never  took  action 
on  the  document,  it  included  this  stipulation  in  a  commer- 
cial treaty  which  it  ratified  half  a  dozen  years  later,  while 
at  the  same  time  it  refused  the  request  of  the  natives  for 
a  protectorat(\ 

Snudl  as  the  Samoan  group  was,  its  politics  were  sekloni 
quiet.    The  intrigues  and  disputes  of  ambitious  local 


322       THE  UNITED  «TATEa  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


chiefs,  stimulated  by  ultra-patriotic  and  overaealous  for- 
ei}?nt*rH,  led  to  repeated  (Usturhuiiccs.  culminatinj?  in  1887 
and  IHSS  in  roiiflicta  tliat  brought  about  Intervention. 
Irritated  l)y  th.-  high-handed  action  of  the  (Jeriiiaiis,  lim 
United  States  (iespatched  throe  war  vessels  to  the  scene; 
but  they,  like  their  German  rivals,  were  destroyed  in  the 
harbor  of  Apia  by  a  typhoon.  This  disaster  cooled  down 
all  parties,  and  after  a  conference  in  Berlin,  a  provisional 
arran^'cnient  was  made  for  a  mixed  system  of  ^;overnment, 
which  fnr  ten  years  worked  })a(lly,  as  siu'h  systems  dn. 
Then  followed  fresh  trouble,  in  whicli  the  Engiisii  and  the 
Americans  were  the  ones  to  use  force  against  the  natives, 
while  the  Germans  protested.  Each  of  the  three  powers 
sent  a  commissioner  to  investigate  matters,  a  new  agree- 
tuent  was  made,  and  finally,  by  the  treaty  of  December, 
ISll'.l,  the  Knglish,  in  return  for  compensation  elsewhere, 
withdrew  altogether  from  the  islands,  which  were  divided 
between  the  other  two  claimants.  Although  Germany  got 
the  larger  part,  the  United  States  was  satisfied  with  its 
share,  Tutuila,  which  contained  the  best  harbor  in  the 
archipelago. 

Already,  before  this  agreenient  was  arrived  at,  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  Spain  had  given  the  Americans  another  Pa- 
cific station  by  the  cession  of  Guam  in  the  Ladrones.  Here, 
again,  the  territory  acquired  was  too  small  to  have  any  value 
exce]5t  as  a  good  stopping-place. 

In  the  Phili])|>ines,  the  situation  was  very  diffc.ont. 
There  the  cjuestion  of  a  naval  base  was  so  distinct  from  that 
of  the  retention  and  government  of  the  islands  that  some 
Anti-imperialists,  who  were  violently  opposed  to  keeping  the 
whole  group,  with  its  seven  million  inhabitants,  were  willing 
to  retain  a  particul  spot  for  naval  purposes.  This  was 
thought  of  in  Washington,  and  thougli  in  the  end  every- 
thing was  kept,  the  importance  of  a  strategic  position  in 
the  western  Pacific  is  nevertheless  a  subject  that  can  be 


THE  UNITED  .STATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC 


323 


considered  apart  from  the  proLIemH  involved  in  the  treat 
ment  i»f  the  native  population. 

That  tfiis  interest  jilono  would  justify  the  United  States 
in  rctaiiiinij;  possession  of  the  i'hilippincs  is  .m  ..pinion  so(no- 
tinii's  advanccii.  i  lovvover  cxt n'ino  rn  iy  rr^'ard  sui  li  ;i 
tenet,  we  cannot  deny  tliat  the  acti  ii-  ,ioii  ^  'Ulv  iis.  .uds, 
for  better  or  for  worse,  has  radically  changed  the  situation 
of  the  Americans  in  the  Far  East.  Thev  are  no  longer  a 
more  traditiK  nation,  como  to-day  and  p  to-raor."t\v,  but 
like  otticr  i^Tcat  powers,  they  aro  a  'a  .^-hokiin-  one  with 
populations  to  govern,  h  i  al  iiitt '-'-s  s  to  to,  and  >  ,  i- 
tories  to  defend.  They  are  now  n*  t  oiuy  tfie  near  neigh- 
bors of  the  French,  the  English,  the  Germans,  and  the 
Dutch,  and  as  such  int(  rested  in  whatever  a  fleets  these; 
they  are  also  in  ■  j)ro>iinity  to  the  two  Asiatic  empires 
of  Ch.na  and  Japan,  in  both  of  whit  '  ;y  are  dciply 
concerned. 

Although  we  may  not  go  so  far  as  those  who  declare  that 
Manila  is  the  natural  distributing  point  of  the  trade  of  the 
whole  westorn  Pacific,  it  is  evident  that,  with  the  i)ossession 
of  the  Philippines,  the  Ain.  iieans  havo  come  into  imme- 
diate contact  with  the  Chinese  and  Japant'se  in  tlieir  own 
part  of  the  world.  There  are  drH\\i)acks  to  propincjuity, 
but  as  long  as  China  is  weak,  the  Americans  are  far  better 
placed  to  bring  pressure  on  the  Middle  Kingdom,  as  well  as 
to  hold  tlieir  own  ap:ainst  other  powers  in  affairs  relating 
to  it,  than  if  tlu  \  lid  not  occupy  a  strong  position  in  the 
immediate  vicinity.  If,  f  -r  in.sTance,  they  had  not  had  a 
powerful  army  near  by  in  I'JOO,  they  would  never  have  been 
!  ^  'e  to  send  the  troops  they  did  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
1  eKing  expedition,  nor  would  they  have  had  the  authority 
which  was  theirs  in  the  councils  of  the  assembled  nations, 
and  which  they  have  cnjo  "d  in  the  Far  East  ever  -^ince. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  admit  that,  by  making  these 
distant  acquisitions,  the  United  States  has  forfeited  part  of 


o24 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


its  former  invulnerability.  But,  though  its  real  strength 
might  be  little  affected  by  losing  them  to  some  victorious 
enemy,  the  wound  to  its  pride  would  be  so  intoleriible 
tliat  it  will  defend  them  at  any  cost.  To  heed  warnings 
as  to  the  dangers  they  bring  with  them  would  seem  like 
listening  to  the  counsels  of  cowardice.  It  is  too  confident 
in  itself  to  fear  other  powers,  and  it  is  willing  to  accept 
the  responsibilities  of  its  new  greatness. 

Whatever  pertains  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  appeals  strongly 
to  Americans  at  the  present  day.  There  is  something  in 
the  very  immensity  of  the  field  which  makes  it  seem  appro- 
priate for  the  display  of  their  superabundant  energy.  They 
believe  that  they  have  an  unequalled  advantage,  and  are 
entitled  to  the  foremost  place.  As  early  as  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  Mr.  (later  Secretary)  Seward  de- 
clared: "The  Pacific  Ocean,  its  shores,  its  islands,  and  the 
vast  region  beyond,  will  become  the  chief  theatre  of  events 
in  the  world's  great  Hereafter."  According  to  Mr.  Seward, 
and  to  many  others  who  have  since  shared  his  opinion,  the 
United  States  is  to  play  the  leading  role  in  this  theatre  of 
the  Hereafter. 

This  idea  has  always  been  firmly  held  in  the  states  of  the 
Pacific  coast,  and  the  more  they  have  grown,  the  more  it 
has  appeared  justified.  In  1903,  President  Roosevelt  pro- 
claimed, at  San  Francisco,  in  a  speech  of  lofty  imperialism, 
that  to  the  United  States  must  belong  the  dominion  of 
the  Pacific.  Such  terms  are  vague,  and  we  may  suspect 
that  if  the  Russo-Japanese  War  had  then  taken  place,  the 
President  might  have  been  moie  guarded  in  his  phrase. 
Nevertheless  the  conviction  which  it  embodies  is  an  article 
of  faith  to  many,  and  it  has  found  much  in  recent  events 
to  confirm  it.  livery  where  the  minds  of  men  have  turned 
towards  the  Pacific  as  never  bef(»re  ;  all  five  of  the  world 
powers  hold  territory  on  its  shores,  and  are  vitally  inter- 
ested in  its  concerns.    Within  a  few  years  it  has  witnessed 


THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  PACIFIC 


325 


ji  succession  of  startling  events,  which  have  followed  each 
other  with  bewildering  rapidity  —  two  wars  and  several 
minor  conflicts,  the  ap^-  carance  of  Germany  as  a  power  in 
the  East,  the  sudden  menacing  growth  of  Russia  and  her 
sanguinary  discomfiture,  the  threatened  dissolution  and 
the  present  awakening  of  China,  and  the  transformation 
of  Japan.  We  can  understand  why  President  Roosevelt 
should  have  called  the  period  of  the  world's  history  which 
is  just  beginning,  "the  Pacific  Era,"  though  not  in  the 
sense  of  the  peaceful  one. 

Anionfz;  these  startling  events,  the  stretching  out  of  the 
United  States  to  tlie  farther  shores  of  the  Great  Ocean  is 
second  to  almost  none  in  its  wide  importance.  No  one  can 
wonder  that  it  has  fired  the  American  imagination,  especially 
in  the  Pacific  States ;  it  has  also  interested  the  whole  people 
as  never  before  in  the  broader  questions  of  world  politics. 
Many  who  would  be  glad  to  get  rid  of  the  Philippines 
are  none  the  less  unwilling  to  see  the  new  prestige  of  their 
country  diniinisiied  by  one  tittle.  This  feeling  has  given 
stimulus  to  the  desire  to  build  up  a  mighty  navy.  In  the 
Atlantic,  the  American  fleet  remains  chiefly  in  its  own 
waters,  w^here,  now  that  most  of  the  English  vessels  are 
withdrawn,  it  does  not  come  into  direct  competition  with 
tliat  of  any  other  country.  But  in  the  Pacific  it  is  kept 
on  the  farther  side  of  the  ocean,  at  the  great  gathering 
place  of  the  fleets  of  all  nations.  American  pride  demands 
that  the  United  States  shall  be  well  represented  there,  and 
the  sending  of  a  formidable  squadron  of  battle  ships  to 
.show  the  might  of  the  republic  in  Pacific  waters  as  it  has 
never  been  shown  before,  is  an  impressive  demonstration 
which  thrills  popular  patriotism.  The  Americans  are 
already  disposed  to  regard  themselves  as  more  than  the 
equal  of  any  other  people  in  tins  part  of  th;^  world,  and 
tliey  are  convinced  that  when  the  Panama  Canal  has  been 
dug,  and  New  York  and  New  Orleans  have  been  brought 


326       THE  UNItED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


into  quicker  water  communication  with  the  Far  East 
than  London  and  Hamburg,  and  when  their  fleet  can 
pass  at  will  from  one  ocean  to  the  other,  then  their 

supremacy  will  be  beyond  question. 

But  the  Pacific  is  not  for  any  one  nation  to  take  exclu- 
sively to  itself;  and  American  boasts  about  domination, 
besides  being  irritating  to  others,  are  premature.  Every 
one  of  the  world  powers  has  territories  in  this  domain,  and 
interests  wliich  it  will  defend  to  the  best  of  its  ability.  Not 
only  has  iini)('rial  Britain  widespread  possessions  in  this 
ocean  world,  l  ut  it  has  a  merchant  marine  many  times 
larger  than  that  of  the  United  States,  and  a  far  stronger 
navy ;  and  it  has  also  great  and  gro  'ing  children,  Canada 
and  Australia,  who  will  have  to  be  taken  into  account  by 
their  American  kindred.  And  there  are  others  to  be 
considered.  Both  China  and  Japan,  if  in  different  ways, 
have  entered  into  the  drama  of  world  politics,  which  they 
have  already  profoundly  affected,  and  on  which  their  further 
influence  is  incalculable.  With  both  of  them  the  present 
relations  of  the  United  States  exceed  in  intricacy  and  in 
difficulty,  when  not  in  actual  importance,  those  with  any 
state  in  Europe. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHINA 

THE  historian  of  the  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  China  is  confronted  at  the  outset  of  his  task 
with  a  curious  fact.  Ho  has  to  rpco{^nize  that  the  tale  of 
the  dealings  of  the  American  government  with  the  Chinese 
Empire  and  with  its  inhabitants  in  their  own  homes  is  one 
story,  and  that  of  the  treatment  of  Chinese  immigrants 
to  the  land  of  liberty,  by  both  government  and  people,  is 
quite  another.  What  is  stranger  still  is  thai  until  very  re- 
cently the  two  phenomena  had  almost  as  little  influence  on 
each  other  as  if  they  concerned  separate  groups  of  nations. 
In  the  first  case  the  Americans  can  point  with  pride  to 
their  record;  in  the  second  they  can  feel  no  pride  what- 
ever; at  best,  they  can  fall  back  only  on  the  plea  of  self- 
defence  and  of  disagreeable  necessity. 

The  American  traders  who  made  their  way  to  Canton  in 
the  last  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  first  of  the 
nineteenth,  suffered  from  the  same  disabilities  as  other 
foreigners  bartering  at  that  port,  but,  on  the  whole,  they 
seem  to  have  been  successful,  as  such  success  went,  in  get- 
ting on  with  the  local  authorities.  In  one  respect  their 
government  took  moral  ground  from  the  first;  not  only  did 
it  prohibit  its  citizens  by  law  from  sharing  in  the  opium 
traffic,  but  it  declared  that  those  guilty  of  so  doing  should 
thereby  forfeit  their  claim  to  the  protection  of  their 
country,  and  be  left  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  Chinese 
courts.  Even  if  we  admit  that  there  are  two  sides  to  the 
opium  question,  and  that  the  English  have  not  deserved 

327 


328       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


all  the  blame  which  has  been  cast  upon  them  in  this  con- 
nection, the  stand  of  the  Americans  is  to  their  credit,  in 
spite  of  the  sneers  it  has  provok(!d  from  some  foreign 
writers,  who  regard  it  as  a  bid  for  Chinese  favor.'  Like 
other  powers,  tlie  United  States  profited  by  the  successes 
of  the  English  and  the  Frencii  in  wringing  from  the  rulers 
in  Peking  concessions  in  behalf  of  foreign  trade.  Its  policy, 
if  a  little  inglorious,  was  prudent  and  successful ;  but  the 
decline  of  the  national  commerce  in  the  East  in  the  period 
following  ISGO  left  to  American  diplomats  and  consuls  in 
China,  as  their  chief  occupation,  the  protection,  not  of 
traders,  but  of  missionaries. 

The  first  American  missionaries  reached  Canton  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1830,  and  were  soon  followed  by  others  who  estab- 
lished themselves  at  many  distant  points.    Their  activity 
has  been  great,  but  its  results  have  been  the  cause  of  pro- 
longed dispute.    This  is  not,  however,  the  place  to  enter 
into  the  complicated  and  thorny  question  of  the  value  of 
Christian  missions  in  heathen  lands,  and  especially  in  the 
Far  East.   In  judging  the  evidence  on  the  subject,  we  must 
remember  that  the  witnesses  are  rarely  unprejudiced,  and 
that  owing  to  the  })ernuiuent  antagonism  between  the  busi- 
ness community  and  the  missionaries,  the  oral  testimony 
of  the  former  has  Httle  more  claim  to  impartiality  than  the 
official  reports  of  the  latter.    They  can  be  used  indeed,  to 
a  certain  extent,  to  counterbalance  one  another.    To  the 
diplomat  and  to  the  consul,  unless  they  happen  to  have 
jicrsonal  sympathy  with  efforts  +o  sf)read  Christianity,  tlie 
missionaries  appear  chiefly  as  the  nuikers  of  endless  trouble. 
Witbo^'.t  passing  a  summary  judgment  on  so  many-sided 
a  controversy,  we  can  understand  the  point  of  view  of 
those  who  declare  that  the  coming  of  strangers  to  convert 
a  peopli."  01  ancioiil  (iviii^  iiion  iruiii  luuj^  iiiucriiid  i;riR'i:> 
with  which  they  are  satistied,  is  an  impi^rtinence  iu  itself; 

'  Of  late  thu  prohiljitioii  of  opiui.  ba.'i  been  e.xtemled  to  aioiphiue. 


THE  UMTED  STATES  AND  CMINA 


329 


that  the  missionanes  frequently  lack  tact,  and  by  their 
iiicddlesomenoss  get  into  unnecessary  difficulties,  and  that 

what  good  tliey  have  accomplished  has  boon  incomnion- 
riurato  with  the  money  spent  in  doing  it.    All  this  may  be 
more  or  less  true,  but  unprejudiced  observers  bear  witness 
that,  notwithstanding  the  jibes  of  the  foreign  settlements 
about  the  missionaries'  comfortable  mode  of  life,  the  latter 
often  set  a  fine  example  of  unselfishness;  that  they  have 
alleviated  nuioh  suffering,  and  in  many  eases  they  have 
(lone  great  good  to  individuals  if  not  to  nations  as  a  wliole. 
They  have  also  more  than  once  been  helpful  to  their  own 
government,  and  they  have  promoted  civilization  by  adding 
to  our  knowledge  of  the  lands  where  they  have  worked,  often 
at  the  price  of  untold  hardships  and  perils,  and  sometimes 
at  the  cost  of  their  lives.    Finally,  it  should  be  noted,  that 
at  the  present  day  the  Protestant  missionary  of  the  older 
type,  whose  single  idea  was  that  of  preaching  the  Gospel 
to  the  recalcitrant  heathen  in  season  and  out  of  season,  is 
(lying  out.    In  his  place  we  find  the  practical,  efficient 
rrpresentative  of  Christianity,  who  gives  more  time  to  look- 
ing' after  the  material  wants  of  his  flock,  and  in  j)articu- 
lar  to  the  cure  of  their  diseases,  than  he  does  to  direct 
propaganda. 

Whatever  might  be  the  personal  opinions  of  the  official 
n-presentatives  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East,  they 

were  obliged  to  protect  their  missionary  fellow-citizens  in 
the  rights  which  treaties  had  accorded  to  them.  Beyond 
this  duty,  the  American  ministers  in  Peking  had,  for  many 
years,  little  to  do.  In  one  respect  they  pursued  a  course 
different  from  that  observed  by  their  government  in  every 
"tlHT  part  of  the  world.  Few  principles  have  been  more 
••liaractcristic  of  American  policy  than  the  avoidance  of 

"  o   •  r.:::L  :::;ili!trfi;i}iCC  Oi    lilt-  pcrled 

independence  of  the  United  8tat(>s  in  all  its  dealings  with 
other  powers.    The  only  marked  exceptions  to  this  rule 


330        THE  UNITED  STATluS  AS  A  WORLD  I'OWER 


have  been  made  in  the  East  where,  by  the  nocossities  o* 
the  situation,  tiic  Ainciican  rcpn^sontatiw's  lave  been 
forced  to  associate  themselves  witii  tlu -r  'Min^Deau  col- 
leagues in  the  making  of  joint  demands  u;»ou  tiic  inij  erial 
government.  This  association  hsis  even  gone  to  the  extent 
of  taking  common  military  action,  as  in  1900,  when  the 
allied  troops  marched  on  Peking  to  rescue  the  besieged 
legations. 

For  a  wliole  generation  after  the  Civil  War  there  is  little 
to  tell  about  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  in  Asiatic 
affairs.  In  1894,  when  the  war  between  China  and  Japan 
broke  out,  the  sympathy  of  the  Americans  at  home,  though 
not  of  those  on  the  spot,  was  generally  on  the  side  of  Japan. 
The  American  governm(>nt  did  not  put  itself  forward  at  the 
time,  I 'lit  it  received  u  unique  tribute  to  its  fairness  by 
being  charged  by  each  of  the  warring  emj)ircs  with  the 
protection  of  its  subjects  who  were  resident  in  the  domain 
of  the  other,  —  always  a  difficult  and  delicate  task  and  here 
doubly  complic;it(>(l.  It  was  through  the  American  min- 
ister at  Peking  that  the  first  overtures  for  peace  were  made 
by  the  Chinese,  and  a  former  American  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  John  W.  Foster,  was  one  of  the  commissioners  ap- 
pointed by  China  to  negotiate  the  treaty.  Nevertheless, 
the  r(.le  of  the  United  States  in  this  i)art  of  the  world  re- 
mained a  platonic  one,  exercising  slight  influence  on  the 
course  of  events,  till  the  results  of  the  Sj)anish  War  brought 
American  warships  and  armies  into  the  scene. 

Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Chinese-Japanese  conflict,  the 
interest  of  the  American  people  in  the  politics  of  the  Far 
East  had  been  languid.  Now  it  became  keener,  and  it  was 
quickly  stiimdatetl  by  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines, 
antl  by  the  independent  revival  of  American  trade.  The 
United  States  hud  never  ceased  to  m;tke  large  purchases 
from  China,  and  in  1880  its  imports  from  that  country 
amounted  to  almost  twenty-two  million  dollars,  but  its 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHINA  331 

exports  thither  were  Lan-ly  ovrr  r,no  million.  In  1890 
the  imports  came  to  ahuut  sixteen  niilHon  and  a  qu'irter' 
the  exports  to  just  under  three  million;  in  l-JOO,  when 
the  imports  had  risen  to  almost  twenty-seven  million  the 
oxDorts  hud  grown  to  over  five  times  what  they  were  ten 

fn'ii  r  '''''         ^'^^-"'^  ^^^-^^^^^  n^iUlon; 

m  1902,  the  exports  at  last  exce.Hled  tlu^  imports  This 

rapid  increase  in  the  sale  of  American  goods,  an  inon^aso 
which  bade  fair  to  continue,  made  it  incumbent  on  the 
nation  to  follow  with  more  attention  what  was  going  on 
HUhe  Par  East,  and  above  all  to  determine  what  course  to 
adopt  in  reference  to  the  break-up  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
Which  then  seemed  imminent. 

The  situation  was  not  easy.    Something  liad  to  be  done 
and  done  promj.tly,  lest  a  trade  which,  in  the  popular 
imagination,  offered  unlimited  possibilities  for  the  future 
should  be  lost  just  as  it  was  coming  into  existence.  Several 
of  the  European  powers  seemed  bent  on  the  partition  of 
Chma,  and  even  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  who  u.-re  op- 
posed to  It  had  taken  care  to  mark  off  a  sphere  of  interest 
for  themselves  in  order  that,  if  the  worst  should  befall, 
they  might  not  come  out  empty-handed.    Unable  to  pre- 
>x.nt  and  unwilhng  to  take  part  in  a  division  of  this  sort, 
the  United  States  fell  back  on  the  principle  of  the  %pen 
door.     The  move  was  successful;  for  not  only  did  it  serve 
to  steady  the  somewhat  wavering  attitude  of  Great  Britain 
but  It  elicited  at  least  the  nominal  approbation  of  the  states 
to  which  Secretary  Hay's  circular  was  addressed.  How- 
ever httle  some  of  them  might  sympathize  with  the  doctrine 
It  enunciated  none  dared  oppose  it  openlv;  for  to  do  so 
would  have  been  to  proclaim  to  the  world 'an  intention  of 
takmg  over  Chmese  territory  for  purely  selfish  purposes 
se  cretary  Hay  was  too  sluvwd  to  put  unlimited  trust  in 
the  assurances  he  receiv<.d,  hut  tl,e  United  States  had  now 
ground  to  stand  on,  a  principle  formally  accepted  by  other 


332       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


couiitrios,  and  one  which  it  couhl  maintain  with  all  the 
Wfi^rht  of  its  influiMicc.  The  (U-claratiou  had  tlu-  addi- 
tional merit  that,  thouK'li  prompted  by  interested  motives,  it 
did  not  set  forth  a  selfish  theory,  but  one  of  fair  play  for  all ; 
and  it  was  likewise  advantageous  to  the  Chinese  tlu mselves. 

The  American  policy  towards  Cliina  was,  indeed,  one  of 
consistent  friendliness.    Even  liurin^'  the  Boxer  troubles 
and  tlie  siege  of  tlie  legations,  the  United  States  announced 
that  it  had  no  war  with  the  Empire  as  such.    The  Ameri- 
can troops  in  the  Peking  exposition  may  have  looted  as 
much  as  the  others,  but  they  treated  the  native  poi)ulation 
with  more  humanity  than  some  of  them  did.    When  order 
was  restored,  the  government  at  Washington,  disclaiming 
all  thoughts  of  revenge,  exacted  an  indemnity  that  was 
moderate  compared  with  what  was  demanded  by  most  of 
the  other  powers;  and  to-day,  after  revising  the  estimates, 
it  proposes  to  release  China  from  all  payments  in  excess  of 
the  loss  actually  suffered  by  the  United  States  and  its 
citizens  at  that  time,  or  from  more  than  half  of  the  total 
amount.'    After  the  suppression  of  the  Boxer  revolt,  when 
China  was  bolstered  up,  with  her  territory  intact,  American 
influence  at  Peking  was  exerted  in  favor  of  treating  her  as 
leniently  and  trusting  her  as  much  as  possible. 

There  still  remained  for  the  Americans  the  difficulty  of 
protecting  their  trade  in  Manchuria,  where  the  Russians, 
in  spite  of  promises  to  the  contrary,  were  making  themselves 
more  and  more  at  home.  Here  again  American  interests 
coincided  with  Chinese.  Profiting  by  the  fact  that  the 
province  was  still  theoretically  a  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire, 
just  beft)re  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  W^ir  the 
United  States  persua(h'd  the  Peking  government,  in  the 
interest  of  both  parties,  and  in  the  face  of  Russian  dis- 
pleasure, to  open  two  more  Manchurian  ports  to  AmeJcan 

» In  1885  the  United  States  returned  to  China  a  sum  of  $453,400  for 
overpayment  of  ewlier  damages. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHINA 


333 


trade.  When  hostilities  hvgan,  Secretary  Hay,  in  a  new 
circular,  insisted  on  the  importance  of  Uniiting  their  area, 
—  a  condition  which  was  accepted  by  the  two  belligerents 
to  the  great  advantage  of  China.  Without  ascribing  to  the 
United  States  a  superhmnanly  altruistic  motive,  we  may 
say  to  sum  up  tliat  for  many  years  it  showed  more  real 
kindliness  to  the  Chinese  Enij)ire  and  gave  it  more  disinter- 
ested aid  and  protection  than  did  any  other  power.'  If  the 
relations  between  the  two  had  been  confined  to  the  western 
sitlo  of  the  Pacific,  we  could  record  them  with  almost  un- 
mixed praise.  But,  during  the  years  when  the  Americans 
were  showing  themselves  the  honest  friends  of  the  Chinaman 
in  his  own  home,  their  attitude  toward  him  in  theirs  was 
something  very  different. 

As  soon  as  American  trade  with  China  began,  a  few  mer- 
chants went  out  and  settled,  at  first  in  Canton,  later  in 
oth(T  ports,  forming  snudl  colonies  such  as  have  existed  in 
other  Oriental  countries.  That  the  Chinese  might,  in  their 
turn,  come  in  any  considerable  number  across  the  water 
did  not  seem  a  contingency  worth  troubling  about.  To  be 
sure,  they  had  shown  in  their  history  a  persistency  in 
emigrating  to  the  Malay  Peninsula,  Java,  the  Philippines, 
and  elsewluTe,  but  these  had  been  merely  migrations  in 
Asia  itself  and  were  little  known  in  Europe  and  America, 
where  the  Chinese  were  supposed  to  be  a  people  much 
attached  to  their  homes.  If  their  relatives  died  abroad, 
did  they  not  send  them  back  to  be  buried  in  the  sacred 
soil  of  their  native  land  ? 

All  this  being  so,  \vlu>n,  in  ISGS,  the  American  minister 
at  Peking,  Anson  Burlingame,  signed  the  treaty  known  by 
his  name,  it  was  regarded  as  a  diplomatic  triumph  for  his 
country.    The  contracting  parties  "cordially  recognized  .  .  . 

"  And  yet  with  rharactoristic  rarclcssncss  tho  United  States  has  some- 
timop  sent  as  consuls  to  China  m'"i  who  have  been  the  laughing-st«ck,  if 
not  worse,  of  the  I  ur  East  and  a  disgrace  to  the  country  they  represented. 


G34 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  iiihiTfiit  and  inalit'iialjli'  right  of  man  to  change  his 
home  and  allegiance,  and  also  the  mutual  advantage  of  the 
free  immip^rution  and  emigration  of  their  citizens  and  sub- 
jects respectively  from  one  country  to  the  otlu  r,  for  pur- 
poses of  curiosity,  of  trade,  or  as  pcrinaiu'rit  rcsiiU'nts." 

Here  was  a  fine  ri'pctition  of  the  priiiciph-s  for  whicii  the 
United  States  had  always  contenthd,  ])rinciplcs  whose 
validity  many  European  nations  still  refused  to  acknowl- 
edge, but  ^vhich  were  now  solemnly  accepted  by  the  most 
conservative  of  Oriental  empires,  thereby  throwing  op(>n 
its  doors  to  American  enteri)rise.  That  the  Chinese,  for 
their  part,  would  ev(>r  make  great  use  of  the  opportunities 
offered  to  them,  was  not  foreseen,  and  if  it  had  been,  it 
would  not  at  the  moment  have  aroused  alarm.  The  first 
who  crossed  over  to  the  Pacific  coast  were  invaluable  in 
the  development  of  California;  they  helped  in  tlie  digging 
of  the  mines,  and  in  the  building  of  the  railways,  and  tliey 
made  excellent  servants.  They  were  therefore  heartily  wel- 
comed. Very  soon,  however,  as  they  grew  more  numerous, 
the  tone  about  them  underwent  a  change. 

We  have  seen  what  reasons  have  impelled  many  persons 
in  the  United  Stat(>s  who  bear  no  dislike  to  the  Chinese  to 
favor  their  exclusion  from  the  country.  It  is  not  merely 
the  clamor  of  the  Pacific  coast,  or  the  influence  of  the  labor- 
unions,  which  has  led  to  this  conclusion  so  much  as  a  con- 
viction that  the  Mongolians  constitute  an  element  which 
cannot  be  Americanized,  cannot  be  amalgamated  with  the 
rest,  and  whi(  h,  though  useful  in  itself,  will,  by  competition, 
lower  the  standard  of  living  of  the  American  workingman, 
and  end  by  driving  him  from  the  field.  The  belief  is  not 
peculiar  to  the  United  States,  it  is  equally  strong  in  Canada 
and  Australia,  and  would  be  in  other  places  under  the  same 
conditions.  An(i  it  is  not  necessaril}-  a  rejection  on  the 
character  of  th(>  Chinese;  on  the  contrary,  we  mif^ht  re- 
gard it  as  a  tribute  to  their  sterling  qualities. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHINA 


335 


It  was  sonic  tiiiic  before  the  .seriousricH.s  of  the  i)rohIem 
presented  was  realized  in  the  Eastern  States,  where  the 
Chinese  have  never  come  in  sufficient  numbers  to  uwaken 
much  opposition,  and  where  their  virtues  have  been  apprc- 

lircciated.  A  ^ood  many  people  in  the  East  condcnm 
cxch'sion,  hut  tliey  are  lukewarm  in  the  matter,  whereas 
the  Pacific  coast  is  terrilily  in  (\ariiest. 

The  story  of  anti-Chinese  legislation  in  the  United  States 
can  be  told  in  a  few  words.  In  1878,  only  ten  years  after 
the  signing  of  the  Burlingamc  Treaty,  Congress  passed  a 
first  exclusion  bill,  which  was  v(>t(ied  by  President  Hayes 
as  beinj?  contrary  to  that  treaty.  Two  years  afterward, 
however,  the  administration  succeeded  in  concludin^^  with 
Peking  a  new  agreement,  according  to  which  the  United 
States  was  given  power  to  "limit  or  suspend"  Chinese  im- 
migration, though  not  to  prohibit  it.  On  the  strength  of 
this,  in  1SS2  Congress  passed  a  bill  forbidding  Chinese 
iinniigr.ition  for  twenty  years.  This  ])ill  was  vetoed,  but  a 
similar  one,  fixing  the  period  at  ten  years,  received  the  Presi- 
dent's signature.  In  1888,  another  treaty  was  negotiated, 
but  before  it  had  been  ratified  by  the  Chinese  government, 
Ciuigress  and  tlie  President,  s])urr('d  by  +lie  near  prospect  of 
an  election,  passed  a  new  exclusion  bill,  in  violation  of  exist- 
ing tn\'ity  rights.  To  quiet  (jtialms  of  conscience,  the 
authorities  in  Washington  concluded  one  more  treaty,  by 
which  the  two  countries  agreed  that  Chirc  iu  immigration 
to  the  United  States  should  be  forbidden  for  the  next  ten 
years.  Since  1904  this  agreement  has  lapsed,  but  the  ex- 
clusion law  remains  in  '     c  —  illegally,  the  Chinese  el; 

Not  content  with  proteiting  itself  against  ''heap  lab(;r  al 
home,  the  United  States  has  extended  its  policy  to  its  trop- 
ical possessions,  where  the  conditions  are  very  different. 
Even  before  annexation,  Hawaii  had  checked  the  inflow  of 
Chinese,  useful  as  they  were  on  the  plantations.  Now  the 
door  has  been  shut  against  them  in  the  Philippines,  partly 


336 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


'it 


out  of  (1(1  n  ncc  to  the  Aincripan  lubor-miions — th"ugli  any 
one  must  kno%  that  the  American  can  never  work  in  the 
fields  in  the  iropios — and  partly  because  those  in  chnrge 
of  the  wclfaiv  of  0  slands  have  felt  that  the  Filipino  is 
no  inatcli  for  tlM>  Cliinaman.  In  ('onsoqucn<-('  we  li:  '  tin 
rurious  anomaly  that  though  Chin<  irnini^ratioii  of 
larj^e  scale  would  probably  be  an  oxcelknt  thing  f>  u! 
Philippines,  it  miglit  bf  death  to  the  Filipinos,  and  it  i.>i 
the  ])('opl(^  rather  tti.ir  the  territory  that  tho.s»  who  an- 
shaping  Anioric-M  m  if  v  have  it  licirt.  On  flic  t.flici 
hand,  t  hi.'^  poli<'y  .  .i;  .r  i  riaU v  t<»  t  li"  gri('vanr<-  if  "  hicii 
the  Chin(>sc  have  >  au-  lo  con  iluiu.  Can  \vc  .  imcr  at 
their  indignation  when  the  Utiited  States,  whi  >  seel  ii^ 
unrestricted  access  to  their  territories,  shuts  th«>m  out  of 
its  possessions  not  only  in  its  own  hemisphere,  but  in 
theirs  ? 

\\'hatovor  ar^'umrnts  urcri  sin  f     ir  .  prevent- 

ing further  immigration  of  L/line^  to  i  I  ited  S  ates, 
they  Ho  not  affect  the  disgrn<'e  to  the  eountry  .  f  the  tn  it- 
ment  which  has  been  meted  out  to  sonu  ■>(  those  already 
st'ttlcd  in  it.    The  story  (if  tiic  o  Tuges  .  hiiii-.se  havo 

had  to  suffer  at  the  h;  ids  if  nob  »r  of  i  i dividual  ruffians 
must  make  any  American  blush  fo  sham 

For  another  wrong  in  connet  ion  wi-h  Chinese  excluai*  .i, 
there  can  also  be  no  defence,  though  there  is  an  unsa  sfsi  - 
tory  explanation.    The  Chinese  ar  horn  smugglers  <  ' 

'  '  More  Chinese  sulijocts  hn^    hoe  -  m\i.  '  .      i  hy  nmb  n 
iStatcs  during  the  last  tvvcnty-tive  years  than  all  ae  AiiKirit  ,u  > 
Iwen  murderjxi  in  China  in  similar  riots.  ...    In  every  instan> 
Ameriran.s  have  sufTcTod  from  li     s,  the  auth'^   tics  have  matli  ,;. 
tion  f(ir  the  losses,  and  ran  ly  h.i-  the  punnh     nt  of  !■  -th  fi'ili 
inflicted  upon  the  guilty  "fTenders.    On  the  c  ler  hn vi.  I  an, 
say  that  I  cannot  recall  a  single  in-stance  when^  the  pcn;dty  of  .ea 
been  visit(^d  on  any  member  of  the  mnb  in  t'     IW  it!".!  8t.it.ps  pi 
the  deatl\  of  Chiiicso,  ;ii,d  ii,  m,     'wo  ii-tai       >>ui    =f  manv  tiiis  ii. 
nity  been  paid  for  the  looses  siwtained  liy  '      (^hi'       " — .-pee  i 
former  Chinese  Minister  quoted  from  C/itno         \ni>-'!,  :  To-day    .  '»>.")) 
by  A.  H.  Smith. 


be 
V  to 


Tilt;     Ni  i.l    M.m2<  AM  CHINA 


337 


jH-rsoiis  ;ts  \\r!i  a-^  (  !  (k  ir  y  '  ;tid  n  my  h.  <■  s  I'cocdod 
in  fiiakiii^'  t!  r  u;i-  n  >  tii  I  i  ted  States  i,.  spile  of  he 
vigila  fc  of  ihv  {»ovprnmen;  officials.  On  their  aide,  the 
latter  ivt  ren  i  ved  all  nrrivnls  frotii  China  ith  impartial 
brut    !tv.    Chi  •' 


pro\      (I     >'  i>.r 
in  witii  coi   I .-.  ;i  . 
bring  nllowci  to  ])a> 
••jM-dinixJi  for  1  n(j;  u(  it 
])         1   ''  Mm    '  "gan 
t.    '  -         ssi'       '  n  ; 


.  nu>n  of  ('(iucat  iMM  a    i  refinement, 
I,,.  !  sus[ 'icion.  have    u  n  herded 
i  jeoted  to  many  indi^ruities  before 
tli'-  customs.    These  barbarous  pro- 
unchc'  ked.    It  was  miy  when 
di 


publi'-  ■! 
different  t 
hunt'n   s  \- 
B;  nd  1! 

!        'i    .  ' 

t  ide 
natio-  ;ii 
seriovi  v 


:it  the  Americans  awoke 

\h       :  l;i fillers. 

•  \.         t:  i          'overnuieiit ,  inese 

>n,       h  "med  extraordin.      •  in- 

d'  the.-  \  A>  (tic  empire  oi  some 

'nil!  '    oi  .s,  tl    ^ate  of  a  few  thou- 

ing  A  as,  11  appea,   1,  not  a  matter  of 

n            .  it  was  taken  for  Rrant   \  in  the 


•.'I.   :  ' 
AO  >lirier 
insumpt 
The  bo 


se 

consit 


it  was  taken  for  grant 
!  !ic  ChiiH  se   had  no  patri 
Uetaliation  on  tlieir  part 
ed,  and  Americans  cherished  t  • 
T  was  possible  to  havf  at  the 
ard   0  them  —  a  selfish  on' 
a      neroua  one  for  foreiuTi  exi 


ism  or 
s  not 
iiifort- 
time 
me 

Ve 


ma ' 
inn 

eV 


diai 


1,  05  rudely  shattered  this  illubi> 
,ch  as  we  will  that  the  movement,  the 
of  which  we  do  not  yet  know,  and  perhaps 
was  due  to  all  so  i  ts  of  influences.  It  may 
.>oni'»  f(treign  instigation,  though  there  has  t  \-er 
re.i  proof  to  that  e'"  It  may  linvc  1  i  n 
d  of  strength  of  certain  organizations  which 
show  their  power  at  the  expense,  as  it  hap- 
tie  Americans,  but  might  just  as  readily  have 
chosen  some  other  victim.  Again,  the  boycott  may  have 
had  somethinj.'  of  the  nature  of  mere  chance  explosion,  or 
have  been  the  work  of  a  few  agitators  who  knew  how  to 


■I 

la  ■ 
01 

lied, 


338       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


mould  others  to  their  use.  Be  all  this  us  it  may,  the  anti- 
American  boycott  has  proved  that,  throughout  China,  there 
now  exists  a  national  resentment  against  the  way  in  which 
the  Chinese^  have  been  treated  in  the  United  States.  It 
also  gave  proof  of  a  skill  in  or^'anization  hitherto  unsus- 
pected, and  it  has  revealed  to  Americans  the  disagreeable 
truth  that,  though  China  may  be  weak  as  a  military  power, 
her  people  are  still  in  a  position  where  they  can  hit  back, 
and  hit  back  effectually,  if  their  rights  and  feelings  are 
trampled  upon. 

The  diffieulty  which  faces  American  statesmen  is  a  grave 
one.  Such  grievances  as  the  ill-treatment  of  upper-class 
Chinese  can  be,  and  probably  will  be,  easily  remedied ;  and 
there  is  reason  to  hope  that  Chinese  laborers  may  be  bet- 
ter protected  in  the  future  from  mob  violence.  But  the 
root  of  the  trouble  goes  deeper.  On  the  one  hand,  there 
is,  at  present,  no  chance  whatever  that  the  United  States 
will  open  its  doors  to  unrestricted  Chinese  immigration. 
The  Pacific  coast  is  inmiovable  on  this  point,  and  it  is  sup- 
ported, not  only  by  the  laboring  classes  everywhere,  but 
also  by  many  other  persons  who  wish  America  to  remain  "a 
white  man's  country."  Every  powerful  independent  nation 
will  exercise  as  an  indispensable  part  of  its  sovereignty 
the  right  of  determining  what  strangers  shall  or  shall  nut 
be  allowed  to  enter  and  to  reside  within  its  borders ;  only 
to  the  we;ik  can  the  privilege  of  shutting  their  doors  be 
denied.  The  Americans  cannot  be  forced  to  let  in  the 
Chinese  if  they  are  determined  to  kee])  them  out,  but  this  de- 
termination may  cost  them  dear.  It  is  jierfectly  conceivable 
that  by  such  means  as  the  boycott,  if  not  by  an  ofhcial 
prohibition,  Americans  may  be  deprived  of  the  market  in 
the  Far  East  to  -.hieh  they  have  looked  forward  with 
confidence.  And  this  is  no  small  loss  in  itself,  If  the  Ameri- 
cans, in  «pite  of  the  obvious  advantage  of  their  position,  in 
spite  of  the  excellence  and  cheapness  of  their  manufactured 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHINA 


339 


goods,  in  spite,  too,  of  the  friendliness  they  have  shown  to 
China  in  foreign  affairs,  are  to  be  denied  the  privilege  to 
which  their  situation  seems  to  entitle  them,  they  wUl  be 
paying  a  heavy  price  for  their  self-defence.  And  yet,  even 
this  ])rice  they  will  pay  if  need  bo,  rather  than  let  their 
country  be  overrun  by  Asiatics.  It  remains  for  their 
statesmen  to  prevent  matters  from  reaching  this  extremity, 
and  to  persuade  the  Chinese  that  no  hostility  is  intended 
against  them ;  that  exclusion  does  not  imply  a  condemna- 
tinn  of  their  character,  but  it  is  only  a  recognition  of  the 
ni;il)ility  of  white  and  yellow  men  to  meet  in  large  masses, 
.)u  terms  that  are  satisfactory  to  both. 

There  is,  however,  fair  reason  to  hope  that  the  task  of 
maintaining  good  relations  may  not  prove  impossible. 
Cliina,  like  every  other  state,  has  no  motive  for  desiring 
that  her  children  should  swarm  into  lands  where  they  are 
not  wanted.  Pro^  led  she  receives  fair  and  courteous  treat- 
ment, which  has  not  always  been  accorded  her  in  the  past, 
she  may  well  think  it  best  to  submit  with  a  good  grace  to 
restrictions  which  are  no  real  injury  to  her.  To  act  other- 
wise, to  attempt  to  force  open  all  doors  to  her  emigrants, 
would  soon  bring  her  into  disastrous  conflict,  not  only  with 
Iho  United  States,  but  with  the  British  Empire,  Russia, 
Japan,  and  probably  others.  And  this  she  can  by  no  means 
afford  to  do ;  for  in  spite  of  recent  reforms,  her  military 
power  is  not  yet  great,  nor  is  it  likely  to  be,  at  least  for 
offensive  purposes,  this  many  a  day.  Among  the  empires 
of  the  world  she  is  one  of  those  which  most  require  internal 
reforms,  and  hiivv  most  cause  for  keeping  clear  of  complica- 
tions with  foreign  i)owcrs.  More  than  that,  she  is  in  no 
small  need  of  friends. 

Though  friends  can  be  had  for  a  consideration,  unfor- 
tunately, even  friendship,  especi.olly  when  bought,  may  be 
dangerous  to  a  weak,  distracted  country.  Russia  and  Japan 
are  both,  perhaps,  in  a  position  to  give  China  more  valuable 


340       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


aid  for  the  moment  than  is  the  United  States,  but  aid  from 
them  would  not  be  without  obvious  perils.  The  United 
States  has  a  remarkably  clean  record  in  the  Far  East:  it 
alone  of  ull  the  powers  active  there  has  never  taken, 
or  tri(>(l  to  take,  one  foot  of  Chinese  soil.  While  naturally 
intent  on  its  own  interests,  it  has  shown  more  actual  kind- 
ness to  the  emi)ire  than  has  any  other  nation,  and  it  can 
hardly  be  suspected  of  designs  against  her.  The  Chinese 
know  this,  and  they  are  plainly  ea^er  for  at  least  the  moral 
support  of  the  Americans  in  their  dealings  with  somo  of 
their  neighbors.  In  s])ite  ot  all  assurances,  China  has  not 
yet  got  hack  the  control  of  Mi-nchuria,  —  of  either  the  Jap- 
anese or  the  Russian  portion,  -  -  and  the  two  late  enemies  may 
not  improbably  agree  to  keep  her  sovereignty  there  a  nomi- 
nal one.  This  she  will  not  submit  to  tamely,  if  she  can  help 
herself ;  and  still  less  does  she  intend  to  allow  the  Japanese 
to  take  her  in  hand  and  dircrt  her  footsteps  as  they  have 
dreamed  of  doing.  The  reformers  among  the  Chinese  are 
ready  to  leam  from  Japan  and  to  imitate  her,  but  not 
at  all  to  be  dominated  by  her,  and  against  her  too  great 
influence  they  are  turning  for  support  to  the  United  Stat(  s. 

As  a  result  of  these  various  considerations,  the  prospect 
for  American  relations,  though  clouded,  is  not  disheartening. 
The  power  of  the  United  States  commands  respect,  and  its 
good-will  is  of  value.  The  Americans  can  show  them- 
selves friendly  to  the  Chines";  Empire  and  desirous  of  its 
maintenance,  without  having  tt-  admit  its  swarms  of  needy 
laborers  into  their  territories.  And  even  in  regard  to  this 
vexed  question,  th(>ir  attitude  now  appears  less  offensive; 
for  recent  events  have  proved  that  they  are  not  intent  on 
affixing  a  stigma  on  one  particular  people,  but  are,  rather, 
struggling  with  a  general  probhnn  of  self-ilefence,  a  prol)lein 
which  has  brought  them  into  difficulties  with  their  old 
friend,  Japan 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 

IF  the  position  of  the  United  States  on  the  Pacific  Ocean 
offers  it  greater  advantages,  and  imposes  upon  it  graver 
responsibilities,  in  its  dealings  with  China  than  fall  to  the 
lot  of  any  European  power  except  Kussia,  this  is  even  more 
true  in  regard  to  its  relations  with  Japan.  Since  the  o])en- 
iiig  of  tlie  Empire  of  the  Mikado  to  outside  influences,  which 
was  brought  about  by  the  direct  action  of  the  United  States, 
the  connection  between  the  two  countries  has  been  closer 
than  that  between  Japan  and  any  other  western  state. 
It  is  true  that  America  faces,  and  long  will  face,  to  the  east 
rather  than  to  the  west;  for  in  spite  of  all  eloquent  proph- 
ecies vu  the  contrary,  there  is  as  yet  little  solid  ground  of 
fact  to  support  the  oi)inion  that  a  change  will  soon  take 
place  in  this  respec^  Nevertheless,  she  already  has  on  the 
shores  of  the  Pacific  a  situation  superior  to  that  of  her 
European  rivals,  she  has  just  tnuisferred,  if  only  tempo- 
rarily, the  bulk  of  her  navy  to  its  waters,  and  what  goes  on 
there  becomes  of  more  vital  interest  to  her  every  year.  And 
to  Japan  the  Pacific  is  all  in  all. 

It  was  the  famous  expedition  of  Commodore  Perry  in 
bS54  which  lirought  Ja])an  into  general  intercourse  with 
the  rest  of  the  world.  Previous  attcin])ts  to  olitain  this 
result  ]'.  '  been  made  without  success  by  Americans  as 
well  Europeans.    Perry's  expedition  was  a  strong 

one,  aiiv.  he  himself  was  more  determined  than  any  of  his 
predecessors.  Since  he  was  prepared  to  repel  att  ick,  and 
firmly  maintained  his  ground  instead  of  complying  with 

341 


342       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  requests  of  the  Japanese  that  he  take  Jiimself  away,  we 
may  say  that  he  triumphed  by  the  use  of  physical  force 
hov  ver  gently  applied.    We  know  now,  what  Perry  did 
not,  thai  foiulitions  in  the  island  empire  were  ripe  for  a 
revolution  which  must  have  occurred  soon  in  any  event, 
and  that  the  old  system  of  rigorous  exclusion  of  the  foreigner 
was  doomed;  but  the  glory  of  Commodore  Terry  losea 
nothing  l.y  this,  .-ny  more  than  does  that  of  any  discoverer 
or  inventor  i.y  his  appearing  when  the  age  is  ready  for 
hmi.    It  was  part  of  Perry's  merit  that  he  carried  out  his 
mission  with  singular  tact,  and  succeeded  in  accomplishinc. 
his  purpose  without  resort  to  actual  violence,  — an  exploit 
for  which  there  is  every  cause  to  be  grateful.    To-day  far 
from  remembering  with  humiliation  the  duress  once 'put 
upon  them,  the  Jap-  nese,  in  view  of  what  they  have  since 
achieved,  look  back  on  the  coming  of  the  Americans  as 
the  beginning  of  their  new  birth,  as  one  of  the  eventful 
glorious  dates  in  their  history.    Their  feeling  about  it  has 
been  shown  by  the  erection  in  1901  of  a  monument  to 
Perry,  to  which  the  emperor  himself  besides  many  other 
prominent  men  subscribed. 

The  United  States  was,  moreover,  fortunate  in  the  choice 
of  its  first  regular  diplomatic  representative  at  Tokio. 
Mr.  Townsend  Harris  was  not  only  skilful  and  firm  in  his 
treatment  of  official  matters,  but  was  also  sincerely  inter- 
ested in  the  welfare  of  the  strange  people  with  whom  he 
was  called  upon  to  deal.  While  obtaining  from  them  con- 
cessions, which  he  believed  would  be  for  their  own  bene- 
fit as  well  as  that  of  his  compatriots,  he  took  no  unfair 
advantage  of  their  ignorance  of  international  usages  or  of 
their  bewildered  condition.  His  friendliness  has  since  been 
gratefully  recogniz.  d  by  the  Japanese,  and  has  helped  to 
render  them  well  disposed  towards  thp  country  Vvliich  ho 
represented.  Their  first  mission  abroad  was' despatched 
to  the  United  States. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN  343 

In  the  troubled  years  that  witnessed  in  Japan  the  over- 
hrow  of  the  old  regime,  the  Americans,  like  others,  suffered 
trom  the  prevailing  insecurity  and  the  hatred  of  foreigners 
ranipant  in  the  empire.    An  American  secretary  of  legation 

was  murdered,  and  on  another  occasion  the  legation  itself 
was  burned  to  the  ground,  yet,  in  spite  of  all,  relations  con- 
tmued  good,  and  the  Americans  did  not  land  troops  for  the 

rcnch    The  United  States  did,  however,  take  a  part  with 
(.mttBntam  France,  and  Holland,  in  the  bombardment 
of  bhimonoseki,  m  18(53,  .nd  though  the  part  was  almost 
nominal,  none  the  less,  the  United  States  received  a  quarter 
of  the  indemnity  exacted.    But  the  money  tlms  obtained 
weighed  on  the  national  conscience  until,  in  1883,  by  a 
vote  of  Congress,  it  was  given  back.    This  fair  dealing,  with 
I  S  implied  admission  of  a  previous  wrong,  was  not  lost  on 
the  Japanese,  who  are  quick  to  appreciate  a  chivalrous  act. 
They  were  grateful,  too,  to  the  United  States  for  being  the 
first  power  to  show  itself  favorable  to  treaty  revision,  a  thin., 
liat  for  years  they  ardently  desired  in  order  to  remove  the 
badge  of  irderiority  which  the  earlier  arrangements, necessary 
ai  tlie  tunc,  had  imposed  upon  thorn.    In  1878,  the  Wash- 
ington government  expressed  its  readiness  to  surrender  its 
nght  of  externtonality  and  commercial  privileges  as  soon 

TZ^7'''  '^^^"^^  ^  "^^^"^^  ^«  the  same;  in 
1S80  and  1887  it  negotiated  with  Tokio  a  treaty  on  the  sub- 
jc-ct,  and  when,  in  1894,  the  British  government  at  last 
acceded  to  the  w..slu  s  of  the  Japanese,  the  American  took 
the  matter  up  agam  and  brought  it  to  a  conclusion. 

1  he  far-seeing  statesmen,  who  with  marvellous  success  have 
re-madc  .apan,  early  realized  the  necessity  of  copying  for- 
eign models  and  of  profiting  by  the  superior  knowledge  of 
western  teachers.  Among  these  the  Americans  were  conspic- 

*u  ^^'^  tf"^  Americans  were  tenr^m^ 

the  bombardment  by  a  hired  Dutch  vessel.  represented  at 


344       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


uous.  They  were  enii)lt)y(d  as  counsellors  in  foreign  affairs 
down  to  the  most  recent  days ;  they  aided  in  creating  the 
new  system  of  public  education,  modelled  on  their  own; 
they  oi'i^aiiized  the  agricultural  bureau,  and  assisted  in  the 
fouiuling  of  scientific  institutions.  By  request,  oflicials  were 
detached  from  the  Treasury  in  \Vushinj^(»n  to  establish  a 
modern  financial  system  for  the  empire,  awl  in  many  other 
ways  American  teaching  and  cxanipie  have  exen  '  ^  d  an 
influence  in  its  ])olitical  and  social  transfu!  rn:ir  a.  Other 
nations,  indeed  —  (iernumy,  England,  France  have  i  id 
their  good  share  in  this  work ;  but  none  of  theni,  accordmg 
to  the  testimony  of  the  Japanese  themselves,  have  done  as 
much  as  the  United  States. 

Turning  now  to  the  commercial  transactions  between  the 
two  lands,  we  notice  that  for  long  they  were  \ery  unequal. 
From  the  first,  the  United  States  was  one  of  Japan's  best 
clients.  By  1871,  it  bought  from  her  $5,298,153  worth  of 
imports  (almost  twelve  times  as  much  as  it  sold  in  return). 
By  1893,  the  year  before  the  war  between  Japan  and  China, 
this  total  had  more  than  quintupled,  being  $27,454,220,  and 
in  llHKi  it  had  almost  doubled  again,  and  amounted  to 
§52,551,520.  Aiiierican  ex])orts  to  Japan  have  until  recently 
been  insignificant :  as  late  as  1893  they  were  only  $3,195,494, 
but  since  that  year  they  have  grown  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
In  1905,  in  consequence  of  the  demands  of  the  war  with 
Russia,  they  were  twice  as  large  as  in  1904;  in  190()  they 
held  a  good  part  of  their  gain,  and  amounted  to  ?3S,404/,)52. 
There  is  reason  to  expect  that,  in  spite  of  protective  tariffs 
in  both  countries,  trade  between  them  will  continue  to 
prosper,  for  each  can  furnish  to  the  other  things  of  which  it 
stands  in  need.  Already  the  Ignited  States  sells  to  Japan 
more  than  it  dcses  to  all  but  its  largest  custonu'rs,  and  in 
rrturn  it  is  a  far  better  mart  fur  Japanese  exports  than  is 
any  state  in  Europe. 

Since  Japan  has  been  thrown  open  to  outside  curiosity, 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


345 


she  has  exercised  an  extraordinary  fasciiuition  on  untold 
thousands  in  the  western  world.  Visitors  have  returned  de- 
lighted with  her  scenery,  the  monuments  of  her  civilization, 

the  ])irturesquo  structure  of  her  society,  and  the  intelligence, 
juuiability,  and  exquisite  courtesy  of  her  i)eople.  Others, 
who^  have  never  been  able  to  see  the  islands,  hiivo  been 
carried  away  by  the  charm  of  Japanese  art,  whether  in  its- 
great  creations  or  in  the  dainty  trifles  that  soon  became  popu- 
lar abroad;  their  imagination  has  been  thrilled  with  tales 
of  the  chivulrous  ideals  of  old  Japan  and  the  beauty  and 
refinement  of  the  life  there.  And  of  foreign  nations  none  has 
been  more  deeply  interested  than  the  Americans.  They 
were  the  first  to  study  Japanese  art,  as  is  testified  by  the 
collection  of  the  Boston  Art  Museum,  which  is  finer  than 
t;iv  other  in  existence  outside  of  the  empire  itself.  They, 
llie  most  western  of  modern  peoples,  have  been  peculiarly 
attracted  by  thv  subtle  charm  of  the  Far  East.   They  have 
filled  their  houses  with  the  products  of  its  handiwork,  and 
they  have  flocked  over  in  thousands  to  visit  it.    A  trip  to 
Jai)an  has  seemed  less  of  un  undertaking  to  an  American 
ilian  to  a  European,  and,  in  fact,  for  a  citizen  of  San  Francisco 
a  visit  to  Tokio  takes  scarcely  more  time,  and  less  trouble 
and  expense,  than  one  to  London  or  Paris.    No  wonde  r  that 
Americans  have  crossed  the  Pacific  in  swarms,  most  as  mere 
tourists,  but  some  for  serious  study,  and  others  to  aid  in 
brmging  modern  knowledge  to  the  Japanese,  many  of  whom 
on  their  part  have  come  as  students  to  the  United  States. 

It  was  not  to  be  expi.cted  that  tli-se  i)lcnsant  relations 
should  be  exemjit  from  occasional  discord.  In  the  I<'ur 
Eiist,  the  American  trading  community,  like  the  various 
European  ones,  has  entertained  a  poor  opinion  of  the  com- 
mercial honesty  of  the  Japanese,  and  has  had  little  affection 
whole.    During  the  war  between  China 


tlic 


and  Japan,  American  as  well  as  European  merchants  in 
both  countries,  who  as  n(>ar  observers  would  supposedly 


346 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


be  well  informed,  not  only  sympathized  with  the  former 
power,  but  were  convinced  that  she  would  win.  When  the 
event  turned  out  otherwise,  though  the  public  in  the  United 

States  warmly  applauded  the  success  of  its  friends,  the 
trader  in  tlie  East  shook  liis  head  and  declared  that  the 
Japanese  would  now  be  more  insufferably  conceited  and 
difficult  to  deal  with  than  ever. 

Few  echoes  of  this  dissatisfaction  reached  home ;  but  even 
there  enthusiasm  did  not  go  to  the  length  of  willingness  to 
sacrifice  interests.  If  Japan  suffered  from  a  surplus  of 
population,  l(>t  her,  said  the  Americans,  direct  it  some- 
where else  —  to  Korea,  to  Manchuria,  only  not  in  too 
great  numbers  to  Hawaii,  which,  years  before,  the  United 
States  had  declared  would  not  be  abandoned  to  any  foreign 
power.  The  influx  of  Japanese  into  the  little  republic, 
and  the  tone  which  the  p^overnment  at  Tokio  took  in  pro- 
ti'cting  their  ri^dils,  was  indeed  the  chief  reason  why  many 
people  felt  annexation  to  be  urgent.  When  it  took  place, 
Japan  handed  in  a  formal  protest  at  Washington,  —  a  rather 
surprising  act,  for  though  it  was  but  a  mild  expression  of  the 
disappointment  felt  at  this  harsh  awakening  from  ambitious 
dreams  of  a  Jaj)anese  Hawaii,  stili  the  ministers  of  the 
Mikado  are  ordinarily  too  cool  and  sensible  to  indulge  in 
futile  recriminations.  They  appear  to  have  thought  better 
of  this  one  before  long,  for  the  protest  was  presently  with- 
drawn. 

When  the  United  States  took  over  the  Philippines, 
wliatever  dissatisfaction  Japan  n  .y  have  felt,  she  kei)t  it 
to  herself.  She  was  not  in  a  position  to  stop  the  transfer 
if  she  had  wished  to,  and  she  desired  American  support 
in  matters  which  concerned  her  more  nearly. 

In  the  vario\:s  questions  that  agitated  the  Far  East  during 
tilt;  troubled  vvais  intf rvi-iiiug  betwi-en  the  last  two  wars, 
American  and  Japanese  int(>r(>sts  were  usually  in  harmony, 
and  tlie  policy  pursued  b}'  the  two  governments  was  much 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN  347 

tho  same.  Thoy  supported  equally  the  principle  of  the  "open 
door, 'even  if  tlie  Jupan,.se  had  not  applied  it  in  Fonnosa- 
and  they  were  opposed  to  the  i)artition  of  China,  though 
Japan,  like  England,  took  care  to  provide  herself  by  treaty 
with  a  particular  .sj,here  of  influence  (the  province  of  Fukien) 
in  ease  of  accident.  During  the  relief  expedition  to  Peking 
the  Ani(>ncan  and  the  Japanese  soldiers  were  on  the  best  of 
terms,  and  both  fraternized  with  the  En-lish,  while  the 
troops  from  continental  Europe  tended  to  form  another 
group.  The  United  States  was  throughout  in  sympathy  with 
Japanese  efforts  to  prevent  the  Russians  from  establishing 
themselves  permanently  in  Manchuria,  — a  step  which  it 
regarded  as  contrary  to  its  interests. 

It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  despite  the  surprise  and 
anger  of  many  Europeans,  that  during  the  recent  war  the 
Amencan  public  overwhelmingly  favored  Japan,  and  gave 
practical  proof  of  its  good-will  by  its  readiness  to  subscribe 
to  her  last  loan.   We  must  remember  how  much  the  tradi- 
tional friendship  between  the  United  States  and  Russia  had 
cooled  down  by  that  time.   Then  there  was  a  natural  sym- 
pathy for  the  smaUer  country,  even  if  it  did  have  the 
greater  avaUable  resources  at  hand;  and  soon  the  splendid 
courage  and  patriotism  shown  by  the  Japanese  in  the  course 
of  the  struggle,  the  perfection  of  their  organization,  and  the 
skill  of  their  conduct  of  affairs,  elicited  unstinted  applause, 
liesides  this,  their  triumphs  flattered  a  certain  self-satisfac- 
tion m  the  Americans;  for  nations,  Uke  individuals,  are 
wont  to  be  proud  of  their  pupils,  and  sometimes  have  a 
doser  i-ttachment  to  those  on  whom  they  have  conferred 
favors  than  to  those  from  whom  they  have  received  them. 

One  argument  which  appealed  to  many  persons  in  Europe, 
even  among  those  who  had  little  fondness  for  the  Russians  — 
that  of  the  solidarity  of  the  white  peoples  against  the  yellow, 
made  httle  impression  in  the  United  States.    Strong  as 
race  feeling  is  there,  it  has  small  influence  in  foreign  afifairs. 


348       THE  UxMTED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


The  Aiacriciin  has  for  some  time  l)0('u  afruiil  of  the  Asiatic 
as  a  competitor  at  home,  atid  he  is  Ko^inning  to  dread  him 
OS  a  rival  abroad  ;  but  the  "yellow  peril,"  in  a  political  sense, 
has  no  torrors  for  him.  He  holievcs  that  on  his  own  conti- 
nent h(  is  aMc  to  defend  himself  aj^ainst  any  armed  foe; 
and  jjrophecies  of  tlie  future  daiij^'er  to  tlie  wliite  races  wheti 
countless  millions  of  Clunesc,  dis('ij)lined  and  led  by  Ja|>an- 
ese  instructors,  shall  renew  the  exploits  of  Genghis  Khan, 
have  left  him  quite  unmoved.  He  was  much  more  affected 
by  the  comparisons  drawn  between  the  reactionary  severity, 
then  at  its  iieii^ht,  of  the  Russian  autocracy  and  the  liberal 
transformation  which  had  made  of  Jaj)an  a  modern  civilized 
power.  In  fact,  he  was  ready  to  declare  that  the  Japanese 
were  the  more  advanced  and  the  more  truly  western  nation 
of  the  two. 

For  tins  friendliness,  the  Japanese^  were  hop <\><tl  .  ;'rateful. 
We  need  not  ahvayu  take  the  j)rufrssi<;iis  of  their  pultlic 
men,  orators,  and  newspapers  at  their  face  value,  any  more 
than  we  do  those  of  other  countries,  but  we  should  beware 
of  distrusting  Asiatics  just  because  they  are  Asiatics. 
Even  if  their  profusion  of  polite  assurances  may  bo  mere 
fi<j;ures  of  sp(>ech  oftener  than  wo  are  luu'd  t'>  in  tli.  wi  stern 
world,  this  does  not  prove  them  to  be  incapable  of  sin- 
cerity. For  instance,  the  extraordinary  ovations  to  vho 
party  headed  by  Secretary  Taft  which  passed  through  Japan 
while  hostilities  were  still  in  pro^'ress,  thou^di  doubtless 
stinudated  and  direcicd  by  political  calculatio::  displayed, 
as  any  one  ]iresent  would  testify,  much  },'eiiuiue  warmth  of 
feeling.  It  is  true  that  there  was  a  sharj)  reaction  when  the 
terms  of  peace  turned  out  less  favorable  than  Japanese 
public  opinion  in  its  elation  had  expected,  and  the  anger 
aroused  by  this  disai)pointment  was  in  part  directed  against 
tlie  natiiiu  which  h;ui  hrljjcd  tii  end  the  war.  Rut  it  is  n('VV 
J  'coj^niized  by  unprejudiced  observers  that  ;;t  tlie  time  the 
military  outlook  in  Manchuria  was  far  from  promising  for 


THE  UNITED  STATICS  A.\D  JAPAN  34U 

T!h>  i:ussi;,n       >v  had  .unvr  hcvn  stronger  or  in 
lu'ttcr  r.m,lin,.n;  th,.  cost  u(  (1,,.  .sv^o  of  Port  Arthur  did 
not  tend  to  make  tlu'  ,,ro.s,M.r(  of  the  mor..  difn.Mdt  one  of 
Vladivostok  alluring;  the  financial  strain  on  tlic  Enij.in-  of 
t  hn  Mikado  was  very  sovoro;  so  that,  whon  all  was  said  and 
dono,  th..  Japanese  obtained  as  satisfactory  terms  as  thoy 
urn.  ,.ntitl..,l  to  hop..  f„r.    Thry  hav,  th.-rrforo,  no  legiti- 
mate cans.,  to  r..s..nt  the  acti..n  of  Anu-rica  in  hringinff  about 
the  peace  of  Portsmouth,  especially  as  slie  p„t  no  ohsf,- 
cle  in  the  way  of  thfir  domination  in  Korea,  thoLit,'h  sh(. 
ua«  under  ire;i;y  ohli^'ation  to  aid  in  maintaining  Korean 
iiulei)en.len,-e  wheiu-ver  her  Winl  services  should  be  asked 
for.    'l.ihin- advantn-e  of  the  f.,reed  technical  consent  of 
the  unfor(i.nat(-  Korean  emperor  to  the  terms  imposed  upon 
him,  the  government  at  Washington  paid  no  attention  to 
1MB  private  appeals,  but  left  him  and  his  empire  to  their 
hard,  though  not  unmerited,  fate. 

To  sum  up,  we  may  say  that  the  record  of  the  relations 
betw.'en  th.-  Unit  . I  States  and  Jaf.nn,  from  the  days  of 
Commodore  P(  ,ry  down  to  a  f.-w  months  aj^'o.  has  Ix .-n  one 
of  genuine  and  rather  extraoidinary  mutual  friendliness! 
Why,  then,  has  a  new  feeling  grown  up  of  late,  and  why  is 
thi  present  outlook  less  serene? 

lu  replying  to  thes(>  rpu  stions  we  may  as  well  recognize, 
to  begin  with,  that  tlie  two  count:  -s  can  n(>ver  again  be  on 
quite  the  same  terms  that  tuey  wi  re  ten  yean;  ago.  Their 
feelings  towards  one  another  may  be  of  tlie  most  cordial 
Kind,  l)ut  both  have  changed  too  much  for  the  old  rela- 
tion, which  was  almost  that  of  Ix^nevolent  teacher  and  eager 
I'Kful,,  to  be  possible  in  the  fut  ire.  The  Americans  a--  no 
longer  the  mildly  interested  spectators  in  the  Far  East 
that  they  once  were,  and  Japan  has  outL^row..  the  need  of 
their  tutelage.  In  the  past  they  have  applauded  her  suc- 
cesses, sometimes  without  stopping  to  consider  whether 
these  would  in  the  end  be  to  their  advantage,  and  now  they 


3.50 


THE  I'MTBD  ST  \TES  A8  A  WORLD  POWER 


Clin  I'lfiim  tin  gri.  vancc  if  iicr  altorrd  position  ^^Ivt'H  lipr  ik  \v 
interests  and  in-spircs  her  with  new  aiiihitioim  whirh  are  not 
invariably  in  necord  with  their  own  desires.  America,  who 
has  firown  m  the  rival  of  so  many  older  states,  rannot 
complain  when  sli."  it.  i.i  r  tuin  is  ri.nfrotited  liy  the  rivalry 
of  ;t  younp  one.  The  worM  is  still  lar^^'e  enoiif^h  for  r  iany 
11  ioius  to  compete  without  quarrelling',  hut  when  the  aspira- 
tions of  one  conflict  with  those  of  anothi'r,  it  serves  no  good 
purpose  to  blink  the  truth.  It  is  saner  to  accept  the  situ- 
ation fr:uikly  and  to  try  to  sec  what  can  reasonably  be  ex- 
pect'Hl  on  l)i>  h  sides,  for  without  su .  h  an  understanding,  a 
fair  adjustment  cannor       arrived  ;it. 

For  the  sake  of  convenience,  we  may  divide  the  questions 
which  threaten  to  produce  friction  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  into  two  groups:  the  first  to  include  those 
whic  h  relate  the  coming  of  the  Japanese  into  the  New 
World,  and  the  sec md  those  pertainiii}^'  \o  the  rivalry  be- 
tween the  two  powers  in  Asia  and  in  the  waters  of  the  I'acifH-. 
The  line  of  demarcation  between  these  sets  of  questions  is 
not  distinct,  —  it  is  hard  *  t  say  to  which  of  them  Hawaiian 
matters  belong,  —  but  in  the  main  they  are  separate,  though 
they  n  act  on  one  another  u^A  combine  to  make  a  much 
involved  jiroblem. 

On  taking  up  the  first  group  of  questions,  we  note  at  ihe 
start  that  for  some  time  the  Japanese  have  been  less  popu- 
lar on  the  Pacific  coast  than  in  other  parts  of  the  United 
States.  Merchants  of  California  have  had  unpleasant  expe- 
riences in  trading  with  them,  and  the  laluning  classes  have 
looked  on  Japanese  immigrants  ^vith  the  same  hostility  that 
they  have  felt  towards  the  Chinese.  iJilTerent  as  these  two 
Asiatic  peoples  are,  the  eflFect  of  their  presence  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  white  laboring  man  is  the  same, — it  ex- 
poses him  to  a  c(»mp<'iilion  against  which,  as  long  as  ho 
maintains  )us  present  standard  of  living,  In-  is  unable  to  hold 
his  own.    In  Caliiornia,  the  Japanese  have  found  a  climate 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


351 


whi'li  siii>.<  thom  piTtoctiv.  ()(<ii|);iti(»iis  wlii.Ii  nrr  coiifrc- 
niul,  — liiu.  t'd,  owiiiK  ttj  th"ir  intflliK«  iit  ciircfiiliicss  they  , 
particulftily  well  adaptod  to  the  important  ituhustry  of  fnn  - 
Krowinp,  —  and  thry  can  get  wage«  far  above  what  tl  lev  (•;  u 
hope  for  at  home.  It  is  tnw,  the  cost  of  living  ia  great'  r 
in  Anicric.'i,  hut  it  l<<;ivc.s  ;i  lur^'o  nmrjrin  of  profit  for  pco- 
pK"  of  thrir  simple,  (  (  (moiiucal  lialiitH.  To  many  of  thnn  a 
preliminary  Hojcjurn  in  lluwaij  huH  Hervcci  an  an  introduc- 
tion to  American  wayn  and  conditions. 

If  the  movement  of  iuimigration  were  a  small  one,  it  need 
not  excite  alarm,  but  though  still  youn-:,  it  has  rapidly 
taken  on  l.ir^'e  diinensiofiw.  The  annual  surplus  of  l.irtlis 
over  deaths  in  Jaj)an,  ain  ad'  an  overerowded  countrw  is 
some  Rcven  hundred  thousand,  and  a  yearly  ininu-rati..n  of 
half  this  rnimher  into  the  United  States  —  a  thin^,'  l»y  no 
means  in  onreivuble  —  would  soon  flood  the  Pacific  coast 
with  an  Aisi;  tie  population  that  wruld  certainly  <lisplaco 
white  workmen  an<I  shopkeepers,  an  !  perhaps  whole  com- 
munities. Already  there  are  Japanese  capitalists  there  who 
own  industrial  enterprises  of  importance,  which  employ 
many  i  '  their  compatriots  a«u  r-iCt  others  from  Japan. 
No  wonder  that  the  labor-unio'  <  in  arms  against  the 

dai  u'er,  and  that  they  find  pop  pnort,  to  the  surp,  :;-:" 

of  n^any  good  pcop!   in  the  easti    i  sla'es  who  clin<r  to  •"; 
old  pro-Japanese  sentiments.    Th<-  exclusion  of  Jap. 
children  from  the  California  schools  was  but  the  chance 
occasion  of  the  raising  of  the  whole  broad  issue. 

Some  persons  maintaii  that  the  iar.ds  which  ha  .e  made 
America  great  in  the  past  are  al  ov  difTeren'  es  of  race 

and  color,  ;  nd  rest  on  fundamental  truths  api)li<  al)!<>  to  all 
mankind.  They  declare  that  the  treatment  and  influences 
which  make  good  Americans  out  of  Italiunp,  Hungarians, 
and  Russian  Jews  will  he  equally  efficacious  wi'  a  the  Japan- 
ese; that  no  one  <  m  doubt  their  mental  capacity,  or  deny 
their  eagerness  to  learn,  not  only  the  language  of  their  new 


352       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


liomo,  but  overythiiifj;  it  hus  to  teach  them,  and  to  copy  its 
ways ;  that  nothing,  indeed,  biu  the  unjust  law  which  forbids 
the  naturalization  of  Asiatics  prevents  the  Japanese  immi- 
grants from  b('(•onlin^^  j^ood  citizens  within  a  few  years  after 
their  arrival  in  the  United  States.  It  may  be  answered  that 
all  tliis  is  unquestionably  true  of  individuals,  and  were  the 
Japanese  coniin^^  over  in  small  numbers  only,  it  would  be 
invidious  and  wrong  to  impose  restrictions  on  them,  even 
if  we  might  regret  the  addition  to  the  American  population 
of  another  ethnic  element,  which,  whatever  may  be  its  own 
virtues,  would  not,  in  the  opinion  of  many,  blend  well  with 
the  rest.  But  the  question  at  issue  is  different ;  it  is  that  of 
checking  such  an  influx  of  the  yellow  race  as  will  swamp  the 
whites  on  the  Pacific  coast.  We  may  doubt,  too,  whether 
the  Japanese,  though  desirous  of  obtaining  citizenship,  are 
as  willing  as  must  other  immigrants  to  divest  themselves  of 
their  former  nationality;  whether  for  them  naturalization 
would  not  be  merely  a  means  of  gaining  influence  ami 
p' wer,  and  whether  they  would  not  use  the  advantages  the 
vote  confers  to  build  up  on  American  soil  a  great  community 
of  the  Shin  Nihon  (the  New  Japan),  which  their  enthusiasts 
have  dreamed  f)f,  and  some  of  thfir  writers  have  discussed 
with  a  frankness  tiiat,  if  known,  w  >iikl  make  men  stare  in 
the  United  States.  It  is  not  easy  to  believe  that  a  people 
who  hold  such  views  think  of  their  emigrants  as  lost  to 
their  old  home  for  the  benefit  of  a  new  one :  on  the  contrary, 
they  appear  to  regard  them  as  pioneers  in  a  movement  of 
national  colonization.  But  national  colonization  of  tiie 
sort  is  an  obvious  menace  to  the  int<\u'rity  of  the  country 
to  which  it  is  directed.  While  we  need  not  take  unauthor- 
ized patriotic  fancies  too  seriously,  it  would  be  unwise  *o 
ignore  tliem  altogether. 

Tl;e  late  violent  outburst  against  the  Japanese  on  the 
Pacific  coast  was  primarily  due  to  their  ra])i(l  increase  of 
numbers  in  the  last  two  years.    The  incident  placed  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


353 


government  at  Washington  in  a  very  uncomfortal)Io  situa- 
tion. Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  American  Constitution, 
federal  control  over  any  state  in  such  matters  is  feeble 
enough  at  best,  as  was  clearly  shown  at  the  time  of  the  New 
Orleans  massacre  in  1S91.  Now,  while  unable  to  bring 
much  pressure  upon  California,  the  administration  has 
had  to  soothe  th(>  legitimate  wrath  of  a  proud,  sensitive 
nation,  aglow  with  triumph.  The  assumption  that  their 
compatriots  were  to  be  treated  as  an  inferior  race  whose 
children  must  be  parked  for  infectious  moral  disease  in  sep- 
arate schools,  seemed  an  intolerable  insult.  The  Japanese, 
except  when  they  are  trying  to  win  popularity  with  the 
Chinese,  resent  being  classed  with  them  or  being  termed 
Mongolians  at  all,  and  they  will  never  submit  to  the  same 
unceremonious  treatment.  They  ask  for  no  privileges,  but 
only  for  the  equality  granted  to  twenty  other  peoples  and 
assured  to  them  by  solemn  treaty.  No  wonder  that  they 
were  fierce  with  anger  at  the  news  that  reached  them  from  San 
Francisco,  and  that  the  unscrupulous  howling  of  the  Ameri- 
can yellow  press  provoked  equally  wild  outbursts  in  reply. 

Happily  fr.r  all  parties,  the  cool,  clear-sighted  statesmen 
who  are  at  the  head  of  affairs  in  Tokio  have  remained  un- 
moved hy  i)()pular  clamor.  They  n  alize  the  difficulties 
under  which  the  American  government  laljors,  and  they 
have  shown  themselves  willing  to  help  it  out  to  the  best 
of  their  ability,  provided  only  the  dignity  of  their  country 
be  respected.  To  have  insisted  uncompromisingly  on  their 
tivMty  ri^'hts  without  doing  anything  to  make  the  situation 
easier  for  tlie  Americans,  would  have  been  to  move  directly 
towards  war;  for  we  may  accept  it  as  beyond  doubt  that,  if 
Japanese  immigration  to  the  United  States  were  to  keep  on 
growing  at  its  recent  rate,  some  means  would  be  found  to 
stop  it,  treaty  or  no  tr(>aty,  peacefully  or  by  force,  at  any 
risk  and  at  any  cost.  This  may  well  have  been  appreciated 
at  Tokio. 

3a 


354 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


Another  consideration  which,  we  may  feel  sure,  has  been 
weighed  there  by  nu  n  who  have  not  been  led  astray  by 
drearis  of  the  Shin  Nihon,  is  whether  it  is  for  Japan's  real 
interest,  not  to  speak  of  her  di}?nity,  that  her  children  should 
leave  her  in  thi'  manner.  Few  counvries  view  with  pleasure 
the  permanent  departure  of  their  citizens  for  foreign  climes. 
It  is  true  that  colonies,  even  under  alien  rule,  help  to  stimu- 
late the  national  trade;  and  many  Japanese  emigrants  to 
America  send  or  take  back  the  money  they  have  made  there, 
to  the  enrichment  of  their  native  land.  But  will  they  not 
all  in  the  end  be  lost  to  their  old  home,  as  so  many  Euro- 
peans have  been  ?  Would  it  not  be  better  for  the  Empire, 
in  any  case,  that  they  should  colonize  Formosa,  Korea, 
Manchuria,  where  they  would  remain  under  the  control  of 
their  own  authorities,  and  could  use  their  strength  and  skill 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Einpire? 

The  United  States  on  its  part  may  take  comfort  in  the 
fact  that  the  Pacific  coast  of  Canada,  as  the  troubles  at 
Vancouver  have  shown,  shares  its  dislike  to  Asiatic  compe- 
tition. This  is  l)ut  natural  in  view  of  the  similarity  of 
conditions.  Th(  is  also  sufficient  evidence  that  the  same 
feeling  obtains  in  .Australia;  all  of  which  is  exceedingly 
awkward  for  Great  Britain,  the  sworn  ally  of  Japan.  Since 
it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  the  mother  country  ^ould  at- 
tempt to  coerce  her  great  self-governing  colonies,  it  app(\'ira 
tliat,  like  the  United  States,  she  is  in  the  rather  humili- 
atin<:  ])osition  of  having  to  rely  chiefly  on  the  prudence 
and  moderation  of  another  country  to  get  her  out  oi  a  bad 
predicament.  Probably  she  will  not  be  disappointed;  for 
the  Japanese,  whatever  may  be  their  feeling  towards  the 
\niericans,  are  not  L'oing  just  now  to  rush  into  a  quarrel 
with  the  l'>!Lrlisli.  Hut  coiu-essions  made  to  Canada  cannot 
well  be  refu.sed  to  the  United  States.  The  anti-Japanese 
movement  is  the  same  in  both  plac(\s,  and  its  spread 
into  the  dominions  of  Japan's  close  friend  proves  that  its 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


355 


character  is  not  specifically  American.  After  all,  Japan  her- 
self has  just  been  ruthlessly  expelling  Chinese  and  Korean 
labi  rers  from  her  territory. 

We  must  lament  that  the  very  desire  to  exclude  people 
from  a  territory  serves  as  an  advertisement  of  its  attrac- 
tions, and  leads  to  determined  efforts  to  smu^j^le  them- 
selves in,  a  thing  hard  to  check  in  the  United  States 
because  of  its  thousands  of  miles  of  open  frontier  toward 
Canada  and  Mexico.  The  measures  taken  to  suppress  this 
smugf^linp  cannot  help  leading  to  incidents  not  conducive 
to  international  pood  feolinp. 

It  is  fortunate  that  the  whole  situation  appears  to  lie  W(>11 
understood  by  the  governments  concerned,  who  have  pre- 
served cordial  relations.  The  Japanese  one  has  earned  a 
claim  to  gratitude  by  its  spirit  of  eon  cession,  as  shown  in  a 
willingness  to  restrict  the  number  of  its  emigrants  to  the 
United  States,  as  also  to  Canada.  On  their  side,  most  .Amer- 
icans still  entertain  a  lively  admiration  for  Japan ;  they 
are  fair-minded  enough  to  appreciate  her  side  of  the  ques- 
tion, and  they  have  sufficient  respect  for  her  military 
strength  to  appreciate  that,  even  if  they  would,  tliey  could 
not  settle  matters  off-hund  without  regard  to  her  wishes. 
Under  these  circumstances,  as  long  as  they  gain  their  main 
point,  the  checking  of  immigration,  they  are  not  likely  to 
indulge  in  wanton  provocation  of  a  great  and  friendly 
power.  For  the  moment,  at  least,  the  danger  of  serious 
complications  seems  past. 

Nevertheless,  it  would  be  idle  to  ])retend  that  the  outcome 
is  wholly  satisfactory.  An  unpleasant  feature  of  the  con- 
troversy for  Americans  has  been  that,  however  much  th.-y 
may  be  in  the  right  on  the  larger  issues,  the  fact  remains 
that,  owing  to  formal  treaty  stipulations,  and  to  their  own 
inability  to  suppress  mob  violence  with  due  promptness, 
they  have  been  in  an  awkward  quandary  from  which  tliey 
owe  their  release;  chiefly  to  the  wisdom,  not  to  say  the 


356 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


magnanimity,  of  Japan.    And  the  arrangement  which  will 
give  the  United  States  the  protection  it  demands,  will  rest, 
not  on  the  efficiency  of  its  own  laws,  but  on  the  fulfilment 
of  oblipitions  voluntarily  assumed  l)y  a  foreign  state.  This 
may  he  making  the  best  of  a  bad  job,  but  it  is  not  ideal. 
Whatever  course  wisdom  may  dictate  to  the  Mikado  and 
his  counsellors,  a  great  nation  like  the  American  cannot 
depend  indefinitely  on  the  generosity,  real  or  presumed, 
of  a  neighbor.    The  Japanese  people  as  a  whole  will  not 
regard  even  their  partial  exclusion  from  the  United  States 
with  anything  but  bitterness;  and  if  they  .should  e\(>r  wish 
for  war  with  their  former  friends,  they  will  have  no  trouble 
in  finding  a  plausible  pretext.    As  long  as  the  Americans 
make  a  distinction  between  nations  in  the  opening  of  their 
doors  to  strangers,  so  long  will  those  who  are  (liscriminat(Ml 
against  feel  that  they  have  a  grievance  hard  to  fori/ive. 
This  consideration  may  strengthen  the  growing  oppositit.n 
in  the  United  States  to  the  present  enormous  immigra- 
tion from  all  quarters.    Such  a  measure  as  the  imposition 
of  a  property  qualification,  which  many  advocate  on  its 
own   merits,  would  liave  the  additional  advantage  that 
it  would  at  the  same  time  put  an  end  to  the  invasion  of 
Asiatic  laborers,  and  remove  the  most  serious  eomi)laint  of 
China  and  Japan.   It  may  be  that  the  solution  of  the  whole 
})rol)lem  lies  in  this  direction. 

The  present  rapid  increase  of  poptilation  in  certain  parts 
of  tlie  world  threatens  to  raise  trou})lesome  questions. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  jH'ojiles  herded  together  in  poor,  small 
areas  will  .strive  to  break  ilown  all  l)arriers  erected  by 
the  selfishness  of  those  who  possess  thinly  settled  tracts 
with  rich  natural  resources.  On  the  other,  those  who  by 
the  kindness  of  nature  or  by  their  own  efforts  are  well 
provided  for,  will  not  lightly  consent  to  be  s\vamj)ed  by  a 
horth-  of  famished  .strangers;  they  will  not  see  why  they 
should  sacrifice  their  own  comfort  and  standard  of  life  just 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


357 


because  their  needy  neighbors  choose  to  have  big  families. 
Coiuijiunism  among  states  will  not  soon  prevail,  especially 

as  it  is  unattractive  to  the  very  men  who  favor  it  among 
individuals;  for  the  laboring  classos  are  those  who  suffer 
most  from  unrestricted  iuiniigration,  and  are,  in  conse- 
(jucuce,  most  hostile  to  it. 

Now  the  Japanese,  perceiving  that  their  islands  have 
already  about  as  large  a  population  as  they  can  well  contain, 
and  that  the  tide  is  still  swelling,  are  anxious  to  find  a 
good  outlet  for  their  overflow.  F(jr  the  moment  Korea  may 
do ;  but  Korea  is  not  very  spacious,  and  it  has  ])e<)})le  of  its 
own,  who  may  be  expected  to  multiply  under  improved  con- 
ditions. If,  in  addition  it  were  to  receive  for  a  generation 
the  surplus  of  births  from  across  the  '  trait,  it  would  become 
as  crowded  as  is  Jaj)an  to-day.  iManchuria  is  larger,  but 
Manchuria  already  has  some  twenty  million  Chinese  inhabir- 
unts,  with  many  more  coming.  There  is  room  enough  there 
for  Japanese  enterjjrisc,  but  the  Chinese  trader  is  not  easy 
to  surpass,  and  the  Chinese  day  laborer,  under  fair  compe- 
tition, has  yet  to  find  his  equal.  Looking  further,  we  see 
vacant  land  -n  the  tropics;  but  the  Ja]>anese  have  so  far  not 
shown  themselves  well  adapted  to  field  work  in  a  hot  ditnate  ; 
in  Formosa,  for  instance,  they  have  been  none  too  successful. 
It  would  seem  that,  like  the  whites,  they  can  live  as  offi- 
cials, merchants,  and  employers  of  labor  everywhere,  but 
i)n\y  within  the  temperate  zone  can  they  emigrate  in  such 
numbers  as  to  relieve  the  congestion  at  home.  Anmng  the 
comi)aratively  empty  temperate  regions,  Siberia, Canada,  and 
Australia  will  assuredly  be  closed  to  any  great  immigration 
on  their  part,  for  the  reasons  that  have  been  operative  in 
the  United  States,  and  that  would  be  equally  so  in  any 
country  of  Europe.    There  remains  only  Latin  America. 

Most  of  the  Latin-American  r(>i)ublics  are  the  hat'py  ])os- 
sessors  of  s])lendid  natural  resources  still  waiting  to  be 
developed.    In  order  to  develop  them,  and  it  is  desired  to 


358       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


do  so  at  once,  there  is  need  of  both  capital  and  labor.  The 
former  can  be  furnished  by  Europe  or  the  United  States,  and 
will  bo  forthcoming,  ])r()vi(UHl  it  can  enjoy  security.  The 
latt(>r  is  ;ilso  to  be  had  ;  but  so  far  only  a  few  of  the  Latin- 
Anioricaii  countries  have  attracted  any  considerate  Euro- 
pean immigration.  The  others  may  have  their  turn  in 
time,  but  they  are  unwilling  to  wait  while  their  rivals  pass 
them  in  the  race,  and  if  they  cannot  get  European  laborers, 
they  are  ready  to  take  Asiatic.  They  made  their  first  ex- 
periments in  importini?  Chinese  in  the  chiys  of  the  infamous 
coolie  traffic  ;  but  not  many  of  thesi'  Chinese  have  remained, 
and  few  have  come  since.  Here,  then,  is  an  o})ening  for 
the  children  of  Japan, —  broad,  fertile,  thinly  settled  lands, 
fine  climates,  natural  wealth  of  divers  kinds,  and  in  some 
cases  indolent,  unprojjjressive  ])opulatitins,  who  witii  their 
mixture  of  white,  black,  and  Indian  blood  can  hardly  enter- 
tain the  race  hau|j;htiness  of  the  Anglo-Saxon.  Neither  gov- 
ernments nor  i)eoi)les  seem  to  have  any  fear  of  the  Japanese ; 
nay,  in  some  quarters  a  desire  has  already  been  expressed 
for  growth  of  their  influence  in  tho  New  World  to  prevent 
the  too  great  prejionderance  of  the  United  States. 

The  existence  of  these  favorable  conditions  is  already 
known  in  Jai)an,  where  a  movement  towards  Latin  Amer- 
ica has  actually  started,  and  bids  fair  to  proceed  rapidly. 
For  some  years  there  has  been  a  Mexican  colonization  society 
in  the  empire,  whose  activity  did  not  altogether  cease  even 
during  the  late  war  with  Russia,  iiut  in  Mexico  the  condi- 
tions are  peculiar,  for  if  immigrants  should  flock  there  only 
to  make  their  way  across  the  border  into  the  United  States, 
as  they  have  already  begun  to  do,  the  latter  may,  in  self- 
defence,  be  obliged  to  ask  of  Mexico  and  Tokio  that  the 
same  restiictive  measures  be  a])jilied  to  Mexican  immi;jrra- 
ti'>nasto  its  own.  At  last  accounts,  .somct liiiig  of  the  kmd 
had  been  conceded,  but,  judged  by  international  iaw,  it  is  a 
curious  demand  to  make,  and  it  might  be  hard  to  persist  in 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


359 


if  it  were  refused.  And  now  the  Japanese  are  aj)i)earing 
in  South  America.  They  have  begun  coming  to  Peru  and 
Chile,  where  they  have  been  welcomed,  and  recently  their 
f^ovornment  signed  a  treaty  with  Brazil  ]n-()vidiri}j:  for  the 
establisluuent  there  of  agricultural  iinini^raiits,  to  whom 
lands  are  to  be  allotted.  Direct  comniuiiication  between 
the  Empire  of  the  Mikado  and  the  chief  ports  of  the  Southern 
republics  is  to  be  assured  by  a  Japanese  line  of  steamships. 
In  view  of  all  these  facts  it  seems  highly  })robable  that  im- 
migration will  soon  set  in  on  a  large  scale,  to  the  immediate 
advantage  of  all  concerned. 

At  present  this  does  not  matter  in  any  way  to  the  United 
States,  and  we  may  hope  that  it  never  will ;  yet  we  cannot 
be  too  confident.  If  the  plan  of  having  European  capital 
cooperate  with  Asiatic  labor  in  the  develo])inent  of  the 
South  American  countries  for  the  particxilar  benefit  of  the 
natives  is  attractive,  it  is  not  without  itsdangcs.  We  liave 
considered  elsewhere  some  of  the  difficulties  connected  with 
the  investment  of  capital  from  Europe;  those  springing 
from  the  influx  of  laborers  from  Asia  are  certainly  not  less. 

Even  in  the  sparsely  settled  territories  of  Latin  America, 
the  ])resence  of  a  consitlerable  miniber  of  Japanese  mav 
provoke  agitation.  Tliis  will  be  more  likely  to  happen  if 
the  newcomers  are  successful  and  get  control  of  affairs  to 
an  extent  that  will  alarm  the  rest  of  the  population, — a  not 
impossible  contingency,  for  the  Japanese  have  shown  their 
ability  to  meet  more  severe  coin])etition  than  that  of  the 
ordinary  Latin  American.  And  tuey  need  not  be  expected 
to  disarm  hostility  b}-  exces.si\-e  modesty  or  b}^  prompt  as- 
similation with  those  about  them.  In  the  United  States, 
^vhere  the  Ja])anese  have  freely  acknowledged  that  theyhave 
had  much  to  learn,  one  of  the  charges  commonlv  brought 
against  them  is  that  of  intolerable  conceit.  How  will  it  be  in 
lands  where  they  will  feel  themselves  su])erior  at  all  points  to 
their  neighbors  ?    If  it  is  difficult  to  think  of  the  Japanese 


300       THE  UMTED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 

as  being  converted  into  "good  Americana,"  it  requires  a 

widor  stretch  of  the  imagination  to  eonceiv(>  of  them  as 
turning  |)ioni])tly  into  ty])ical  I'cruvians  or  Brazilians ;  and 
they  have  proved  that  they  will  not  submit  tamely  to  ill- 
treatment,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  Cliinese  formerly  en- 
dured in  Brazil.  We  may  rest  assured  that  the  government 
at  Tokio  will  not  leave  its  citizens  un])n)tected  in  any  part 
of  the  world;  nor  will  it  sit  by  with  folded  hands  while  one 
door  after  another  is  slammed  in  tiieir  face,  an  insult 
which  no  high-spirited  nation  could  bear  with  equanimity. 
It  is  one  thing  to  show  moderation  in  dealing  with  the 
United  States,  and  readiness  in  helping  it&  government  out 
of  a  quandary;  it  is  another  to  put  up  with  an  affront 
from,  let  us  say,  Ecuador.  Can  W(>  imagine  that  in  every 
case  Jai)an  would  submit  to  an  exclusion  act  directed  against 
her  peoi)le? 

Questions  like  the  above  may  some  day  have  to  be  taken 
into  earnest  consideration  by  the  United  States;  for  it  is 
certain  that,  if  the  Japanese  should  threaten  to  use  force 
against  any  Latin-Anierican  republic,  that  re{)uMic,  even 
if  it  harbored  no  fri  endly  feeling  towards  its  Angh.-Saxon 
sister,  would  speedil.^'  appeal  to  her  for  protection  in  tlie 
name  of  the  Monrot  Doctrine.  The  Americans  might  then 
find  tlif-M<f'1ves  in  a  bad  dilemma.  They  would  not  wish 
to  pr-.lect  a  delinquent  against  d(>served  punishment,  anJ 
could  remain  traiupiil  if  the  jninishment  were  ru)t  pu.ihed 
too  far,  but  the  case  might  not  be  so  simple.  If,  for  instance, 
the  Japanese  were  to  increase  to  such  an  extent  in  Peru 
that  the  native  population,  in  fear  of  losing  control  of  their 
own  country,  were  t.-  forbid  lurther  adnussion  of  Asiatics, 
and  w(i(>  to  turn  to  t!ie  Tnited  States  for  support  against 
coercion  from  Jajmn,  what  then?  Could  the  Americans  be 
expected  to  accept  all  the  fearful  resjjonsibilities  of  war 
solely  that  the  people  of  Peru,  not  one-seventh  of  whom 
are  of  the  white  race,  might  shut  out  at  their  good  pleas- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  ASD  JAPAN 


301 


ure  the  immigrants  who  could  best  develop  the  country? 
It  would  he  still  more  absurd  if  the  United  States,  while 

excluding  the  Jap.-incsc  from  its  own  borders,  rtliould  insist 
that  IX  sister  re})ul)lie  iidniit  tliem.    And  yt  t,  to  stand 
aside  and  abandon  that  rei)ublic  to  its  fate  would  \n-  hazard- 
ous, besides  being  quite  out  of  kee])ing  with  the  present 
practice  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    We  must  remember,  too, 
that  while  the  Japanese  may  respect  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  the  corner-stone  of  tli.-  foreign  policy  of  a  powerful  nation, 
there  is  no  reason  why  tlu'y  should  like  it  any  more  than 
many  Europeans  do.    As  applied  to  them,  it  cannot  be 
defended  on  the  same  moral  ground  as  when  enforced 
a^jainst  Europe;  for  then,  in  theory  at  least,  it  rests  on 
the  idea  of  reciprocity.   The  United  States  holds  no  land 
in  the  Old  World,  takes  no  part  in  its  political  affairs,  and 
in  return  will  not  tolerate  that  any  European  power  should 
intervene  in  the  affairs  of  the  New,  or  extend  its  domination 
there.    But  this  theory  breaks  down  when  applied  to 
Jai)an,  for  the  United  States  not  only  takes  part  freely  in 
the  affairs  of  the  Far  East,  —  witness  its  championship  of 
the  "  open  door,"  —  it  also  has  acquired  extensive  terri- 
tories, territories  much  nearer  to  Japan  than  is  most  of 
South  America  to  the  United  States.    To  any  insistence  on 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  Japanese  can  therefore  reply, 
"Why  not  Asia  for  the  Asiatics?  " 

No  })eople,  of  course,  ever  lets  itself  be  prevented  by  a  logi- 
cal dilemma  fiom  defending,'  what  it  believes  to  be  its  rights 
and  its  legitimate  interests,  and  the  Aniericans  will^^not 
change  their  long-established  policy,  even  if  the  Japanese 
are  able  to  prove  in  argument  that  it  is  one-sided.  But 
they  will  do  well  to  appreciate  the  Japanese  point  of  view. 
Fortunately,  the  perils  of  a  large  immigration  into  Latin 
America  are  not  immeiliate.  and  the -movement  itself  may 
not  come  to  anything,  —  prophecy  in  such  matters  is  most 
uncertain.    If  the  present  problem  of  the  Japanese  influx 


362        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


into  tin-  United  States  can  be  sutisfacto  Iv  settleil,  Ameri- 
cans will  not  borrow  troufile  ul-out  the  future  in  their  own 
f)art  (it  the  wtirhl.  'Yhcs  must,  however,  pn ,  ..(tention 
to  their  n  lutions  willi  Japan  in  tho  Far  East,  for  in  that 
region,  too,  thouph  there  is  no  crisis,  there  are  causeti  of 
discord  which  will  require  watching  to  prevent  them  from 
bccnniinj;  serious. 

To  bcf^in  with,  it  is,  alas,  true  that  the  Japanese,  in  ad- 
dition to  their  res.  nt iiiciit  about  the  !Minii).'i .dion  question, 
have  other  grievances,  the  exis^tence  of  wim  u  i.^  barely  known 
in  the  United  States,  but  which  are  not  forgotten  by  the 
jingo  party  in  Japan.  Tht'se  same  jingoes  also  entertain 
:ini!)itions  not  reconcilable  with  American  interests.  To  be 
sure,  there  is  as  yet  no  valid  reason  for  takinfjj  these  am- 
bitions trat^ically,  or  for  supposing  that  they  are  shared  by 
public  men;  every  country  has  its  irrepressibU-  ciiauvinists, 
who  often  attract  more  attention  abroad  than  at  home. 
Their  aspirations  cannot,  however,  be  entirely  overlooked 
in  :i  study  of  international  politics,  for  the  jingoes  are 
soinetinies  merely  an  advance  guard, —  men  who  give 
indiscreet  expression  to  liopcs  that  others  cherish  in  secret 
and  may  some  day,  if  circumstances  are  favorable,  try  to 
carry  (.it. 

The  first  Japanese  grievance  of  this  kind  relates  to  Hawaii. 
Although  the  useless  jirotest  made  at  the  time  of  annexa- 
tion w^as  soon  officially  withdrawn,  the  disappointment  to 
which  the  protest  gave  expression  ha  not  disappeared,  nor 
can  we  expect  it  to  as  long  as  the  Japanese  in  the  islands 
outnumber  all  the  other  elements  put  together  and  are 
several  times  as  numerous  as  the  Americans.  Geographi- 
cally, Hawaii  is  almost  as  much  a  r  itural  outpost  of  Japan 
as  it  is  of  the  United  .States,  and  would  be  invaluable  to  her 
for  either  defensive  or  offensive  purposes.  Since  it  will 
hardly  be  pretended  that  the  Japanese  there  are  inferior 
to  the  natives,  they  cannot  in  justice  remain  indefinitely 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


363 


deprived  of  the  vote;  hut,  if  they  get  it,  they  riuiy  prufit 
by  their  numbers  tu  ugitute  in  fuvor  of  union  with  thtii 
former  country.  We  need  not  wonder,  then,  that  there  are 
patriotic  subjects  of  the  Mikado  who  still  hope  to  see  his 
authority  extended  over  this,  the  first  conquest  of  Japanese 
Coh)i:i/.:iti()n. 

In  the  Philippines  the  sit  ii;ition  is  difTercnt.  Few  Japanese 
are  to  be  found  there,  and,  though  their  number  is  incTeas- 
ing,  it  will  never  be  formidable,  as  the  tropical  climate  is  no 
more  suited  to  th(  ni  than  to  white  men.  In  the  past,  Japan 
has  li.ui  sonic  slight  eonneetion  with  the  islands,  and  in  the 
sixteenth  eeiitury  even  meditated  a  military  expedition 
iig;ii"st  them.  In  reeent  years  she  lias  hwn  aeeused  of 
eyeint?  them  covetously,  of  encouragiuK'  native  revolt  against 
Hpain,  and,  now  that  the  United  States  has  taken  the  place 
of  Spain,  of  biding  her  time  until  she  is  ready  to  snatch 
at  this  splendid  spoil. 

As  far  as  we  know,  there  is  little  foundation  for  this 
supposition.  Admitting  that  Japanese  im|)enalists  of  the 
usual  type  are  animated  by  a  desire  to  get  the  Philipj  ines, 
there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  their  feeling  is  shared  by 
responsil)I(>  statesmen  in  Tokio.  Nor  is  there  evidence  that 
the  hitter  ever  had  designs  on  the  islands  wlu  r,  they  were 
under  Spanish  rule,  although  this  sj)eetre  was  made  use 
of  by  malcontent  Filipinos,  and  troubled  men's  minds  in 
Madrid.*  A  few  Filipino  insurgents  at  the  time  of  the  last 
rising  against  Spain  sought  refuge  in  Japan,  where  the 
movement  in  which  they  were  engaged  awakened  i  certain 
amount  of  sympathy,  and  suggested  tempting  possibilities, 
but  never  received  real  help.  Japan  wa^  i'-t  then  taken 
up  with  plans  m  another  direction,  and  at  the  moment  of 

'  In  1895  when  Russia,  Cerniany,  and  Franco  forbade  a  Japniiosc  ac- 
quisition of  the  LiaotunR  Peninsula,  Spain  wished  to  have  the  same  pro- 
hibitio!!  i  xfciidci  to  Formosa,  in  order  to  avoid  having  Japan  the  nearest 
nt.ghbor  to  the  Philippines. 


L 


MICTOCOPY  RfSOlUTION  TEST 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  N. 


364 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


the  transfer  of  the  Philippines  to  the  United  Htates  jhe 
gave  no  sign  of  resentment.  The  desire  of  the  Japunese 
for  the  islands,  such  as  it  is,  and  their  objection  to  the 
presence  of  the  Americans  there,  date  rather  from  the  last 
war,  which  so  miL'htily  stimulated  their  national  self-con- 
fidence and  ambition.  Their  successes  were  in(l(>ed  eii()u<,'h 
to  turn  weak  heads,  but  the  men  who  direct  their  destinies 
cannot  be  accused  of  weakness. 

Many  of  those  who  accuse  Japan  of  longing  for  the 
Philippines  forget  that  since  she  is  rich  in  children  and 
poor  in  capital,  what  she  really  needs  is  vacant  lands  in  the 
temperate  zone,  and  not  unprospirous  territory  in  the 
tropics  peopled  by  seven  million  Christian  iuluibitatits  who 
prefer  to  govern  themselves.  Still,  we  must  admit  that 
the  ardent  expansioni  t  will  not  be  stopped  so  easily.  He 
believes  that  his  country,  like  others,  should  have  tropical 
colonies,  and  he  jjoints  out  that  the  Philippines  should 
oln-iously  be  the  first,  not  only  because  they  are  close 
at  hand,  but  because  they  have  been  forcibly  acquired  by 
their  present  owners  at  io  recent  a  date  that  possession  is 
not  consecrated  by  time.  To  crown  all,  they  are  inhabited 
by  a  discontented  population,  possibly  of  distant  kin  to  the 
Japanese,  who,  he  is  convinced,  will  be  welcomed  as  libera- 
tors. If  he  is  an  entlui  ,iast  for  Pan-Asiatic  ideals,  his  zeal 
will  be  the  more  inflamed  against  the  Americans,  the  most 
western  of  western  nations. 

Without  attaching  too  much  importance  to  fancies  of  this 
sort,  we  must  recognize  that  they  exist  and  may  need  watch- 
ing. We  must  remember  too  that,  tliough  the  Japanese 
said  nothing  when  the  Philijjpines  were  taken  over  by  the 
Americans,  no  people,  be  it  ever  so  innocent  of  covetousness, 
enjoys  seeing  the  territories  in  its  vicinity,  those  which  are 
the  most  oln-ious  field  for  possible  future  expansion,  pass 
from  the  hands  of  ;i  woak  nntion  into  tlic  fxrasp  of  a  strong 
one.    Ten  years  ago  the  United  States  had  no  designs  on 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


365 


the  Spanish  West  Tiidies,  but  it  had  long  iinnounced  that  it 
would  never  allow  thoni  to  he  transferred  from  Spain  to 
another  European  power.  If  Jai)an  at  that  date  had  been 
in  a  position  to  enforce  her  views,  she  would  have  been 
justified  in  maintaining  a  similar  doctrine  about  the  Spanish 
East  Indies,  albeit  against  the  United  States.  To-day, 
when  she  is  strong  enou^'h  to  take  such  a  stand,  it  is  too 
late,  but  the  thou^dit  will  rankl(\ 

Another  \h'uvj:  which  Americans  must  be  prepared  to 
accept  is  tliat  their  policy,  however  justified,  of  debarring 
the  Japanese  from  the  western  world,  will  surely  impel 
them  towards  the  eastern.  In  recent  years  the  Japanese 
have  been  almost  morbidly  desirous  of  not  being  regarded 
as  Asiatics  in  the  ordinary  western  sens(>  of  the  term. 
It  has  been  their  heart's  dearest  wish  to  be  accepted  as  one 
of  the  great  civilized  peoples,  the  equal  of  any  other.  And 
now  the  United  States,  with  Great  Britain  shamefacedly 
concurring  for  her  colonies,  says  to  them,  "We  welcome 
Europeans  of  every  nationality  to  our  shores,  we  throw  open 
our  gates  to  Jews  and  Armenians,  but  you  are  not  wanted, 
you  are  Asiatics."  If  the  Japanese  are  forced  to  acquiesce 
in  this  decision,  we  may  expect  to  see  them  bending  their 
energies  the  more  strenuously  to  the  work  of  securing  and 
extending  their  position  in  Asia,  where  they  have  been  told 
that  they  belong.  There  is  limitless  room  for  their  ambi- 
tions, and,  aft(>r  all,  why  are  not  Pan-Asiatic  dreams  as 
legitimate  as  Pan-American? 

In  the  general  politics  of  the  Far  East,  complete  harmony, 
as  we  have  seen,  prevailed  for  a  time  between  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  and  those  of  Japan.  We  may  doubt,  how- 
ever, whether  the  situation  is  still  the  same.  Both  })()wers 
were  o]i])osed  to  a  partition  of  China:  but  this  danger  is  no 
longer  menacing,  —  indeed,  it  is  less  so  than  Japanese  pre- 
dominance, which  would  hardly  be  to  the  advantage  of  the 
United  States.    Both  were  hostile  to  a  Russian  absorption 


366        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


of  Manchuria;  but  if  Husisia  should  now  keep  any  part 
of  Manchuria,  it  would  only  he  in  collusion  witli  Jai)an, 
who  herself  threatens  to  absorb  the  southern  and  more 
thickly  settled  portion,  the  chief  field  for  American  trade. 
x\) ready  accusations  have  been  made  that  the  Japanese  are 
aiding  the  sale  of  their  own  goods  by  underhand  methods, 
and  we  may  expect  to  hear  of  more  such  charges  in  the 
future.    If,  as  seems  likely,  the  Unit(>(i  States  and  Japan 
are  to  be  two  of  the  most  active  commercial  rivals  in  this 
part  of  the  world,  perhaps  the  most  active,  we  need  not 
be  surprised  if  wherever  one  is  in  political  control  it  is 
tempted  to  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  other,  which, 
in  r-turn,  will  be  ready  on  the  slightest  provocation  to  com- 
plain of  unfair  play     What  adds  to  the  displeasure  of 
Americans  is  that  the  Japanese  imitate,  not  to  say  counter- 
feit, their  productions  with  inferior  ones  of  their  own,  a  way 
of  underbidding,  and  at  the  same  time  discrediting  a  rival 
that  has  more  than  once  been  followed  by  nations  as  well 
as  by  individuals.     If  now  the  Japanese  make  use  of 
their  position  in  Korea  and  southern  Manchuria  to  violate 
the  principle  of  the  "open  door,"  —  a  principle  so  much 
easier  to  support  with  enthusiasm  when  you  yourself  do 
not  control  the  door,  —  American  resentment  is  sure  to 
be  keen. 

On  the  side  of  the  Japanese,  it  will  not  be  conducive  to 
good  feeUng  if  people  get  the  impression  that  the  United 
States  is  not  only  a  troublesome  competitor  in  the  Chinese 
markets,  but  is  also  the  power  which  does  most  to  hinder 
the  fulfilment  of  their  political  ambitions.  Already  they 
have  one  grudge  on  this  score,  which,  however  unwarranted, 
none  the  less  exists.  Though  the  wiser  heads  among  them 
may^  recognize  that  at  the  peace  of  Portsmouth  Japan 
obtained  as  many  advantages  as  she  had  any  right  to  expect 
in  view  of  the  military  situation  and  of  her  own  financial 
condition,  to  the  Japanese  public,  the  terms  of  the  treaty 


THE  UMTED  8TATES  AND  JAPAiN 


367 


came  as  a  bitter  disappointment ;  and  there  is  danp(>r  of  the 
survival  of  a  belief  that  just  as  Russia,  Germany,  and  France 
combined  to  rob  Japan  by  force  of  the  fruits  of  her  earlier 
victories,  so  the  United  States,  actuated  by  the  same 
jealousy,  but  in  the  guise  of  a  friend,  managed  to  deprive 
her  of  the  full  reward  of  her  triumphs  over  Russia.  False 
as  is  this  interpretation  of  what  took  place,  it  is  the  sort 
of  legend  which,  owing  to  its  appeal  to  national  passion,  is 
everywhere  too  readily  accepted.  The  whole  story  points 
out  some  of  the  perils  of  even  the  friendliest  mediation. 

Towards  China,  the  position  of  the  Japanese  is,  in  their 
own  eyes,  that  of  magnanimous  liberators  who  have  saved 
her  from  servitude  to  the  Europeans,  of  wise  teachers  who 
have  imparted  to  her  the  lessons  necessary  for  her  regenera- 
tion, of  kindly  guides  who  will  direct  her  footsteps  along 
the  paths  that  lead  to  future  greatness.  The  Chinese  look 
at  the  matter  differently :  it  was  Japan,  they  say,  that  first 
exposed  their  weakness  to  the  wond,  that  robbed  them  of 
Formosa,  and  deprived  them  of  their  ancient  suzerainty 
over  Korea,  which  state  she  has  now  seized  for  herself ; 
her  action  in  repelling  the  Russians  was  due  to  selfish 
motives,  and  in  any  case  it  will  be  time  enough  to  talk 
of  gratitude  when  Manchuria  has  been  restored  without 
restriction  to  its  sole  legitimate  possessor.  Accordingly, 
their  attitude,  far  from  being  docile,  is  rather  one  of  distrust 
not  unmixed  with  fear.  Taught  by  experience,  they  are 
suspicious  of  disinterested  professions,  but  they  feel  the  need 
of  foreign  aid,  and  there  is  but  one  country  to  which  they 
can  well  turn.  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  have  all  re- 
cently signed  treaties  with  Japan;  Germanv,  though  doubt- 
less sympathetic,  is  not  in  a  position  to  run  the  risk  of 
openly  opposing  her  for  their  sake  ;  there  remains,  then,  the 
United  States,  whose  interest  still  is,  as  it  has  been,  to  main- 
tain the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  including  Man- 
churia, and  to  uphold  the  policy  of  the  "open  door." 


308 


THE  UNITED  fSlATES  A.n  A  WOULD  POWER 


This  is  all  very  well,  and  it  may  be  sound  policy  as  well 

as  f^cncrosity  for  the  United  States  to  assume  a  henevolent 
attitu(h\  hut  whatever  it  jxaius  in  thanks  from  China  it 
will  assuredly  lose  in  ^rood-will  from  Jai)an.  The  mere 
su<jgestion  that  the  Chinese  look  upon  it  as  their  natural 
protector  against  the  ambitions  of  the  Japanese  is  enough 
to  irritate  the  latter,  whether  they  cherish  designs  or  not, 
—  a  fact  of  which  the  Chinese  an  perhaps  quite  well  aware. 

There  remains  one  last  set  of  reasons  for  which  many 
people  in  Japan  as  well  as  in  the  United  States,  and  perhaps 
still  more  outside,  believe  that  the  two  must  some  day  come 
to  blows.  The  inevitable  contest  between  them  is  to  be 
either  a  "conflict  betwee.i  eastern  and  western  civiliza- 
tion" or  for  the  less  ideal,  but  scarcely  more  tangible,  "do- 
minion of  the  Pacific."  Now  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  vast 
majority  of  the  persons  who  use  these  high-sounding  terms 
have  very  little  idea  of  what  they  mean.  The  differences 
between  eastern  and  western  civilization,  though  often  pro- 
found, are  not  easy  to  define  with  accuracy,  and  the 
phraseology  is  misleading.  There  is  more  difTerence  between 
the  Turk  and  the  Japanese,  for  instance,  than  between  the 
latter  and  the  European.  But,  whatever  the  differences 
may  be,  it  is  not  clear  how  Japanese  and  Americans,  by 
destroying  each  other's  persons  and  possessions  with  the 
aid  of  the  latest  improved  implements  of  warfare,  are  going 
to  promote  civilization  of  any  kind.  If  the  Americans 
triumph,  they  will  scarcely  imj)ose  on  their  adversaries, 
by  the  articles  of  peace,  the  use  oi  the  Roman  alphabet 
or  baptism  into  the  Methodist  Church,  and  even  a  com- 
plete Japanese  victory  would  do  little  to  further  the  study 
of  the  Chinese  classics  or  to  spread  the  tenets  of  Shintoisin 
in  the  New  World.  If  there  is  to  be  a  conflict  of  civilizations 
between  the  East  and  the  West,  a  point  about  '.vhicli  one 
may  remain  sceptical,  it  will  not  be  settled  in  this  simple, 
for  ible  manner. 


THE  UMTED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


Afcain,  the  grandiloquent  expressions  "dominion  of  the 
soas,"  "mastery  of  tlie  Pacific,"  and  the  like,  are  mere 
ehiptrap.    What  does  this  "mastery"  sij^nify,  and  liow  is 
either  America  or  Japan  to  obtain  it  by  victory  over  the 
other?    Does  it  mean  building  up  the  hirger  navy?  But 
Britannia  continues  to  rule  the  waves  by  having  more  ships 
of  war  than  any  other  power,  and  she  can  send  them  all  to 
the  Pacific,  if  she  so  pleases.    As  long  as  slie  retains  this 
superiority,  American  or  Japanese  "mastery"  can  last  only 
so  long  as  the  English  kindly  keep  out  of  the  way.  Or, 
suppose  that  one  country  possesses  the  stronger  fieet  and 
the  other  holds  mos'.  of  the  trade:  which  will  then  enjoy 
"dominion"?    Theoretically,  perhaps,  the  one  with  the 
more  vessels  of  war,  as  being  able  to  plunder  its  neipjhbor; 
liut  piracy  is  out  of  date,  and  while  peace  is  preserved,  there 
is  no  doubt  which  will  have  the  more  valuable  asset.  And 
why  should  a  war  betv  een  the  United  States  and  Japan 
settle  any  question  of  commercial  supremacy  between  them? 
Great  loss  might  be  incurred,  and  certain  industries  be 
crippled,  but  the  day  is  past  when  the  victors  could  pro- 
hibit tlie  vanquished  from  manufacturing  what  they  wished 
to,  and  disposing  of  their  produce  as  best  they  could  in 
neutral  markets.    If  the  American  fleets  were  to  sweep  the 
Pacific,  this  would  not  prevent  Japanese  cotton  goods  from 
underselling  American  ones  in  the  shops  of  Shanghai,  or, 
when  peace  returned,  Japanese  shijis  from  charging  lower 
fr(>ight  rates  than  those  of  their  American  competitors. 
Per  contra,  the  loss  of  the  Philippines  and  Hawaii,  grievous 
as  it  might  be,  would  probably  not  seriously  affect  the 
sale  of  Standard  oil  in  the  Far  East.    The  United  States 
and  Japan   may,  indeed,  be  rivals  in  the  waters  of  the 
Pacific  to-day,  and  rivalry  of  this  sort  is  accompanied  by 
some  friction,  l.mt  the  supposition  is  monstrous  that  they 
must  therefore  enter  into  a  desperate  struggle  with  each 
other  in  order  that  one  of  them  may  obtain  an  undis- 

2b 


370        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWIIll 


puted  primacy,  which  dep'nds  on  other  things  than  force 

of  arms. 

riifortunatcly,  tho  use  of  ovrn  mraninploss  phrasrs  may 
(lanf^erous  in  itself.  \'a{^ue  and  intangible  as  "<  oi-iin- 
ion"  and  "mastery"  are,  they  appeal  to  men's  ir\'igination ; 
and  before  now  people  have  fought  for  abstractions.  We 
may  think  that  a  war  for  the  ''dominion  of  the  Pacific" 
would  bo  absurd,  and  wickc^l,  but  if  a  large  number  of  per- 
sons in  the  United  States  and  in  Japan  are  convinced  that 
this  "dominion"  properly  belongs  their  own  country  and 
not  to  the  other,  and  that  then  ast  some  day  be  a  war 
between  the  two  to  settle  the  pomt,  —  an  opinion  in  which 
many  outsiders  noisil}  concur,  —  a  situation  and  a  state  of 
mind  are  created  which  are  perilous  to  the  peace :  nations 
h;  0  not  quite  lost  the  temper  of  the  game-co^''  ready  to 
do  battle  for  the  privilege  of  having  the  root,  o  himself 
and  crowing  undisturbed.  And  the  widespread  impression 
that  the  United  States  and  Japan  are  inevitable  rivals  for 
the  "mastery"  of  the  Eastern  seas  renders  friendship  be- 
tween them  more  difficult,  and  familiarizes  both  with  the 
idea  of  a  possible  conflict.  Even  when  the  adjective 
"peaceful"  is  attached  to  the  word  "domination,"  and 
it  is  explained  that  only  commercial  supremacy  is  meant, 
the  reiteration  of  the  claim  by  leading  men  in  both 
countries  is  not  likely  to  improve  international  relations.' 

'  The  first  number  (Octol)or,  19()7)  of  tho  now  review  of  The  Pacific  Era, 
contains  articles  by  President  Roosevelt  and  Baron  Kaneko.  Here  are 
two  extracts :  — 

"The  cxtonsinn  in  the  area  of  our  domain  has  been  immense;  the 
extension  in  the  area  of  our  influence  even  greater.  America's  geograph- 
ical position  on  the  Pacific  is  such  as  to  insure  peaceful  domination  of 
its  waters  in  tho  future  if  wo  only  prasp  with  sufErient  resolution  the  ad- 
vantages of  that  position."  —  Puesident  Roosevelt,  revised  version  of 
speech  in  San  Franeiseo,  in  1903. 

"What  liicn  shoulii  ho  (ho  aliiiude  of  our  imperial  country  in  the  faco 
of  all  this  American  activity  ?  It  cannot  possibly  be  otherwise  than  this : 
That  we  must  do  our  utmost  m  disputing  this  command  of  the  Pacific 


THE  UMTEU  STATES 


JAPAN 


371 


To  sum  up,  when  we  come  to  consider  the  factorB,  large 

nnd  srniill,  whk-h  li:ivo  cont n'outod  in  tlio  lust  throe  years 
to  the  estran)^(  nient  of  Jajtanesc  and  Americans,  \ve 
need  not  marvel  ut  the  change  in  their  feehng  towards 
one  another.  How  far  it  has  gone,  whether  the  angry 
vjvporings  of  a  part  of  the  press  or  the  cordial  utterances  of 
])ul)lic  men  represent  more  exactly  the  popular  temper 
in  the  two  countries,  it  is  not  easy  to  say,  though  we  may 
retncnd)er  tli(>  general  truth  that  an  angry  man  talks  louder 
than  a  contented  one.  There  are  people  in  both  who 
expect  war;  there  is  distrust  on  the  American  side,  a 
suspicion  that  Japan  having  triumphed,  first  over  China, 
then  over  Russia,  has  now  picked  out  the  United  States 
as  her  third  antagonist,  and  that  when  she  thinks  the 
moment  come,  she  will  strike  as  suddenly  and  as  fiercely 
as  she  did  in  her  last  conflict.  In  return,  here  are  Japanese 
who  look  on  the  United  States  as  the  chii  *  obstacle  to  the 
future  greatness  of  their  country.  But  in  ooth  lands  there 
are  also  men,  men  high  in  authority,  mindful  of  the  old 
friendship  between  the  two,  convinced  that  there  is  no 
valid  reason  why  it  should  not  continue,  and  certain  that 
a  war  between  them  would  be  not  only  a  folly  but  a  crime. 
Tapan  were  to  plan  an  attack,  she  would  have  to  act 
i.  She  cannot  build  as  many  ships  as  the  United 
ke  rnes,  and  when  the  Panama  Canal  is  dug,  —  a  task 
wnich  some  might  compare,  in  its  military  significance,  to 
the  construction  of  the  Trans-Siberian  land  route  for 
Russia  a  few  years  ago, — the  Americans  will  no  longer 
suffer  from  their  worst  disadvantage,  the  dispersion  of 
their  naval  strength,  and  it  is  not  Ukely  now  that  they 
will  be  cauglit  napping  as  the  Russians  were. 

It  is  also  not  very  evident  where  Jajian  could  find  the 
resources  for  a  prolonged  contest,  especially  as  there  is 

with  the  United  States,  and  also  do  our  best  in  the  control  of  the  Far 
Eastern  marketa."  —  Babon  Kanbko  Kbntaro. 


372        THE  UMTLD  STATES  AS  A  WOULD  POWER 


little  chance  that  she  could  olitaiii  fmaiicial  or  other  aid 
from  outside.  Alliiincc  or  no  alliance,  (Jreat  Britain  will 
never  take  up  nr.s  aj;ainst  the  I'mted  States  in  Jajjan's 
sole  behalf.  No  treaty  oljligations  could  staid  the  strain, 
fur  such  a  course  of  action  would  not  be  tolerated  by  the 
English  public,  and  would  be  enough  to  drive  some  of  the 
colonies  intn  rehellion. 

The  [r\\])  prophets  of  future  conflicts  usually  overlook  the 
many  forces  that  are  working  to  prevent  them.  Nations 
are  cajjable  of  losing  their  heads  and  of  beginning  to  fight 
before  they  know  what  they  are  doing,  but  the  conse- 
quences of  modern  war  are  enormous,  and  the  uncertain- 
ties so  fearful  that  few  public  mm  will  deliberately  plan 
one.  It  may  not  take  two  to  make  a  quarrel,  but  one 
at  least  has  to  be  willing  for  it.  Now  there  is  no  reason 
why  the  United  States  should  wish  for  a  war  with  Japan : 
it  has  no  desire  for  her  territory,  no  grudge  to  vent,  and  no 
grave  danger  to  fear  from  her  in  the  future.  The  trade 
rivalry  betv.een  the  two  is  not  dissimilar  to  other  ommer- 
cial  rivalry  all  over  the  world.  We  may  confidontiy  affirm 
that  it  is  beyond  the  bounds  of  probability  that  the  Ameri- 
cans should  go  out  of  their  way  to  seek  a  conflict  with  the 
Japanese.  For  Japan  the  temptation  may  be  greater. 
The  chance  of  getting  the  Philippines  and  Hawaii,  of 
adding  another  to  the  list  of  Japanese  victories,  of  giving 
to  the  empire  of  the  Mikado  a  still  ])rouder  position  among 
the  nations  of  the  world  and  vindicating  the  claims  of  the 
Japanese  race  to  equality  with  others,  —  all  these  may 
well  appeal  to  the  instincts  of  an  ambitious,  warlike  people 
flushed  with  success.  But  if  Japan  has  more  to  gain  by 
,1  war  than  the  Unit(>(l  States,  the  risks  she  nms  are  more 
formidable.  Tiie  American  navy  is  the  stronger  of  the 
two;  but  oven  supposing  it  to  l>e  defeated,  and  the  Ameri- 
cans to  be  deprived  of  their  insular  possessions  in  the  East, 
the  mass  of  their  territory  would  remain  invulnerable,  and 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


373 


they  have  given  in  tlit'  pjist  sufru  iont  evidence  of  their  i»iide 
and  doterminution  to  nmke  it  probable  that  they  would 
persist  in  the  struggle  till  it  terminated  in  their  favor,  as 

it  should  do  ultimately,  owing  to  their  superior  resouii-es.' 
When  it  did,  they  would  exact  heavy  retrihution  for  what- 
ever luiiniliation  they  had  underj^one.  In  war  with  tin 
United  States  to-duy,  victory  would  bring  to  Jnpiin  gloiy 
and  power,  but  scarcely  much  permanent  gain;  defeat 
would  mean  crushing  disaster,  the  end  of  her  high  hopes, 
and  the  loss  of  the  splendid  position  she  has  won  for 
her^^  If  by  her  two  l)rilliantly  successful  appeals  to  the 
decision  of  tlie  sword. 

It  was  only  with  extreme  reluctance  that  several  of  the 
Japanese  statesmen  consented  to  the  war  with  Russia, 
although  they  believed  that  *he  vital  interests  of  their 
country  were  imperilled ;  and  il  is  hard  to  imagine  their 
plunging  light-heartedly  into  a  perilous  conflict  with  a 
country  from  which  otherwise  they  have  little  to  fear.  Of 
course,  if  their  safety  were  threatened  or  their  honor  were 
affected ,  the  Japanese  would  fight,  and  fight  to  the  bitter  end, 
or  if  the  Americans  were  to  neglect  reasonable  precautions 
for  defence,  this  might  subject  the  virtue  of  their  neighbors 
to  too  severe  teni])tation.  There  is  no  especial  reason  to 
expect  either  of  these  contingencies,  but  when  all  is  said 
and  done,  the  best  guarantee  for  continued  peace  between 
the  two  nations  is  the  earnest  desire  of  the  wisest  men  in 
both  that  they  should  remain  friends. 

Tlie  moral  for  Americans  of  the  various  international 
comi)lications  in  which  they  find  themselves  involved 
is,  after  all,  the  old  one  that  greatness  brings  responsibili- 
ties. These  they  will  have  to  face,  for  it  is  now  too  late 
for  them  to  return  to  the  simple  life  of  their  earlier  history. 

•  Russia,  who  was  in  a  much  more  disadvantageous  position,  might 
have  foiifiht  on  indefinitely  if  she  had  not  been  weakened  by  internal 
disconteut. 


374       THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 


The  \  will  (It)  well,  therefor;.',  to  take  to  heurt  the  words 
of  tlie  I'lvsidt'iit :  — 

"We  have  no  choice,  we  people  of  the  United  States,  aa 
to  whether  or  not  we  shall  play  a  great  part  in  the  world. 
That  has  been  determined  for  us  by  fate,  by  the  march  of 
events.  We  have  to  play  that  pari.  All  that  we  can 
decide  is  whether  we  shall  play  it  well  or  ill.  ' 


INDEX 


AdMM,  J.  Q.,  and  Moorae  Doctrine,  00, 
9Bii. 

Aerial  navigation  and  Canadian-Ameri- 
can rclatioM,  206. 

AKuinaldo,  Emll<o,  and  American  offi- 
ciab,  1S2-1S5. 

Alabama  <  laima,  233. 

Alaaka,  government  30;  purchaM,  38, 
216;  atatua,  13S,  boundary  tribunal, 
241 ;  effect  of  acquisition  on  Canada, 
2fil. 

Alexander  1  of  RuMia,  and  United  States, 
214. 

Alexia,  Qrand  Duke,  vit;»  m  United 
SUtea,  215. 

Alfeciraa  Conference,  United  State*  and, 
119;  "open  door,"  183. 

American  Revolution,  cauae,  20 ;  French 
aid  and  attitude,  184-186;  German 
interest,  197;  attitude  of  Catherine  II, 
313;  of  Fraicb  Canadians,  247,  248; 
Canada  and  peace  negotiations,  248; 
lojraliata  in  Canada,  249. 

Americans,  obarmcter,  and  immigratio-.i, 
40,  43;  En^[^  as  langua«[e,  44-46, 
M;  future,  60;  French  opinion  of, 
103-lOfi;  and  Russians,  216;  Eng- 
lish opinion  of,  23fi,  242.  See  aho 
Nationality,  Political  ideaa. 

Annexations.   See  Territory. 

Anti4mperialists,  origin,  134;  and  Ha- 
waii, 134;  and  Porto  Rico,  13A,  143; 
arguments  against  annexation  of 
Philippines,  13A;  and  Philippine  In 
surrection,  186;  and  government  oi 
Philippines,  160;  and  protectorate, 
167;  and  naval  base  in  Philippines, 
322. 

Anti-Senutism  in  United  8t-tes,  62. 
See  eUto  Jews. 

Arbitration,  San  Juan  Island,  102; 
Venezuela-Guiana  boundary,  104 ;  and 
Monroe  Doctrine,  111 ;  Beliring  Sea, 
232;  Geneva,  232;  Alaskan  tribimal, 
241. 

Argoitine  Republic,  not  a  world  power, 
7;  future,  17;  and  Falkland  Islands, 
283;  future  Anaerican  relation,  308. 
iSee  aUo  Latin  America. 


Armed  neutrality,  213. 

Armenian  maaaacrea,  236. 

.\riiiy,  American,  negroes  as  soldiers,  73; 
attitude  towardu  regular,  80;  in  Phil- 
ippine Inaurr«>rtion,  1A7. 

Assimilation.    See  IramiRruliim. 

Australia,  anti-Japanese  aRitutiim,  :\rA. 

Austria-Hungary,  as  Kuropean  (xiw  -r,  2 ; 
not  a  world  power,  7;  and  United 
SUtea,  224. 

Bahama  Islands,  strategic  |»os<iHon,  2fi7. 
lialkans,  Kuaaiaii  inti-rvt  ution  (1877), 
128. 

Baltimvrr  incident  with  Chile,  284. 
Ik-uronsfield,  Earl  of,  and  expansion,  5. 
lU-hring  Sea  controviTsy,  232. 
Hclgiuni  and  Coiiuo,  '>. 
I)<>rniudu,  Htratpgic  puxition,  267. 
Hiamarck,  Fiirst  von,  and  expandon  8; 

on  Monroe  IX>ctrine,  107. 
Blaine,  J.  O.,  and  New  Orleans  Mafia 

lynching,  235;   and  iHtlimian  canal, 

274 ;  and  Pan-Anicricanitim,  208,  300. 
Bohemian))  as  immigrants,  54. 
Bolivar,  Simon,  and  Washington,  282. 
Boundaries,  chiiructcr  of  I'nitcd  States, 

•X);    disp>itos    w        Kngland,  230; 

Alaskan,  241 ;   (       Ui  and  disputes 

over,  250 

Boxertroub.es,  nttituae of  United  .States, 
332. 

Brasit,  no*,  a  world  power,  7,  future, 
17;  Gen.  ..j  colcnists,  49;  ai>f<  Ger- 
man expai<!  on,  208-211  ;  past  .  ..neri- 
can  relations,  284;  future  .Vint-rican 
relations,  308;  Japaneso  iiiiinigration, 
359.    See  also  Latin  Aiiifrii-u. 

Bureau  of  American  Republiin,  utility, 
300;  enlarged  scope,  301. 

Burlingame,  Anson,  Clunesc'  treaty,  333. 

California,  annexation  and  development, 
38,  316,  334.  See  atto  Chinese,  Jap- 
anese. 

Canada,  and  treaty  of  1783,  27,  248 ;  Eng- 
I'liul  and  American  relntioiia,  241  ; 
l)liy«iral  divi.sions,  245 ;  geograplnciil 
relatioub  with  United   States,  246, 


375 


376 


INDEX 


2f>f> ;  union,  246 ;  patriotism  and  hos- 
tility to  Americanism,  247,256,258; 
luiV)itantH  and  American  Revolution, 
247  248 ;  loyalist  immigrants,  249 ;  re- 
menibniiicc  of  War  of  1812,  249;  and 
houndiiry  ilisputes,  250;   growth  of 
Knglish-spcaking     population,    250 ; 
role  of  Catholic  Irish  in,  250;  reciproi!- 
ity  with  United  States,  251 ;  and  ac- 
quisition of  Alaska,  251;  American 
protect    against    union,    252;  dow 
growth,  252;    emigration  to  United 
States,  252;   wheat  culture  and  de- 
velopment of  western,   253;  other 
resources,    254;     immigration  from 
United  States,  254,  255;  enthusiasm 
over  future,  justification  of  it,  254; 
attitude  of  Irish  Catholics  towards 
United  States,  257;  of  French  Cana- 
dians, 257  ;  of  inhabitants  of  Ontario, 
258  :  American  former  condescension 
and  present  attitude,  259;  tariff  re- 
lations, 200,  2o2 ;  and  Newfoundland, 
261  ;  and  union  with  West  Indies,  201 ; 
and  Pan-American  Congresses,  261 ; 
present  government,  262 ;  future  pos- 
sibilities,  imperial   federation,  262- 
264  ;  independence,  264 ;  union  with 
TTnited  States,   265;  anti-Japanese 
agitation,  354. 

Canadians  as  immigrants,  252.  See 
also  French  Canadians. 

Canning,  George,  and  Monroe  Doctrine, 
96,  98,  99,  101. 

Caribbean  Sea,  strategic  points,  268; 
EngUsh-.^nJcrican    rivalry   in,  270; 
end  of  rivalry,  275;   American  su- 
premacy and  future,  278.   See  al> 
Isthmian  canal,  West  Indies. 

Ca-ohnes,  cession  to  Germany,  199. 

Catherine  II,  and  American  Revolution, 
213. 

CathoUcism,  in  United  States,  50;  of 
French  Canadians,  53,  258;  of  Fili- 
pinoa,  165. 

Central  America,  past  American  rela- 
tioua,  283 ;  future  American  relations, 
300.  See  aUo  Isthmian  canal,  Latin 
America. 

Chile,  piKft  American  relations,  284; 
future  American  relations,  308.  See 
also  Latin  America. 

China,  as  former  world  power,  1 ;  not  a 
present  one,  7  ;  threatened  partition 
and  "open  door"  policy,  180,  331 ; 
rivals  for  trade  of,  204 ;  development 
of  American  trade,  313-315,  326 ;  in- 
fluence of  Philippines  on  American 


relations,  323;   duahty  of  American 
relations,   327;    opium   trade,  327; 
missionaries  in,  328;    United  States 
and  concerted  demands  on,  329  ;  and 
Japanese  War,  330,  345;  develop- 
ment of  American  exix)rt8  to,  330; 
United  States  and   Hoxer  troubles, 
332;  and  Manchurian  trade,  3.32  ;  and 
Russo-Japanese  War,  333;  disinter- 
estedness of  American  policy,  333; 
liurlingame  treaty,  freedom  of  resi- 
dence, 333,  334;  American  exclusion 
and  treatment  of  Chinese,  ,334-337; 
retaliation  by  boycott,  337-339 ;  prob- 
able submission  to  exclusion,  339; 
need  of  American  friendship,  339,  367 ; 
and  Japan,  340,  367;   American  in- 
difference to  political  "yellow  peril," 
348 ;    future  Japanese-American  re- 
lations   as    to,    365-368.    See  also 
Chinese,  I'ar  East. 
Chinese,  ba.sis  of  exclusion,  74-78,  3.34, 
340;  and  Philippines,  100,  162,  171, 
335;  in  Hawaii,  320,  335;  treaty  right 
of    immigration,    334;     attitude  of 
Eastern  States,  335;  exclusion  legis- 
lation and  treaty,  335;  treatment  in 
United  States,  330;    harsh  adminis- 
tration of  exclusion  law,  337 ;  Chinese 
retaliation  by  boycott,  337 ;    ,  rma- 
nence  of  exclusion,  the  possible  cost, 
338;  solution  of  exduffion  problem, 
339,  340,  366. 
Citizenship.    See  Nationality,  Naturali- 
zation. 

Cixil  War,  and  physiography,  22 ;  issue 
closed,  37,  173;  attitude  of  Russia, 
214 ;  of  England,  232. 

Clark,  O.  R.,  conquest  of  Northwest, 
27. 

Clay,  Henry,  on  Monroe  l>)ctrine, 
115. 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  Monroe 
Doctrine,  102;  provisions  and  effect, 
272;  attempts  to  abrogate,  274; 
abrogation,  275. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  and  Hawaii,  39,  139; 
and  foreign  affairs,  80;  Venesuela 
boundary  incident,  103. 

Climate  of  United  States,  19. 

Colonies,  defined,  137.  See  also  next 
title,  and  Dependencies. 

Colonies,  English,  in  America,  and  Alle- 
ghanies,  22;  conditions  of  settlement, 
23,  24;  character  of  sections,  24; 
French  and  Indian  War,  25,  26. 

Commerce.    See  Trade. 

Congress  of  Vienna,  control  at,  3. 


INDEX 


377 


Consuls,  character   of   American,  S5, 

333  n. 

("otton,  international  ini|x)rtance,  18. 

('uV)a  stratepc  poxitiori,  124,  2(58;  first 
American  attitudo  towards,  124;  and 
slavery  interests,  125;  <ipsir<' to  annex, 
126;  Ostcnd  Manifesto,  12(5;  first 
insurrection,  126;  investment  of 
American  capital,  127 ;  second  insur- 
rection and  intervention,  127 ;  con- 
ditions compared  with  Balkans  in 
1877,  128 ;  sovereignty  over  dis- 
claimed, 129;  fate,  279;  effect  of 
evacuation  on  Latin-American  senti- 
ment, 285  ;  reoccupation  and  futtire 
relations,  286-289. 

Custom-liouse,  and  forcible  collection  of 
foreign  debts,  290,  292. 

Danish  West  Indies,  attempted  anne.xa- 
tion,  39,  139,  140;  l.  te,  112,  279. 

Debts,  forcible  collection  of  public,  and 
Monroe  Doctrine,  116;  Roo.sevelt  on, 
290,  291  ;  and  torts,  291  ;  San  Do- 
mingo case,  292  ;  Venezuela  case,  293  ; 
problem  of  national  bankruptcy,  29.3 ; 
of  private  investments,  294;  Drago 
Doctrine,  295-298 ;  Hague  Confer- 
ence on,  296. 

Democratic  party  and  annexation  of 
Phihp])ines,  136. 

Deiiendencies  of  United  States,  a.s  out- 
post.s,  17,  20;  and  policy  of  Northwest 
Ordinance,  28,  30,  36;  defined,  137; 
and  territories,  138 ;  former  American 
repugnance  to  alien,  139 ;  effect  of 
Spanish  War,  140;  character,  140; 
status,  140.  See  also  World  powers, 
and  dependencies  by  name. 

Devonshire,  Duke  of,  on  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 106. 

Dewey,  George,  in  Philippines,  149 ;  and 
Diedriohs,  199. 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  as  President,  283,  310. 

Diedrichs,  t)tto,  in  Manila  Bay,  199 

Drago  Doctrine,  attitude  of  United 
States,  177,  296-298;  purpose,  295; 
Hague  Conference  on,  296. 

Economic  conditions,  in  Porto  Rico,  144  ; 
in  Philippines,  170;  period  of  depres- 
sion in  United  States,  173;  prosperity 
and  its  effect  on  international  policy, 
17r>;  infliie'ire  of  investmenta  abroad. 
17fi,  296.  ^V<?  (Uno  Debts,  Immigra- 
tion, Labor,  Trade. 

Education,  in  Philippines,  162,  169; 
anti-British,  in  United  States,  233. 


Election  of  1900  and  Philippines,  157. 
Emigration  to  Canada,  254,  255.  See 

also  Immigration. 
England.    A'p*  Great  Britain. 
English  as  immigrants,  51. 
Equality,  American  attitude,  91-93. 
Europe,  great  powers  (1500-1876),  2-4; 

interests,  and  world-power  empires, 

13-15,  99,  109. 
E.xpansion,  recent  impetus,  4.    See  also 

Territory,  "World  powers. 
Exterritoriality  in  Japan,  343. 

Falldand  Islands  incident,  283. 

Far  East,  Ru.ssian  development,  6,  221; 
as  field  for  American  trade,  180; 
policy  of  "open  door,"  181-183,  221, 
331,  347,  366;  French  attitude,  191; 
German  attitude,  200;  American- 
Briti.sh  relations,  242 ;  temporary 
decline  of  .American  political  influence, 
318.  See  also  China,  Japan,  Philip- 
pines. 

Ferry,  Jules,  and  expansion,  5. 

Fihpinos.    See  Phihppines. 

Finances,  influence  of  investments 
abroad  on  foreign  policy,  176,  296. 
See  also  Debts,  Economic  condi- 
tions. 

Fisheries,  disputes  with  England,  231. 

Florida,  annexation,  32;  contrat  with 
Spain  over,  123. 

Foreign  policy  of  United  States,  con- 
ditions (1897),  70;  VenezueU  boun- 
dary incident,  80;  indifference,  86; 
diplomatic  and  consular  sennce,  85, 
333  n. ;  recklessness  of  speech,  86 ; 
impatience  of  irksome  obligations,  86, 
93 ;  national  honor,  87 ;  inconsist- 
ency, 87;  development  of  policy,  88; 
peai'efulness,  88-90;  army  and  navy, 
89;  influence  of  investments  t^broad, 
176,  296;  and  transformation  in  ex- 
port trade,  177-179;  influence  of 
English  press  on  American  ideas,  192, 
193,  200,  219.  See  alto  Isolation, 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  nations  by 
name. 

Foster,  J.  W.,  and  Chinese-Japanese 
War,  330. 

France,  as  European  power,  2,  3 ;  sacri- 
fice of  former  colonies,  4,  25;  expan- 
sion, 6;  population  and  area  of  em- 
pire, 11;  sale  of  Louisiana,  31,  184, 
187;  world  power  and  race  questions, 
63;  and  American  Revolution,  93, 
184;  and  peace  negotiations  (1782), 
185 ;  United  States  and  French  Revo- 


378 


INDEX 


lution,  186,  187 ;  Napoleon  III  and 
Mexico,  187  ;  United  States  and  Ger- 
man War,  188,  197  ;  and  American- 
Spanish  War.  188;  and  Boors,  188; 
present  American  relations,  188,  201  ; 
elimination  of  possible  disputes,  180  ; 
Panama  Canal,  189,  272-274,  276; 
and  West  Iiulies,  100 ;  and  Tahiti, 
190;  and  affairs  in  Far  East,  191; 
Anuriran  trade  competition,  191  ; 
American  knowloilge  of,  102,  193; 
social  I  l  lations  with  Americans,  103 ; 
influeme  on  American  thought,  194; 
on  politics,  19") ;  Venezuelan  dispute, 
293  n.    See  also  New  France. 

Franco-German  War,  American  atti- 
tude, 188,  197. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  and  acquisition  of 
Canada,  247. 

Frederick  the  Great,  and  American 
Revolution,  197 ;  incident  of  gift  of 
statue  of,  201. 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.,  on  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  arbitration.  111  n.  ;  and 
Liberia,  130;  and  isthmian  canal, 
274. 

French  and  Indian  War,  2.5,  26. 

French  as  immigrants,  .52. 

French  Canadians,  as  innnigrants,  52, 

253;  and  American  Uevohition,  247; 

present  attitude  towards  United  States, 

2.57. 

Fur-trade  with  China,  314. 

Gadsden  Purchase,  35. 

Genet.  E.  C,  as  minister  to  United 

States,  186. 

Geography,  influence  on  nations,  18. 

Germans,  as  colonists  in  Hu.>,sia,  48:  in 
Brazil.  40,  2()S  211;  :is  immigrants 
in  United  States,  number,  5.5.  .5() ; 
Pennsylvania  Dutch,  .5() ;  decline  of 
immigration,  56;  assimilation,  57, 
106. 

Gerrnanv,  as  European  pjwer,  3;  policy 
of  expansion,  5,  16,  206,  2()S;  popu- 
lation and  area  of  empire,  12 ;  race 
<luestions  of  empire,  <')2  ;  and  Monroe 
Iloctrine.  106  »  ;  and  Philippines.  151. 
190  ;  recentness  of  ,\merican  relations. 
I'.tC. ;  historical  ties  with  Uniteil  States. 
I'.C  and  Siinioa.  198,  321,  322;  and 
Aincncau-Spanish  War,  19S;  accjui- 
Ritioiis  from  r-pain,  'i'.>\< ,  iniiuc-nn-  ui 
these  incidents  on  American  atiitude. 
199;  influence  of  British  press,  2lM) ; 
and  Far  Eastern  affairs,  200 ;  ad- 
vances to  United  States,  201,  211; 


Venezuela  incident,  202;  American 
trade  rivalry,  203,  206 ;  present  Amer- 
ican relations,  203,  211;  and  South 
American  politics,  205-211 ;  Pan- 
Geruianists,  208;  and  Brazil,  208- 
211. 

fiovernment,  policy  of  Northwest  Ordi- 
nance, 28,  30,  36 ;  people  as  sovereign, 
40 ;  status  of  dependencies,  140.  See 
also  Foreign  policy,  Political  ideab, 
and  deiiendencies  by  name. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  and  Monroe  Doctrine,  112, 
114  ;  and  isthmian  canal,  273. 

Granville,  Earl  of,  and  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  274. 

Great  Britain,  as  European  power,  2; 
growth  of  colonies,  4;  policy  of  ex- 
pansion, 5;  and  European  interests, 
13,  00  ;  population  and  area  of  empire, 
9 ;    race   questions   of   empire,  62 ; 
Venezuela  boundary  incident,  80,  103- 
105;    and  Holy  Alliance,  96,  98; 
Japanese  alliance,  99;    increase  of 
empire  in  America  since  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 101 ;  present  attitude  toward 
Monroe  Doctrine,  106 ;  and  imperial 
Zollverein,  179,  242 ;  and  "open  door," 
181 ;  as  source  of  American  knowledge 
of  continental  Europe,  192,  193,  200, 
219;  and  France,  193;  and  Germany, 
200;  intervention  in  Venezuela,  202, 
241  ;  reasons  for  importance  in  Ameri- 
can foreign  relations,  228,  233;  ill- 
feelings  after  Revolution,  229,  230; 
boundary  disputes,   230,  241;  fish- 
eries disputes,    231 ;  disputes  over 
Central  America,  232 ;  and  Civil  War, 
232;    American   anti-British  educa- 
tion,  233;    hostility    of  American 
Irish  and  Germans,  234;  American 
resentment    of    criticism    by,  _  235; 
former  attitude  towards  Americans, 
235;    harmonizing   influences,  235; 
mutual  mollification  of  hostility,  2.36  ; 
attitude     during  American-Spanish 
War,  causes  and  effects,  237-239;  iso- 
lation, 2.38;  America  and  South  Afri- 
can War,  239,  240 ;  present  and  future 
.\merican    relations,    241-244;  and 
Far  Eastern  affairs,  242;  social  ties, 
242;    potency  of  kinship,  243;  and 
.\merican  relations  with  Canada,  244; 
imperial  federation,  262-264;  stra- 
li^;u'    position    in    Caribbean,  287; 
.Xmerican  rivRlr>  in  West  Indies,  270, 
271  ;  Clavton-Bulwer  treaty  and  its 
abrogation,  272,  274,  275;  and  isth- 
mian canal,  273 ;  end  of  rivah-y,  275 ; 


INDEX 


379 


and  Suooa,  323;  and  colonial  anti- 
Japaneaa  a^tation,  354.  See  also 
American  Revolution,  Canada,  Colo- 
nies. 

Guam,  annexation  and  value,  140,  141, 
322. 

Hague  Conference,  United  States  and, 
105,  117;  on  Drago  Doctrine,  29ft; 
Latin  America  in  Second,  306. 

Hague  Tribunal,  on  Venecuelan  inter- 
vention, 293. 

Haiti,  fate,  279. 

Harris,  Townsend,  aa  minister  to  Japan, 

342. 

Hawaii,  attempted  annexation,  39; 
value  and  social  structure,  141 ;  ter- 
ritorial government,  141 ;  beginning 
of  American  interest,  315 ;  and  Ameri- 
can whalers,  316 ;  missionaries  in,  317 ; 
American  assertion  of  paramount  in- 
terest in,  317 ;  reciprocity  with,  318  ; 
strategic  value,  318;  character  and 
decrease  of  natives,  319;  labor  con- 
ditions, 319 ;  native  government,  320 ; 
revolution  and  annexation,  320,  321  ; 
Chinese  exclusion,  335;  Japanese 
protest  against  annexati<Hi,  346;  atti- 
tude of  Japan,  362. 

Hay,  John,  basis  of  his  policy,  95 ;  pro- 
tests on  treatment  of  Jews,  119 ;  abro- 
gation of  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  27() ; 
isthmian  canal  treaty,  276;  "oiJt'ii 
door"  policy,  331 ;  circular  on  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  333. 

Hayes,  R.  B.,  and  isthmian  canal,  273; 
and  Chinese  exclusion,  335. 

Henry  of  Prussia,  Prince,  virit  to  United 
States,  201. 

Hindus,  immigration  problem,  75-78. 

Holy  Alliance  and  America,  98,  99. 

Holy  Roman  Empire  as  £iu-opean 
power,  2. 

Hungarians  as  immigrants,  54. 

Immigration,  and  American  character, 
40,  43;  opposition,  43;  and  English 
language,  44-46 ;  proportion  of  foreign 
population,  44;  sectional  predomi- 
nance by  immigrants  of  one  nation  not 
possible,  45;  politics  as  assimilating 
power,  46;  influence  of  voluntary 
character  of,  on  assimilation,  40-49  ; 
Catholic  immigrants,  50;  EnRlish- 
qieaking  inunigrants,  50,  51 ;  speed  of 
asmmilation,  61 ;  Russian  Jews,  51 ; 
French,  62;  French  Canadians,  52, 
253;  Scandinavians,  63;  from  south- 


em  and  eastern  Europe,  64;  danger 
from  these,  54;  Germans,  65-58,  190; 
unlimited,  58,  75;  restrictive  move- 
ments, SS-tM);  .\siatir,  74-78;  Cana- 
dians. 2.52;  emigration  to  Cana»la, 
254,  2,55;  general  effert  of  anti- 
JaI)aIu■^^e  agitation,  356;  property 
((ualification,  356.  See  aU»  Chinese, 
Japanese. 

Imperial  federation,  United  States  and 
ixjs.sible  Greater  Britain,  263. 

Imperialists,  origin  of  name,  134. 

Indians,  treatment,  67,  68 ;  probable  ex- 
tinction, 68;  and  foreign  relatitHis. 
69. 

Insular  Decisions,  141. 
International  law  and  Monroe  Doctrine, 
107. 

Irish,  as  immigrants,  50,  51  ;  influence 
on  American  anti-British  sentiment, 
234 ;  role  in  Canada,  250,  257. 
Isolation,  aa  American  foreign  policy, 
93,  94,  131;  Jefferson's  policy,  95; 
and  Monroe  Doctrine,  117;  growing 
disregard,  119;  effect  of  Spanish  War, 
131-133;  conditions  favoring  aban- 
donment, 172-176;  disregarded  in 
Chinese  relations,  329.  See  al*o  For- 
eign policy. 

Istlunian  canal,  zone  ac<i>iired,  140; 
strategic  position,  268;  Uriti^h  Amer- 
ican rivalry,  270  ;  early  American  de- 
fen.sive  attitude,  270;  American  in- 
terest, 271 ;  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
272;  lull  in  agitation,  272;  French 
company,  272 ;  demand  for  American 
control,  273;  attempts  to  abrogate 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  274  ;  failure  of 
French  company,  274 ;  effect  of  Span- 
ish War,  274;  abrogation  of  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  275  ;  route  selected,  276 ; 
French  company  bought  out,  276 ; 
abortive  Colombian  treaty,  276; 
Panama  Revolution  and  treaty,  276 ; 
progress,  277  ;  advantages,  278,  371 

Italians  as  immigrants,  54,  226. 

Italy,  as  European  power,  3,  4;  ex- 
pansion, 5;  not  a  world  power,  7; 
and  United  States,  224-226. 

I  lata  affair,  284. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  and  Falkland  Islands, 

283. 

Ji—..-iica,  and  trade  wiih  Liiiled  States, 
261,  279;  strategic  position,  267. 

Japan,  policy  of  expansion,  0,  16;  not 
a  world  power,  7  ;  and  Korea,  62,  'M9, 
367;  and  white  superiority,  64,  363; 


380 


INDEX 


British  alliance,  99,  242 ;  and  Monroe 
Doctrine,  119,  305;  and  Philippines, 
166,  346,  363-365 ;  and  Chinese  trade, 
204  ;  United  States  and  Russian  War, 
222,  223,  347,  348 ;  United  States  and 
Chinese  War,  330,  345;   and  China, 
340,  367;  connection   with  United 
States,  341;  and  the   Pacific,  341; 
Perry's  expedition,  341 ;   Harris  as 
minister  to,  342;  United  States  and 
internal    disturbances,     343 ;  and 
Shimonoseki    indemnity,    343;  and 
exterritoriality,  343 ;  American  teach- 
ing and  example,   343;  American 
trade,  344 ;  American  interest  in  con- 
ditions and  art,  344;  protest  against 
annexation    of    Hawaii,    346;  and 
United  States  in  Far  t^astern  ques- 
tions, 346;    and  "open  door,"  347, 
366;  American  indifference  to  politi- 
cal  "yellow   peril."  347;   effect  of 
peace  of  Portsmouth  on  American  re- 
lations,  343,   360;    necessary  basic 
chang;e  in  American  relations,  349; 
present  questions  with  United  States, 
350;    and  Ameriran   and  Canadian 
anti-Japanese  agitation,  353-355;  and 
emigration  to  Ai.ierica,  354 ;  effect  of 
anti-Japanese  agitation  on  American 
relations,    355;    possible  American 
complications  due  to    atin  American 
emigration,  359-362;  attitude  towan Is 
Hawaii,  302 ;  and  Pan-Asianism,  305 ; 
future  American  relations  as  to  Far 
East,  365-368;    abstract  questions, 
"conflict  of  civilizations,"  368;  war 
for  "dominion  of  the  Pacific,"  369, 
370;    extent   of  estrangement  with 
United  States,  371  ;  speed  necesjary 
if  Japan  plans  to  attack,  371 ;  frctors 
working  against  war,  372,  373.  See 
al.fo  Far  East,  Japanese. 
Japanese,  ba.sis  of  agitation  for  exclusion, 
74-78,  350,  351,  359;  emigration  to 
Latin   America,    210,    357-362;  as 
laborers  in  Hawaii,  320;  and  annexa- 
tion of  Hawaii,  321,  340;  commercial 
honesty,  345  ;  unpopularity  on  ~  cific 
coast,    350 ;     probable    attitude  as 
citizens,  351 ;  American  and  Japanese 
governments  and  anti -Japanese  agi- 
tation, 352,  353;  home  oi)position  to 
American  err-gration,  3.54;  opposition 
to,  in  15ritisl\  ooloiues,  .iM;  smuggUng 
of,  355;  etTect  of  agitation  on  Ameri- 
can relations  with  ,Iapan,  355 ;  neces- 
sity of  emigration,  357 ;  emigration  to 
Korea,  357;  to  Manchuria,  357;  and 


tropics,  357;  and  citizenship  in 
Hawaii,  362.    See  also  .lapan. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  and  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase, 31,  88;  and  Frencli  alliance 
(1793),  94;  policy  of  isolation,  05; 
and  Cuba,  124;  and  French  Revolu- 
tion, 186 ;  and  Oenet,  186 ;  and  Alex- 
ander I,  214. 

Jews,  as  inunigrants,  51,  218;  anti- 
Semitism  in  United  States,  62; 
persecution  in  Russia,  217. 

Kennan,  George,  articles  on  Siberia,  217. 
Kentaro,  Baron  Kaneko,  on  command 

of  the  Pacific,  371  n. 
Kishinev  massacre,  220. 
Korea,  and  peace  of  Portsmouth,  349; 

Japanese  immigration,  357. 
Kossuth,  Louis,  visit  to  United  States, 

224. 

Koezta  a£fair,  224. 

Labor,  unionism  and  immigration,  59; 
and  negro  problem,  72;  and  Asiatic 
immigration,  75,  77,  351 ;  question  in 
Philippines,  160,  162,  171 ;  in  Hawaii, 
319. 

Ladrones,  cession  to  Germany,  199.  ^ 
Lafayette,   Marquis  de,  as  American 
hero,  185. 

Language,  and  nation,  42,  44;  futtire, 
in  United  States,  44-46,  58;  and 
assimilation  in  Porto  Rico,  147; 
question  in  Philippines,  169. 

Latin  America,  fear  of  Monroe  Doctrine, 
•  107;  preservation  under  it,  109-111, 
168,  286;   Monroe  Doctrine  and  re- 
sponsibility  for  conduct,  115-117; 
Pan-Americanism  and  congresses,  180, 
298-302;    and   "open  door,"  183; 
German-American  trade  rivalry,  204, 
206;    and  German  expansion,  205- 
211 ;  test  of  American  diplomacy,  281 ; 
United  States  and  revolt,  281 ;  later 
American    historical    ties,  281-284; 
and   Venezuela   boundary  incident, 
284;    and    American-Spanish  War, 
285;  and  Panama  Revolution,  285; 
and  evacuation  of  Cuba,  285 ;  Cuba  as 
test  of  capacity  for  self-government, 
286 ;  and  reoccupation  of  Cuba,  288 ; 
United  States  and  foreign  grievances 
in,  289-292;  Roosevelt  on  this,  289- 
291 ;    torts  and  contractual  obliga- 
tions, 291;   San  Domingo  interven- 
tion,   292;     political    suspicion  of 
United   States,   292,   298,  304-30..; 
Venezuela  case,  293 ;  problem  of  pri- 


INDEX 


381 


vatp  fnrrign  invcstmrnts,  294 ;  Drago 
Doctriia-,  295;  United  Stated  and 
doctrine,  290-298 ;  reciprocity  treaties, 
300;  Europe  and  Pan- Americanism, 
302,  303 ;  social  relations  witli  Ameri- 
cans, 303  ;  and  international  e(Hiaiity, 
3()();  at  Second  Hanue  Conferouce, 
300;  Paii-Il)cri;iiiiMn,  307 ;  groups  a.s 
regards  future  relations  witli  United 
States,  307- '511  ;  necessity  of  stable 
governments,  311;  union.  311;  .l;ii>- 
aucse  inuiiiKralion.  3r)7-3o9 ;  of  pos- 
sible resultiig  Anierican-.IapT.ese 
complications,  309-302.  See  alxo 
Monroe  Doctrine,  West  Indies,  and 
nations  by  name. 

l.csseps,  Ferdinand  de,  and  Panama 
Canal,  272,  273. 

Liberia,  and  United  States,  130. 

Liberty,  American  attitude.  "l-f3. 

Lf-uisiana,  purdiase,  30;  in , ;  . .rtanee  of 
purcha.se,  31,  1S4.  1S7:  Crc.ilos,  52. 

Loyalists,  in  C  anada,  249 ;  altitude  of 
descendants,  258. 

MeKinley,  William,  interests,  79;  char- 
acter, S(l;  and  annexation  of  Philip- 
pines, 148-152,  158;  and  government 
for  tliem,  159. 

Madagascar,  ,\merican  trade,  179. 

Mahan,  A.  T.,  on  Monroe  Doctrine,  111, 
118. 

Manchuria,  Russia  in,  221;  .\merican 
trade,  332  ;  limiting  of  Hnsso-.Iapanese 
hostile  area,  333;  restoration  of 
Chinese  control,  340,  366,  367;  Jap- 
anese immigration,  .3.')7. 

Ma,s.sachusetts,  Catholicism  in,  .50  n. 

Meade,  K.  W.,  Samoan  treaty,  321. 

Mexico,  and  Texas,  34  ;  .American  War, 
35;  empire  and  Monroe  Doctrim  , 
100,  115,  lSS;p.ast  .\nierican  relation;-. 
282;  stability  and  future  .-\nierican 
relations.  310;  .lapanese  imn.igration, 
357.    .SV<?  alsn  Latin  America. 

Mexico  City,  Pan-American  Congres.s, 
301. 

Mexico,  fiulf  of,  strategic  points.  2('iS  ; 

devi'lo|>uii-nt  of  Amerioan  dominance, 

2(50.  ■.'78. 
Middle  colonics,  character,  24. 
Minncsot.a,  Scandiniwians  in,  54. 
\f iscegenatio'.i,  *t.'>-07. 
Missionaries,  conditions  in  TurVrey,  226; 

i.i  Hawaii,  317  :  ni  China.  328. 
Monroe.   .lanies,   .'.tatement    of  Monroe 

Doctrine,  9'     as  minister  to  France, 

186. 


Monroe  Doctrine,  basis,  95;  ijimediate 
cause,  95;  original  statement,  96; 
reception  at  home,  97,  102;  and 
hegemony  in  America,  98,  110,  120; 
appearance  of  daring,  98  ;  present  rela- 
tive value  of  passages  in  statement, 
99,  100,  108;  and  F.uropcan  coloni- 
zat'on  and  iTiterventions,  101,  111; 
conce.s.sions,  101  ;  development,  102, 
108,  11";  Venezuela  boundary  inci- 
dei,*,  ':in.  Doctrine,  103,  105,  115; 
a.s  nation,;,  <  reed,  105;  present  atti- 
tude of  lOuropean  powers,  100;  not  an 
impertinence,  107;  not  international 
law,  107  ;  not,  doctrine  of  expansion, 
107  ;  and  protection  of  Latin  t  iTica, 
109-111,  108,  289;  and  arbi  ration, 
111;  and  transfer  of  teiritory,  112; 
and  cessation  of  European  colonies, 
114:  dependence  on  force  I  '.  -  obli- 
gations, 114;  and  responsibility  for 
Latii -;Vmerican  conduct,  115-117, 
290;  and  non-intervention  in  Euro- 
pean ixilitics,  117,  227;  and  Asia, 
117,  118;  and  Asian  interve.-.tion  in 
America,  119,  359-362;  and  growing 
interest  in  European  »f airs,  1 19,  120 ; 
Spain  and,  123;  and  German  inter- 
ests in  South  America,  205,  210;  and 
revolt  of  .'Spanish  America,  281.  iSe« 
aha  Foreign  •,)<ji"'y.  Political  ideals. 

Montesquieu,  influoBce  on  American 
thought,  194. 

Morocco  and  "open  door,"  183. 

Morris,  Gouvemetir,  as  minister  to 
France,  186. 

Xapoleon  \.  sale  of  Louisiana,  187. 

Napoleon  III,  and  United  States,  187; 
M«  <ican  expedition,  188. 

Nationality,  American,  and  immigra- 
tion, 40^  43,  fr.ice  of  spirit,  41,  243; 
langi  -";e  chief  element,  42,  44; 
di.nger  of  diverse  nationalities  in 
United  States  considered,  44-46; 
and  religion,  49;  growing  policy  of 
forcing,  on  immigrants,  58;  *vpe  f 
future  American,  60;  and  xisiat 
immigration,  75,  334,  351,  352. 

Naturalization,  requirements,  59;  and 
return  to  native  land,  59  n.;  probable 
effect  on  .lapanese,  352. 

Navv,  decline  of  American,  89 ;  in  the 
Pacific,  325. 

Negroes,  and  sovereignty  of  the  people, 
41;  problem,  69;  increase,  69; 
segregation.  70,  72;  question  of  amal- 
gamation, 70;  white  douiination  in 


382 


INDEX 


South,   70;   wjcial    conditions,  71 
Ubor  questions,  72,  7  < ;  progress,  72 
problem  and   forpipn   rolatious.  73, 
no  reli^ous  problem,  73 ;  as  soldiers, 
73;  problem  and  West  Indian  an- 
nexations, 280. 

Netherlands,  as  Euiopean  power,  J; 
colonies,  4,  23.  ,  «     .  • 

Neutrality,  American,  and  Napoleonic 
Wars,  187. 

New  England,  colonial  character,  24; 
and  French  Canatlian.s,  53. 

Newfoundland  and  Canada.  2,'>2,  201. 

New  France,  control  of  interior,  22 ;  over- 
throw, 25,  26.  J  J  , 

New  Mexico,  annexation  and  develop- 
ment, 3S. 

New  Netherland,  23. 

New  Orleans,  Mafia  lynchinR,  225. 

Nicaragua,  canal  scheme,  274,  276. 

Northwest  Ordinwice  as  basis  of  pouc;-, 
28,  30,  36. 

Olney,  Richard,  interpretation  of  Mon 
roe  Doctrine,  103,  114,  115,  284. 

"Open  door,"  and  Philippines,  171,  182 
American   ad>rocacy,    181-183;  ex 
tension,  183;    Russia  and,  221;  in 
China,  331 ;  Japan  and,  347,  366. 

Opium,  United  States  and  Chinese 
trade,  327. 

Oregon,  voyage,  274. 

Oregon  Countrj-,  dispute  and  settle 
ment,  33. 

Ostend  Manifesto,  126. 

Ottoman  Empire  as  European  power, 
3,  4;  and  United  States,  226,  227. 

Pacific  coast.  See  Chinese,  Japanese, 
Pacific  Ocean. 

Pacific  Ocean,  Russian  interests,  6; 
growth  of  American  interest  on  east- 
em  coast,  271,  315;  (icvelopnient  of 
American  trade,  313-315;  American 
whalers,  316;  decline  of  American 
marine,  318;  importance  in  world 
poUtics,  question  of  .\merican  su- 
premacy, 324-326,  .341;  J  im  and 
United  States,  341,  360,  370.  Sr. 
alao  Far  East,  Isthmian  canal,  ami 
islands  and  bordering  nations  by 
name. 

Pan-Americanism,  origin  of  policy,  ISO; 
and  "open  door,"  183;  Canada  and, 
261 ;  sentimental  basis,  298;  practic  al 
basis,  298;  first  Congress,  3f>0 ; 
Bureau,  300,  .301  ;  later  Congres-cs, 
301 ;  European  attitude  towards,  302, 


,303 ;    and   social   conditions,    303 ; 
an.l'  poliiiciil  condiaona,  304-30©. 

r:in-.\siani.>-in,  3r>.'). 
I'an-lberianism,  307. 
Panama.    iSe*'  Isthmian  canal. 
Paraguay,  expedition  against,  283.  Set 

also  Latin  America. 
Pennsylvania  Outcli,  50. 
People,  sovereign  [mwer,  40. 
Perry,  M.  C,  Jai)aii  expedition,  341. 
Philippines,   natives  and   negroes.  73; 
arguments  on  annexation,    135-13S| ; 
states,  141;    annexation  unpremedi- 
tated,'HH;   reasons  for  Manila  cam- 
paign',  14!),    150;    control  by  insur- 
gents,   1.50;    alternatives   as   to,  in 
peace    negotiations,     150,     155    n. ; 
Aguinaldoand  American  officials,  152- 
1.55;  insurrection,  1.55-1.5H;  reaction 
against    retaining,    150,   157  ;  Antl- 
im[«>ri!ilists    and    instirrection,  156; 
cruelties,  1.57 ;  and  election  of  1900, 
157;  Taft  policy  of  government,  158, 
102-104;    opposing  policy     '  Anti- 
imperialists,  151;  of  commercialists, 
1.59-161 ;   and  Chinese  immigration, 
160  102  171,  335;  attitude  of  upper 
class  of  natives,  101,  104-166;  edu- 
cation,  1()2 ;   native  participation  m 
government,  103;  elective  assembly, 
103;  Christianity,  165;  natives  and 
Japan,  100  ;  no  transfer  without  con- 
sent, 107;  question  of  protectorate, 
167;'  question  of  neutralization,  108; 
results  of  .American  rule,  109-171  ;  lan- 
guage question,  109;  tariff,  171,  182; 
German   attitude,  199;  in.surrect;on 
and  .\merican  attitude  in  Boer  ^^  ar, 
240;  as  naval  ba-se,  322;  influence 
on  American  situation  in  Far  E^t, 
.323;  attitude  of  Jajian,  346,  363-366. 
Scr  also  Dependencies,  IVr  East. 
Physiography  of  United  States,  19-21; 

and  process  of  settlement,  22. 
Poles  ;.s  immigrants,  .54. 
Political  ideas,  .Vmerican,  .self-satisfac- 
tion  and   consciousness   of  success, 
81  ,83;    idealism,   83;    optimism  as 
to  d.  fi'i  ieneies,  83;  improvidence,  84  ; 
boast  fulness    and    Etiropean  conde- 
s,,i].-inn    84;    official  .simplicity,  90; 
,.,,uulitv'    and    liberty,    91-93.  .Sec 
iil.'i,)  Aiuericans,  I'orei^ni  j.olicy. 
Poiitii  s,  and  iissiiuiiaiio;.  ;.:  ;::;:::!gr.nn-.-, 
40. 

Polk,  .].  K.,  and  Monroe  Doctrine,  102  n., 
108  »). 

Population,  of  five  world  powers,  9-12 ;  of 


INDEX 


383 


United  Statps,  RTOWth  and  tciritonal 

expaiisiot.,  2<»,  35,  :5r. ;  ratio  of  foreign, 

44;  „f  l>,,rt<>  Kir..,  142. 
Porto  Kirn,  A .iti-iii.p<Tialists  an.l,  l-iS, 

status,  141;  cUariict.r  of  popalat'on, 

142-      wi  lcoim's     annexation,     14J ; 

Rovf'rnn.r.it,  14.5,  144;  and  tariff ,  144; 

economic  ron.lit ions,  Hr, .  an.  st.itc- 

ho...l,  1411;  an.l  assliiHhiti.in,  147. 

nhn  Depcn.lciu'ics. 
r..rtut;Ml.  c  .l.mics.  4:  an.l  expansion,  :.. 
r.irtun.icso  in  iawaii, 
Prot.rtorati'  f.T  Philippim's,  107. 
Pru.ssia,   as   l::iiropean  power,  3.  *e« 

aim)  (icrniany. 


Race  questions,  of  world  powers,  61-63 ; 
of  Unitc.l  States,  >n  ;  ati'i  ^-pI'^' 
in  supori..nty  of  vvlutcs,  64;  rni^'o- 
penation,  r,.'->-(17  ;  Indians,  67-b.J , 
neeroos,  (•.0-74  ;  1-  ilipinos  and  Amen- 
oans  101,  l(i4-lf.7;.  an.l  Pan-Ameri- 
canisrn,  -.m.  Srr  also  Chinese,  Imnu- 
Eration,  .lapaiicsp. 

R^.iprooity,  Canadian,  251 ;  attempted 
Latin  American,  300,  303;  Hawauan, 
318 

Religion,  conaiti.„is  in  Enpli.h  colonies 
in  America,  23;  an.l  nationality,  4  ; 
(atl.oli.ism  in  Unite.l  States,  50; 
Catlioli.Msm  of  French  Canadians  53, 
258;  not  inv.,lve.l  in  negro  pro.ilv-m. 
73  and  poU.  v  in  PhiUppmea,  .65; 
(onAfrn  missionaries,  220,  317,  32fe. 
Republican   party    and   aunexation  of 

Philippines,  130,  157 
Rio  .laneiro,  Pan-Ameri.  :in  Congress,3Ul. 
H.inie  as  \v.)rl.l  power,  1. 
Ro.)sevelt.  rhe.i.lore,  and  Monroe  Uoc- 
trine    1(J5.  107  ;  on  problem  of  Latin 
America.  116.  28'.)-291  ;    and  status 
of  Porto  Rico,  140  ;  an.l  government 
for  Philippines,  1.50,162;  and  Kish- 
inev massacre,  220  n.;  and  Husso- 
.Japanese  War,  223  ;  and  protection  of 
foreigners,  220;   and  Cuba,  286;  on 
American  domination  in  the  Pacmc, 
324,  370  ri.  ;  on  inevitabiuty  of  Ameri- 
can worl.l  p.)wer,  374. 
R,„,t.  KlUui.  and  Drago  Doctrine,  Ml, 

in  rt.iutli  Amen.'a,  302,  306. 
Ro^eberv,  l-arl  of,  .>n  expansion,  5 
R.mmania,  protest  against  treatment  of 

Jews  m,  110. 
llous.seau.  .1.       ii.fi-.icncc  or.  Ampnean 

thought,  104. 
Russia,  a.s  European  power,  3;  cxpe.n- 
eion,  6;  and  the  Pacific,  6;  popula- 


tion and  area  of  empire,   10,  an.l 
European  interests,  13  ;  sale  of  Alaska, 
38,  216;  German  colonists,  48;  ajiil 
Asiatic  immigration  '.n  Siberia,   77 ; 
and  origin  of  .M.mroe  D.H  trine,  05,  09  , 
and  Balkans  an.l  United  States  an. 
Cuba,   128;    compared   with    I  nited 
States  213,  210;  an.l  American  Revo- 
lution,'213;  later  relations,  214;  and 
Civil  War,  214  ;  exchange  of  amenities, 
•>15-  change  in  American  sentiment, 
Iseit  of  autocracy,  217,  219  ;  of  treat- 
ment of  Jews,  217-219;    of  Ki.^hinev 
massacre,  220;  of  Manchurian  affairs, 
221  332  340;  Am.  rica  an.l  .Iapai.c  s.> 
War    2'2    347-349,    300;  reaction 
towards  better  feeUng,  223;  future 
relations,  223. 
Russian  .lews,  as  immigranta,  61, 

persecution,  21/. 
Rusmans  as  unmigrant«,  219. 


St.  Barth«emi  Island,  transfer  to  Frwice, 
113. 

St.  Thomas  Islan.l.  attempted  ann;  ra- 
tions, 39,  139,  140;  and  Monroe  IHK- 
trine,  112.  , 
SaUsbury,  Marquis  of,  "^'^ ^  ,^ 

boundary  controversy,  l"'^.  108. 
Samoa,  controversy,  198,  321,  -i^^- 
San   Domingo,  attempted  annexation, 
39    139;    temporary   Spanish  rees- 
tablishment,  112;   fate,  279;  Latin 
America   an.l   intervent...n   m,  Mb, 
T  iblem  of  intervention,  :i02.  ^ 
Sanaalw.x.d,  Hawaiian  trade,  31o. 
Scan.Unavians  as  imnugrants,  .)3. 
ScctionaUsm,  a.lverse  influence  ..f  phvsi- 

ogr.phv  of  rnite.l  States,  21. 
Seward,  W.  H.,  an.l  Krench  in  Mexico, 

100  n. ;  on  the  Pa.  ifK  . 
Shimonoseki    inci.lent    and  in.lommty. 

343  1 
SlaveiT,  in  southern  colonies  25 ;  an.l 
expansion,  33 ;        secession,  37 ,  and 
Cuba,  125. 
Slovaks  as  immigrants,  54. 
Smith,  Gol.lwin,  on  physical  map  of 

Canada,  245,  205  ri. 
South,  colonial  character,  24.    See  aho 

NeKroe:-.  Slavery.  . 
South  African  War,  American  attitude, 
188,  239,  240;  Caaadian  contingent, 

262'.  ,  ,„ 

Snvpreientv  in  the  jjeople,  40.   ^  ^ 
Spain,  as  European  po«.-.  ,  -^-t , 

Florida.  32,  123;  pa.st  r.  Inti.ins  wm» 
United  States,  122;  and  Moi.  ve  Doc- 


384 


INDEX 


trine,  123;  rrsfions  »o  Gprmnny,  100; 
prowont  Amrrican  rplafinns,  224  ;  do- 
ray  .-i."  Amcriran  j><)W(  r,  2f)'.» ;  rmi- 
IV)cnanisni,  :i07.  Srr  nt.w  Spiiiii^li  War. 
fcpaiiiKh  War,  rfTcct  on  mt.riiational 
fitatus  (if  l  iiitcd  States,  121,  1H(>-1:«, 
172;  military  insiRnificanro,  121; 
rrniotp  and  inimrdiate  causes,  123- 
128;  and  C>iV)aP  free.ltmi,  12(»:  effect 
on  liiilitary  position  of  United  ,-^tates. 
130;  and  aciiuisition  of  colonies, 
140;  I'hiUiipiiiP  eanipaigii,  l  l.S-l.')0; 
Philippines  and  peace  negotiations, 
1.50;  attituile  of  Tranoe,  IH,**;  of 
Gprmany,  ;    of    Cireat  Uritain, 

237-230;  effect  on  isthmian  catiul, 
274;  attitude  of  Latin  Aniprira,  2.S') ; 
and  annpNation  of  Hawaii,  321. 

Steuben,  Baron  von,  in  American  Revo- 
lution, 197.  . 

Supz  (  anal,  and  British  interest  in  Pan- 
ama, 272. 

Sweden  as  Etiroppan  power,  3. 

Switzerland,  rpligion  and  nationality,  50. 

Taft,  William,  and  Koverninent  of 
Philippines.  158,  162;  and  Philip- 
pine tariff,  171,  182;  reception  in 
.Japan,  348. 

Tahiti,  United  States  and,  190. 

Tallpyrand,  C.  M.  de,  at  Congress  of 
Vienna,  3. 

Tariff,  and  dppendpneies,   141  ;  Porto 
Riean,  144;    Phihppine,  and  "open 
door,"  171,  182;  loses  force  a.s  issue, 
174;     and    development    of  export 
trade,  1"S,  179;  present  liritish  atti- 
tude, 242  ;  Canadian  reciiirocity,  251  , 
Canadian    and    .\iTierican,  2.59,  260; 
Canadian  prefcrenti.     262;  reciproc- 
ity with   Latin  America,  300;  Ha- 
waiian reciprocity,  318. 
Territories,  policy  of  government,  28, 
.30,  36;   and  colonies,  137-1.39.  See 
aim  Dependencies. 
Territory,  scramble  of  powers  tor,  4-6; 
area  of  five  world  powers,  9-12;  es- 
fieiitial  element  to  world  power,  16 ; 
fluiractcr  :,vA  influence  of  contitirntal 
United    States,    17-22;  .■Xinerican, 
under  treaty  of  17.83,  27;  e.xpansion 
and  growth  of  population,   29,  .3.5; 
Louisiana  Purchase.  30-32,  1.S4,  187; 
Monda,  32,  123;   Urenoii,  33;  slav- 
ery and   expansion,  34 ;  Texas,   34 ; 
California  and  New  Mexico,  3.5 ;  Gads- 
den Purchase,  .35;    character  of  an- 
nexations   since    1855,   36 ;  expan- 


dion  and  Union,  3B,  37;  Alaska,  3S, 
216;  attempted  non-continental  an- 
nexations, 38 ;  period  of  non-impprial- 
isfie  attitude,  39,  80;  annexations 
aft.r  Spanisll  War,  1.30,  321; 
(pieHtion  of  annexation  of  Canada, 
2()5;  economic  and  social  aspects  of 
possible  West  Indian  annexations, 
270;  Hawaii,  321. 
Texas,  annexation,  34. 
Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  as  student  of 

American  conditions,  195. 
Trade,  attitude  of  commercial  interests 
in  r  hilippines,  161,  170;  and  develop- 
ment of  world  powers,  178 ;  Americnu 
international    policy    and   deveh  p- 
ment  of  export  of  manufactures,  177- 
180;   rivalry  for  Far  Eastern,  ISO, 
366;  Pan-American,  180,  299,  30S, 
310;  United  States  and  Asian  "open 
door,"  180-183,  331;   "open  door" 
elsewhere,    183 ;  French-Amenean 
competition,  191;  German-American 
rivalry,  203-207;  Russia  and  Ameri- 
can, in  Manchuria,  221,  332;  diffi- 
culties of  commercial  treaties,  260; 
an<l  isthmian  canal,  278;  aspect  of 
possible  West  Indian  annexations, 
279 ;  American-Chinese,  313-315,  326, 
330 ;  effect  of  Civil  War  on  American 
marine,  318;   opium,  327;  Chinese 
boycott  of  American,  337-339 ;  Ameri- 
can-Japanese,   344;   futiUty  of  an 
American-Japanese   war   over,  369. 
See  also  Tariff. 
Treaties,  diflTiculty  of  commercial,  260. 
Turkey.    See  Ottoman  Empire. 
Tutuila,  annexation,  140 ;  value,  141, 322. 

Union,  influence  of  physiography  on 
American,  21;  attempted  secession, 
22,  37 ;  influence  of  expansion,  36. 

Venezuela,  Guiana  boundary  incident, 
80,  103,  104,  115,  285;  European 
intervention,  202,  241,  293;  dispute 
with  France,  293  n.  See  also  Latin 
America. 

Vergenn-^s.  Comte  de,  and  peace  nego- 
tiations (1782),  185. 
Virginius  affair,  127. 
Von  Plehve,  Baron,  administration,  219. 

Walker,  William,  filibuster,  283  n. 
War  of  1812,  Canadian  remembrance  of, 
249,  258. 

Washington,  George,  foreign  policy,  93, 
94,  187. 


INDEX 


Webster,  Daniel,  and  H:i«!iii, 

West  Indies,  Monrw  I).»  trinc  lu  .1  trnns- 
fer  of  territory  in,  U  J,  li:<;  I  tut.  ,1 
Statefl  and  Fronrli,  l(<i);  wnioii  of 
British,  vitli  Caniiila.  -'tU  ;  Hnti^-li 
Btratcgic  pnsitidii,  JUT:  1  lurt.iKiiii 
rivalry  for,  2f.S ;  iiritisli-Aint  ririin 
rivalry,  270,  '-'71,  'JT.'j  ;  Amenraii 
miprernncy  niid  future,  278;  trail.' 
anil  Kocial  uspccts  of  union  wltli 
I'nitiMl  State  ,  -'7!».  S,-r  also  Liitiii 
Anioricii,  and  islamls  by  iinnic. 

Whaling,  American,  in  Tacific,  316;  de- 
cline, 318. 


Wlirat  rult\ire  in  Canac'n,  2M. 
Wildinan,  I'.ilwin,   and  AkuIi  ililn,  153. 
Wdliani    11   of    Ciirnianx,   advaiicew  to 

l  iiited  Stairs,  I'Dl ,  -M  1 . 
World  powers,  niraninn  of  |ilirii,-i'.  1,  7; 
^<  rainhlr  for  land,  l-ti;  and  continen- 
tal mt.rc'^ts,  l.'i-l"),  !•!»,  eom- 
parison  of  rcronni/.i'd,  K-i:{;  territory 
as  essential  element.  If.;  anil  -ill.je.t 
raee-^.  t'il-»i:5;  effect  of  .-^pani-li  War 
on  I'niled  States,  IJl,  i:fJ;  i  \|>an- 
sion  and  trade,  ITS;  iiu'vitahility  and 
responsibility  of  liiitcd  States  as 
world  power,  374. 


So 


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